ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
BETWEEN:
HIS MAJESTY THE KING
Respondent
– and –
SHAN LATIF
Defendant/Applicant
Javier Arvizu, for the Crown
Allison Craig, for the Defendant/Applicant
HEARD: December 9, 2025
REASONS FOR DECISION
DE SA J
OVERVIEW
1On November 22, 2024, the Applicant was found guilty of several human trafficking related offences and one count of uttering threats contrary to the Criminal Code.
2On December 1, 2025, the Applicant applied for a stay of proceedings on the grounds that his rights as guaranteed by s. 11(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (“Charter”) have been violated.
3The “total delay” in this case is 1341 days or approximately 44 months. The defence concedes a total delay of approximately 6 months. The net delay, after “defence delay” is factored in, is 38 months for the December offences, and 33 months for the May offences. The Applicant argues that the delay here exceeds the 30-month ceiling, and accordingly is presumptively unreasonable. Given the absence of any meaningful explanation for the delay, the charges should be stayed.
4The Crown acknowledges that it needs to rebut the presumption that the delay in this case is presumptively unreasonable. The Crown submits that there were clear additional instances of “defence delay” and “discrete events” that must be considered. After deducting defence delay and discrete events (exceptional circumstances), the Crown submits that the net delay is 852 days or 28 months.
5Having reviewed the record presented, I would agree with the Crown that after accounting for the defence delay and discrete events, the delay falls within the guideline of 30 months as set out by the Supreme Court in Jordan.
6Accordingly, the application is dismissed.
7The reasons for my decision are set out below.
SUMMARY OF FACTS
The Proceeding Commences
8The Applicant, Shan Latif, was charged with the following human trafficking related offences on December 15, 2020 pursuant to the Criminal Code (the “December charges”):
(i) CC 279.01(1) – Exercise control;
(ii) CC 286.1(1) – Receive a financial or material benefit;
(iii) CC 286.4 – Advertise sexual services (x2);
(iv) CC 286.3 – Procure (x2); and
(v) CC 286.1(1) –Receive a financial or material benefit.
9Related to the above offences, the Applicant was also charged with uttering threats under s. 264.1(2) of the Criminal Code.
10Additionally, on May 3, 2021, the Applicant was charged with further human trafficking offences and a firearm offence stemming from the allegations of a separate complainant, S.B., (the “May charges”). These offences included:
(i) CC 279.01 – Exercise control;
(ii) CC 279.02(2) – Receive a financial or material benefit; and
(iii) CC 87(2) –Point firearm.
11The Applicant’s case originated in the Ontario Court of Justice. Between the Applicant’s arrest dates of December 15, 2020 and May 3, 2021, up until the first appearance on June 25, 2021, the case progressed in the ordinary course.1
Scheduling the Initial Preliminary Inquiry and Discovery
12The Applicant elected to be tried on all counts in the Superior Court of Justice before a judge and jury with a preliminary inquiry.
13On June 24, 2021, preliminary inquiry dates were set for June 20 – 22, 2022. Earlier dates commencing May 4, 2022 and continuing to May 6, 2022 were offered and while the Crown was available, the defence was not.
14On the following day, an agent appeared for Ms. Craig, the Applicant’s counsel, and confirmed that Ms. Craig was unavailable on the scheduled preliminary inquiry dates. The matter would have to return so that new dates could be scheduled.
15On July 5, 2021, another agent for Ms. Craig appeared and adjourned the matter to July 26, 2021 to obtain a date in a trial scheduling court.
16A trial scheduling date was finally obtained for August 11, 2021. On August 11, 2021, a second set of preliminary inquiry dates were set for September 28 – 30, 2022.
17By September 23, 2021, the Applicant’s counsel advised the Crown that she was not available for the dates in September 2022, and a third set of dates would need to be obtained.
18As committal was not in issue, the parties agreed to proceed by way of discovery to expedite matters and were able to obtain the dates of November 18 and December 2, 2022. The Applicant explicitly waived 11(b) from September 28, 2022 to November 18, 2022.
