Steve Anthony Banate Coroza

The appellants appealed a summary judgment ordering repayment of funds advanced by the respondent and dismissing the appellants' counterclaim for defamation.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the motion judge's grant of summary judgment on the loan claim, his rejection of the non est factum defence, or his dismissal of the defamation counterclaim.

However, the court found that the issue of reverse corporate veil piercing to impose liability on the corporate appellants was not properly before the motion judge and may not have been fairly argued.

The appeal was allowed in part: the judgment against the corporate appellants was set aside and remitted for redetermination, but dismissed in all other respects.

The moving party brought a motion under s. 7(5) of the Courts of Justice Act to set aside a single judge's order requiring her to post $50,000 in security for costs of her appeal.

The panel found no error in principle, unreasonable result, legal error, or misapprehension of material evidence in the motion judge's decision.

The motion judge had considered 11 outstanding costs orders totalling over $146,000, the moving party's lack of diligence in perfecting her appeal, and the prejudice to the estate beneficiaries.

The panel declined to consider new affidavit evidence filed after the motion judge's decision.

The motion was dismissed with costs of $10,000 payable to the responding party.

The appellant sought to set aside a default judgment entered seven years earlier after her pleadings were struck for non-compliance with a costs order imposed as a condition of an adjournment.

The motion judge dismissed the motion, finding it was not brought promptly or pursued diligently and disbelieving the explanation offered.

On appeal, the court found no error in the motion judge's application of the test under Rule 19.08 for setting aside a default judgment, including findings of prejudice and tarnishing of the administration of justice.

The appellant appealed convictions for sexual assault, sexual interference, invitation to sexual touching, and possession of child pornography, raising three grounds including that the application judge erred in dismissing his s. 11(b) Charter application.

The Court of Appeal found that the application judge incorrectly characterized multiple periods of delay as defence delay, applying a bright-line rule later rejected by the Supreme Court in Hanan.

Properly calculated, the net delay exceeded the 18-month Jordan ceiling by nearly three months, and the Crown failed to establish exceptional circumstances.

The convictions were quashed and a stay of proceedings entered.