Cidalia Faria

The Crown appealed the acquittals of the respondents on charges of failing to provide necessaries of life and forcible confinement of their four-year-old child.

The trial judge erred by requiring proof of actual risk of harm for the necessaries charge under s. 215(2)(a)(i) of the Criminal Code, and by not considering the egregious conditions of confinement for the forcible confinement charge.

The appeal court found that a sanitary environment is a necessary of life and the child was in necessitous circumstances, overturning the acquittal on necessaries.

For forcible confinement, the court held that the parents' authority to confine ceases when conduct is abusive or harmful, remitting this charge for a new trial.

The accused, charged with sexual assault with a weapon and aggravated sexual assault, brought an application under s. 276 of the Criminal Code to adduce evidence of prior sexual activity with the complainant.

The accused argued the evidence was necessary to provide context for their relationship and to challenge the complainant's credibility, as their accounts of the incident and their prior relationship differed significantly.

The court allowed the application in part, permitting the defence to adduce evidence that the parties were in an intimate, sexual relationship prior to the alleged assault to challenge credibility and provide context.

However, the court prohibited the introduction of any details regarding specific past sexual encounters, finding such details irrelevant and highly prejudicial.

The accused, charged with sexual assault and other offences, brought a motion for directions to determine whether Facebook messages exchanged with the complainant constituted a 'record' under s. 278.1 of the Criminal Code.

The defence sought to use the messages during cross-examination but argued they were not subject to the s. 278.92 admissibility regime because the complainant lacked a reasonable expectation of privacy in them.

The court adopted a procedure allowing the judge to review the messages without disclosing them to the Crown.

The court concluded that the complainant did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the non-sexual messages sent to the accused, considering the content, the manner of communication, the adversarial nature of their current relationship, and the policy implications.

Consequently, the messages were not deemed a 'record,' and the accused was not required to bring an application under s. 278.93 before using them at trial.

At a bail hearing for an accused charged with second-degree murder, the defence objected to the Crown cross-examining a proposed surety about conversations with the accused regarding the alleged offence.

The defence relied on recent case law suggesting such questions unfairly exploit the bail hearing for discovery.

The court disagreed, ruling that the Crown is permitted to ask such questions.

The court found that these questions do not violate the accused's fair trial rights, fall within the broad scope of evidence permitted at bail hearings, and may be relevant to assessing the strength of the Crown's case and the ongoing risk to public safety.

The accused was charged with sexual assault under section 271 of the Criminal Code.

The defence brought an application under section 276.1 of the Criminal Code seeking to adduce evidence of the complainant's prior sexual relationship with the accused and her sexual activity with third parties.

The court conducted a hearing under section 276.2 to determine admissibility.

The court granted the application only to the extent that the defence could adduce evidence that the complainant and accused had met during a specific period to exchange sex for crack cocaine or money, as this was necessary context for understanding their relationship.

The court denied the application regarding evidence of specific prior sexual encounters between the parties and all evidence regarding the complainant's sexual activity with third parties.

The application record was sealed to protect the complainant's privacy and dignity.

The Crown applied to have the respondent declared a Dangerous Offender following his convictions for criminal harassment, mischief, and breach of a Long-Term Supervision Order.

The respondent had a lengthy history of stalking and harassing former intimate partners.

The court found that the criminal harassment convictions constituted serious personal injury offences, as they caused severe psychological damage to the victim.

The court declared the respondent a Dangerous Offender, imposing a determinate global sentence of 6 years (reduced to 2.5 years after pre-trial custody credit) and a 10-year Long-Term Supervision Order.

The accused was charged with assault against his former intimate partner.

The Crown alleged that during an argument in their shared apartment, the accused punched the complainant in the face and stomach.

The accused denied the assault, claiming he only squeezed past the complainant to exit the apartment.

The central issue was the credibility of the witnesses.

The court found the complainant credible and rejected the accused's explanation for a text message in which he apologized for hitting her, finding his claim that he was coerced into a false confession implausible.

The court convicted the accused of assault.

The accused was charged with breaching a Long Term Supervision Order by failing to obey the law and keep the peace, contrary to s. 753.3(1) of the Criminal Code.

The count was severed from a multi-count indictment that included extortion, criminal harassment, and mischief allegations involving the same complainant.

A jury had previously convicted the accused of criminal harassment and mischief arising from the same period.

The court relied on those verdicts and evidence to determine whether the accused breached the supervision condition requiring him to obey the law.

The court concluded that the commission of the underlying offences while subject to the order constituted a breach and entered a finding of guilt.

The accused was charged with threatening to kill the complainant on December 14, 2012.

The trial took place in Toronto's Integrated Domestic Violence Court.

The complainant and accused had a former romantic relationship and were engaged in a contentious family court proceeding regarding custody and access to their child.

The complainant alleged that the accused threatened to kill her, that she would explode like a balloon, that he would break her, and that he sent a threatening email.

The court found the complainant's credibility was substantially damaged by her prior false affidavit recanting allegations of assault, the suspicious timing of her allegations coinciding with an unfavorable custody recommendation, and her demonstrated determination to obtain sole custody.

The court found the accused not guilty, holding that the Crown failed to prove the charge beyond a reasonable doubt.

The Crown brought an application under s. 486.5(1) of the Criminal Code seeking a publication ban prohibiting disclosure of the complainant’s identity in a prosecution involving allegations of criminal harassment and extortion arising from a personal relationship.

The court considered the statutory factors under s. 486.5(7) and the open court principle, applying the test articulated in R. v. Mentuck.

The evidence indicated that publication of the complainant’s identity could expose her to significant harm, including employment consequences, because the alleged extortion involved threats to publicize the relationship.

The court concluded that a limited ban referring to the complainant only by initials was necessary for the proper administration of justice and that the salutary effects outweighed any deleterious impact on openness.

The accused pleaded guilty to multiple counts of gross indecency involving seven child victims between 1980 and 1985.

The offences involved fondling of the victims' genitals in various contexts, including overnight stays, car rides, camping trips, and at a public swimming pool.

The accused had prior convictions for similar offences in 1990 and had undergone extensive psychiatric treatment and counselling over the intervening 22 years without reoffending.

The Crown sought a custodial sentence of two years less one day, while the defence sought a conditional sentence.

The court imposed a conditional sentence of two years less one day, finding that the unique circumstances of the case, including the accused's genuine remorse, low risk of reoffence, and successful rehabilitation over decades, warranted a departure from the typical custodial approach in child sexual abuse cases.