Anita Nathan

The appellant appealed convictions for two counts of possession of drugs for the purpose of trafficking.

He challenged the validity of the search warrant used to locate fentanyl and cocaine at a Toronto residence, arguing that the Information to Obtain lacked sufficient evidence to support its issuance and that the evidence ought to have been excluded under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

Three confidential sources had identified the appellant as a drug dealer through single photo identification, and police surveillance corroborated his connection to the searched address.

The Court of Appeal found no legal error, misapprehension of evidence, or failure to consider relevant evidence in the application judge's analysis, and dismissed the appeal without calling on the respondent.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed Mauro Granados-Arana’s conviction appeal for first degree murder, finding no reversible error in the trial judge’s Vetrovec instructions regarding unsavoury witnesses.

The court allowed the sentence appeal, quashing the order that parole ineligibility run consecutively to a prior sentence, in light of the Supreme Court’s decision in R. v. Bissonnette.

The period of parole ineligibility will now run concurrently.

The appellant was found guilty of possession of fentanyl for the purpose of trafficking and possession of proceeds of crime.

The appeal challenged the reasonableness of the verdict, specifically the finding of constructive possession of fentanyl located in a backpack in the trunk of a car the appellant was driving.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming that the trial judge's inference of guilt was reasonable, given the circumstantial evidence, the high value of the fentanyl, and the absence of an exculpatory explanation from the appellant.

The Crown applied for an assessment order under s. 672.11(b) of the Criminal Code to determine whether the accused, who pleaded guilty to aggravated assault, was suffering from a mental disorder rendering him exempt from criminal responsibility.

The defence agreed the accused suffered from a mental disorder but opposed the application.

The court found that while the accused understood the nature and quality of his act, there were reasonable grounds to doubt his criminal responsibility regarding whether he understood the act was morally wrong.

The court granted the assessment order limited to the moral wrongfulness prong of the s. 16(1) test.

The applicant sought a review under s. 520 of the Criminal Code of bail conditions imposed by a Superior Court judge.

The applicant was charged with drug trafficking and had been released on strict conditions including house arrest, bi-weekly reporting, prohibition on possessing a cellphone, and prohibition on associating with persons with criminal records.

The applicant sought to vary these conditions to permit employment and to possess one cellphone.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the application, holding that absent special circumstances, superior courts should deal with bail matters prior to and during trial, while courts of appeal should deal with bail pending appeal.

The applicant failed to demonstrate special circumstances warranting appellate intervention.

The Crown applied for a voir dire to determine the admissibility of a 911 call made by the complainant and a statement given by the accused to police.

The court found the 911 call admissible under the res gestae and principled exceptions to the hearsay rule, noting its necessity due to challenges in domestic violence cases and high reliability.

The accused's statement was found voluntary and admissible, as the accused possessed an operating mind despite mistaken beliefs about the law, and there was no evidence of threats, inducements, oppression, or police trickery.

Both Crown applications were allowed.

The accused was stopped at a RIDE checkpoint and arrested for driving under suspension after failing an approved screening device test.

A search incident to arrest revealed crack cocaine in his possession.

The defence sought exclusion of the cocaine evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter, alleging three breaches: arbitrary arrest under s. 9, unreasonable search under s. 8, and failure to provide complete right to counsel information under s. 10(b).

The court found no Charter breaches and admitted the evidence.

The accused was found guilty of possession of cocaine.

The Crown brought a motion to remove two lawyers and their firm from the record due to a conflict of interest.

The lawyers, partners in the same firm, were representing two co-accused charged with sexual assault.

The respondents opposed the motion, asserting solicitor-client privilege over their defence positions and formally waiving any conflict.

The court addressed threshold procedural issues regarding the review of sealed affidavit evidence and the concept of waiver of solicitor-client privilege.

The court found that a judge's review of privileged information for adjudication purposes does not destroy or waive the privilege.

However, considering the differing DNA evidence for the co-accused, the court concluded there was a substantial and realistic risk that their defence positions would diverge, creating conflicting duties of loyalty for their counsel.

Despite the clients' waivers, the interests of justice, including the integrity of the trial process, predominated.

The motion to disqualify and remove counsel was granted.

Three Toronto police officers charged with sexual assault sought a publication ban on investigative materials filed by the Crown in a related application to remove counsel.

The court applied the Dagenais/Mentuck test, finding a real and substantial risk to trial fairness due to potential juror stigmatization and witness tainting, especially given the salacious nature of the allegations against police officers.

While acknowledging the public interest in scrutiny, the court determined that allowing media access to the information (without publication) and expert commentary provided a sufficient substitute for full public disclosure.

The publication ban was granted, prohibiting publication until the jury retires or the charge is withdrawn/dismissed.