K. van Rensburg

The appellant appealed his conviction for conspiracy to import cocaine into Canada.

He argued that the trial judge erred in finding that his discussions with co-conspirators amounted to a concluded agreement, and that the trial judge misapplied the co-conspirators' exception to the hearsay rule.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the trial judge's conclusion that the appellant had agreed to join the conspiracy to import cocaine by airplane.

The court also held that the trial judge properly applied the Carter framework and did not improperly rely on hearsay evidence.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed convictions for two counts of possession of drugs for the purpose of trafficking.

He challenged the validity of the search warrant used to locate fentanyl and cocaine at a Toronto residence, arguing that the Information to Obtain lacked sufficient evidence to support its issuance and that the evidence ought to have been excluded under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

Three confidential sources had identified the appellant as a drug dealer through single photo identification, and police surveillance corroborated his connection to the searched address.

The Court of Appeal found no legal error, misapprehension of evidence, or failure to consider relevant evidence in the application judge's analysis, and dismissed the appeal without calling on the respondent.

The appellant was convicted of importing heroin contrary to s. 6(1) of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act after approximately 11 kilograms of heroin were found in a suitcase he carried into Canada from South Africa.

On appeal, the appellant challenged the trial judge's findings of fact and credibility, alleged a miscarriage of justice from the Crown's purported withholding of exculpatory evidence on his electronic devices, and sought to introduce evidence regarding COVID-19 entry restrictions as new evidence.

The Court of Appeal found no reversible error in the trial judge's assessment, held there was no Crown disclosure failure, and determined the COVID-19 restrictions argument had already been considered at trial and was not determinative.

Following the dismissal of the appeal (2026 ONCA 3), the court addressed costs.

Having considered the written submissions and costs outlines of both parties, the court fixed all-inclusive costs of the appeal payable by the appellant to the respondents in the amount of $37,000.

The moving party sought panel review under s. 7(5) of the Courts of Justice Act of two single-judge decisions: a refusal to extend time to perfect an appeal of a judgment rejecting allegations of undue influence in an estate matter, and a full indemnity costs award of $16,492.35.

The panel found no error in the refusal to extend time, noting the long unexplained delay, prejudice to the estate, and lack of merit in the proposed appeal.

However, the panel found the motion judge erred in awarding full indemnity costs, as there was no evidence of especially egregious misconduct warranting enhanced costs on appeal, and substituted partial indemnity costs of $9,400.

The appellant sought to prove the validity of a holograph codicil executed by the deceased testatrix, purportedly leaving the most valuable estate asset, a home farm worth approximately $20 million, to the appellant alone.

The trial judge found suspicious circumstances relating to both the testatrix's knowledge and approval of the codicil's contents and her testamentary capacity, and concluded the appellant failed to discharge her burden on either issue.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's assessment of suspicious circumstances, no misapplication of the legal standard for knowledge and approval, and no improper reliance on the family doctor's clinical notes.

The court also found the reasons for decision were sufficient for meaningful appellate review.

Costs of $100,000 were awarded to the respondents.

The appellant was convicted of 33 counts of voyeurism based on video recordings found on a USB device seized from a safe in his condominium.

He appealed, challenging the validity of the warrant authorizing the search of the safes.

The application judge had found that the information to obtain disclosed sufficient credible and reliable evidence to support the issuing justice's conclusion that a digital storage device would be found in the safes and would afford evidence of the offences under investigation.

The Court of Appeal held that the application judge made no extricable legal error, as his findings were rooted in the evidence and reflected permissible common-sense reasoning rather than speculation or impermissible propensity reasoning.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellants appealed a summary judgment ordering repayment of funds advanced by the respondent and dismissing the appellants' counterclaim for defamation.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the motion judge's grant of summary judgment on the loan claim, his rejection of the non est factum defence, or his dismissal of the defamation counterclaim.

However, the court found that the issue of reverse corporate veil piercing to impose liability on the corporate appellants was not properly before the motion judge and may not have been fairly argued.

The appeal was allowed in part: the judgment against the corporate appellants was set aside and remitted for redetermination, but dismissed in all other respects.

The moving party brought a motion under s. 7(5) of the Courts of Justice Act to set aside a single judge's order requiring her to post $50,000 in security for costs of her appeal.

The panel found no error in principle, unreasonable result, legal error, or misapprehension of material evidence in the motion judge's decision.

The motion judge had considered 11 outstanding costs orders totalling over $146,000, the moving party's lack of diligence in perfecting her appeal, and the prejudice to the estate beneficiaries.

The panel declined to consider new affidavit evidence filed after the motion judge's decision.

The motion was dismissed with costs of $10,000 payable to the responding party.

The appellant sought to set aside a default judgment entered seven years earlier after her pleadings were struck for non-compliance with a costs order imposed as a condition of an adjournment.

The motion judge dismissed the motion, finding it was not brought promptly or pursued diligently and disbelieving the explanation offered.

