Javier Arvizu

The Ontario Court of Justice sentenced Anson Keung to a global 30-month jail term for multiple firearms offences, including carrying a concealed firearm, occupying a vehicle knowing a prohibited weapon was present, and possession of a loaded restricted firearm without authorization.

The court emphasized the significant public safety threat posed by loaded handguns in public, applying general deterrence and denunciation as primary sentencing objectives.

Despite mitigating factors such as Keung's youth, lack of criminal record, and good behaviour on bail, the court found a conditional sentence insufficient.

The sentence accounted for pre-trial custody and house arrest credit.

Additionally, the firearm and ammunition were forfeited, and a 10-year weapons prohibition was imposed.

Keung was also ordered to provide a DNA sample for the national databank due to the serious nature of the offences.

This sentencing decision by Justice A. A. Ghosh in the Ontario Court of Justice addresses the appropriate sentence for David Pusey, convicted of possessing a loaded firearm contrary to the Criminal Code, including possession contrary to a prohibition order.

The decision carefully analyzes the applicability of presentence custody credit, particularly rejecting the use of custody for an unrelated murder charge in sentencing.

It discusses sentencing principles, aggravating and mitigating factors, and relevant case law, including the impact of systemic racism and immigration consequences.

The ruling provides detailed guidance on sentencing ranges for firearm offences and the interplay with immigration law, making it a valuable precedent for sentencing in firearm possession cases involving complex collateral consequences.

The defendant, Anson Keung, was charged with firearms offences after a loaded handgun was found during a pat-down search following an arrest based on mistaken identity.

The defence brought a Charter application, arguing arbitrary detention (s. 9) and unlawful search (s. 8), seeking exclusion of the evidence under ss. 24(1) and 24(2).

The court found that the police's actions, including the investigative detention and pat-down search, were reasonable given the dynamic situation and concerns for officer safety, particularly due to the actual suspect's history with firearms.

The Charter application was dismissed, and the defendant was found guilty on all three charges.

The offender, Domonic Andre Mudahy, pleaded guilty to two counts of robbery.

The first involved a Rogers store, where he acted as the driver, and the second involved a Best Buy, where he was also the driver and not directly involved in the kidnapping or entry.

The second offence was committed while on bail for the first.

The court considered his youth, lack of prior record, and community involvement as mitigating factors, alongside significant pre-sentence custody credit (including enhanced Summers credit and Duncan/Marshall credit for harsh conditions).

Aggravating factors included the commercial nature of the robberies, the vulnerability of the victims, the sophisticated planning, and the commission of a new offence while on bail.

The court emphasized denunciation and general deterrence due to the serious and prevalent nature of such violent commercial robberies.

A global sentence of 5 years in the penitentiary was imposed, with 20 months deducted for pre-sentence custody, resulting in a further 40 months.

The accused, Shan Latif, faced multiple charges including human trafficking, receiving material benefit from sexual services, advertising sexual services, procuring sexual services, uttering threats, and pointing a firearm.

The Crown alleged Latif exploited S.B. and K.B. in the sex trade between January 2020 and January 2021, exercising control and influence over their movements and profiting from their activities.

The defence argued Latif was merely an "errand boy" and that the complainants' testimonies were inconsistent and motivated by bias.

The court found the complainants' evidence credible despite minor inconsistencies.

The judge concluded that Latif recruited and influenced both complainants for the purpose of exploitation, routinely assisting with ads, client texts, arranging accommodations, and receiving a 50% share of earnings.

Latif was found guilty of human trafficking (Counts 1 and 8), receiving material benefit (Counts 2 and 9), advertising sexual services (Count 3), procuring sexual services (Count 4), and uttering threats (Count 5).

He was found not guilty of pointing a firearm (Count 10) due to insufficient proof that the item was an actual firearm.

Submissions on Kienapple stay for Count 4 were requested.

