Kathryn Hull

The appellant appealed his conviction for accessing child pornography, seeking to set aside his guilty plea due to ineffective assistance of counsel.

The appellant alleged counsel failed to review a police statement video and provided erroneous advice regarding the mandatory minimum sentence.

The court found counsel's actions and advice were deficient but concluded these deficiencies did not result in a miscarriage of justice, as the appellant's plea was effectively ratified after he learned the correct mandatory minimum sentence.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant, convicted of driving while disqualified, appealed a 30-day intermittent sentence.

The Superior Court of Justice found that the trial judge erred by overemphasizing general deterrence and failing to adequately consider the appellant's unique medical challenges and potential for rehabilitation.

The appeal was allowed, the intermittent sentence was set aside, and a 30-day conditional sentence with house arrest was substituted, while maintaining the one-year driving prohibition.

The victim fine surcharge was also vacated.

Justin Fabbro, an accused, applied for an order to sever his charges from co-accused Stephen Stadnik and for a separate trial.

Fabbro argued severance was in the interests of justice due to Stadnik's potential exculpatory testimony regarding drugs and proceeds of crime, the risk of "guilty by association" given stronger evidence against Stadnik, and the potential improper use of Stadnik's statement about firearms belonging to Fabbro.

The Crown opposed, arguing that Stadnik's statements were not overwhelmingly exculpatory, jury instructions could mitigate prejudice, and other factors like nexus, complexity, and judicial economy favored a joint trial.

The court dismissed the application, finding Fabbro failed to establish that severance was in the interests of justice, emphasizing the strong nexus between the accused, the complexity of separate trials, and the risk of inconsistent verdicts and multiplicity of proceedings.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual assault and touching a person under the age of 16, arguing the trial judge erred in assessing the complainant's evidence regarding dreams and inconsistencies in her testimony.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge's conclusions on credibility and reliability were amply supported by the evidence and entitled to deference.

The court held that the trial judge properly considered the frailties in the complainant's evidence and reasonably concluded that the events were not dreamt.

John Adamovsky appealed his three convictions for mischief, which arose from his unauthorized alteration of a neighbour's waterfront property on Georgian Bay.

The appellant, representing himself, argued that the trial judge erred in admitting hearsay evidence, assessing witness credibility, misapprehending evidence, and rendering an unreasonable verdict.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, affirming the trial judge's findings that the evidence was properly admitted for a non-hearsay purpose, the credibility assessment was entitled to deference, there was no material misapprehension of evidence, and the verdict was reasonable given the wilful damage and interference with the lawful enjoyment of property, irrespective of the appellant's subjective view of "improvement."

The appellant, Tessa-Lyn Wookey, appealed her convictions for Dangerous Driving, Impaired Driving, and Refuse Breath Sample, as well as her sentence.

The court found legal error in the trial judge's analysis of the mens rea for dangerous driving, noting a failure to explain "how and why" the driving constituted a marked departure from the standard of care.

For impaired driving, the court found the trial judge erred by concluding impairment was the only reasonable explanation for the driving, without considering other possibilities like dangerous or careless driving.

Consequently, new trials were ordered for Dangerous Driving and Impaired Driving.

The appeal against the Refuse Breath Sample conviction was dismissed, as the trial judge's factual findings regarding the appellant's unequivocal refusals and the officer's non-renewal of the demand were upheld, affirming that the "last chance" doctrine did not apply.

The global sentence appeal was not addressed due to the new trial orders, but the sentence for Refuse Breath Sample was deemed fit.

Jason William Heffernan pleaded guilty to criminal negligence causing death after an incident in a shopping plaza parking lot where the victim, Corby Stott, was struck and killed.

Stott was attempting to direct traffic when a confrontation ensued, leading to Heffernan driving his vehicle with Stott on the hood, accelerating to a speed that caused Stott to fall and sustain fatal head trauma.

The court considered the principles of denunciation, general deterrence, and rehabilitation.

Aggravating factors included the verbal confrontation, aggressive driving, driving with the victim on the hood, failure to stop immediately, and the significant impact on the victim's family.

Mitigating factors included the guilty plea, expressed remorse, calling 911, remaining at the scene, the offence being out of character, and strong family support.

The court emphasized the high moral blameworthiness despite the absence of intent to kill.

The accused pleaded guilty to aggravated assault after stabbing a convenience store clerk 17 times while under the influence of drugs and alcohol.

The unprovoked attack left the victim with a permanent disability in his hand.

The court accepted a joint submission, sentencing the accused to 3.5 years in custody, less 18 months of pre-sentence custody credit, leaving 2 years to be served in the penitentiary.

The applicant, previously convicted of child luring, brought an application for a stay of proceedings, arguing that the undercover police officer's actions during an internet sting operation amounted to entrapment.

The applicant contended the officer lacked reasonable suspicion and engaged in random virtue testing when responding to a Craigslist ad.

The court dismissed the application, finding the officer had abundant objectively reasonable grounds to suspect the applicant was a predator based on the ad's contents and the unfolding conversation.

The court held that the police conduct did not constitute random virtue testing and was a bona fide inquiry.

The Crown applied for a warrant of committal for the imprisonment of the respondent, who had defaulted on paying a $288,000 fine in lieu of forfeiture and a $37,000 victim surcharge imposed for a prior fraud conviction.

The respondent, who was self-represented and on social assistance, argued he lacked the means to pay.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the respondent's limited discretionary spending did not demonstrate a wilful refusal to pay the fine without reasonable excuse under section 734.7(1) of the Criminal Code.

The appellant appealed his convictions for impaired driving and driving with excess blood alcohol.

