Lucille Shaw

The Crown sought leave to introduce evidence of prior discreditable conduct against the accused, J.D. and D.B., in a criminal trial involving charges of procuring, exercising control, receiving financial benefit from sexual services, and advertising sexual services.

The court applied the probative value versus prejudicial effect test, considering issues of credibility, state of mind, and narrative.

The court granted leave for most of the requested evidence, including assaults, threats, and drug supply as means of control, and the involvement of other escorts, but dismissed the admission of evidence regarding a belief in a firearm and details of a romantic relationship due to excessive prejudice.

The court also found no air of reality to the defence's collusion argument.

April Vuong and Hao Quach, a married couple, were found guilty by a jury of defrauding the public of over $5,000 through a sophisticated Ponzi scheme totaling $5,175,000.

The sentencing hearing addressed the appropriate sentence, restitution, and forfeiture.

The Crown sought a nine-year penitentiary sentence, restitution of $3,567,992, and a fine in lieu of forfeiture for the same amount.

The offenders, who were self-represented, argued for a conditional sentence, emphasizing their intent to repay victims.

The court found the fraud to be large-scale, complex, prolonged, and to have had devastating impacts on numerous victims, many of whom were vulnerable.

The court rejected a conditional sentence, emphasizing denunciation and general deterrence for such commercial frauds.

The offenders were sentenced to six years imprisonment (net 5 years, 8 months, 19 days after credit for pre-trial custody and bail conditions), ordered to pay joint and several restitution of $3,567,992, and a fine in lieu of forfeiture of the same amount, with a default term of five years imprisonment.

A 15-year prohibition from managing others' money and a DNA order were also imposed.

Saad Fouad was found guilty of robbery.

This decision outlines the reasons for his sentencing.

The court considered aggravating factors, such as the premeditated nature of the robbery and the fear induced in the victims, and mitigating factors, including Fouad's youth, first-time offender status at the time of the offence, and expressed remorse.

Despite subsequent convictions, the court balanced denunciation and deterrence with rehabilitation, ultimately imposing a six-month imprisonment followed by two years of probation.

Following a successful summary judgment motion where the plaintiffs were awarded a forfeited $60,000 real estate deposit, the court determined the costs of the proceeding.

The plaintiffs sought $45,676.40 on a substantial indemnity basis, while the defendants argued for no costs.

Considering the plaintiffs' multiple unaccepted offers to settle, the defendants' discontinued $500,000 counterclaim, and the disproportionate litigation conduct by both sides, the court fixed costs at $25,000 payable to the plaintiffs.

The Plaintiffs brought a summary judgment motion seeking damages and costs arising from the Defendants' failure to close an agreement of purchase and sale for a property.

The Defendants argued the Plaintiffs breached the contract and sought their own damages, but had not filed a counterclaim.

The court found the Defendants were in breach of contract due to their unwillingness to close the transaction, primarily due to an outstanding writ of execution.

The Plaintiffs were awarded specific damages for the deposit, property taxes, and moving expenses to rental accommodation.

The court also awarded litigation costs, but significantly reduced the amount claimed by the Plaintiffs, emphasizing proportionality and the Plaintiffs' failure to respond to a settlement offer.

A portion of damages for additional living expenses was deferred for further assessment.

Sentencing for sexual interference, invitation to touch for a sexual purpose, and breach of a child-contact prohibition order arising from sexualized communications with and sexual touching of a 15-year-old complainant.

The court treated the offender's prior similar record, grooming conduct, exploitation of vulnerability, and the severe victim impact as significant aggravating factors, while also crediting harsh pre-trial detention conditions, family support, work history, counselling efforts, and rehabilitative prospects.

The court agreed with prior Superior Court authorities holding the one-year mandatory minimums for the sexual offences unconstitutional under s. 12 of the Charter.

