Allan D. Powell

The moving parties (defendants) sought an order requiring the plaintiff to re-attend an examination for discovery to answer questions regarding damages, mitigation, and governmental land regulation issues.

The plaintiff opposed the motion, arguing it was a delaying tactic.

The court partially granted the motion, ordering the plaintiff to re-attend for two hours to be examined on the issue of damages, finding it proportionate given the $300,000 claim.

However, the court declined to order further examination on the governmental land regulation documentation, as it was not satisfied the plaintiff could provide relevant evidence on that matter.

The plaintiff, a suspended lawyer, brought an action against the vendor's lawyer and real estate agent after they filed complaints with the Law Society of Ontario regarding his attempt to purchase a property.

The defendants moved to strike the statement of claim under Rule 21.01(1)(b) for disclosing no reasonable cause of action.

The court granted the motion, finding that the doctrine of absolute privilege provides a complete defence to all claims arising from complaints made to a quasi-judicial regulatory body.

The statement of claim was struck without leave to amend, and costs were awarded to the defendants.

The defendants moved to strike the plaintiff's Statement of Claim under Rule 21.01(1)(b) for failing to disclose a reasonable cause of action.

The plaintiff, a lawyer, sued the defendants (a former client's new lawyer, his firm, and the former client) for various torts including defamation, malicious prosecution, and abuse of process, arising from complaints made to the Law Society of Ontario (LSO) regarding his professional conduct and capacity.

The court found that the complaints and related statements made in quasi-judicial proceedings before the LSO were protected by absolute privilege, which is a complete defence to all claims, even if made with malice.

The Statement of Claim was struck without leave to amend, and costs were awarded to the defendants.

The appellant appealed a Superior Court judgment dismissing her claim for professional negligence and breach of contract against real estate agents on the basis that the action was statute barred under section 5(1)(b) of the Limitations Act, 2002.

The underlying dispute arose from the sale of a property in 2008-2009, with the appellant alleging that the real estate agents improperly induced her to sign a counter-offer and presented it against her instructions.

The appellant commenced the action in 2015, claiming she only discovered her claim during an examination for discovery in March 2015.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal, finding that the appellant should have known of her claim well before commencing the action, particularly after obtaining a real estate licence and taking real estate courses that would have put her on notice to make further inquiries.

The defendants moved for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiff's action for negligence and breach of contract, arguing the claim was statute-barred.

The plaintiff alleged negligence by real estate agents regarding a right of first refusal in a 2008 property sale.

The court applied the discoverability principle under the Limitations Act, 2002, and found that the plaintiff, a licensed real estate agent, ought to have known of her claim against the real estate agents before June 12, 2013, more than two years before commencing the action in June 2015.

Consequently, the action was dismissed as statute-barred.

A realtor appealed a motion judge's decision dismissing a summary judgment motion in a negligence and improvident sale claim.

The key issue was when a two-year contractual limitation period commenced: at the time the Agreement of Purchase and Sale was signed or at closing.

The motion judge found the limitation period began at closing because no damage occurred prior to that time.

The Court of Appeal upheld this decision, holding that while negligent acts may have occurred before the agreement was signed, damage is an essential element of negligence and did not accrue until title transferred at closing.

The applicant and her co-tenant signed a commercial lease for a basement unit to operate a restaurant.

Shortly after, the co-tenant was incarcerated.

The applicant attempted to access the premises but was repeatedly denied entry by the landlord, who demanded confirmation from the incarcerated co-tenant.

The applicant sought a declaration that the lease was terminated due to fundamental breach.

The court found that the landlord improperly refused access, depriving the applicant of substantially the whole benefit of the lease.

The application was granted, the lease was declared terminated, and the applicant was permitted to retrieve her equipment and receive a refund of her rent deposit.

The defendants brought motions to dismiss the plaintiff's action for delay and for breach of a prior consent order.

The court declined to enforce the consent order's limitation on opposition, finding it would cause a clear injustice to the plaintiff due to counsel's failures.

However, the court found inordinate and inexcusable delay by the plaintiff's counsel over a period of six years, which created a substantial risk that a fair trial would no longer be possible.

The plaintiff failed to rebut the presumption of prejudice arising from the lengthy delay and the age of the underlying transactions (15-20 years old).

Consequently, the action was dismissed for delay.

A Crown corporation providing mortgage default insurance brought a subrogated solicitor’s negligence claim against a lawyer who had acted for lenders in several residential mortgage transactions that later went into default.

The defendant moved for summary judgment, arguing the action was barred by the two‑year limitation period under the Limitations Act, 2002.

The court held that the insurer ought reasonably to have discovered any potential negligence claim when it paid the insurance proceeds and conducted its internal fraud investigations following the mortgage defaults.

Because those payments occurred between 2004 and 2007, the limitation period expired between 2006 and 2009.

The action commenced in 2012 was therefore statute‑barred.

Following prior reasons for judgment on a summary judgment motion limited to the issue of possession, the court convened to settle the form of order and address case management issues.

The court clarified that the plaintiff’s claim relating to contaminated soil and debris had not been dismissed and ordered that the reference in the draft order suggesting otherwise be deleted.

The plaintiff was directed to serve an amended statement of claim clearly articulating the causes of action, material facts, and relief sought against each defendant, with corresponding timelines for amended defences and related pleadings.

The court also scheduled completion of remaining discoveries, struck the jury notice by consent, adjourned the previously scheduled trial date, and set a new trial date.

The defendant real estate brokerage sought leave to appeal to the Divisional Court from an order dismissing its motion for summary judgment.

The underlying motion argued that the plaintiff's negligent misrepresentation claims regarding suspected mortgage frauds were statute-barred.

The motion judge had found a genuine issue for trial regarding when the plaintiff reasonably discovered the claims against the listing agent.

The Superior Court dismissed the application for leave to appeal, finding no good reason to doubt the correctness of the motion judge's decision and concluding that the discoverability issue required a trial.

The appellant issued two claims in Small Claims Court against her former criminal defence lawyer for professional negligence.

A deputy judge consolidated the claims to prevent claim splitting, limiting the total claim to $25,000.

The appellant's motion to set aside the consolidation was dismissed by another deputy judge.

The appellant appealed both orders to the Divisional Court.

The respondent moved to quash the appeal.

The Divisional Court quashed the appeal, holding that it has no jurisdiction to hear appeals from interlocutory orders of the Small Claims Court.

The appellant appealed a decision finding that its lawyer acted as counsel for the respondent corporation and ordering the disclosure of information regarding a trust account.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding overwhelming evidence that the lawyer acted for the corporation when he received the monies in trust, and upheld the application judge's jurisdiction to order the information.

The appellant, a law student, sued the respondent for defamation after the respondent made disparaging remarks about him into a microphone at an Italian social club meeting.

The motion judge dismissed the claims for libel and slander on a motion for summary judgment, finding that the use of a microphone was not a 'broadcast' under the Libel and Slander Act, that the appellant could not claim slander per se because he was not yet a lawyer, and that there was no evidence of special damage.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the motion judge erred by deciding novel and significant questions of law on a summary judgment motion without a full factual record, and finding that there was some evidence of special damage.

Counsel for the appellants brought a motion to be removed from the record.

The court granted the order removing counsel.

As the remaining appellant failed to appear despite being advised that the appeal would proceed, the appeal was dismissed as abandoned with costs awarded to the respondent.