Vanita Saxena Goela

The appellants were convicted of misrepresentation offences under the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act.

The trial judge delivered bottom-line guilty verdicts but delayed providing written reasons for over nine months.

The appellants appealed, arguing the delay rebutted the presumption of judicial integrity.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the lengthy, largely unexplained delay, combined with the trial judge's characterization of the post-verdict period as 'deliberation time', would cause a reasonable observer to apprehend that the reasons were an after-the-fact justification.

The convictions were set aside and a new trial was ordered.

The appellant was convicted of importing cocaine after border officers found nearly three kilograms of the drug hidden in the false bottom of his carry-on suitcase.

On appeal, he argued the trial judge erred by failing to give a fabrication instruction regarding his statements to border officers and by characterizing Crown witnesses as 'professionals' who took notes compared to 'civilian' witnesses.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that while the jury instructions were flawed in both respects, the errors did not prejudice the appellant's right to a fair trial given the overwhelming independent evidence of fabrication and trial counsel's strategic decision not to object.

Lee Marrazzo appealed his conviction for trafficking in narcotics and his four-year global sentence.

The conviction appeal argued that circumstantial evidence left open an innocent inference that he did not know the transaction involved narcotics, suggesting he believed it was a loan-sharking deal.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding ample evidence to infer Marrazzo's knowledge of the drug transaction based on his actions and intercepted comments.

For the sentence appeal, Marrazzo argued the trial judge erred in assessing his role and failed to credit him for medical hardships in custody.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the assessment of his role but agreed that the trial judge failed to adequately address his unmet medical needs when calculating Duncan credit.

Consequently, the Court granted leave to appeal sentence, set aside the original sentence, and substituted a reduced global sentence of 46 months.

Claude Séguin appealed his conviction for possession of fentanyl for trafficking, possession of methamphetamine pills, and possession of criminally obtained property, as well as his 12-year incarceration sentence.

His grounds of appeal included alleged violations of his linguistic rights (right to a French trial), inaccurate transcription of proceedings, an erroneous finding of fact regarding his control over a storage room where fentanyl was found, and ineffective assistance of counsel.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds of appeal, finding that Séguin had explicitly chosen to proceed in English, the trial judge's factual findings were reasonable and supported by evidence, and there was no merit to the claims of transcription errors or ineffective counsel.

The court also found no error in the imposed sentence, noting the serious nature of the offences and the large quantity of fentanyl involved.

The accused, convicted of possession of 7.038 kg of heroin for the purpose of trafficking, was sentenced to five years imprisonment.

The court considered aggravating factors, including the large quantity of heroin and the accused's association with organized crime, and mitigating factors, such as his non-profit motive, pro-social conduct, and genuine remorse.

The court rejected the Crown's request for a 16-year sentence and the forfeiture of $10,500, finding the latter not proven to be proceeds of crime.

A 10-year weapons prohibition and a $200 victim surcharge were also imposed.

The appellants, Leopold and Matthiew Mercier, appealed their seven-year jail sentences for commercial drug trafficking and related offences, arguing the sentences were unfit given their Indigenous background and the absence of Gladue Reports at sentencing.

The Court of Appeal granted leave to appeal and admitted fresh Gladue Reports as evidence.

However, the court dismissed the appeals, finding that despite the Gladue factors, the original sentences, which were based on joint submissions and fell at the lower end of the applicable range for such serious commercial trafficking, remained fit, emphasizing denunciation and deterrence.

Le requérant, reconnu coupable de possession d'héroïne en vue d'en faire le trafic, a contesté la validité constitutionnelle du paragraphe 5(2) de la Loi réglementant certaines drogues et autres substances.

Il alléguait que la disposition violait les articles 7 et 15 de la Charte canadienne des droits et libertés en criminalisant les « bons samaritains » qui tentent de fournir un approvisionnement sécuritaire aux toxicomanes.

La Cour a rejeté la requête, concluant que la loi ne crée pas de discrimination fondée sur la dépendance et que l'atteinte au droit à la liberté n'est ni d'une portée excessive ni totalement disproportionnée par rapport aux objectifs de santé et de sécurité publiques de l'État.

The accused, Suhaib Mustafa, was charged with three counts of possessing and three counts of importing altered Mexican passports in order to contravene the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA).

The passports were found concealed in his luggage upon entry to Canada.

The court clarified that knowledge of the fraudulent nature of the passports is not an essential element of the offence under s.122(1) of the IRPA, but rather the intent to contravene the Act.

Relying solely on circumstantial evidence, the Crown failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Mustafa possessed and imported the passports with the specific intent to contravene the IRPA, as other reasonable inferences inconsistent with guilt could be drawn from the evidence.

The court found significant gaps in the Crown's investigation.

Consequently, Mr. Mustafa was found not guilty on all counts.

The applicant was charged with possessing and importing fraudulent documents under the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA).

He brought a constitutional challenge seeking to strike down the mandatory rebuttable presumption in s. 122(2) of the IRPA, which presumes an intent to contravene the Act upon proof of possession of altered documents.

The court found that the presumption violates the right to be presumed innocent under s. 11(d) of the Charter because proof of possession does not lead inexorably to an intent to contravene the IRPA.

The court also found a violation of s. 7 of the Charter.

The violations could not be saved under s. 1, as the presumption did not minimally impair the applicant's rights.

Section 122(2) was declared of no force and effect.

This is an application to re-open an appeal, brought by the applicant after her initial appeal of a habeas corpus dismissal was rejected.

The applicant sought to introduce what she characterized as "fresh evidence" to argue that the trial court lacked jurisdiction for her conviction.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the application, finding that the proposed "fresh evidence" was merely further legal argument and did not satisfy the test for admission of fresh evidence as established in Palmer v. The Queen.

