Paul Genua

The appellant appealed her convictions for possession of fentanyl and methamphetamine for the purpose of trafficking, and weapons-related offences.

The narcotics and weapons were found in her bedroom during a search warrant execution.

The appellant argued the trial judge erred in finding she possessed the narcotics, suggesting a reasonable alternative inference that another individual in the room possessed them.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge properly applied the principles of circumstantial evidence and reasonably concluded the alternative theory was implausible.

The trial judge's credibility findings regarding the other individual's testimony were entitled to deference.

The accused, Anthony Fanone, was charged with impaired operation of a conveyance by alcohol or drug, and operating a conveyance with a blood alcohol concentration over 80 mg.

The central issue was the lawfulness of a single breath sample "rule-out test" administered during a Drug Recognition Expert (DRE) examination.

The court found that the single sample "rule-out test" was not authorized by law, constituting a breach of the accused's s. 8 Charter rights.

However, the court found no s. 10(b) Charter breach regarding the right to counsel.

Applying the s. 24(2) Grant analysis, the court admitted the breathalyzer results, finding the Charter breach was committed in good faith and had minimal impact.

The accused was found guilty of both impaired driving and the "80 and over" offence, but due to the Kienapple principle, a conviction was entered for the more serious "80 and over" offence, and a conditional stay was entered for the impaired driving charge.

The defendant was charged with multiple drug trafficking and breach of conditions offences.

The defence brought an application to exclude evidence under s. 10(b) and s. 24(2) of the Charter, arguing a delay in access to counsel.

The court found that the initial delay in access to counsel was justified due to ongoing public and officer safety concerns related to an unrecovered firearm and the need to preserve evidence.

The court also found that the defendant later waived his right to counsel.

Consequently, the application to exclude evidence was dismissed.

The defendant was found guilty of possession of cocaine (lesser included), possession of fentanyl for trafficking, possession of heroin/carfentanil for trafficking, possession of methamphetamine for trafficking, two counts of breach of recognizance, and breach of a weapons prohibition.

The applicant sought to set aside guilty pleas entered on April 13, 2016, to three counts of knowingly using forged documents, totalling $138,807.01 in losses.

The applicant claimed the pleas were involuntary and uninformed, alleging his counsel pressured him to plead guilty and failed to inform him that the Crown would seek a freestanding restitution order.

The court rejected the applicant's evidence as lacking credibility and accepted the counsel's evidence that the plea was voluntary, unequivocal, and informed.

The applicant was aware of the Crown's intention to seek restitution and had multiple opportunities to disclose any improper pressure.

The application was dismissed and the guilty pleas were upheld.

The appellant was convicted of second degree murder in the death of his common law spouse following a ten-week jury trial.

He was sentenced to life imprisonment with no eligibility for parole for 16 years.

The appeal raised multiple grounds including challenges to the admissibility of statements, after-the-fact conduct evidence, prior discreditable conduct evidence, and evidence obtained through search warrant.

The primary focus was on the jury charge, particularly regarding the treatment of circumstantial evidence, the cause of death, and the use of evidence of the appellant's history of violence and abuse toward the victim.

The Court of Appeal found that while certain aspects of the jury charge contained problematic instructions, the overall charge adequately directed the jury on the proper approach to circumstantial evidence and the use of character evidence.

The conviction and sentence were upheld.

The appellant appealed his convictions on seven counts for various offences against his former domestic partner, including sexual assault with a weapon, and his three-year custodial sentence.

The appellant challenged the trial judge's assessment of credibility and reliability, arguing uneven scrutiny of evidence, improper application of the rule in Browne v. Dunn, and ineffective assistance of trial counsel.

The Court of Appeal upheld the convictions and sentence, finding the trial judge fairly assessed the evidence, that any error regarding Browne v. Dunn did not materially affect the outcome, and that the appellant failed to meet the threshold for ineffective assistance of counsel.

The appellant appealed his conviction for smuggling approximately three kilograms of cocaine from Jamaica into Canada and sought leave to appeal his sentence.

