Theresa Donkor

The appellant was convicted of multiple firearms offences after police discovered a loaded handgun during a warrantless search of a rental car under s. 12(3) of the Cannabis Control Act, 2017.

On appeal, the Crown conceded that the appellant's s. 10(b) Charter right to counsel was breached when officers failed to advise him of his rights before conducting the CCA search, consistent with the court's intervening decision in R. v. McGowan-Morris, 2025 ONCA 349.

The court upheld the trial judge's finding that the vehicle search did not breach s. 8 but allowed the appeal on the s. 10(b) ground, setting aside convictions and ordering a new trial where the admissibility of the appellant's flight evidence and his racial profiling claim could be properly assessed.

The appellant, Gregory Whalen, was convicted of multiple sexual offences against his stepdaughter, V.K., and appealed his conviction.

The central issue on appeal was the admissibility of surreptitious audio recordings made by V.K.’s mother during phone calls with the appellant.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge’s decision to admit the recordings, finding that their probative value outweighed any prejudicial effect and that the trial judge’s instructions to the jury were appropriate.

The appeal from conviction was dismissed.

The applicant sought judicial interim release pending his conviction and sentence appeal for firearm offences, including pointing a firearm, assault with a weapon, and possessing a weapon for a dangerous purpose, stemming from a drive-by shooting.

Despite the Crown's consent, the Court of Appeal denied the application.

The court found the appeal grounds, particularly regarding the sentence, to be weak and determined that the applicant's detention was necessary in the public interest, given the serious nature of the gun violence and the need to maintain public confidence in the administration of justice.

The appellant, Selvin De Flores Bermudez, appealed his convictions for sexual assault, sexual interference, and invitation to sexual touching.

The Crown cross-appealed the three-year concurrent sentence imposed at first instance.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no error in the admission of bad character evidence (due to defence counsel's tactical decision) or the trial judge's approach to emotional response evidence.

The court granted leave to appeal sentence, concluding that the trial judge erred in declining to apply the sentencing principles from R. v. Friesen to historical offences.

The Court of Appeal substituted a four-year custodial sentence, emphasizing that the effects of the sentence on the offender and his prospects for rehabilitation, while considered, cannot take precedence over the harm caused to the child victim.

The Crown appealed a stay of charges granted under s. 11(b) of the Charter due to unreasonable delay.

The trial judge found that defence counsel acted reasonably in not accommodating earlier trial dates offered by the Crown, which would have brought the case within the *Jordan* ceiling.

Consequently, the delay was not attributed to the defence, and the charges were stayed as the original schedule exceeded the 18-month ceiling.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's finding of fact regarding defence counsel's reasonableness, noting it was entitled to deference, and found no error in the application of law, dismissing the appeal.

The appellant, Dalibor Klaric, appealed his conviction for first-degree murder.

The appeal focused on the trial judge's jury instruction regarding sexual assault as an element of constructive first-degree murder under s. 231(5) of the Criminal Code, specifically concerning the absence of consent.

The Court of Appeal found the instruction, though brief, was carefully tailored to the live issue at trial and the positions of the parties, adequately equipping the jury to decide the case.

The appeal was dismissed.

The defendant, Samuel Osei-Tutu, was convicted by a jury of importing cocaine (2.8899 kg) and was before the court for sentencing.

The Crown sought a seven-year sentence, while the defence proposed 4.5 years (net 4 years) due to mitigating factors.

The court considered aggravating factors such as the quantity and commercial nature of the drug, and mitigating factors including the defendant's lack of a criminal record, strong community support, and prospects for rehabilitation.

The court also considered the impact of anti-Black racism on sentencing, as per R. v. Morris.

A sentence of 5.5 years (net 5 years after pre-trial credit) was imposed, along with ancillary orders.

The appellant, convicted of drug possession and possession for the purposes of trafficking, appealed his convictions.

The appeal raised two main issues: whether the police used excessive force in violation of section 7 of the Charter, and whether evidence seized from the appellant's jacket should have been excluded under section 24(2) of the Charter due to a section 8 breach.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's finding that the police force was justified under section 25(4) of the Criminal Code, accepting the trial judge's factual findings regarding the officers' actions.

Regarding the search, the Court agreed with the trial judge that while the search of the jacket violated section 8, the evidence was admissible under section 24(2) due to the likelihood of inevitable discovery.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant, Ersan Buakasa, appealed his conviction for firearm-related offences, arguing that the gun and ammunition found in his car should have been excluded as evidence due to violations of his Charter rights (ss. 8, 9, 10(a), 10(b)).

The trial judge had found the warrantless search of the car justified as a stand-alone safety search, and while finding breaches of ss. 10(a) and (b), did not exclude the evidence under s. 24(2).

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the trial judge's finding that the search was a lawful and justified safety search.

