Hannah Freeman

The appellant appealed his first-degree murder convictions for setting a fire that killed his mother and stepfather.

He argued the trial judge erred by admitting his stepfather's dying declarations, admitting his own statements about a knee injury as fabricated, and finding he was not psychologically detained during police interviews.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no errors in the trial judge's admissibility rulings or jury instructions.

The appellant appealed jury convictions for historical sexual offences against a family member, alleging errors in the jury charge concerning the W.(D.) framework, eyewitness identification, and defence submissions about recovered memory.

He also sought to file fresh evidence consisting of a post-verdict juror Facebook message and a foreperson's note to argue a reasonable apprehension of jury bias.

The court held that the charge, read as a whole, adequately instructed the jury on reasonable doubt and the frailties of identification evidence, and that the trial judge's narrow corrective instruction on recovered memory was proper.

Although the fresh evidence was admitted because it bore on trial fairness, it did not rebut the presumption of juror impartiality.

The appeal was dismissed.

The Crown appealed the respondent's acquittals on charges of assault, choking, and sexual assault.

The Crown argued the trial judge erred in law by misunderstanding the requirement for communicated consent to each sexual act and by drawing an adverse inference against the Crown for failing to call a corroborating witness.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge's comments regarding consent were directed at the Crown's submission that verbal consent was required, and that the trial judge merely noted a gap in the Crown's case rather than drawing an adverse inference.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual offences against four teenage and pre-teenage girls, and sought leave to appeal his sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's assessment of the complainants' credibility or her conclusion that they had not colluded.

However, the Court granted leave to appeal the sentence and reduced the global sentence from eight years and four months to eight years, noting that the trial judge had imposed a sentence exceeding the Crown's submission on totality.

The appellant appealed his dangerous offender designation and indeterminate sentence following convictions for sexual assault and sexual interference involving a minor.

The appellant argued the sentencing judge erred in finding a likelihood to reoffend, failing to appreciate gaps in his record, and discounting future treatment prospects.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the sentencing judge reasonably concluded the appellant posed a high likelihood of harmful recidivism and that an indeterminate sentence was necessary to protect the public.

A joint request to seal and redact medical exhibits was granted.

The appellant challenged a criminal appeal decision from the Court of Appeal for Ontario.

The Court heard the appeal and delivered an oral judgment the same day.

It held that the appeal should be dismissed substantially for the reasons of the majority in the provincial appellate court.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault against a resident of a group home who had Down syndrome.

At trial, the Crown successfully applied to admit the complainant's hearsay statements to personal support workers without calling the complainant to testify, and without expert evidence that testifying would cause trauma.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial, finding the trial judge erred in concluding the hearsay evidence was necessary without first hearing directly from the complainant or receiving expert evidence regarding potential trauma.

The appellant was convicted of one count of assault and one count of sexual assault relating to the same complainant and was sentenced to 7 years' imprisonment.

On appeal, the appellant raised two related grounds: first, that the trial was rendered unfair because he lacked testimonial capacity due to mental illness; and second, that the trial was unfair because the counts in the indictment were vague and failed to identify specific instances of assault and sexual assault.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the fresh evidence application regarding the appellant's psychiatric condition, finding that the evidence lacked cogency without expert opinion linking the mental illness to testimonial capacity.

The court also rejected the indictment vagueness argument, finding that the counts did not violate the single transaction rule and that the appellant received full disclosure and knew the case he had to meet.

The appeal from conviction was dismissed, and the appeal from sentence was dismissed as abandoned.

Appeal from conviction for aggravated assault of a two-year-old child.

The appellant was convicted based on medical evidence establishing that the child's severe cranial fracture and extensive bruising could not have resulted from accidental falls or self-inflicted injuries.

The appellant provided multiple inconsistent accounts of events, culminating in trial testimony that the child fell from a bed and then engaged in self-injurious conduct.

The trial judge rejected the appellant's credibility based on inconsistencies with medical evidence, the implausibility of the narrative, and the failure to mention the critical fall from the bed in earlier statements.

The appeal challenged whether the trial judge erred by rejecting credibility based on the appellant's access to disclosure and presence at trial.

The court dismissed the appeal, finding no reversible error and applying the curative proviso based on overwhelming evidence.

A young person was convicted of sexual assault, sexual touching, and invitation to sexual touching of his stepsister.

On appeal, the court found two critical errors: (1) the trial judge improperly discontinued cross-examination of a key witness based on insufficient medical evidence and then relied on that witness's testimony to support the conviction, and (2) the trial judge placed undue weight on the appellant's demeanour to reject his evidence as untruthful, despite initially finding him credible.

The appeal was allowed, convictions on two counts were quashed, and a new trial was ordered.

The Crown appealed a sentence imposed on a 17-year-old youth who was found guilty of sexual interference with a 13-year-old intoxicated girl.

The trial judge imposed 24 months probation with 120 hours of community service.