A global sentence of 42 months was imposed, with 35.8 months' credit for pre-trial custody, followed by probation and extensive ancillary orders; an addendum clarified that the invitation count was not stayed and attracted a concurrent 36-month sentence.

The applicant, though unsuccessful in the main application concerning the determination of brain death and the withdrawal of life support, sought partial indemnity costs from the respondent physician, arguing the case involved significant public interest issues.

The respondent, who was successful, did not seek costs but argued for each party to bear their own costs.

The court acknowledged the public interest dimensions of the case, particularly regarding the common law definition of death and Charter rights, but found it did not meet the "truly exceptional" standard for special costs as set out in Carter v. Canada (Attorney General).

Crucially, the court noted a lack of authority for awarding costs to an unsuccessful litigant against a private individual respondent, as opposed to a government or public authority.

Consequently, the applicant's request for costs was denied, and parties were ordered to bear their own costs.

The parties separated after a high-conflict marriage.

The applicant sought sole custody, child support, and spousal support, while the respondent sought joint custody and an equalization of net family property.

The court granted sole custody to the applicant, finding that the parties' inability to communicate and the respondent's controlling behaviour made joint custody contrary to the children's best interests.

The court ordered the respondent to pay retroactive child support based on minimum wage, found the applicant entitled to spousal support, and directed a further hearing to determine the respondent's current income as a pharmacist for ongoing support purposes.

The plaintiff, Sound Solutions, brought a summary judgment motion for breach of contract against Cladit Siding Solutions Inc. for unpaid invoices for construction panels, and for breach of trust against Cladit and Gregory Bell.

Cladit sought an equitable set-off for alleged panel deficiencies and damages from a counterclaim for intentional interference in contractual relations, loss of reputation, and punitive damages.

The court granted partial summary judgment to Sound Solutions for the breach of contract claim, allowing a set-off of $2,340 for costs incurred to remediate colour deficiencies, but dismissed the set-off for panel size and the counterclaim.

The breach of trust claim and Cladit's counterclaim were ordered to proceed to trial due to unresolved credibility issues and lack of cogent evidence for damages.

Saad Fouad was charged with robbery and using an imitation firearm.

The court found him guilty of robbery, determining that an implied threat of violence existed based on the totality of circumstances, including leading the victim to a dark, secluded area where a second individual brandished an object perceived as a gun.

However, he was found not guilty of using an imitation firearm because the Crown failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he was the individual who brandished the object, as witness testimony indicated it was the second male, not Fouad.

The United States requested the extradition of Karan Uppal for trafficking MDMA.

The Minister of Justice issued an Authority to Proceed.

Uppal opposed committal, arguing insufficient evidence for identity and knowledge, and that a cooperating witness's evidence was unreliable due to anonymity.

The court found prima facie evidence for identity based on law enforcement identifications and rejected the argument that the cooperating witness's evidence was manifestly unreliable.

The court also found sufficient evidence to infer Uppal's knowledge of the drugs, noting the large quantities and multiple incidents.

The request for committal was granted.

The defendants, Tanisha Evans and Chantelle Rochester, were found guilty by a jury of importing cocaine, contrary to section 6(1) of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act.

They were arrested at Pearson International Airport with approximately 2.4 kg of cocaine each, concealed in their luggage.

Both claimed they believed they were importing money, but the jury rejected their defence.

The court considered mitigating factors such as their lack of criminal records, consistent employment, and strong support systems, as well as the aggravating factor of importing a significant quantity of cocaine.

Applying the sentencing guidelines from R. v. Cunningham, the court imposed a sentence of six years imprisonment for each defendant, along with ancillary orders for DNA samples, a ten-year weapons prohibition, and forfeiture of the cocaine.

The applicant, who was declared dead by neurologic criteria (brain death), sought an order to be maintained on mechanical ventilation, arguing that her Christian belief that life continues as long as the heart beats should be accommodated under the Charter.

