Vanita Saxena Goela

Lee Marrazzo appealed his conviction for trafficking in narcotics and his four-year global sentence.

The conviction appeal argued that circumstantial evidence left open an innocent inference that he did not know the transaction involved narcotics, suggesting he believed it was a loan-sharking deal.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding ample evidence to infer Marrazzo's knowledge of the drug transaction based on his actions and intercepted comments.

For the sentence appeal, Marrazzo argued the trial judge erred in assessing his role and failed to credit him for medical hardships in custody.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the assessment of his role but agreed that the trial judge failed to adequately address his unmet medical needs when calculating Duncan credit.

Consequently, the Court granted leave to appeal sentence, set aside the original sentence, and substituted a reduced global sentence of 46 months.

Claude Séguin appealed his conviction for possession of fentanyl for trafficking, possession of methamphetamine pills, and possession of criminally obtained property, as well as his 12-year incarceration sentence.

His grounds of appeal included alleged violations of his linguistic rights (right to a French trial), inaccurate transcription of proceedings, an erroneous finding of fact regarding his control over a storage room where fentanyl was found, and ineffective assistance of counsel.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds of appeal, finding that Séguin had explicitly chosen to proceed in English, the trial judge's factual findings were reasonable and supported by evidence, and there was no merit to the claims of transcription errors or ineffective counsel.

The court also found no error in the imposed sentence, noting the serious nature of the offences and the large quantity of fentanyl involved.

The accused, convicted of possession of 7.038 kg of heroin for the purpose of trafficking, was sentenced to five years imprisonment.

The court considered aggravating factors, including the large quantity of heroin and the accused's association with organized crime, and mitigating factors, such as his non-profit motive, pro-social conduct, and genuine remorse.

The court rejected the Crown's request for a 16-year sentence and the forfeiture of $10,500, finding the latter not proven to be proceeds of crime.

A 10-year weapons prohibition and a $200 victim surcharge were also imposed.

The appellants, Leopold and Matthiew Mercier, appealed their seven-year jail sentences for commercial drug trafficking and related offences, arguing the sentences were unfit given their Indigenous background and the absence of Gladue Reports at sentencing.

The Court of Appeal granted leave to appeal and admitted fresh Gladue Reports as evidence.

However, the court dismissed the appeals, finding that despite the Gladue factors, the original sentences, which were based on joint submissions and fell at the lower end of the applicable range for such serious commercial trafficking, remained fit, emphasizing denunciation and deterrence.

The accused, Suhaib Mustafa, was charged with three counts of possessing and three counts of importing altered Mexican passports in order to contravene the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA).

The passports were found concealed in his luggage upon entry to Canada.

The court clarified that knowledge of the fraudulent nature of the passports is not an essential element of the offence under s.122(1) of the IRPA, but rather the intent to contravene the Act.

Relying solely on circumstantial evidence, the Crown failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Mustafa possessed and imported the passports with the specific intent to contravene the IRPA, as other reasonable inferences inconsistent with guilt could be drawn from the evidence.

The court found significant gaps in the Crown's investigation.

Consequently, Mr. Mustafa was found not guilty on all counts.

This is an application to re-open an appeal, brought by the applicant after her initial appeal of a habeas corpus dismissal was rejected.

The applicant sought to introduce what she characterized as "fresh evidence" to argue that the trial court lacked jurisdiction for her conviction.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the application, finding that the proposed "fresh evidence" was merely further legal argument and did not satisfy the test for admission of fresh evidence as established in Palmer v. The Queen.

Furthermore, the court found the arguments irrelevant to the sufficiency of the application judge's original reasons.

Angelina Codina applied for bail pending her application for leave to appeal three decisions of the Court of Appeal for Ontario to the Supreme Court of Canada.

The motion judge dismissed the bail application, finding that Ms. Codina had not met her burden of persuading the court that her release was in the public interest.

The court considered the strength of her proposed grounds of appeal, which were deemed not to "clearly surpass the minimal standard" of "not frivolous," and noted a residual public safety concern given her history of preying on vulnerable individuals and being "ungovernable." The court emphasized the paramountcy of enforcing trial judgments at this stage of proceedings, especially given no further right of appeal.

The appellant, Angelina Codina, appealed the dismissal of her application for a writ of habeas corpus, alleging unlawful detention.

The application judge had dismissed the application, finding no reasonable grounds for the complaint, as many issues had been previously litigated or were pending in other criminal proceedings.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming that the application judge did not err by considering prior determinations in criminal proceedings and that the reasons provided were sufficient, addressing the critical issues without needing to address every argument.

The court rejected the appellant's arguments regarding a change in law and the jurisdiction of Public Prosecution Services Canada.

The applicant, Angelina Codina, sought to re-open her conviction and sentence appeals, along with judicial interim release.

She had been convicted of four counts of providing unauthorized immigration advice/representation (s. 91(1) IRPA) and one count of counselling misrepresentation (s. 126 IRPA), receiving a net sentence of five years' imprisonment.

Her previous appeals were dismissed in 2019 (sentence) and 2020 (conviction).

Codina argued for re-opening based on claims that s. 91 IRPA was ultra vires, the CBSA lacked jurisdiction, her corporate structure precluded conviction, and the trial judge misdirected the jury.

The Court of Appeal found no basis to re-open the appeals, noting that all these points had been comprehensively addressed and dismissed in its prior decision, R. v. Codina, 2020 ONCA 848.

The court concluded there was no miscarriage of justice and dismissed both the application to re-open the appeals and the application for bail as moot.