19Given the events above, the Applicant has conceded defence delay from May 4, 2022 (the first date offered for preliminary inquiry) and November 18, 2022.
Vacating the Discovery Date for a New Preliminary Inquiry Date
20On October 26, 2022, the Crown wrote to the Applicant’s counsel to notify them that they needed to obtain new dates for a preliminary inquiry. The Crown discovered that due to the nature of the charges, the matter could not proceed by way of discovery. Rule 4.4 of the Ontario Court of Justice Rules required a judge to be available for the examination given the involvement of a vulnerable witness (witnesses under 18 or victims of physical or sexual violence).
21The Crown wrote to the Trial Coordinator. In email correspondence on November 2, 2022, the Trial Coordinator acknowledged that the Crown’s assessment for the need of a preliminary inquiry was correct.
22As a result, the parties obtained the date of November 16, 2022 to schedule a new date for the preliminary inquiry. On November 16, 2022, the fourth and final set of preliminary inquiry dates were set for March 9 and 10, 2023.
Committal and Proceedings in Superior Court
23The preliminary inquiry proceeded on March 9 and 10, 2023, and the matter was committed to Superior Court.
24Between May 19, 2023 and June 5, 2023, SCJ pre-trials were conducted. On the pre-trial form, the parties agreed that having regard to the defence delay and/or exceptional circumstances, the Jordan presumptive ceiling date was May 4, 2024.
25On June 5, 2023 trial dates were confirmed for one week commencing on April 15, 2024 and pre-trial motions were also noted for January 3 and 5, 2024. These dates were Jordan compliant with the 11(b) timelines set out in the pre-trial forms. Notably, there was no mention of any 11(b) concerns when trial dates were set.
26On December 15, 2023, the SCJ Trial Coordinator, Ms. Haddad, wrote to the Applicant and the Crown inquiring if the dates for the pre-trial motions could be moved. The parties agreed to change the pre-trial motions dates to January 4 and 5, 2024.
27On December 21, 2023, Ms. Haddad wrote to counsel about materials not being filed for the anticipated pre-trial motions. The Applicant’s counsel confirmed on December 28, 2023 that the pre-trial motions were not needed and if they were, the Applicant’s counsel would obtain new dates and that “11(b) certainly will not be an issue and the trial dates remain in any event!”.
28The 278 application ultimately proceeded on April 3, 5 and 9, 2024 prior to the scheduled trial date.
29The trial commenced on April 15, 2024 as anticipated. On April 16, 2024, Ms. Craig requested that matter not sit on April 19, 2024 as Ms. Craig had a flight that was leaving that morning. It was contemplated that the evidence would be completed by April 18, 2024, and that another date would be required for submissions once the evidence was complete. There was no issue with delay raised, and the parties were content that additional dates could be found to accommodate the schedules of all parties involved.
30On April 17, 2024, counsel acknowledged that it would be unlikely that all evidence would be completed by April 18, 2024. Both counsel suggested selecting two additional days to accommodate any potential defence evidence.
31Dates were suggested in July, but the Court inquired whether there were dates prior for completion of the evidence. Ultimately, the parties agreed to adjourn the matter for May 2, 2024 for the matter to continue. If an additional day was required, all parties agreed that it could be obtained on May 2, 2024.
32On April 18, 2024, the Crown’s case was essentially complete apart from filing an Agreed Statement of Facts, but the defence still had to decide whether a defence would be called. The matter was adjourned to May 2, 2024 for defence evidence, if any.
33Defence evidence was called and completed on May 2, 2024. The matter was adjourned to May 3, 2024 to schedule a date for submissions. All parties agreed that submissions would require additional time given the nature of the evidence heard.
34While defence counsel was available as early as July 8, 2024, the earliest date the Court was available was August 6, 2024 which was selected for submissions. This date was later moved to August 16, 2024 as the Court was ultimately unavailable on August 6, 2024.
