Jessica Sickinger

The defendant was convicted of internet child luring following a police sting operation known as Project Raphael.

The defendant's initial application for a stay of proceedings based on entrapment was dismissed by the court, relying on horizontal precedent that found the project was a bona fide investigation.

Following a recent decision by another judge who reversed his own prior ruling and found the project constituted entrapment, the defendant applied to re-open his entrapment application.

The court granted the request, finding that the reversal in horizontal precedent constituted a material change in circumstances that justified re-opening the application to hear evidence and make an independent determination.

The Crown sought a preliminary ruling to dismiss the defendant's entrapment application, arguing that prior Project Raphael cases had already determined the police investigation was bona fide and not random virtue testing.

The defendant argued that the Supreme Court's decision in R. v. Mills provided a new basis to distinguish his case.

The court found that Mills did not alter the entrapment analysis regarding the bona fide nature and precision of the police investigation, and dismissed the first branch of the defendant's entrapment application, but allowed the defendant to proceed with arguments under the second branch of entrapment (inducement).

The accused was charged with possession for the purpose of trafficking.

He brought pre-trial Charter applications alleging violations of his s. 8 and s. 10(b) rights.

The court found the search of a co-accused's cellphone and the tele-warrant for the accused's residence were lawful under s. 8.

However, the court found a serious violation of the accused's s. 10(b) rights because police delayed implementing his right to counsel and elicited self-incriminating statements and assistance in locating drugs during the search.

Applying the Grant framework, the court excluded the statements and the drugs found at the residence under s. 24(2).

The Crown brought a dangerous offender and long-term offender application following the offender's convictions for a series of violent, random attacks on women, including robbery, attempted sexual assault, and break and enter.

The court dismissed both applications, finding that the offender's risk of violent re-offence was moderate and did not meet the high threshold of intractability required for such designations.

The court imposed a global sentence of 14 years imprisonment, reduced to 6 years and 6 months net after accounting for pre-sentence custody and enhanced credit for harsh lockdown conditions.

The accused was charged with luring a minor following an undercover police sting operation.

Upon arrest, police seized his cell phone and subsequently obtained two warrants to extract and search its data.

The accused brought a pre-trial motion to exclude the cell phone evidence, alleging multiple breaches of his section 8 Charter rights regarding the warrants' execution and the police's failure to report the seized data back to a justice of the peace.

The court found a section 8 breach due to the failure to report the seized data under section 489.1 of the Criminal Code, but declined to exclude the evidence under section 24(2) of the Charter.

The court also granted the Crown's application to adduce text messages from the phone as bad character evidence, finding their probative value regarding the accused's ability to communicate in English outweighed any prejudicial effect.

The defendant, Sivaratnam Sinnappillai, brought a motion for a directed verdict at the close of the Crown's case in a trial for child luring and inviting sexual touching under s. 172.1 of the Criminal Code.

The defendant argued there was insufficient evidence to establish the first essential element of the offences, specifically the identity of the communicator.

The court dismissed the application, finding that there was sufficient circumstantial evidence, even without relying on the seized cell phone, for a reasonable jury to infer the defendant's guilt.

Issues regarding the continuity of the cell phone were deemed to go to the weight of the evidence, not its admissibility at this stage.

This ruling addresses the appropriate jury instruction when directed verdicts of acquittal and stays of proceedings are granted against some, but not all, defendants in a joint criminal trial.

The court considered arguments from defence counsel, who sought to withhold reasons for the defendants' departure, and the Crown, who advocated for instructions consistent with R. v. Rowbotham.

The judge decided to instruct the jury on the directed verdicts and stays, have the Crown enter stays in the jury's presence, and provide a cautionary instruction to prevent speculation and ensure individual assessment of guilt for the remaining defendants.

This decision provides supplemental reasons for directed verdict applications in a criminal trial involving charges of manslaughter, assault with a weapon, and assault causing bodily harm.

