Jeffrey Goldglass

This decision addresses the charge of dangerous operation of a vehicle under s 320.13(1) of the Criminal Code.

The court considered the credibility of the police officer's radar speed measurement and the accused's testimony.

The officer's evidence of the van traveling at 139 km/hr in a 70 km/hr zone, combined with aggressive driving and distraction, was found credible.

The accused's contradictory and unreliable testimony was rejected.

The court found the accused's driving to be a marked departure from the standard of care, constituting dangerous operation.

This sentencing decision by Justice A. A. Ghosh in the Ontario Court of Justice addresses the appropriate sentence for David Pusey, convicted of possessing a loaded firearm contrary to the Criminal Code, including possession contrary to a prohibition order.

The decision carefully analyzes the applicability of presentence custody credit, particularly rejecting the use of custody for an unrelated murder charge in sentencing.

It discusses sentencing principles, aggravating and mitigating factors, and relevant case law, including the impact of systemic racism and immigration consequences.

The ruling provides detailed guidance on sentencing ranges for firearm offences and the interplay with immigration law, making it a valuable precedent for sentencing in firearm possession cases involving complex collateral consequences.

D.L. pleaded guilty to sexual interference and manufacturing child pornography involving his stepdaughter, A.W., who was 13-15 years old during the prolonged abuse.

The court considered aggravating factors including a profound breach of trust, sexual grooming, the graphic nature of the manufactured child sexual exploitation videos, the variety and prolonged period of sexual activity, and the use of bondage.

Mitigating factors included an early guilty plea and a forensic risk assessment indicating a "below average risk to reoffend sexually," though the offender showed diminished insight.

The court applied the principles from R. v. Friesen regarding upward departure from dated sentencing ranges for child sexual abuse and the non-mitigating nature of victim participation.

Despite the Crown's initial proposed range of 8-10 years, the court imposed a global custodial term of 8 years, comprising 6.5 years for sexual interference and 18 months consecutive for manufacturing child pornography, balancing totality and restraint given the pre-plea Crown position and recent appellate guidance.

The Law Society of Ontario (LSO) brought a motion for a stay of a Divisional Court costs order, pending the determination of its motion for leave to appeal the Divisional Court's substantive decision.

The Divisional Court had allegedly ruled on costs without affording parties an opportunity for submissions.

The Court of Appeal granted the stay, applying the three-part test from RJR-MacDonald.

The court found a serious issue regarding both the substantive decision and the costs order, irreparable harm to the LSO if required to pay out monies that might be unrecoverable, and that the balance of convenience favored the stay, especially given its limited duration and the LSO's automatic entitlement to a stay if leave to appeal is granted.

The accused, Brandon Boise, was charged with violating conditions of an order, specifically attending a property frequented by Jessica Carter and contacting children.

The court assessed witness credibility, including an alibi defense presented by the accused's father, Ronald Boise.

The judgment provides a detailed interpretation of the term "frequents" in the context of non-contact orders, establishing seven guiding principles.

The court found the alibi unreliable and determined that the property was indeed frequented by the complainant.

Boise was acquitted of the charge related to contacting children due to lack of evidence but found guilty of two counts of violating the attendance conditions at the frequented location.

The Crown brought a dangerous offender and long-term offender application following the offender's convictions for a series of violent, random attacks on women, including robbery, attempted sexual assault, and break and enter.

The court dismissed both applications, finding that the offender's risk of violent re-offence was moderate and did not meet the high threshold of intractability required for such designations.

The court imposed a global sentence of 14 years imprisonment, reduced to 6 years and 6 months net after accounting for pre-sentence custody and enhanced credit for harsh lockdown conditions.

The accused faced 22 charges relating to three random attacks on women and a scheme involving fake Craigslist job postings.

The Crown alleged the accused targeted women for kidnapping and sexual assault.

The court found the accused guilty of multiple offences, including robbery, attempt kidnapping, assault with a weapon, unlawful confinement, and attempt sexual assault in relation to the physical attacks, relying heavily on circumstantial evidence, DNA, and the doctrine of recent possession.

However, the court acquitted the accused of attempt kidnapping and attempt sexual assault regarding the Craigslist scheme, finding the acts did not go beyond mere preparation and the specific intent was not proven beyond a reasonable doubt.

This ruling addresses the admissibility of evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter, following findings that five of six judicial authorizations were invalid and police exceeded the "plain view" doctrine during searches.

The court applied the R. v. Grant framework to various items.

Computer and cell phone evidence were excluded due to serious Charter violations and high impact on privacy interests.

Observations of the computer screen were also excluded.

However, handcuffs, a forensic textbook, handwritten notes, and Rogers cell phone records were deemed admissible, as their exclusion would bring the administration of justice into disrepute, despite some Charter breaches, particularly where lawful alternative means to obtain the evidence existed.

The applicant, facing 22 criminal charges including attempted sexual assault and kidnapping, brought a pre-trial application challenging the validity of six judicial authorizations (search warrants and a production order) under section 8 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The court conducted a Garofoli review, finding that while the affiant made full, fair, and frank disclosure, only the initial telewarrant for specific items (sunglasses and gloves) was valid.

However, specific seizures and searches conducted under this initial warrant (handcuffs, a forensic textbook, and activating a laptop screen) were deemed unlawful as they exceeded the warrant's scope or the plain view doctrine.

The subsequent five judicial authorizations, including a second telewarrant for laptop seizure, two warrants to search laptop contents, a warrant to search a cell phone, and a production order for cell phone records, were all quashed due to insufficient grounds or fatal flaws on their face.

The court emphasized that "plausibility" or "possibility" is not the legal standard for issuing warrants, which require "reasonable and probable grounds." The admissibility of the unlawfully obtained evidence will be determined in a subsequent s. 24(2) Charter analysis.

The accused, Antonio Ricciardi, brought a pre-trial application challenging the warrantless seizure of his sweatshirt by police during a court appearance.

The Crown argued the seizure was authorized under s. 489(2) of the Criminal Code as a simple seizure of evidence in plain view.

The court, applying a broad and purposive interpretation of Charter s. 8 privacy rights, held that the non-consensual removal of clothing from a person constitutes a "search and seizure," not merely a "seizure." Since s. 489(2) only authorizes a seizure and not a search, the police action fell outside its scope and violated the accused's s. 8 Charter rights.

The accused pleaded guilty to failing to remain at the scene of an accident knowing that bodily harm had been caused and being reckless as to whether death resulted.

The victim, a 19-year-old cyclist, died from blunt force head trauma after being struck by the accused's vehicle on an unlit road.

The accused initially fled the scene and misrepresented the incident to his father before surrendering to police the following day.

The court imposed a 90-day intermittent jail sentence, a 2-year driving prohibition, and a 2-year probation order with conditions including community service and counselling.

The sentencing balanced denunciation and deterrence against the accused's youth, first-offender status, genuine remorse, and rehabilitative prospects.