The Superior Court of Justice held that the common law definition of death includes brain death and that the applicant met the medical criteria for brain death despite exhibiting spinal reflex movements.

The court further held that the Charter does not apply to a deceased person or to a physician making a medical determination of death.

The common law definition of death was found to be consistent with Charter values, as the need for certainty and objectivity outweighs religious accommodation.

Finally, the court ruled that the Consent and Capacity Board lacks jurisdiction over disputes involving deceased persons, as mechanical ventilation of a corpse does not constitute 'treatment' under the Health Care Consent Act.

The application was dismissed.

In an addendum to a previous decision on a motion to stay proceedings, the court reconsidered its ruling regarding the qualification of a forensic accountant employed by the Ontario Securities Commission.

Relying on recent appellate jurisprudence, the court reversed its prior finding that the witness had to be qualified as an expert.

The court held that the accountant could testify as a fact witness regarding the movement of funds, provided no opinion evidence was proffered.

The applicants, charged with fraud over $5,000 in relation to an alleged Ponzi scheme, brought a pre-trial motion seeking a stay of proceedings based on an abuse of process.

They argued that the charges were barred by issue estoppel due to a prior settlement with the Ontario Securities Commission, and alleged state misconduct including pre-charge delay and breaches of solicitor-client privilege.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the OSC settlement explicitly excluded fraud, the pre-charge delay was justified by the complexity of the investigation, and the handling of potentially privileged documents did not prejudice the applicants' right to a fair trial.

Additionally, the court ruled that a forensic accountant retained by the police could not testify merely as a fact witness, but must be qualified as an expert witness at trial.

The accused was tried on charges of sexual assault, sexual interference, invitation to sexual touching, and breach of a prohibition order arising from online communications with a 15-year-old complainant and a late-night drive from Mississauga to Kitchener.

Applying the W.(D.) framework, the court rejected the accused's evidence as illogical and implausible on key issues, including his claimed ignorance of the complainant's age and his explanation for requesting sexual acts and providing transportation.

The court accepted the complainant's evidence as credible and reliable despite immaterial inconsistencies, and rejected the defence theory that she fabricated the allegation to avoid parental discipline.

Convictions were entered on all four counts.

The plaintiff sought an interim injunction against former employees and their new competing business, alleging breach of a confidentiality and non-solicitation agreement.

The court found the plaintiff established a prima facie case of breach, but dismissed the motion because the plaintiff failed to show it would suffer irreparable harm that could not be compensated by damages.

The applicant sought a declaration that she was the sole beneficial owner of a property legally owned by the respondent, her friend, to prevent the respondent's former spouse from selling the property to enforce a family law judgment.

The applicant claimed an oral agreement existed where the respondent held the property in trust because she could not obtain a mortgage.

The court found insufficient evidence of a 100% trust but determined that both parties contributed to the purchase price.

Applying the presumption of a purchase money resulting trust, the court declared the applicant held a 60% interest and the respondent held a 40% interest in the property.

The applicant sought leave to permit 72 hours of continuous videotaping of a patient who had been declared brain dead, arguing that her bodily movements were responsive to commands and indicative of brain function.

The respondent hospital and physicians opposed the motion, providing medical evidence that the movements were consistent with spinal reflexes and that ancillary tests showed no blood flow or electrical activity in the brain.

The court dismissed the motion, finding no scientific or medical support for the necessity of 72 hours of videotaping and concluding it would not assist the court in making a final determination.

The applicant sought to qualify Dr. Paul Byrne as an expert witness on the neurological determination of death (NDD) and related medical principles in an application to prevent the withdrawal of life support.

The court applied the Mohan criteria and the White Burgess gatekeeper framework to assess admissibility.

The court found that Dr. Byrne lacked the necessary training and experience with adults and the CMAJ Guidelines.

Furthermore, the court held that Dr. Byrne lacked independence and impartiality due to his demonstrated bias against the concept of brain death.

The request to qualify him as an expert was denied.