The court affirmed that the police officer had reasonable grounds to believe there was an imminent threat to public safety, justifying the search, and that the evidence should not be excluded even if there were Charter breaches.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual assault causing bodily harm, unlawful confinement, choking, and uttering a death threat, primarily alleging ineffective assistance of trial counsel.

The Court of Appeal found trial counsel's representation ineffective due to eliciting highly prejudicial bad character evidence, failing to seek disclosure of an arrest warrant and criminal record for the complainant, and providing inadequate advice on challenging jurors for cause based on racial prejudice.

The court concluded that the cumulative effect of these deficiencies undermined the reliability of the jury's verdict, rendering it unreliable.

The appeal was allowed, convictions set aside, and a new trial ordered.

The appellant appealed his convictions for drug trafficking and possession of proceeds of crime, arguing that his s. 10(b) Charter right to counsel was breached upon arrest.

The Court of Appeal reviewed the trial judge's factual finding regarding the appellant's response to the police's offer of counsel ("I will at some point").

The court found no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's determination that this statement did not constitute an invocation of the right to counsel, consistent with established jurisprudence.

As a result, no Charter breach occurred, and the issue of excluding evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter was not considered.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellants were convicted of distributing child pornography, advertising sexual services, procuring a person under 18, and receiving financial benefit from sexual services provided by a minor.

They appealed their convictions, arguing errors in Vetrovec instruction and jury misdirection on procurement.

They also sought leave to appeal their sentences, alleging the trial judge made findings of fact inconsistent with the jury's verdict.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no error in the Vetrovec decision or the jury instructions on procurement, noting the overwhelming evidence of control.

On the sentence appeal, the court agreed the trial judge erred by relying on violence allegations for sentencing after acquittals on related charges.

While this reduced the fit sentence for procurement, the overall global sentences remained appropriate for one appellant.

For the other appellant, fresh evidence regarding his rehabilitation and current circumstances led to a stay of execution for the remainder of his sentence.

The appellant appealed his summary conviction for assault and failing to comply with a probation order, arising from an incident where he spat on a security guard while being escorted out of a building.

He argued the trial judge erred in applying the W. (D) framework and impermissibly relied on a witness's lack of exaggeration to bolster credibility.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge properly applied the W. (D) principles by providing a reasoned basis for accepting the strong Crown evidence, which included independent witness testimony and video surveillance.

The court also held the trial judge did not err in noting the absence of exaggeration in the security guard's testimony, as it was a responsive observation to the defence's theory.

The appellant appealed his conviction for firearms offences and breaches, and his sentence.

The conviction appeal argued the trial judge failed to adequately address significant discrepancies between police officers' evidence.

The sentence appeal argued the trial judge failed to give credit for pre-sentence incarceration conditions related to the COVID-19 pandemic.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both the conviction and sentence appeals, finding no error in the trial judge's assessment of evidence or in the sentencing judge's discretion regarding enhanced credit for COVID-19 conditions.

The appellant appealed his summary conviction for domestic assault, arguing the trial judge made fundamental errors in assessing credibility.

Specifically, the appellant alleged the trial judge improperly used prior discreditable conduct evidence, used the complainant's lack of exaggeration to buttress her credibility, and relied on ungrounded common sense assumptions.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge's credibility assessments were grounded in the evidence and entitled to deference.

The court emphasized that appellate courts should not dissect trial reasons in a search for technical errors.

Michael Mills appealed a six-month conditional sentence for fraud under $5,000, seeking a conditional discharge.

The Court of Appeal found the sentencing judge erred by requiring an "exceptionality" threshold for a discharge under s. 730 of the Criminal Code.

Considering Mills' lack of prior record, guilty plea, remorse, restitution, minimal financial gain, and significant impact on employability due to the conviction, the Court determined an absolute discharge was appropriate and in the public interest, allowing the appeal and imposing the discharge.

The appellants, Elias Akhi and Jezreel Moxam, appealed their convictions for robbery, assault with a weapon, and other offences arising from a home invasion.

The Court of Appeal found serious errors in the trial judge's jury instructions, specifically regarding party liability (aiding and common intention) and the failure to adequately delineate between the two accused and the multiple counts.

The instructions were deemed confusing and insufficient to properly equip the jury.

Consequently, the convictions were quashed, and a new trial was ordered for both appellants.

This appeal concerned the applicability of the third-party records regime under sections 278.1-278.9 of the Criminal Code to a former police officer's anticipated testimony and a draft statement of claim in a criminal trial.

The appellants, J.R. (the former officer) and Toronto Police Service, sought to overturn a subpoena requiring J.R. to testify and to prevent the use of the draft statement of claim.

The Court of Appeal upheld the lower courts' findings that the third-party records regime did not apply to oral statements made by J.R. and, in the specific circumstances, did not apply to the draft statement of claim.

Furthermore, even if the regime applied to the draft statement, its production was deemed necessary in the interests of justice.

The appeal was dismissed, and an interim stay was set aside, making the lower court's unsealing and set aside orders effective.