The appellant was detained at Pearson Airport during a secondary customs inspection where CBSA officers discovered cocaine hidden in plastic bags containing a dried food product.

The appellant challenged whether he was detained and whether his Charter rights were breached.

The trial judge found no detention occurred until after the cocaine was discovered, and the Court of Appeal upheld this finding.

The Court also dismissed the sentence appeal, finding the six-and-a-half-year sentence was appropriate and within the established sentencing range for cocaine importation offences.

The applicant, charged with first degree murder, brought an application to quash his committal to stand trial following a preliminary inquiry.

He argued there was no evidence that he forcibly confined the deceased distinct from the act of killing during a robbery in a small washroom.

The reviewing judge dismissed the application, finding there was some evidence upon which a properly instructed jury could conclude the applicant unlawfully confined the deceased for a period of time beyond what was integral to the killing.

The accused was convicted of trafficking in fentanyl powder following a controlled drug transaction.

The sentencing decision addresses the serious dangers of powdered fentanyl trafficking, the accused's lengthy criminal history involving violence, firearms, and drugs, and his status as both an addict and a commercial trafficker.

The court imposed a sentence of 6 years less pre-trial custody, emphasizing denunciation and deterrence as dominant sentencing objectives given the public health crisis created by fentanyl trafficking.

The accused Moore and Abbott were charged with trafficking fentanyl on March 15, 2016.

Abbott was additionally charged with possession of fentanyl for the purpose of trafficking.

The Crown conceded it had not proven the trafficking count against Abbott, which was dismissed.

At trial, the court found Abbott guilty of simple possession of fentanyl but not guilty of possession for the purpose of trafficking, finding reasonable doubt as to trafficking intent.

The court found Moore guilty of trafficking fentanyl, determining on the basis of circumstantial evidence that Moore was the dealer "Sweets" who sold the fentanyl to Abbott from apartment 1415 at 263 Pharmacy Avenue.

The accused Moore and Abbott were charged with trafficking in fentanyl.

Moore was additionally charged with possession of fentanyl for the purpose of trafficking.

Both brought pre-trial Charter motions alleging violations of their rights under ss. 8, 9, and 10 of the Charter.

The Crown sought to establish the voluntariness of utterances made by both accused.

The court found that the arrests of both accused were lawful based on reasonable and probable grounds.

However, the court found a violation of Moore's rights under s. 10(b) when police failed to follow up after his request for counsel could not be connected.

The court applied the s. 24(2) test and admitted the evidence, finding that exclusion was not necessary to maintain public confidence in the administration of justice.

The appellant appealed her conviction for importing cocaine into Canada.

She challenged the trial judge's decision to admit statements she made to Canada Border Security officers at the airport.

The appellant argued that she was detained before making these statements and that her Charter rights were engaged, requiring exclusion of the statements.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's finding that the appellant was not detained during routine questioning and luggage searches, and that detention only occurred after x-ray images revealed suspicious tins and the appellant asked what was in them.

The court found no error in admitting the pre-detention statements and dismissed the appeal.

Appeal from a sentence imposed by the Ontario Court of Justice following a conviction.

The appellant challenged the trial judge's assessment of whether section 8 Charter rights were breached during a search.

The trial judge found that a level 3 search was reasonable except for the "squat and cough" procedure, which was deemed unreasonable.

The trial judge reduced the sentence as a remedy under section 24(1) of the Charter.

The appellant sought a stay of proceedings, arguing systemic deficiencies.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's decision, finding no error in her findings and determining that the sentence reduction was an appropriate remedy for the breach.

The applicant, facing extradition to Romania for a murder conviction, brought a disclosure application to obtain records from the Canadian and Romanian governments to support an abuse of process motion based on allegations of torture.

The court dismissed the application, applying the Larosa test and finding no 'air of reality' to the torture allegations due to significant inconsistencies in the applicant's evidence and his failure to disclose his conviction to Canadian immigration authorities.

The court also found the requested documents were largely irrelevant or amounted to a fishing expedition.