The Crown sought to rely on s. 21(2) of the Criminal Code to establish liability for manslaughter against all defendants, clarifying a previous misunderstanding of their position.

The court, however, found that even with the application of s. 21(2), there was insufficient evidence to establish a common intention among the defendants to commit a group assault on the pedestrians, which is a prerequisite for extended liability under s. 21(2).

Consequently, the earlier directed verdicts of acquittal for manslaughter against two defendants and assault causing bodily harm against two others remained undisturbed.

The court ruled on directed verdict applications for four defendants charged with manslaughter, assault with a weapon, and assault causing bodily harm following a fatal altercation.

The judge dismissed the assault with a weapon charge for all defendants due to insufficient evidence.

Manslaughter charges were dismissed for two defendants (Ampadu and Paniccia) but proceeded for two others (Clare and Zenczuk).

Assault causing bodily harm charges proceeded for two defendants (Ampadu and Paniccia) but were dismissed for the other two (Clare and Zenczuk).

The court found insufficient evidence for a common intention to attack all pedestrians, requiring individual assessment of party liability.

The defendant, on trial for manslaughter and assault charges, had his bail revoked when his father withdrew as surety.

A bail hearing was held to determine new release conditions.

The court found the Crown established a safety risk and likelihood of re-offence, necessitating a surety release.

The defendant proposed his mother as surety.

The court ultimately released the defendant on a $25,000 recognizance with his mother as surety, imposing house arrest and other conditions, but removing the electronic monitoring ankle bracelet.

The electronic monitoring condition was deemed constitutionally non-compliant due to its imposition without an opportunity to be heard, its unaffordable cost, and the significant emotional toll it placed on the family.

The defendant, facing serious charges including manslaughter, had his bail revoked after his father withdrew as surety.

The court conducted a fresh bail hearing, determining that the original recognizance was vacated and a new de novo hearing was required, with the Crown bearing the onus.

Given the defendant's history of breaching bail conditions and committing further serious offenses, the court found that an unconditional undertaking or less stringent conditions were insufficient.

A surety release was deemed necessary to address public safety concerns and the substantial likelihood of re-offence.

The matter was adjourned to determine adequate sureties and further conditions.

The defendants, jointly charged with manslaughter and assault, brought a motion seeking further disclosure from the Crown.

The applications concerned two areas: notes taken by police officers during witness preparation meetings with the Crown, and materials the Crown intended to use to cross-examine a proposed defence expert witness (a toxicologist) on the issue of bias.

The Crown opposed both applications, arguing that the notes contained no new relevant information and were subject to litigation privilege, and that the expert's prior testimony transcript was a matter of public record and not part of the "fruits of the investigation." The court ruled that the Crown was obliged to disclose both the officers' notes, finding them relevant and not privileged, and the transcript of the expert's prior evidence, as it related to the expert's impartiality and the accused's constitutional right to make full answer and defence.

The court emphasized the Crown's role as a minister of justice, prioritizing the proper administration of justice over tactical litigation advantages.

The request for "will-say" statements from officers who did not take notes was denied, as it would amount to creating evidence rather than disclosing existing material.

The Crown sought to exclude cell phone copies of surveillance video in a manslaughter trial, arguing they were unreliable due to unexplained differences from the original and violated the best evidence rule.

The defence contended the cell phone copies offered superior clarity and had been used without objection in a prior mistrial.

The court dismissed the Crown's application, finding the cell phone copies met the threshold for reliability, provided the clearest images, and thus satisfied a common sense application of the best evidence rule, emphasizing that "original" does not always mean "better" in terms of evidence quality.

The Crown brought an application to relitigate two prior evidentiary rulings made during an initial trial that ended in a mistrial.

The rulings concerned the admissibility of a witness's statement and the scope of cross-examination regarding an alleged attempt to influence testimony.

