Hannah Freeman

The appellant appealed both his conviction for sexual assault and his sentence imposed by the Superior Court of Justice.

The appellant argued that the trial judge applied uneven scrutiny to the evidence of the appellant and the complainant.

The Court of Appeal rejected this argument, finding that the trial judge's reasons must be construed as a whole and that the Crown's case had great strength based on eyewitness and technical evidence, including blood alcohol content corroborating that the complainant was incapacitated.

The conviction appeal was dismissed.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, with the court finding the sentence was not unfit given the gravity of the offence.

The appellant appealed his conviction entered on July 6, 2016 by the Ontario Court of Justice.

The appellant pleaded guilty following a ruling dismissing his Charter application.

The Court of Appeal found no basis to interfere with the trial judge's Charter ruling, which was based on findings of fact.

The appellant raised issues regarding his treatment during arrest and suggested ineffective assistance of counsel, but had not properly pursued such claims.

The court found no basis to conclude the guilty plea was not voluntary and informed.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant was convicted of sexual assault following a judge-alone trial.

The trial judge found the complainant's evidence credible and rejected the appellant's testimony that the sexual activity was consensual.

On appeal, the appellant raised six grounds of appeal challenging the conviction.

While the Court of Appeal rejected the first three grounds (misapplication of burden of proof, improper use of silence, and improper use of lack of embellishment), it allowed the appeal on three remaining grounds: the trial judge's failure to inspect the complainant's shirt despite defence counsel's reasonable expectation that he would do so; the trial judge's erroneous admission and use of reply evidence from the appellant's roommate to establish a collusion theory without proper foundation; and most significantly, the trial judge's application of markedly different levels of scrutiny to the credibility of the complainant and the appellant.

The Court found that cumulatively, these errors undermined the fairness of the trial and constituted a miscarriage of justice.

The appellant appealed his conviction on a single ground: that the trial judge erred in dismissing his motion to stay proceedings for breach of s. 11(b) of the Charter (right to trial within reasonable time).

The appellant had been arrested on five counts of criminal harassment in November 2008 and subsequently re-arrested six times over three years on similar charges.

After a lengthy and complex procedural history spanning over four years, the appellant pleaded guilty to five counts and was sentenced to probation.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal on two bases: first, that the appellant's guilty plea barred him from challenging the pre-trial s. 11(b) ruling under the Fegan doctrine; and second, on the merits, that even under the Jordan framework (which post-dated the trial judge's decision), the delay did not constitute a breach of s. 11(b) when defence delay and transitional exceptional circumstances were properly accounted for.

The appellant appealed a 12-month sentence imposed for failure to comply with a probation order and failure to comply with a recognizance.

The breaches involved possessing internet-capable devices in violation of orders prohibiting such possession, which were imposed following the appellant's second conviction for possession of child pornography.

The appellant argued the sentence was outside the proper range as it was his first breach and he was not a long-term offender, and that he did not download illegal material.

The Court of Appeal upheld the sentence, finding the offences were flagrant, planned, deliberate, and occurred shortly after release.

The court found no errors in law or principle and determined the sentence was not demonstrably unfit.

The appellant appealed his conviction for offences relating to the stabbing of a victim and his sentence.

The trial judge had provided extensive reasons rejecting the appellant's evidence, accepting the victim's evidence, and finding the appellant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the trial judge's treatment of corroborative evidence, including knife evidence and Facebook evidence.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant abandoned her appeal from a conviction entered on October 14, 2016 and a sentence imposed on October 17, 2016 by Justice John B. McMahon of the Superior Court of Justice.

The appellant communicated with Crown counsel and decided to abandon the appeal.

The appeal was dismissed as abandoned.

The appellant appealed his convictions for assault with a weapon and two counts of sexual assault against a former intimate partner, as well as seeking leave to appeal a 51-month penitentiary sentence.

The sole ground of appeal was that the trial judge reversed the burden of proof by finding guilt based on rejection of defence submissions without considering whether the evidence as a whole established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no reversal of the burden of proof when the reasons were read as a whole.

The court upheld the trial judge's credibility findings regarding the complainant and rejected the argument that the manner of disclosure undermined her evidence.

Leave to appeal sentence was granted but the sentence appeal was dismissed, as the court found the sentences reflected no error in principle and were fit given the aggravating factors present.

Three appellants were convicted of first degree murder, attempted murder, and committing those offences for the benefit of a criminal organization arising from a drive-by shooting in Toronto.

The Crown's case relied heavily on testimony from two gang members who testified the appellants confessed to the shooting.

The appellants challenged numerous aspects of the trial including jury selection procedures, joinder of counts, admission of bad character evidence, ballistics evidence, jury instructions on Vetrovec witnesses, and alleged Charter violations.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeals of Atkins and Riley but allowed Wisdom's appeal, finding the trial judge erred in admitting evidence of an attempted theft four months after the shooting, which had minimal probative value but significant prejudicial effect.

