Paul Genua

The appellant sought a new trial following a jury conviction, arguing that the jury's rejection of her evidence may have been influenced by hearsay evidence that she was subject to a drug look-out on arrival from Trinidad.

The Crown did not oppose the request.

The Court of Appeal was satisfied that the appeal should be allowed and ordered a new trial.

The conviction was quashed.

The appellant was stopped for speeding and arrested for breaching his recognizance curfew.

During a search of the vehicle incident to that arrest, the officer smelled raw marihuana, leading to a second arrest for possession and a further search of the trunk, which revealed 18.1 pounds of marihuana.

The appellant appealed his conviction for possession for the purpose of trafficking, arguing the search violated his s. 8 Charter rights.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the trial judge's findings that the officer had reasonable and probable grounds for the initial arrest, the search of the front of the car was justified for officer safety, and the officer's testimony regarding the smell of marihuana was credible, making the subsequent search of the trunk lawful.

The appellant was convicted of sexual assault and assault.

Prior to trial, the defence learned of police occurrence reports relating to one of the complainants from an unrelated incident and sought disclosure.

The trial judge ruled that the occurrence reports were 'records' under s. 278.1 of the Criminal Code and subject to the third-party production regime in s. 278.2.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal held that the trial judge erred in statutory interpretation.

The Court found that a complainant does not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in a police occurrence report, and that records made by persons responsible for the investigation or prosecution of the offence are explicitly excluded from s. 278.1.

The occurrence reports were subject to the Crown's first-party disclosure obligations under Stinchcombe.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The applicant sought access to a sealed information used to obtain a search warrant executed at his residence, where no firearms or contraband were found and no charges were laid.

A prior order had directed that the warrant materials be unsealed and disclosed in redacted form, leaving the issue of which public institution was responsible for vetting the materials to protect confidential informer privilege.

The Attorney General of Ontario and the police each argued the other bore the responsibility.

The court held that informer privilege is jointly owned by the Crown and the informer and that the Attorney General bears the legal responsibility for protecting the privilege.

Accordingly, the Attorney General must perform the editing of the sealed search warrant materials, with assistance from the police as necessary.

The accused was charged with possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking after police executed a search warrant at his residence and located 505 grams of cocaine hidden in a Kleenex tissue box.

The Crown relied primarily on circumstantial evidence to establish knowledge and control, including the accused’s admitted involvement in marijuana trafficking, drug paraphernalia found in the residence, and his association with a known cocaine trafficker.

The accused testified that he had no knowledge of the cocaine and suggested that a third party with access to the residence may have hidden it there shortly before the search.

The court rejected aspects of the accused’s credibility regarding the extent of his drug trafficking but found that the possibility that the third party concealed the cocaine in the residence raised a reasonable doubt about the accused’s knowledge.

As knowledge was not proven beyond a reasonable doubt, the essential element of possession was not established.

The accused brought a s. 8 Charter application challenging the manner in which police executed a search warrant at his residence using a dynamic entry.

The accused argued that the failure to comply with the knock notice rule and the alleged ransacking of the home rendered the search unreasonable and required exclusion of cocaine discovered during the search.

The court reviewed the governing principles from recent jurisprudence concerning dynamic entries and exigent circumstances.

It held that police had reasonable grounds to conduct a dynamic entry based on risks of destruction of cocaine and the possible presence of firearms connected to the drug investigation.

The court further found insufficient evidence that the search itself was conducted in an unreasonably destructive or disorderly manner.

The application was dismissed.

The accused, charged with possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking, sought leave to adduce third party suspect evidence suggesting another individual was responsible for the drugs discovered during execution of a search warrant.

The proposed evidence connected the third party to cocaine trafficking and placed him at the residence shortly before police located the drugs, along with evidence of suspicious driving, possession of a large sum of cash, and cocaine discovered at his own residence.

Applying the governing test from Supreme Court jurisprudence, the court held that the accused met the evidentiary burden of demonstrating a sufficient connection between the third party and the offence.

The evidence was capable of supporting a reasonable inference that the third party deposited the cocaine at the residence to avoid police detection.

Concerns about the strength of the inference or competing explanations were matters for the trier of fact rather than the threshold admissibility stage.