Howard C. Rubel

The appellant appealed a forfeiture and prohibition order under s. 117.05(4) of the Criminal Code, arguing the trial judge erred in preferring hearsay evidence, reversing the onus of proof, impermissibly speculating, and misapprehending evidence.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge's conclusions were reasonable and supported by the evidence, particularly given the deference owed to credibility findings.

The court found no errors in the trial judge's assessment of hearsay or the burden of proof, and that the inferences drawn regarding the appellant's anti-government views and potential for inciting others were reasonable given the evidence.

The appellant, a permanent resident, appealed his convictions for drug and credit card offences, arguing his guilty pleas were uninformed due to erroneous advice from trial counsel regarding immigration consequences.

A prior deportation order had been stayed but was lifted following these convictions.

The Court of Appeal admitted fresh evidence, found that trial counsel had misadvised the appellant, leading to an uninformed plea and subjective prejudice.

The court emphasized the duty of defence counsel to advise on collateral immigration consequences.

The appeal was allowed, convictions set aside, and a new trial ordered.

The accused was charged with sexual assault contrary to section 271 of the Criminal Code.

The complainant, a high school student, alleged that the accused, a first-year university student, sexually assaulted her in his residence room following a fraternity party.

The central issue was whether the sexual intercourse was consensual.

The court found the complainant's evidence to be incoherent, implausible, internally and externally inconsistent, and marked by a pattern of dishonesty.

The roommate's evidence was found to be credible and reliable, corroborating key aspects of the accused's account.

The court concluded that the complainant was apprehensive initially but was persuaded by the accused to engage in sexual activity, and after being reassured about the roommate's presence, she consented.

The court found insufficient evidence to prove lack of consent beyond a reasonable doubt and acquitted the accused.

The Crown brought an application during a criminal fraud prosecution seeking admission of a spreadsheet summary prepared by a police investigator analyzing drug purchase and billing records.

The spreadsheet relied on information from Ministry of Health databases and records obtained from a pharmaceutical wholesaler.

The court held that the Crown failed to establish that the underlying documents constituted admissible business records under s. 30 of the Canada Evidence Act or at common law.

Because the source documents themselves were inadmissible, the summary derived from them could not be admitted.

The court also expressed serious concerns regarding the reliability and completeness of the underlying data sources.

In a fraud prosecution alleging billing of the Ontario Drug Benefit Plan for drugs not dispensed, the Crown sought a pre‑trial ruling admitting “prescriber verification letters” completed by physicians during a government audit.

The Crown argued the documents were admissible as business records under s. 30 of the Canada Evidence Act or under the principled hearsay exception.

The court found the letters were not business records because they were not created or maintained in the ordinary course of medical practice and were prepared during an investigation.

Reliability concerns also arose from physicians’ testimony that their answers may have been influenced by memory gaps or investigator comments.

The court held the principled hearsay exception was not satisfied because reliability and necessity were not established.

The Ontario College of Teachers brought a motion seeking leave to withdraw allegations of professional misconduct, including sexual abuse of a student, against the member.

In exchange, the member signed an undertaking to resign, never seek reinstatement, and never teach again in Ontario.

The Discipline Committee granted the motion, finding that the withdrawal of the allegations in exchange for the undertaking and a notation on the public register was appropriate and served to protect the public interest.

The accused pleaded guilty to multiple counts of gross indecency involving seven child victims between 1980 and 1985.

The offences involved fondling of the victims' genitals in various contexts, including overnight stays, car rides, camping trips, and at a public swimming pool.

The accused had prior convictions for similar offences in 1990 and had undergone extensive psychiatric treatment and counselling over the intervening 22 years without reoffending.

The Crown sought a custodial sentence of two years less one day, while the defence sought a conditional sentence.

The court imposed a conditional sentence of two years less one day, finding that the unique circumstances of the case, including the accused's genuine remorse, low risk of reoffence, and successful rehabilitation over decades, warranted a departure from the typical custodial approach in child sexual abuse cases.

The appellant, a high school teacher, appealed his conviction for touching a student for a sexual purpose.

He argued the trial judge erred in assessing the complainant's credibility and reliability, particularly after finding certain events could not have occurred as described.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge properly applied the W.D. principle and reasonably relied on overwhelming independent evidence, including graphic electronic messages and notes, to support the conviction.

The appellant appealed his convictions and sentence for historical sexual and physical offences committed against his two former wives and two daughters.

He argued the trial judge erred by failing to resolve his first daughter's earlier recantation of her allegations and by relying on her evidence to support other complainants.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the trial judge properly assessed credibility and was not required to resolve every discrete factual issue.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the four-year and three-month sentence was not demonstrably unfit for an offender in a position of trust who sexually abused children over a substantial period.

The appellant, a former teacher, appealed his convictions for sexual offences involving five former students.

He argued that the trial judge reversed the burden of proof, applied uneven scrutiny to the evidence, and provided inadequate reasons for rejecting his testimony.

The Court of Appeal rejected these arguments, finding that the trial judge correctly applied the burden of proof and properly relied on the totality of the evidence, including compelling similar fact evidence from the complainants.

The appeal from conviction was dismissed.

The appellant appealed the sentence imposed by the trial judge.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the sentence that would warrant appellate intervention.

Leave to appeal sentence was granted, but the appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed a summary conviction appeal decision that allowed a Crown appeal and ordered a new trial.

The central issue was the sufficiency of an information to obtain a warrant following a single-car accident where the appellant had consumed alcohol.

The Court of Appeal agreed with the summary conviction appeal judge that the information was sufficient based on the totality of the circumstances, including an anonymous tip about erratic driving and evidence of alcohol consumption.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his sentence of 18 months' imprisonment for a sophisticated fraud committed while on probation for another crime of dishonesty.

The majority of the Court of Appeal upheld the sentence, finding it was not demonstrably unfit given the aggravating circumstances, including the appellant's prior record and lack of remorse.

Laskin J.A. dissented, finding the sentence unfit based on recent sentencing decisions.

The appellant was convicted of importing and possessing restricted and prohibited weapons after purchasing firearms in Florida that were subsequently sold by an associate to undercover officers in Canada.

On appeal, he argued that the trial judge erred in admitting co-conspirator hearsay statements, relying on a suspect witness, and dismissing his s. 11(b) Charter application for unreasonable delay.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding sufficient independent evidence of his participation in the common design, proper corroboration of the witness, and reasonable explanations for the delay.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the four-year term was fit for a front-line principal in a firearms trafficking enterprise.

The appellant appealed a conviction arising from allegations of repeated sexual assaults committed against the complainant during childhood.

The appeal challenged the trial judge’s use of the complainant’s prior disclosures to her mother and the application of a childhood memory standard to inconsistencies concerning disclosures made when the complainant was an adult.

The court held that the fact of disclosure was admissible as part of the narrative and, in the circumstances, could also answer the defence suggestion of fabrication linked to a property dispute.

Although the trial judge appears to have misapplied the childhood memory standard to peripheral inconsistencies about adult disclosures, the error caused no prejudice and did not affect the verdict.

The conviction appeal was dismissed, and the trial non-publication order was terminated on consent.