The appellant was convicted of sexual assault, sexual interference, and invitation to sexual touching of his step-daughter over a period of approximately nine years, from when she was five to fourteen years old.

The sexual assault and invitation to sexual touching convictions were stayed pursuant to the Kienapple principle, and the appellant was sentenced to eight years' imprisonment.

On appeal, the appellant challenged the trial judge's credibility findings, arguing they were tainted by palpable and overriding errors.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no reversible error in the trial judge's assessment of the complainant's credibility or the evidence.

The applicant sought leave to appeal his conviction for mischief to property under $5,000, alleging bias on the part of both the trial judge and the Summary Conviction Appeal Judge.

The applicant had smashed four windows of the CBC building in Ottawa using a sledgehammer to draw attention to perceived historical abuses by government officials and other entities.

The trial judge dismissed the applicant's Charter application to stay proceedings and found him guilty, imposing a suspended sentence and one year of probation.

The Summary Conviction Appeal Judge dismissed the subsequent appeal.

The Court of Appeal found no indication of bias or reasonable apprehension of bias, determined the trial was conducted fairly, and refused leave to appeal.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence for possession of child pornography.

He argued that his inculpatory statement to the police was involuntary due to an unrecorded period at the station and his utterances regarding bail.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's conclusion that the statement was voluntary and not induced by police promises.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the trial judge had appropriately considered the appellant's strict pre-trial bail conditions as a mitigating factor.

The applicant, convicted of fraud, applied for the appointment of counsel under s. 684(1) of the Criminal Code for his appeal based on ineffective assistance of counsel.

A previous application was dismissed on the basis that duty counsel would assist him.

However, the Inmate Appeal Duty Counsel Program subsequently declined to assist, determining the appeal was beyond the scope of what could reasonably be expected of the program due to the voluminous record.

The Court of Appeal found this to be a significant change in circumstances and, applying the Bernardo test, concluded the applicant could not effectively present his appeal without the help of a lawyer.

The application was granted and counsel was appointed.

The appellant was convicted of aggravated assault, assault with a weapon, assault, and uttering a threat to cause death against his domestic partner, receiving a global sentence of seven years.

He appealed his convictions and sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's treatment of the appellant's silence.

On the sentence appeal, the Court found the trial judge erred by treating a lack of remorse as an aggravating factor and by not considering Gladue principles, as fresh evidence showed the appellant had Aboriginal heritage.

However, after conducting its own sentencing analysis applying Gladue principles, the Court concluded the seven-year sentence remained fit given the brutal nature of the domestic violence and the appellant's criminal record.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his global sentence of 42 months for fraud, arguing it was excessive and had uncontemplated negative immigration consequences.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the sentence was not excessive for a major and serious fraud.

The Court also declined to artificially reduce the sentence to avoid immigration consequences, citing Parliament's intent regarding serious crimes committed by immigrants.

The appellant, a taxi driver, appealed her conviction and one-month sentence for dangerous driving causing bodily harm.

The trial judge found that the appellant drove away while the rear door was open and an intoxicated passenger was trying to exit, causing the passenger to fall and sustain injuries.

The Court of Appeal found no legal error or misapprehension of evidence by the trial judge and held that the sentence was fit.

The appeal from conviction and sentence was dismissed.

The accused was acquitted of sexual offences involving two underage girls after the trial judge found he had taken all reasonable steps to ascertain their ages under s. 150.1(4) of the Criminal Code.

The Crown appealed, arguing the trial judge erred in his application of the mistake of age defence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge properly identified and applied the legal principles, and that it was open to him to conclude that a reasonable person would not have made further inquiries given the compelling indicia of age presented by the complainants.

The accused pleaded guilty to impaired driving causing bodily harm, dangerous driving causing bodily harm, and two counts of failing to remain at the scene of an accident.

The trial judge sentenced the accused to 90 days' imprisonment to be served intermittently, and adjourned sentencing on the remaining counts to later impose an additional 60 days intermittent.

The Crown appealed.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the trial judge exercised her discretion for an illegal purpose by bifurcating the sentencing to circumvent the 90-day limit on intermittent sentences under s. 732(1) of the Criminal Code.

The Court also found the original sentence demonstrably unfit and varied the sentence to a total of 15 months' imprisonment, less credit for time served.

The appellant, found unfit to stand trial, appealed a disposition of the Ontario Review Board that rejected a joint submission without explicit prior notice.

The Board imposed a more restrictive disposition than proposed, citing the appellant's ongoing violent behaviour.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the Board's probing questions during the hearing provided adequate notice of its concerns regarding the joint submission, satisfying the requirements of procedural fairness.

The appellant, a former high school teacher, appealed his conviction for the sexual exploitation of a student.

He argued that the trial judge materially misapprehended the evidence, applied a harsher standard of scrutiny to his testimony, and erred in admitting similar act and post-offence conduct evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge's credibility assessments were fair, the admission of similar act evidence from another student was reasonable, and the post-offence conduct evidence was properly used to assess credibility and the trajectory of the relationship.