On appeal, the court found no error in the motion judge's application of the test under Rule 19.08 for setting aside a default judgment, including findings of prejudice and tarnishing of the administration of justice.

The appellant appealed convictions for sexual assault, sexual interference, invitation to sexual touching, and possession of child pornography, raising three grounds including that the application judge erred in dismissing his s. 11(b) Charter application.

The Court of Appeal found that the application judge incorrectly characterized multiple periods of delay as defence delay, applying a bright-line rule later rejected by the Supreme Court in Hanan.

Properly calculated, the net delay exceeded the 18-month Jordan ceiling by nearly three months, and the Crown failed to establish exceptional circumstances.

The convictions were quashed and a stay of proceedings entered.

The appellant, found not criminally responsible for criminal harassment, appealed the Ontario Review Board's disposition ordering his detention in a Secure Forensic Unit and retaining an electronics supervision clause.

The appellant argued the disposition was not the least onerous and restrictive option and that the Board improperly rejected a joint submission to remove the electronics clause.

The Court of Appeal dismissed these grounds, finding the Board's decisions reasonable given the appellant's recent elopements and worsening auditory hallucinations.

However, the appeal was allowed in part to reinstate clauses for indirectly supervised and accompanied privileges, which the Board had mistakenly removed.

The appellants appealed an order declaring them vexatious litigants under s. 140 of the Courts of Justice Act.

The application judge found that the individual appellant, who was the sole officer and employee of the corporate appellant, had serially engaged in vexatious litigation since 2017, including bringing proceedings outside the court's jurisdiction and failing to pay significant costs awards.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the application judge's application of the relevant factors and concluding that the order against both the corporation and the individual directing its litigation was entirely justified.

The appellants appealed an order declaring them vexatious litigants under s. 140 of the Courts of Justice Act.

The application judge found the respondent had standing and applied the Lang Michener test, noting the appellants' history of meritless litigation against a former client who is a party under a disability.

The Court of Appeal found no reversible error and dismissed the appeal, confirming the vexatious litigant order applies to the appellants in their personal capacity.

The appellant condominium owner appealed a summary judgment ordering it to pay $495,888.39 in common expense arrears and granting vacant possession to the respondent condominium corporation.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's use of enhanced fact-finding powers to resolve credibility issues and reject the appellant's claim of having paid in cash.

The Court also declined to entertain a new limitations defence raised for the first time on appeal.

However, the Court allowed the appeal in part, finding the motion judge erred by using the oppression remedy to expand the respondent's registered condominium lien to cover unsecured arrears, as doing so could prejudice third-party creditors.

The self-represented appellant mother sought leave to appeal a costs order made following a lengthy family law trial in which the respondent father was largely successful.

The trial judge had awarded the father net costs of $20,000 after setting off support arrears, noting the father's reasonable offers to settle and the mother's bad faith conduct.

The Court of Appeal found no error in principle and held the costs award was not plainly wrong.

Leave to appeal the costs order was denied.

The appellant appealed her convictions for possession of fentanyl and methamphetamine for the purpose of trafficking, and weapons-related offences.

The narcotics and weapons were found in her bedroom during a search warrant execution.

The appellant argued the trial judge erred in finding she possessed the narcotics, suggesting a reasonable alternative inference that another individual in the room possessed them.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge properly applied the principles of circumstantial evidence and reasonably concluded the alternative theory was implausible.

The trial judge's credibility findings regarding the other individual's testimony were entitled to deference.

The appellant appealed her convictions for fraud, uttering forged documents, and breach of probation arising from the purchase of jewellery using fraudulent cheques.

On appeal, she sought to introduce a bank statement as fresh evidence to show she believed she had sufficient funds.

The Court of Appeal declined to admit the fresh evidence, finding it was not genuine based on a sworn statement from a bank investigator.

The Court also rejected the appellant's argument that the trial judge failed to conduct a proper analysis of the circumstantial evidence regarding her mental state, concluding the evidence of her fraudulent intent was overwhelming.

The conviction appeal was dismissed, and the sentence appeal was dismissed as abandoned.

Following an appeal that was allowed in part with divided success, the parties made written submissions regarding costs in the court below.

The appellants sought to set aside a $20,000 costs award against them, while the respondent argued the costs order should remain.

The Court of Appeal held that the divided success on appeal informed the appropriate disposition of costs below.

The court set aside the $20,000 costs award and ordered no costs of the motion in the court below.

The appellant, an inmate, pleaded guilty to intimidating a justice system participant and uttering threats.

On appeal, he sought to strike his guilty pleas due to procedural irregularities, including a failure to properly arraign him on one count, the failure to apply the Kienapple principle to stay the threatening count, and an insufficient plea inquiry.

The Court of Appeal admitted fresh evidence indicating the appellant was unmedicated and influenced by correctional officers to plead guilty to secure a federal transfer.

The Court allowed the appeal, struck the guilty pleas, and ordered a new trial, finding that maintaining the pleas risked a miscarriage of justice.