The appellant, a permanent resident, appealed his convictions for drug and credit card offences, arguing his guilty pleas were uninformed due to erroneous advice from trial counsel regarding immigration consequences.

A prior deportation order had been stayed but was lifted following these convictions.

The Court of Appeal admitted fresh evidence, found that trial counsel had misadvised the appellant, leading to an uninformed plea and subjective prejudice.

The court emphasized the duty of defence counsel to advise on collateral immigration consequences.

The appeal was allowed, convictions set aside, and a new trial ordered.

The appellant appealed a sentence of seven years imposed for four counts of providing immigration advice without a license contrary to s. 91(1) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act and one count of counselling misrepresentation in an immigration application contrary to s. 126 of the IRPA.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in law or principle by the trial judge.

The court upheld the trial judge's decisions regarding denial of enhanced credit for pre-sentence custody due to delay caused by the appellant, reliance on victim impact statements, consideration of future risk, imposition of maximum sentences, consecutive sentencing, and failure to address bail conditions as a mitigating factor.

The appellant appealed his conviction for possession for the purposes of trafficking cocaine and failure to comply with conditions of a recognizance.

The appellant was stopped for a non-functional licence plate light, during which the officer detected the odour of burnt marijuana.

Following the discovery of a small amount of marijuana in a grinder, the appellant was arrested.

A subsequent search of the vehicle revealed 172 grams of cocaine hidden under the hood.

The appellant challenged the legality of the arrest and search on Charter grounds, arguing violations of sections 8 and 10 rights.

The trial judge rejected these arguments and convicted the appellant based on circumstantial evidence of knowledge and control.

The Court of Appeal upheld the conviction, finding the officer's actions reasonable and the search lawful as incident to arrest.

The appellant appealed his conviction for drug possession, raising various Charter issues regarding the lawfulness of the initial traffic stop, the search incident to arrest, and questioning after invocation of the right to counsel.

The trial judge rejected all Charter arguments.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal upheld the conviction, finding the initial stop was lawful based on reasonable grounds, the search was a lawful incident of arrest and not unduly intrusive, and while the questioning after invocation of the right to counsel may have constituted a breach of s. 10(b), any such breach would not have resulted in exclusion of evidence under s. 24(2).

The appellant appealed his conviction for possession of marijuana for the purpose of trafficking and his sentence of six months' imprisonment.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no basis to set aside the trial judge's credibility findings.

However, the court allowed the sentence appeal, finding that the sentence failed to reflect the appellant's peripheral role in the offence given the amount of marijuana involved.

The sentence was reduced to time served, with all ancillary orders remaining in place.

The Court allowed an accused’s appeal and restored a stay of proceedings for breach of the right to be tried within a reasonable time under s. 11(b) of the Charter.

Applying Jordan, it held that net delay remained above the 30‑month ceiling after proper deductions for defence delay and certain discrete events.

The case was not particularly complex despite voluminous disclosure, and transitional exceptional circumstances did not justify the remaining delay.

The Court emphasized that all justice system actors must proactively prevent and minimize delay and that Jordan must be followed as governing law.

The appellant was convicted of production of marijuana and possession of marijuana for the purpose of trafficking after police entered his home without a warrant, ostensibly to check on the welfare of his autistic son who had wandered to a nearby intersection.

The police discovered a marijuana grow operation in the basement.

The trial judge found multiple Charter breaches but admitted the evidence under section 24(2).

On appeal, the court held that the police's initial warrantless entry into the home breached section 8 of the Charter and that the trial judge erred in applying R. v. Godoy beyond its limited scope.

The court also found that the trial judge erred in admitting the evidence under section 24(2), as the seriousness of the breaches and their impact on the accused's privacy interests outweighed society's interest in an adjudication on the merits.

The appellants pleaded guilty to marijuana production under section 7(2)(b) of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act and received the mandatory minimum sentence of nine months imprisonment.

The appellants appealed on the grounds that their guilty pleas were not informed due to ineffective assistance of counsel and language barriers.

The police brief summarizing the facts was in English only, not shared with the appellants, and contained admissions that would establish aggravating factors triggering the mandatory minimum sentence.

The appellants were not adequately informed of these consequences.

The court found that the appellants' guilty pleas were uninformed and that they suffered prejudice, as they would not have pleaded guilty had they been aware of the relevant facts and sentencing consequences.

The offender pled guilty to seven counts of counselling misrepresentation contrary to section 126 of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act.

Over a five-year period, the offender, an unlicensed immigration consultant, exploited vulnerable would-be immigrants seeking entry through the Live-In Caregiver Program by providing false employment contracts and Labour Market Opinions, charging substantial fees while delivering no legitimate services.

The offender threatened victims who complained.

The court imposed a sentence of 12 months imprisonment (11 months after pre-trial custody credit), three years probation with conditions including a prohibition on providing immigration advice, no contact orders with victims, and restitution orders totalling $23,500.

The accused was charged with human trafficking and misrepresentation to immigration authorities under the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act.

The accused brought a third party records application seeking disclosure of Children's Aid Society records and police records relating to the complainant.

The court determined that the O'Connor regime applied to the CAS records and the Mills regime (section 278) applied to the police records.

The court denied production of the police records as the accused failed to establish they were likely relevant, relying solely on credibility arguments which are insufficient under section 278.3(4).

The court found the CAS records were likely relevant as they were compiled during a joint investigation that led to the charges, and ordered the second stage of the O'Connor test to proceed.