The self-represented Indigenous offender was sentenced for discharging a restricted firearm, possessing a loaded restricted firearm, and possessing a firearm while prohibited.

The offences occurred while the offender was on parole and involved firing multiple shots from a vehicle in a public place.

The court weighed the serious aggravating factors, including a lengthy criminal record and prior firearms prohibitions, against mitigating factors such as a difficult childhood, efforts at rehabilitation, and harsh pre-trial custody conditions.

A global sentence of 7 years was imposed, which was reduced to approximately 2.6 years of net additional custody after applying enhanced credit for pre-sentence custody, Charter breaches, and harsh lockdown conditions.

The applicant, charged with firearm offences, applied for a stay of proceedings alleging multiple Charter breaches during his arrest and subsequent detention.

The court found no breaches regarding the use of force during arrest, right to counsel, or bail delay.

However, the court found breaches of s. 8 for an unreasonable strip search, and s. 12 for excessive force by correctional staff following a suicide attempt and prolonged administrative segregation.

Despite these breaches, the court declined to grant a stay of proceedings, concluding that the breaches were not among the 'clearest of cases' and should instead be considered at sentencing if the applicant is convicted.

The accused was charged with multiple firearm offences after discharging a stolen handgun from a vehicle in a public parking lot.

He admitted to possessing the loaded restricted firearm without a license and while bound by prohibition orders, but argued he lacked the mens rea for the discharge offence due to extreme cocaine intoxication akin to automatism.

The court held that discharging a firearm under s. 244.2(1) is a general intent offence.

The accused failed to establish the defence of automatism, as he did not call expert evidence and his actions demonstrated an operating mind.

The accused was found guilty on three counts, with the fourth stayed under the Kienapple principle.

At a preliminary inquiry, the Crown sought committal of two accused on multiple drug trafficking and firearms offences.

The accused Barker conceded committal on most counts except simple possession of fentanyl.

The accused Duncan challenged committal on all counts.

The court found sufficient evidence to commit both accused on trafficking charges related to cocaine transactions with an undercover officer on December 19, 2018, and on possession for purpose of trafficking charges related to drugs found in a rental vehicle.

The court found sufficient evidence to commit Duncan on possession charges related to prescription pills found in his bedroom.

However, the court discharged Duncan on all firearms offences, finding insufficient evidence of his possession of a firearm found in the basement.

The court committed Barker on all firearms offences based on circumstantial evidence linking him to the shoebox where the firearm was found.

The accused pleaded guilty to two counts of trafficking in cocaine contrary to s 5(1) of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act.

Over a period of months, the accused sold cocaine to undercover officers on ten occasions, progressing from small amounts to a final transaction involving half a kilogram for $28,000.

A search of the accused's residence yielded approximately 193 grams of cocaine, scales, packaging material, and cash.

A Gladue report was prepared and a sentencing circle was held to consider the accused's personal circumstances as an Indigenous person and systemic factors contributing to the offences.

The Crown sought a four-year sentence, while the defence proposed a restorative justice approach with three to six months custody followed by probation, or alternatively, the minimum federal term of two years.

The court imposed a global sentence of three years and six months, reflecting the serious nature of commercial-level cocaine trafficking while considering the accused's rehabilitation efforts, guilty plea, and Indigenous heritage.

The accused was charged with trafficking cocaine, possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking, and possession of property obtained by crime over $5,000.

The trial was scheduled for November 13-15, 2018.

The accused's counsel sought to delay proceedings by arguing that a pending appeal of a Superior Court jurisdictional ruling created an automatic stay of proceedings.

The court rejected this argument, finding no automatic stay exists and that the trial would proceed as scheduled unless superseded by a higher court order.

The court imposed strict deadlines for filing any pre-trial motions and issued a bench summons to ensure the accused's attendance at trial.

The accused was charged with possession of cocaine contrary to section 4(1) of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act.

The accused was arrested in his vehicle in his driveway after police observed him attend a residence believed to be a drug stash house.