He argued that the trial judge erred by denying an adjournment request after the late disclosure of the arresting officer's complete handwritten notes, and that the trial judge misapprehended the evidence regarding the officer's reasonable and probable grounds for arrest.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding that the late disclosure did not impair the appellant's right to make full answer and defence, as an adequate transcription had been provided months earlier and defence counsel lacked diligence in pursuing the original notes.

The court also upheld the trial judge's finding that the officer had objective reasonable grounds to arrest based on the cumulative observations of the appellant's red eyes and slow, deliberate movements.

This decision concerns a bail recognizance estreatment hearing following the accused's breach of a house arrest condition.

The accused, Mark Meulendyks, breached his $50,000 recognizance, for which his father, John Meulendyks, acted as sole surety.

The Crown sought forfeiture of the full amount.

The court found the accused solely at fault for the breach but declined to order forfeiture against him due to undue hardship and inability to pay.

Despite the surety's diligence in monitoring the accused, the court ordered the surety to forfeit $25,000, emphasizing the importance of the moral pressure exerted by the recognizance and the surety's role as an assurance of compliance.

The appellant, Craig Warling, appealed his conviction for operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 mg, contrary to s. 253(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

The appeal raised three grounds: error in applying the legal test for Officer in Charge release under s. 498 of the Criminal Code, error in finding no connection between the purported Charter breach (arbitrary detention) and breath readings for s. 24(2) analysis, and error in determining the seriousness and impact of the s. 24(2) breach.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge correctly determined that the police acted reasonably in detaining the appellant for a bail hearing given his non-resident status and other factors.

The court also found no contextual connection between the alleged arbitrary detention and the breath samples, and that even if a breach occurred, its impact was minimal, thus not warranting exclusion of evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

Following an undercover internet sting, the accused was tried on multiple child luring counts and one count of making sexually explicit material available to a child.

The court rejected the accused's evidence that he believed he was engaged in role-playing with an adult and found his explanation about chatting to impress co-workers not credible.

Applying the statutory presumptions and the Supreme Court's framework for internet luring, the court held the accused believed he was communicating with a 14-year-old, took no reasonable steps to ascertain age, and used sexualized communications, requests for images, and pornography links to groom and lower the child's inhibitions.

Convictions were entered on all counts.

The applicant, Gary Allen, sought to exclude a "chat log" as evidence in his trial for luring and making sexually explicit material available.

He argued that the "chat log" was obtained in violation of his section 8 Charter rights (unreasonable search and seizure), constituted participant surveillance requiring prior judicial authorization under section 184.2 of the Criminal Code, and was inadmissible under the best evidence rule.

The court found that Allen had no subjective or objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in the online communications, as he advertised for sexual encounters with strangers on Craigslist and made no requests for confidentiality.

Consequently, section 8 of the Charter was not engaged, and no judicial authorization for interception was required.

The court further found the "chat log" admissible under the best evidence rule, explaining that the concept of an "original" is not readily applicable to electronic documents and that the integrity of the compilation was sufficiently established by police testimony.

The application was dismissed, and the "chat log" was deemed admissible.

The Crown brought a voluntariness application to admit the accused's videotaped statement to police, while the accused brought a Charter application seeking to exclude evidence obtained during a search of his home and computer, alleging breaches of ss. 8, 9, and 10(b).

The accused was charged with child luring after communicating online with an undercover officer posing as a 14-year-old girl.

The court found the videotaped statement was voluntary and admissible.

While the court found a s. 8 breach regarding the obtaining of subscriber information and a s. 10(b breach regarding pre-caution statements, it admitted the evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter, finding the police acted in good faith and the evidence was highly reliable and crucial to the prosecution.

The appellant, Anna Trubashnik, appealed her conviction for public mischief, arguing errors by the trial judge and seeking to admit fresh evidence, specifically a videotaped police interview and medical evidence.

The court applied the R. v. Palmer test for fresh evidence, relaxing the due diligence requirement for criminal cases.

It found the videotaped statement, which revealed the appellant's state of mind and doubts about the alleged robbery, to be relevant, credible, and potentially outcome-determinative.

The appeal was granted, and a new trial was ordered to allow the trial judge to consider this fresh evidence.

The appellant, Ramanpreet Sran, appealed his conviction for driving with excess blood alcohol (over 80) contrary to s. 235 of the Criminal Code.

The appeal was based on three grounds: alleged unlawful and arbitrary detention (s. 9 Charter), lack of reasonable suspicion for an Approved Screening Device (ASD) demand (s. 9 Charter), and failure to provide an interpreter for Panjabi (s. 10 Charter).

The appellate court, applying a standard of review of palpable and overriding error for factual findings and correctness for legal standards, dismissed the appeal.

The court found no Charter breaches, affirmed the lawfulness of the ASD demand based on the officer's reasonable suspicion, and concluded there was no language barrier requiring an interpreter.

The applicant, Gary Phillip Allen, challenged the constitutionality of subsections 171.1(3)-(4) and 172.1(3)-(4) of the Criminal Code, which pertain to internet luring and making explicit material available to a child.

The applicant argued these provisions violated sections 7 and 11(d) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms by creating a reverse onus and reducing the constitutionally required mens rea.

The court dismissed the application, finding the impugned provisions constitutionally valid.

The court held that these provisions impose an evidential burden, not a persuasive one, and are akin to a due diligence inquiry, consistent with prior appellate and Supreme Court jurisprudence on similar "reasonable steps" provisions.

The accused, charged with second degree murder following a vehicular confrontation with a pedestrian, applied for release on bail pending trial.

The Crown conceded that the accused met his onus on the primary, secondary, and tertiary grounds for detention.

The court granted the application and ordered the accused's release on a $200,000 recognizance with strict conditions, including house arrest and supervision by named sureties, to maintain public confidence in the administration of justice.