35After submissions, the matter was adjourned to November 22, 2024 for judgment.
36The parties agree that any delay after August 16 is not to be considered in the assessment of delay.2
ANALYSIS
The Jordan Framework
Calculating Delay and the Presumptive Ceiling
37In R. v. Jordan, 2016 SCC 27, [2016] 1 S.C.R. 631 (“Jordan”), the Supreme Court set a presumptive ceiling for delay of 18 months for Provincial Court and 30 months for those cases going to Superior Court.
38Under the Jordan framework, delay exceeding the presumptive ceiling is presumptively unreasonable and a stay will be issued unless the Crown can show exceptional circumstances: Jordan, at para. 46.
39Delay is calculated from the time the charges are laid until the actual or anticipated end of trial. Any defence delay – waived or caused by the defence – is subtracted from the total.
40Net delay that exceeds the ceilings is presumptively unreasonable, but the Crown can rebut the presumption by showing the excessive delay was caused by “exceptional circumstances”: Jordan, at para. 68.
41These are circumstances that “lie outside the Crown’s control” in that they are “reasonably unforeseen or reasonably unavoidable” and the Crown cannot “reasonably remedy the delays emanating from those circumstances”: Jordan, at para. 69; R. v. Villanti, 2020 ONCA 755, 153 O.R. (3d) 481, at para. 11.
Defence Delay in this Case
42Delay that is explicitly waived by the defence is deducted from the total and is not counted toward the ceiling. Any waiver by the defence however must be “…clear and unequivocal [t]he accused must have full knowledge of his or her rights, as well as the effect waiver will have on those rights.”: Jordan, at paras. 61, 63-65; R. v. Cody, 2017 SCC 31, [2017] 1 S.C.R. 659, at para. 30 (“Cody”); and R. v. Godin, 2009 SCC 26, [2009] 2 S.C.R. 3, at para. 11.
43Delay that is caused solely by the conduct of the defence, such as delay caused by defence tactics, to deliberately sidetrack the trial, will also be deducted from overall delay and not counted towards the ceiling.
44The defence will also have directly caused the delay if the court and the Crown are ready to proceed, but the defence is not: Jordan, at para. 64; R. v. Mallozzi, 2018 ONCA 312, at para. 3.
45In this case, the defence has acknowledged a delay of approximately 199 days, which is the period between May 4, 2022 and November 18, 2022 (just over 6 months) that can be attributed to waived and/or defence delay.
46There was another 49 days of delay from June 24, 2021 to August 11, 2021 related to selecting a new date for the preliminary inquiry after vacating the original dates of June 20, 2022. I agree with the Crown that this delay should also be attributed to the defence as it flowed from the decision to vacate the original preliminary inquiry dates.
47Beyond the waived delay, in my view, there were also a number of instances where the defence either encouraged the delay or engaged in conduct that would inevitably delay the matter beyond the Jordan timeline. For example:
(i) Between May 19, 2023 and June 5, 2023, SCJ pre-trials were conducted. On the pre-trial form, the parties agreed that having regard to the defence delay and/or exceptional circumstances, the Jordan presumptive ceiling date was May 4, 2024. The defence now disputes this date as being the Jordan date and relies on the delay caused by the erroneous scheduling of the discovery.
(ii) On June 5, 2023, trial dates were confirmed for one week commencing on April 15, 2024 and pre-trial motions were also noted for January 3 and 5, 2024. There was no mention of any 11(b) concerns when the trial dates were set. On the contrary, when the pre-trial motion dates were vacated, the defence made clear that 11(b) was not in issue.
(iii) As outlined above, the trial commenced on April 15, 2024. On April 16, 2024, Ms. Craig, counsel for the Applicant, requested that matter not proceed on April 19, 2024 as Ms. Craig had a flight that was leaving that morning related to a personal matter. By making this request, the defence agreed to have the trial continue beyond what was identified as the “Jordan date” of May 4, 2024.