Applying s. 653.1 of the Criminal Code and the "interests of justice" factors from R. v. Victoria, the court found that the prior rulings were not clearly wrong and that no new evidence or arguments were presented to justify relitigation.

The application was dismissed, affirming the binding nature of the previous evidentiary decisions for the re-trial.

The appellant, Ryan Luckese, appealed his conviction for assault with a weapon.

The appeal grounds were that the trial judge erred by failing to address the issue of consent and, alternatively, erred in rejecting the defence of self-defence.

The Superior Court dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge implicitly considered consent by accepting the complainant's evidence of being threatened and taking defensive action.

The court also found that the trial judge correctly determined that self-defence under Section 34 of the Criminal Code did not apply, as the appellant initiated the threat with the axe before the complainant acted.

The Crown applied to admit the accused's statement to police as voluntary.

The accused had asserted his right to silence, but the interviewing officer made two improper inducements: suggesting the accused might not be charged if he gave his side of the story, and stating that an early explanation would be more credible to a judge than a later one presented by a lawyer.

The court found these inducements to be false and a direct assault on the accused's right to silence.

Despite the Crown arguing that the statement was prompted by the presentation of Snapchats, the court concluded that the inducements were significant and contributed to the accused's decision to speak.

Consequently, the statement was ruled inadmissible as the Crown failed to prove its voluntariness beyond a reasonable doubt.

The applicant, previously convicted of child luring, brought an application for a stay of proceedings, arguing that the undercover police officer's actions during an internet sting operation amounted to entrapment.

The applicant contended the officer lacked reasonable suspicion and engaged in random virtue testing when responding to a Craigslist ad.

The court dismissed the application, finding the officer had abundant objectively reasonable grounds to suspect the applicant was a predator based on the ad's contents and the unfolding conversation.

The court held that the police conduct did not constitute random virtue testing and was a bona fide inquiry.

The accused faced 22 charges relating to three random attacks on women and a scheme involving fake Craigslist job postings.

The Crown alleged the accused targeted women for kidnapping and sexual assault.

The court found the accused guilty of multiple offences, including robbery, attempt kidnapping, assault with a weapon, unlawful confinement, and attempt sexual assault in relation to the physical attacks, relying heavily on circumstantial evidence, DNA, and the doctrine of recent possession.

However, the court acquitted the accused of attempt kidnapping and attempt sexual assault regarding the Craigslist scheme, finding the acts did not go beyond mere preparation and the specific intent was not proven beyond a reasonable doubt.

The accused brought a Charter application seeking exclusion of approved instrument breath test readings pursuant to s. 24(2) of the Charter, alleging multiple breaches of his Charter rights.

The primary focus at trial was whether the officer had reasonable grounds for the approved instrument demand given the possibility of mouth alcohol contamination.

The court found no Charter breach.

The officer's observation of the accused drinking while driving, the presence of an open beer can in the vehicle console, the accused's admission of prior drinking, and the odour of beer on the accused's breath provided reasonable suspicion for the approved screening device test.

The court rejected the defence argument that the officer should have suspected further drinking during a two-minute interval when the accused was briefly unattended, finding the accused's testimony unreliable and the officer's belief that no further drinking occurred to be logical and reasonable.

The officer properly waited more than 15 minutes after the accused's last observed drink before administering the approved instrument test, ensuring test reliability.

The Charter application was dismissed.

The accused brought a motion for a mistrial based on concerns raised by the Crown during trial that the accused may have been drinking alcohol and impaired.

The Crown's concern was based on observations by an officer in the hallway.

Defence counsel confirmed with the accused that he had not been drinking and was fit to proceed.

The defence argued that the mention of the issue could prevent a fair trial given that the charge related to alcohol and driving.

The court dismissed the mistrial application, finding that trial courts routinely hear prejudicial evidence later found inadmissible and must disregard such evidence.

The court noted that no prejudicial result occurred from the Crown's concern, which was appropriately raised and addressed.