The Crown sought leave to appeal and argued the trial judge erred in finding the offence was not a violent offence under the Youth Criminal Justice Act and in treating the victim's willing participation as a mitigating factor.

The Court of Appeal granted leave to appeal but dismissed the appeal, finding the sentence was fit despite the trial judge's legal errors regarding the victim's participation and the provision of birth control.

The appellant, L.B., was convicted of sexually abusing his adopted daughter and physically assaulting his adopted son over a lengthy period while they were children in his care.

He received a global 10-year sentence, less 6 months for pre-trial custody and harsh detention conditions.

On appeal, L.B. challenged the consecutive nature of the sexual exploitation sentence and the overall length of the sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the sentencing judge’s analysis or conclusions, and held that the sentence was fit and proportionate given the aggravating circumstances and absence of mitigating factors.

The appellant appealed his conviction on three counts of historical sexual assault against his niece.

He argued that the trial judge materially misapprehended the evidence by misinterpreting his testimony and overlooking internal inconsistencies in the complainant's evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's assessment of credibility and reliability.

The appellant, convicted of sexual assault, appealed on the ground that the trial judge erred in assessing the complainant's credibility, specifically regarding the judge's view that the complainant's confusion about consent enhanced her credibility.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no reversible error in the trial judge's assessment, affirming that a witness's candour, including about confusion, can properly support credibility findings.

The appellants, Darko Stojanovski and Daniel Stojanovski, appealed their convictions for attempted murder and their 18-year sentences.

The central issues included the adequacy of jury instructions on party liability (aiding), the introduction of alternative Crown theories, the use of prior consistent statements for identification, and the appropriateness of the sentences.

The majority dismissed both the conviction and sentence appeals, finding the jury charge adequate and the sentences fit.

A dissenting judge would have allowed Darko's conviction appeal, arguing the jury instruction on the specific intent required for attempted murder by aiding was insufficient and misleading.

The appellant was convicted of sexual touching, invitation to sexual touching, sexual touching while in a position of trust, and uttering a death threat against his stepdaughter.

He appealed his conviction, arguing the trial judge erred in using a statement he made to the police.

Specifically, he contended the judge improperly inferred prior sexual activity from an admission of later consensual sexual activity (propensity reasoning/stereotypical assumptions) and failed to properly analyze the statement's exculpatory aspect under R. v. W.(D.).

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge's use of the statement was a permissible evidence-based credibility assessment, not based on prohibited reasoning.

The court also found the W.(D.) analysis was properly conducted, as the trial judge recognized the statement's partially exculpatory nature but gave it little weight due to its lack of spontaneity and its character as an "alternate narrative" rather than a denial.

P.C. appealed convictions for sexual assault and sexual interference and sought leave to appeal his four-year sentence.

The appeal raised grounds concerning the trial judge's jury charge, specifically the language used to refer to the unrepresented accused's evidence versus his submissions, and the sufficiency of assistance provided to the unrepresented appellant.

Additionally, the appellant challenged the trial judge's factual findings at sentencing, particularly regarding penetration, and the weight given to mitigating factors.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds of appeal, finding no reversible error in the jury charge, that sufficient assistance was provided to the appellant, and that the sentencing judge was entitled to make factual findings not explicitly determined by the jury's verdict.

Leave to appeal sentence was granted but the appeal was dismissed.

The appellant, Ali Elenezi, sought leave to appeal a three-year consecutive sentence for contempt of court.

This sentence was imposed after he refused to testify at a murder trial, despite having previously pleaded guilty to manslaughter in the same incident and affirmed an agreed statement of facts.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed the appeal, finding no error in principle by the sentencing judge regarding the consideration of the appellant's youth, rehabilitative prospects, or the totality principle.

The court affirmed that denunciation is the primary principle for contempt of court, especially refusal to testify, and that significant jail terms are required to deter such behaviour.

The appellant, K.C., appealed a sexual assault conviction under the Youth Criminal Justice Act.

The appeal centered on the trial court's failure to properly administer oaths or affirmations to key witnesses, including the complainant and the appellant, despite statutory requirements.

The Court of Appeal found that the casual "promises" to tell the truth made by witnesses did not constitute a functional equivalent of an oath or affirmation.

Consequently, the court determined that the procedural irregularity could not be cured by the Criminal Code's proviso, as it prejudiced the accused in a case turning entirely on witness credibility.

The conviction appeal was allowed, and a new trial was ordered.

Michele Fiorilli appealed his convictions for four counts of fraud related to two series of real estate transactions, arguing ineffective assistance of trial counsel.

The transactions involved fraudulently obtained mortgage funds from the Royal Bank of Canada (RBC), with losses ultimately borne by the Canada Mortgage and Housing Corporation (CMHC).

The appellant alleged counsel prevented him from testifying, lost crucial evidence, failed to raise a defence theory, failed to pursue disclosure, and incompetently discredited witnesses.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the appellant failed to establish the factual, performance, or prejudice components of the ineffective assistance of counsel test.