The accused, Dexter Peters, was convicted by a jury of importing 2.827 kilograms of cocaine.

Defence counsel argued for a sentence reduction of 5-11 months, citing the Abolition of Early Parole Act (AEPA) and its elimination of accelerated parole review (APR), to ensure parity with individuals sentenced before the AEPA came into force.

The court rejected this submission, distinguishing Canada (A.G.) v. Whaling on the basis of retrospectivity and affirming that parole eligibility is generally not a factor for sentencing judges.

The court also held that the parity principle does not apply across different legislative regimes and that courts should not impose artificial sentences to circumvent Parliament's legislative intent.

Considering the gravity of the offence, the quantity of drugs, the accused's lack of criminal record, family support, and rehabilitation prospects, the court imposed a sentence of six and a half years.

After accounting for 239 days of pre-trial custody at a 1.5:1 ratio (359 days credit), the net sentence was five years, six months, and six days.

A 10-year weapons prohibition order and a DNA order were also issued, and seized drugs and property were forfeited to the Crown.

The accused was charged with importing cocaine after a secondary customs inspection at the airport revealed cocaine hidden in bags of dried soy product.

The accused brought a pre-trial application to exclude statements made to border officers, arguing he was detained prior to his arrest without being advised of his right to counsel, violating ss. 7, 10(a), and 10(b) of the Charter.

The court found that the accused was not detained until the officer discovered the contraband, at which point he was arrested and given his rights.

The court also found the statements were voluntary.

The application was dismissed and the evidence was ruled admissible.

The accused was charged with importing cocaine after CBSA officers found cocaine in fruit juice cans in her luggage during a secondary inspection at the airport.

The accused sought to exclude statements she made to a CBSA officer, arguing they were involuntary and obtained in violation of her s. 7 and s. 10(b) Charter rights.

The court held that the statements were voluntary, as the accused was statutorily compelled to answer routine questions at the border.

The court further held that the accused was not detained until the officer formed a sufficiently strong particularized suspicion after x-raying the cans, at which point no further statements were made.

The Charter motion was dismissed and the statements were ruled admissible.

Police seized $100,000 in cash from the trunk of a rental vehicle during a traffic stop and detained it as offence-related property under s. 490(1) of the Criminal Code.

The accused applied under s. 462.34(4) of the Criminal Code for release of a portion of the seized funds to retain counsel for upcoming criminal proceedings.

The Crown argued the court lacked jurisdiction to release offence-related property for legal expenses.

The court rejected that position, relying on jurisprudence recognizing access to seized funds for reasonable legal fees where necessary to preserve the right to counsel and a fair trial.

The court ordered $25,000 released to defence counsel in trust for legal fees, subject to accounting safeguards.

The applicant sought access to a sealed information used to obtain a search warrant executed at his residence, where no firearms or contraband were found and no charges were laid.

A prior order had directed that the warrant materials be unsealed and disclosed in redacted form, leaving the issue of which public institution was responsible for vetting the materials to protect confidential informer privilege.

The Attorney General of Ontario and the police each argued the other bore the responsibility.

The court held that informer privilege is jointly owned by the Crown and the informer and that the Attorney General bears the legal responsibility for protecting the privilege.

Accordingly, the Attorney General must perform the editing of the sealed search warrant materials, with assistance from the police as necessary.

The accused was charged with possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking after police executed a search warrant at his residence and located 505 grams of cocaine hidden in a Kleenex tissue box.

The Crown relied primarily on circumstantial evidence to establish knowledge and control, including the accused’s admitted involvement in marijuana trafficking, drug paraphernalia found in the residence, and his association with a known cocaine trafficker.

The accused testified that he had no knowledge of the cocaine and suggested that a third party with access to the residence may have hidden it there shortly before the search.

The court rejected aspects of the accused’s credibility regarding the extent of his drug trafficking but found that the possibility that the third party concealed the cocaine in the residence raised a reasonable doubt about the accused’s knowledge.

As knowledge was not proven beyond a reasonable doubt, the essential element of possession was not established.