Furthermore, the court found the arguments irrelevant to the sufficiency of the application judge's original reasons.

Angelina Codina applied for bail pending her application for leave to appeal three decisions of the Court of Appeal for Ontario to the Supreme Court of Canada.

The motion judge dismissed the bail application, finding that Ms. Codina had not met her burden of persuading the court that her release was in the public interest.

The court considered the strength of her proposed grounds of appeal, which were deemed not to "clearly surpass the minimal standard" of "not frivolous" and noted a residual public safety concern given her history of preying on vulnerable individuals and being "ungovernable." The court emphasized the paramountcy of enforcing trial judgments at this stage of proceedings, especially given no further right of appeal.

The appellant, Angelina Codina, appealed the dismissal of her application for a writ of habeas corpus, alleging unlawful detention.

The application judge had dismissed the application, finding no reasonable grounds for the complaint, as many issues had been previously litigated or were pending in other criminal proceedings.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming that the application judge did not err by considering prior determinations in criminal proceedings and that the reasons provided were sufficient, addressing the critical issues without needing to address every argument.

The court rejected the appellant's arguments regarding a change in law and the jurisdiction of Public Prosecution Services Canada.

The applicant, Angelina Codina, sought to re-open her conviction and sentence appeals, along with judicial interim release.

She had been convicted of four counts of providing unauthorized immigration advice/representation (s. 91(1) IRPA) and one count of counselling misrepresentation (s. 126 IRPA), receiving a net sentence of five years' imprisonment.

Her previous appeals were dismissed in 2019 (sentence) and 2020 (conviction).

Codina argued for re-opening based on claims that s. 91 IRPA was ultra vires, the CBSA lacked jurisdiction, her corporate structure precluded conviction, and the trial judge misdirected the jury.

The Court of Appeal found no basis to re-open the appeals, noting that all these points had been comprehensively addressed and dismissed in its prior decision, R. v. Codina, 2020 ONCA 848.

The court concluded there was no miscarriage of justice and dismissed both the application to re-open the appeals and the application for bail as moot.

The applicant, having been convicted of offences under the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act and having had her appeals dismissed, applied for a writ of habeas corpus alleging unlawful detention.

The court applied the two-part test from R. v. Olson and found no reasonable and probable grounds for the complaint.

The grounds raised had either been previously dismissed at trial and on appeal, or were the subject of a pending application to re-open her appeal.

The application was dismissed.

The appellant, a disbarred lawyer and unlicensed immigration consultant, was convicted of providing unauthorized immigration advice for consideration and counselling misrepresentation under the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act.

She appealed her convictions, arguing that the charging provisions were ultra vires the federal government, violated section 7 of the Charter, and that the trial judge made numerous evidentiary and instructional errors.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the provisions were validly enacted under the federal criminal law power, were neither vague nor overbroad, and that the trial judge made no errors in her rulings or jury instructions.

The appellant, a permanent resident, appealed his convictions for drug and credit card offences, arguing his guilty pleas were uninformed due to erroneous advice from trial counsel regarding immigration consequences.

A prior deportation order had been stayed but was lifted following these convictions.

The Court of Appeal admitted fresh evidence, found that trial counsel had misadvised the appellant, leading to an uninformed plea and subjective prejudice.

The court emphasized the duty of defence counsel to advise on collateral immigration consequences.

The appeal was allowed, convictions set aside, and a new trial ordered.

The appellant appealed a sentence of seven years imposed for four counts of providing immigration advice without a license contrary to s. 91(1) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act and one count of counselling misrepresentation in an immigration application contrary to s. 126 of the IRPA.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in law or principle by the trial judge.

The court upheld the trial judge's decisions regarding denial of enhanced credit for pre-sentence custody due to delay caused by the appellant, reliance on victim impact statements, consideration of future risk, imposition of maximum sentences, consecutive sentencing, and failure to address bail conditions as a mitigating factor.

The appellant appealed his conviction for possession for the purposes of trafficking cocaine and failure to comply with conditions of a recognizance.

The appellant was stopped for a non-functional licence plate light, during which the officer detected the odour of burnt marijuana.

Following the discovery of a small amount of marijuana in a grinder, the appellant was arrested.

A subsequent search of the vehicle revealed 172 grams of cocaine hidden under the hood.

The appellant challenged the legality of the arrest and search on Charter grounds, arguing violations of sections 8 and 10 rights.

The trial judge rejected these arguments and convicted the appellant based on circumstantial evidence of knowledge and control.

The Court of Appeal upheld the conviction, finding the officer's actions reasonable and the search lawful as incident to arrest.

The defendants were convicted of possession of GBL for the purpose of producing GHB and possession of Ketamine for the purpose of trafficking.

The Crown sought 8.5 years of incarceration, while the defendants sought 4 to 5 years.

The court found the operation to be a mid-level commercial enterprise involving significant quantities of 'date rape' drugs.

Emphasizing denunciation and deterrence, the court sentenced each defendant to a total of 6 years of incarceration, declining to grant Downes credits or reduce the sentence based on potential immigration consequences.

The appellant appealed his conviction for drug possession, raising various Charter issues regarding the lawfulness of the initial traffic stop, the search incident to arrest, and questioning after invocation of the right to counsel.

The trial judge rejected all Charter arguments.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal upheld the conviction, finding the initial stop was lawful based on reasonable grounds, the search was a lawful incident of arrest and not unduly intrusive, and while the questioning after invocation of the right to counsel may have constituted a breach of s. 10(b), any such breach would not have resulted in exclusion of evidence under s. 24(2).