James Carlisle

The respondent, Hassan Jarrar, was found guilty of multiple sexual and child pornography offences.

The Crown sought a dangerous offender designation and an indeterminate sentence.

The court found a pattern of repetitive violent and sexual behaviour targeting young vulnerable females, demonstrating a failure to restrain behaviour and a likelihood of causing death, injury, or severe psychological damage.

Despite the respondent's lack of cooperation with assessments and treatment, the court concluded there was no reasonable expectation that a determinate sentence or a long-term supervision order would adequately protect the public.

Consequently, the respondent was designated a dangerous offender and sentenced to concurrent indeterminate terms for the serious personal injury offences, along with other prohibitions and orders.

The appellant appealed his sentence imposed by the trial judge.

The parties agreed that the trial judge was inadvertently misled regarding the immigration consequences of the sentence.

A sentence of exactly 6 months would preclude an appeal of a removal order, whereas a sentence under 6 months would permit such an appeal.

On consent, the Court of Appeal varied the effective sentence from 6 months to 5 months 29 days concurrent on all counts, with the probation order remaining unchanged.

The variation included credit for 98 days of pre-trial custody.

The appellant appealed his conviction on a single ground: that the trial judge erred in dismissing his motion to stay proceedings for breach of s. 11(b) of the Charter (right to trial within reasonable time).

The appellant had been arrested on five counts of criminal harassment in November 2008 and subsequently re-arrested six times over three years on similar charges.

After a lengthy and complex procedural history spanning over four years, the appellant pleaded guilty to five counts and was sentenced to probation.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal on two bases: first, that the appellant's guilty plea barred him from challenging the pre-trial s. 11(b) ruling under the Fegan doctrine; and second, on the merits, that even under the Jordan framework (which post-dated the trial judge's decision), the delay did not constitute a breach of s. 11(b) when defence delay and transitional exceptional circumstances were properly accounted for.

Two co-accused appealed their sentences imposed following guilty pleas to breaking and entering and convictions on firearm and drug offences.

The appellants argued the sentencing judge erred in characterizing the offence as a home invasion and imposed sentences that were too high and violated the totality principle.

The Court of Appeal upheld the sentences, finding the sentencing judge was entitled to find the appellants were reckless as to whether anyone was home, and that the sentences were fit given the aggravating factors including the use of a firearm, criminal records, breach of court orders, premeditation, and proximity to schools.

The court allowed Mr. Fourtounes' appeal only to award additional pre-trial custody credit of 227 days.

The offenders were found guilty of conspiracy to import 112 kg of cocaine and possession for the purpose of trafficking.

The cocaine was hidden in wooden pallets in a sea container shipped from Guyana.

The court found both offenders were principal participants in a sophisticated importation scheme.

Buttazzoni, who had a prior drug conviction in the US and made threats of violence, was sentenced to 17 years.

Ramlall, a first-time offender who received the pallets at his home, was sentenced to 15 years.

Both received credit for pre-sentence custody and house arrest.

During a trial for drug importation, the Crown sought to admit statements made by the accused to police following his arrest.

The accused made an initial statement in a police cruiser and a subsequent video-recorded statement at the police station.

The court found the cruiser statement involuntary due to an incomplete record and inducements offered by the officer.

Applying the derived confessions rule, the court also excluded the subsequent video statement, finding it was causally, temporally, and contextually connected to the first tainted statement.

The accused were tried before a judge alone on charges arising from a large-scale cocaine importation scheme involving approximately 112 kilograms of cocaine shipped from Guyana to Canada in a sea container.

The Crown alleged conspiracy to import cocaine, importing cocaine, and possession for the purpose of trafficking, relying on surveillance, intercepted communications, controlled delivery evidence, and admissions.

The court found that two of the accused knowingly participated in a conspiracy to import cocaine and later exercised possession of the drugs for trafficking purposes, based largely on circumstantial evidence and intercepted communications demonstrating knowledge, control, and shared financial interest in the shipment.

However, the court found insufficient evidence that any accused actually committed the offence of importing under the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act because their involvement occurred after the drugs entered Canada.

Two accused were acquitted entirely due to reasonable doubt regarding knowledge and participation.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Consent and Capacity Board confirming an involuntary psychiatric admission and finding the appellant incapable of consenting to certain forms of treatment under the Health Care Consent Act.

By the time the appeal was heard, the appellant had been discharged from the treating facility and was under the care of a different physician, with subsequent admissions and new incapacity findings having occurred.

The court concluded there was no longer a live controversy between the parties because the treatment relationship underlying the Board decision had ended.

Applying the mootness principles articulated in Borowski v. Canada (Attorney General), the court declined to exercise its residual discretion to hear the matter.

The appeal was dismissed as moot, leaving the Board’s earlier decision as the final disposition of the application.