J. Blackburn

Aviva Canada Inc. brought a motion for directions regarding the timing of its answers to undertakings, seeking to defer disclosure until the defendants, Hubio Solutions Inc. and Ingenie (Canada) Inc., provided their answers to questions ordered answered.

Aviva alleged that Hubio had taken an obstructionist approach during discovery and that there was a significant risk of Hubio tailoring its evidence if Aviva disclosed first.

The Master found a significant overlap in the information sought by both parties concerning pre-agreement representations and accepted the risk of tailoring.

The Master also criticized Hubio's conduct during discovery and its delay in contacting former employees.

The motion was granted in part, allowing Aviva to defer answers to undertakings related to pre-agreement meetings and discussions until Hubio provided its ordered answers, with a simultaneous exchange date set.

Other undertakings were to be answered forthwith.

The appellant, Timothy Keizer, appealed a decision by the Consent and Capacity Board (CCB) that found him incapable of consenting to psychiatric treatment.

The CCB had upheld Dr. Nagari's finding that Mr. Keizer suffered from delusional disorder and was incapable of applying treatment information to his circumstances due to his failure to recognize his illness.

The Superior Court of Justice allowed the appeal, finding that the Board's conclusion that Mr. Keizer suffered from a delusional disorder at the time of the hearing was unreasonable and unsupported by evidence.

The court emphasized that a patient's disagreement with a diagnosis does not automatically equate to incapacity, especially when the patient recognizes the manifestations of their condition and their refusal of treatment is based on past experience and a differing medical opinion, rather than a delusion.

The court also determined the appeal was not moot, given the potential impact on future substitute decision-maker decisions.

An appellant found not criminally responsible on account of mental disorder in 2000 for assault and uttering threats appealed his disposition of detention in a general forensic unit with community living privileges at the discretion of the hospital.

The appellant argued the Board's finding that he continues to pose a significant threat to public safety was unreasonable and sought a conditional discharge.

The Court of Appeal upheld the Board's majority decision, finding the disposition reasonable based on the appellant's persistent pattern of threatening behaviour, impulsivity, inability to control anger, and the structured environment's role in preventing escalation to physical violence.

Mr. Robertson, an accused under the jurisdiction of the Ontario Review Board (Board) and detained at Waypoint Centre for Mental Health Care, applied for a writ of habeas corpus with certiorari in aid.

He challenged the use of the Acute Risk of Violence Scale (ARVS) by Waypoint staff, alleging Charter violations and seeking various remedies including damages, injunctions, and orders for employee termination or police investigation.

The Superior Court, sitting as a criminal court on a habeas corpus application, determined it lacked jurisdiction to grant most of the civil remedies sought.

It affirmed that the Ontario Review Board is a court of competent jurisdiction for Charter remedies related to conditions of detention, and is the more appropriate forum for such issues, except for costs.

The court found no basis to award costs against the Crown.

Consequently, Mr. Robertson's application was dismissed.

The appellant, a forensic inpatient diagnosed with schizoaffective disorder, appealed a Consent and Capacity Board decision finding him incapable of consenting to treatment with antipsychotic medication.

The appellant argued the Board erred in its application of the capacity test and relied on uncorroborated evidence from his attending physician.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding the Board reasonably concluded that the appellant's persecutory delusions prevented him from appreciating the reasonably foreseeable consequences of refusing treatment.

The court also held that the physician's evidence was adequately corroborated by the appellant's own testimony.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Consent and Capacity Board confirming her involuntary admission under the Mental Health Act and a finding that she was incapable of consenting to psychiatric treatment under the Health Care Consent Act.

The appellant argued both procedural and substantive errors, including alleged failures in timely delivery of statutory notices and errors in assessing the criteria for involuntary admission and treatment capacity.

The court applied the standards of correctness for legal questions and reasonableness for factual and mixed questions, emphasizing deference to the specialized tribunal.

The court held that the Board reasonably concluded the statutory criteria for involuntary admission were met due to the likelihood of serious bodily harm to others and that the appellant lacked capacity because she could not appreciate the consequences of refusing treatment.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Consent and Capacity Board under the Mental Health Act concerning ongoing involuntary detention at a maximum security psychiatric facility.

The appeal raised issues regarding the standard of review, the application of the statutory criteria for detention, and alleged breaches of Charter rights under ss. 7, 9, 11(h), and 12.

During the hearing, the Court of Appeal released its decision in P.S. v. Ontario, which addressed the constitutionality of long-term involuntary committals and the limited powers of the Consent and Capacity Board.

The court held that the appellate ruling fundamentally altered the legal landscape and rendered the issues raised in the appeal moot, as the appellant fell within the class of long-term involuntary patients affected by the constitutional findings in that decision.

An employee sought a court order compelling payment of $150,000 from his employer’s deferred profit sharing plan due to alleged financial hardship.

The employer argued that it was not the proper respondent because the plan trustee administered the plan and that the employee did not meet the plan’s pre‑retirement withdrawal criteria.

The court held that only the trustee could effect payment and that the employee’s plan holdings did not qualify for pre‑retirement withdrawal under the governing trust deed.

The provision allowing trustees to distribute plan property pursuant to a court order did not grant a broad discretionary power to order payment outside the plan’s terms.

The court declined to interfere with the trustee’s discretion and dismissed the application.

The self-represented plaintiff commenced nine separate actions against 30 defendants, including doctors, nurses, physiotherapists, and academic advisors, alleging medical malpractice and negligence.

The plaintiff, who had been diagnosed with schizophrenia but refused to accept the diagnosis or take medication, claimed the defendants failed to properly diagnose and treat his physical injuries and ignored his beliefs about synchronicities.

The defendants brought motions for summary judgment to dismiss the actions.

The Superior Court of Justice granted the motions, finding no genuine issue for trial as the plaintiff failed to provide any expert evidence to support his claims, while the defendants provided uncontradicted expert evidence that they met or exceeded the standard of care.

The court also found the actions to be frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of process, and ordered the plaintiff to pay costs of $1,500 to each defendant.