(iv) On May 2, 2024, the parties again suggested that the matter go over for submissions. While the date of May 3, 2024 was available, the parties requested that the matter go over for submissions, and a date of August 16, 2024 was ultimately selected. Again, no issue was raised with the delay.
48While legitimate defence actions directed at responding to the charges fall outside defence delay, accused persons must bear in mind that a corollary of the s. 11(b) right “to be tried within a reasonable time” is the responsibility to avoid causing unreasonable delay: Jordan, at para. 112; Cody, at para. 36.
49The Jordan framework requires that the defence be an active part of the solution to the problem of delay in criminal cases. Defence counsel are expected to “actively advance their clients’ right to a trial within a reasonable time, collaborate with Crown counsel when appropriate and... use court time efficiently” (Jordan, at para. 138; J.F., 2022 SCC 17, [2022] 1 S.C.R. 330 (“J.F.)., at paras. 30-36).
50Inaction can amount to illegitimate conduct on the part of the defence, because “[i]llegitimacy may extend to omissions as well as acts” (Cody, at para. 33). The defence may not benefit from its own inaction or lateness in taking action; it must act proactively. The Supreme Court explained in J.F. at para. 32:
As this Court wrote in Morin, “[t]he purpose of s. 11(b) is to expedite trials and minimize prejudice and not to avoid trials on the merits” (p. 802). This section was not intended to make it possible for an accused to frustrate the ends of justice (Jordan, at paras. 21, 60 and 63). As the Court also recently noted, an accused may not benefit from the lengthening of delay where it is caused by the accused’s own conduct (R. v. Boulanger, 2022 SCC 2, [2022] 1 S.C.R. 9, at para. 6; R. v. Ste Marie, 2022 SCC 3, [2022] 1 S.C.R. 14, at para. 11) [ Emphasis added].
51It is also of note that the defence only raised the issue of delay at the end of trial. Being proactive and raising s. 11(b) concerns early on alerts the Crown and the Court to their concerns about delay. As a result, all parties can take proactive measures and cooperate to expedite the proceedings. As the Court explained in J.F. at para. 35:
…The defence is in fact encouraged to act before the start of the trial, since the Jordan framework allows “the parties to know ‘in advance, the bounds of reasonableness so proactive measures can be taken to remedy any delay’” (K.G.K., at para. 43, quoting Jordan, at para. 108 (emphasis in original)).
52The defence was well aware that vacating the date of April 19 and adjourning the matter over for defence evidence and submissions would inevitably delay the conclusion of the trial beyond that Jordan date. Their request in this regard obviously should not be something that can be used by the Applicant to obtain a stay of the proceedings.
53In the circumstances, I would treat the delay from April 19 (the anticipated end of trial) to August 16, 2024 as neutral in the 11(b) calculation (119 days). Regardless of whether it is characterized as defence delay or a discrete event, in my view, it should be deducted in determining the net delay.
Exceptional Circumstances: Discrete Event
54In this case, there is no suggestion that a delay exceeding the presumptive ceiling was necessitated by the complexity of the case. Indeed, the dates scheduled in April 15 – 19, 2024 were anticipated to fall well within the Jordan timeline.
55The main point of contention is attributing the delay relating to the parties’ decision to set a discovery for November 18, 2022. This date ultimately had to be vacated and rescheduled for March 10, 2023 to ensure a judge was available to assist (preliminary inquiry). This error made by the parties added another 112 days (approximately 3.5 months).
56The Applicant takes the position that the 112 days of delay occasioned by vacating discovery dates to the end of the preliminary inquiry should count as institutional time. According to the Applicant, the Court and/or the Crown should have caught the error prior to scheduling the date.
57The Crown takes the position that this time period should be treated as a discrete event that was not anticipated or foreseeable. The Crown and the Court did what it could to expedite a continuation date once the error was discovered.
58The jurisprudence makes clear that if relying on ‘discrete events’ to justify delay, the Crown must establish that discrete events claimed were outside Crown counsel’s control in the sense that:
They were reasonably unforeseen or reasonably unavoidable; and
Crown counsel could not reasonably remedy the delays emanating from those circumstances once they arose.
