Travis Walker

The court addressed a motion to interpret an order made on September 9, 2025, regarding the preservation of funds in trust accounts.

The plaintiff sought clarification on whether the order required the defendants to deposit additional funds into trust or merely maintain funds already held in trust.

The court also addressed whether the order applied to all defendants or only the Mayfield defendants.

The court held that the order requires maintenance of funds already in trust, not the deposit of new funds, and that the order applies only to the Mayfield defendants, not the Gandhi defendants.

The applicants sought an order for the sale of a co-owned property under the Partition Act.

The respondent opposed the sale, arguing that there was a reasonable expectation among the parties to hold the property for at least two years as an investment and leisure property, and that the applicants' desire to sell amounted to oppression.

The court applied principles of oppression from corporate law, finding that "reasonable expectations" must be objective and contextual, not merely subjective wishes.

The court determined that the evidence did not establish an objective reasonable expectation to hold the property for a minimum period and found no oppressive conduct by the applicants.

Consequently, the court ordered the sale of the property and dismissed the respondent's cross-application and motion for an interim injunction.

Following the successful certification of a class proceeding arising from a residential high-rise fire, the court determined the costs of the certification motion.

The plaintiffs sought over $435,000 in costs from the defendant, while the third parties sought their costs from the plaintiffs.

Applying the Pearson factors, the court awarded the plaintiffs $348,056.04 in costs against the defendant.

The court also found that the plaintiffs had drawn the third parties into the certification motion by amending the common issues, and ordered the plaintiffs to pay $45,200 in costs to the third parties.

This decision concerns a motion for certification of a class action following a fire in an apartment building.

The court addressed preliminary issues of jurisdiction (Superior Court vs. Landlord and Tenant Board), admissibility of an expert report, and the involvement of third parties.

The court found that the Superior Court had jurisdiction because the total amount claimed exceeded the LTB's monetary limit, even if individual claims might be smaller.

The expert report was deemed admissible for certification purposes.

The class action was certified, with modifications to the proposed class definition and common issues.

Specifically, the court removed references to "contractors" and "subcontractors" from common issues related to the Third Parties, as no direct cause of action was pleaded against them by the plaintiffs.

The court emphasized access to justice and behaviour modification as key factors favoring certification.

The defendant/plaintiff by counterclaim, Viola, brought a motion to compel the plaintiff/defendant to counterclaim, Alexandre (represented by Sach), to re-attend cross-examination to answer nine specific questions and follow-up questions.

The questions were initially refused and later answered in writing, but not under oath or in accordance with a prior court order.

The court granted the motion, finding that while re-attendance is not an absolute right, it was reasonable and just given the circumstances, particularly the failure to comply with a previous order regarding the conduct of cross-examinations and the lack of sworn testimony.

The court also awarded Viola $1,500 in costs.

A realtor appealed a motion judge's decision dismissing a summary judgment motion in a negligence and improvident sale claim.

The key issue was when a two-year contractual limitation period commenced: at the time the Agreement of Purchase and Sale was signed or at closing.

The motion judge found the limitation period began at closing because no damage occurred prior to that time.

The Court of Appeal upheld this decision, holding that while negligent acts may have occurred before the agreement was signed, damage is an essential element of negligence and did not accrue until title transferred at closing.

The defendants sought a nunc pro tunc order to issue a third party claim against a doctor and an unknown individual after the two-year limitation period had expired.

The plaintiffs consented, but the proposed third party doctor opposed the motion.

Applying the framework from CIBC v. Green, the court found that while the defendants met the red-line rule by filing their motion before the deadline, they failed to act diligently in pursuing the claim.

The court dismissed the motion, concluding that the defendants were the authors of their own misfortune and that the proposed third party would be prejudiced by the backdated order.