Alexander Ostroff

The appellant appealed his conviction for second-degree murder, arguing the trial judge erred by dismissing his application to sit at counsel table rather than in the prisoner's box.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, taking the opportunity to clarify the legal framework for courtroom seating.

The Court held that an in-custody accused is presumed to sit in the prisoner's box, though trial judges retain discretion to permit alternative seating based on security, trial fairness, and the ability to make full answer and defence.

The Court found the trial judge's decision was reasonable and that standard jury instructions adequately mitigate any potential stigma associated with the prisoner's box.

The appellant appealed convictions for sexual assault, sexual interference, invitation to sexual touching, and possession of child pornography, raising three grounds including that the application judge erred in dismissing his s. 11(b) Charter application.

The Court of Appeal found that the application judge incorrectly characterized multiple periods of delay as defence delay, applying a bright-line rule later rejected by the Supreme Court in Hanan.

Properly calculated, the net delay exceeded the 18-month Jordan ceiling by nearly three months, and the Crown failed to establish exceptional circumstances.

The convictions were quashed and a stay of proceedings entered.

The appellant appealed his convictions on the ground that the application judge erred in dismissing his application for a stay of proceedings based on unreasonable delay.

The Court of Appeal agreed that the time from when the second trial date was set until the first offered trial date available to defence counsel should have been apportioned rather than treated entirely as defence delay, but held that the time from the July 2022 proposed trial date to the second trial date was properly defence delay.

With the corrected apportionment, the net delay fell just under 30 months, below the presumptive ceiling, and no stay was warranted.

The appellant appealed his conviction on three counts of historical sexual assault against his niece.

He argued that the trial judge materially misapprehended the evidence by misinterpreting his testimony and overlooking internal inconsistencies in the complainant's evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's assessment of credibility and reliability.

The appellant was convicted by a jury of participation in the activities of a criminal organization for the purpose of weapons trafficking, contrary to s. 467.11 of the Criminal Code, following an investigation into illegal firearms trafficking.

On appeal, the appellant argued that the trial judge erred in law in his jury instructions on the definition of 'criminal organization' by failing to explain that such an organization must have structure and continuity, as required by R. v. Venneri.

The Supreme Court of Canada (majority) held that the trial judge's failure to instruct the jury that a criminal organization must pose an enhanced threat to society by virtue of its structure and continuity constituted an error of law, as the bare statutory definition is insufficient without this gloss from Venneri.

The majority further clarified the functional approach to appellate review of jury instructions, explaining that a properly equipped jury is one that is both accurately and sufficiently instructed, and that trial circumstances — including evidence, counsel's arguments, and the absence of objection — cannot substitute for a mandatory accurate and sufficient instruction on the law.

The appeal was allowed, the conviction on the criminal organization count set aside, and a new trial ordered on that count.

The appellant appealed his convictions for having a blood alcohol concentration over 80 mg/100 mL and driving while prohibited.

At trial, the sole issue was identity.

The appellant argued the trial judge erred in assessing eyewitness reliability, misapprehended evidence regarding a gap in police observation, and reversed the burden of proof.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding the eyewitness identification was contemporaneous and corroborated by circumstantial evidence, and that the trial judge made no errors in apprehending the evidence or applying the burden of proof.

The appellant, a personal support worker, appealed his conviction for sexual assault against a resident with Down Syndrome.

The Crown's case at trial relied heavily on hearsay statements made by the complainant to her sister and a police officer, which the trial judge admitted under the principled exception and as res gestae spontaneous statements.

The Superior Court of Justice allowed the appeal, finding the trial judge erred in his hearsay analysis by failing to properly articulate reliability as a hearsay danger, misconstruing corroborative evidence, and failing to consider alternative explanations.

The conviction was set aside and a new trial ordered.

The appellant, an inmate serving a life sentence, was convicted of assaulting two jail guards.

At trial, he represented himself and brought a Charter application alleging severe mistreatment by correctional officers following the assault, including being left in handcuffs for hours, denied food and washroom access, and having his property destroyed.

The trial judge dismissed the Charter application, concluding he had no jurisdiction to grant a stay of proceedings for state misconduct that occurred after the events giving rise to the charges.

On appeal, the Superior Court of Justice found this was an error of law, as courts have the authority to order a stay for post-offence state misconduct.

The convictions were quashed and a new trial was ordered.

The appellant appealed his conviction for first-degree murder, arguing the trial judge erred by refusing to grant an adjournment to retain new counsel after he discharged his trial lawyer mid-trial, and that the Crown's cross-examination and closing address rendered the trial unfair.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge properly exercised her discretion to refuse a lengthy adjournment, as the discharge was an attempt to derail the trial, and the appointment of amicus curiae ensured trial fairness.

The Court also held that while some of the Crown's conduct was improper, the trial judge's corrective instructions neutralized any prejudice.