59The Crown must show that it took reasonable available steps to avoid and address the problem before the delay arose if it was foreseeable. The Crown must also take steps to reduce the delays occasioned by discrete events.
60I agree that this error in scheduling is a “discrete event” and should be deducted from the overall calculation of delay. As the Supreme Court explained in Cody, at paras. 58-59:
In principle, an inadvertent oversight may well qualify as a discrete event. The first prong of the test for exceptional circumstances requires only that the event at issue be reasonably unforeseeable or reasonably unavoidable. It does not impose a standard of perfection upon the Crown. As this Court observed in Jordan, “[t]rials are not well-oiled machines” (para. 73). Mistakes happen. Indeed, they are an inevitable reality of a human criminal justice system and can lead to exceptional and reasonably unavoidable delay that should be deducted for the purpose of s. 11(b).
The question under the second prong of the test is whether the Crown took reasonable steps to remediate the error and minimize delay. The Crown “is not required to show that the steps it took were ultimately successful — rather, just that it took reasonable steps in an attempt to avoid the delay” (Jordan, at para. 70).
61The Crown did contact the trial coordinator as soon as it discovered the oversight. Efforts were clearly made to get as early a date as possible in the circumstances.
Net Delay and the Presumptive Guideline
62The periods outlined above to be deducted can be summarized as follows:
May 4, 2022 – November 18, 2022 (199 days): defence acknowledged delay.
June 24, 2021 – August 11, 2021 (49 days): selecting a new date for the preliminary inquiry.
November 18, 2022 – March 10, 2023 (112 days): error with discovery by the parties and setting a new date.
April 19, 2024 – August 16, 2024 (119 days): adjournment for completion of trial.
63After deducting these periods, the net delay would be approximately 28 months, which falls below the presumptive ceiling.
64The 11(b) analysis requires all factors be taken into account in assessing the reasonableness of the delay. Even if my calculation is incorrect in some aspects, this is hardly a case where a stay would be warranted. On this point, I note the comments of the majority in Jordan at para. 58:
Our colleague Cromwell J. misapprehends the effect of the presumptive ceiling, asserting that this framework “reduces reasonableness to two numerical ceilings” (para. 254). As we will explain in greater detail, this is clearly not so. The presumptive ceiling marks the point at which the burden shifts from the defence to prove that the delay was unreasonable, to the Crown to justify the length of time the case has taken. As our colleague acknowledges, pursuant to our framework, “the judge must look at the circumstances of the particular case at hand” in assessing the reasonableness of a delay (para. 301). [Emphasis added.]
65Section 11(b) is framed in terms of reasonableness: R. v. Kovacs-Tatar, 73 O.R. (3d) 161 (C.A.), at p. 78. See also R. v. Seegmiller, 191 C.C.C. (3d) 347 (Ont. C.A.). In R. v. Morin, [1992] 1 S.C.R. 771, Sopinka J. described the exercise in these terms at p. 1130:
The general approach to a determination as to whether the right has been denied is not by the application of a mathematical or administrative formula but rather by a judicial determination balancing the interests which the section is designed to protect against factors which either inevitably lead to delay or are otherwise the cause of delay. As I noted in Smith, supra [R. v. Smith (1989), 52 C.C.C. (3d) 97], “[i]t is axiomatic that some delay is inevitable. The question is, at what point does the delay become unreasonable?” (p. 105).
66Having regard to the above, I am satisfied that the delay in this case is not unreasonable. In my view, the Crown has justified the delay in the circumstances of this case.
67Accordingly, the application is dismissed.
Justice C.F. de Sa
Released: January 13, 2026
CITATION: R. v. Latif, 2026 ONSC 239
COURT FILE NO.: CR-21-5602
DATE: 20260113
ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
HIS MAJESTY THE KING
– and –
SHAN LATIF
REASONS FOR DECISION
de Sa J
Released: January 13, 2026