A search incident to arrest yielded 0.2 grams of cocaine.

The accused brought a Charter application alleging violations of sections 8 and 9 of the Charter.

The court found that the arresting officer did not have reasonable grounds to believe the accused was in possession of a controlled substance, rendering the arrest unlawful and the search unauthorized.

The court excluded the evidence under section 24(2) of the Charter, finding that admission would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The applicant was charged with nine drug offences arising from a search warrant executed at his residence.

He challenged the validity of the warrant under section 8 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, arguing that the warrant should not have been issued and that the search breached his right to be free from unreasonable search and seizure.

The applicant also argued that the warrant was a ruse or pretext to gain entry to install listening devices related to a parallel homicide investigation.

The court applied the Garofoli test and found that there was sufficient credible and reliable evidence to support the issuance of the warrant under section 11 of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act.

The court rejected the argument that the dual purpose of the warrant rendered it invalid, finding that the presence of a secondary purpose did not invalidate the resort to the statutory power.

The application was dismissed.

The accused was convicted of trafficking in fentanyl powder following a controlled drug transaction.

The sentencing decision addresses the serious dangers of powdered fentanyl trafficking, the accused's lengthy criminal history involving violence, firearms, and drugs, and his status as both an addict and a commercial trafficker.

The court imposed a sentence of 6 years less pre-trial custody, emphasizing denunciation and deterrence as dominant sentencing objectives given the public health crisis created by fentanyl trafficking.

The accused was convicted of simple possession of fentanyl following a trial.

The Crown sought a 90-day jail sentence, emphasizing the toxicity of fentanyl and the need for deterrence and denunciation.

The court rejected a custodial sentence, finding that the fentanyl crisis is primarily a public health issue rather than one requiring criminal deterrence.

The court imposed a suspended sentence with three years' probation, including conditions requiring monthly reporting, residence approval, non-association with criminals, abstinence from controlled substances, and participation in substance abuse and mental health counselling.

The accused Moore and Abbott were charged with trafficking fentanyl on March 15, 2016.

Abbott was additionally charged with possession of fentanyl for the purpose of trafficking.

The Crown conceded it had not proven the trafficking count against Abbott, which was dismissed.

At trial, the court found Abbott guilty of simple possession of fentanyl but not guilty of possession for the purpose of trafficking, finding reasonable doubt as to trafficking intent.

The court found Moore guilty of trafficking fentanyl, determining on the basis of circumstantial evidence that Moore was the dealer "Sweets" who sold the fentanyl to Abbott from apartment 1415 at 263 Pharmacy Avenue.

The accused Moore and Abbott were charged with trafficking in fentanyl.

Moore was additionally charged with possession of fentanyl for the purpose of trafficking.

Both brought pre-trial Charter motions alleging violations of their rights under ss. 8, 9, and 10 of the Charter.

The Crown sought to establish the voluntariness of utterances made by both accused.

The court found that the arrests of both accused were lawful based on reasonable and probable grounds.

However, the court found a violation of Moore's rights under s. 10(b) when police failed to follow up after his request for counsel could not be connected.

The court applied the s. 24(2) test and admitted the evidence, finding that exclusion was not necessary to maintain public confidence in the administration of justice.

The accused, Mr. Wu, brought a Charter application to exclude evidence in his second trial for drug trafficking and possession of crime proceeds, alleging violations of his right to counsel under s. 10(b).

The Crown conceded a s. 10(b) breach but argued for the admission of evidence.

The court found multiple and serious s. 10(b) violations, including an 11-hour delay in providing access to counsel, unrecorded interviews conducted during the suspension of rights, and misleading testimony by the investigating officer at the first trial.

Applying the R. v. Grant s. 24(2) analysis, the court concluded that the seriousness of the state conduct and the impact on the accused's Charter interests significantly outweighed society's interest in an adjudication on the merits.

Consequently, all evidence seized during the related investigation was excluded.