Brigid McCallum

The accused, charged with human trafficking and sexual services offences, brought a pre-trial motion for the disclosure of redacted portions of a complainant's police statement.

The Crown argued the redacted information, which related to an unrelated criminal investigation and the complainant's sexual history, was clearly irrelevant and raised privacy concerns.

The court applied the Stinchcombe framework, finding that the low threshold for relevance favoured disclosure and that the redacted portions were not clearly irrelevant to the defence.

The court also rejected the Crown's argument that the statement constituted a 'record' under section 278.1 of the Criminal Code, concluding it was subject to the common law first-party disclosure regime.

The application for disclosure was granted.

Sentencing for sexual interference of one child complainant resulting in pregnancy, and for receiving material benefit from the trafficking of another child complainant in the sex trade, together with robbery and breach of a release order.

The court applied the proportionality principle, the child-sex-offence sentencing guidance in Friesen, the totality principle, and Summers pre-sentence custody credit, while also treating exceptionally punitive remand conditions as mitigating.

Significant aggravating factors included the victims' ages, the offender's degree of control, internet advertising of sexually exploitative images, pregnancy, repeated breach of a no-contact order, and serious emotional harm to the complainants and one complainant's family.

The court imposed a global 10-year penitentiary sentence less 608 days' credit, plus ancillary DNA, SOIRA, firearm prohibition, no-contact, s. 161, and forfeiture orders.

The offender pleaded guilty to receiving a material benefit from sexual services and assault causing bodily harm against his intimate partner.

The Crown sought a global sentence of nine years, arguing the offender procured the complainant and exerted coercive control.

The court rejected the Crown's characterization, finding the offender did not procure the complainant or use violence to force her into the sex trade, though the relationship was exploitative and he assaulted her twice.

Emphasizing the offender's youth, lack of significant record, and strong rehabilitative prospects, the court imposed a global sentence of two years' imprisonment, with 13 months' credit for pre-sentence custody and strict bail conditions.

Following a jury trial, the sentencing court addressed convictions for human trafficking and procuring a complainant under 18, with acquittals on sexual interference and assault-with-a-weapon counts.

The court held that denunciation and deterrence required substantial penitentiary terms given the complainant's youth, vulnerability, coercive exploitation, and enduring harm, while also weighing mitigation including limited or absent records and subordinate roles in a joint enterprise.

The court rejected a 12-year Crown position and a conditional-sentence defence position, finding both inconsistent with proportionality and parity.

The court imposed six-year custodial sentences on each offender, less pre-sentence custody credit, and granted ancillary non-communication, DNA, weapons prohibition, and 20-year SOIRA orders, while declining requested s. 161 orders.

The offender was found guilty by a jury of human trafficking, receiving a material benefit from human trafficking, and related offences.

The Crown sought a seven-year custodial sentence, while the offender sought a conditional sentence, relying on his youth, minor record, and 5.5 years of restrictive bail conditions.

The court found that a conditional sentence was inappropriate given the need for denunciation and deterrence.

After weighing the aggravating factors against the mitigating factors, including the restrictive bail conditions and harsh pre-sentence custody, the court imposed a sentence of four years imprisonment, less 36 days credit for pre-sentence custody.

The accused was charged with eight counts including human trafficking, receiving a financial benefit from human trafficking, procuring, receiving a material benefit from sexual services, advertising sexual services, uttering threats, assault, and assault by choking.

The Crown alleged the accused violently trafficked the complainant into the sex trade over approximately three weeks in April-May 2023, controlling her movements, finances, and communications while directing her to provide sexual services at hotels across the GTA and Barrie.

The court found the complainant's core evidence credible and reliable, corroborated by hotel records, Uber records, bank records, surveillance footage, and cryptocurrency purchase records.

The court was satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused was the person the complainant knew as "Troubles" and that he recruited, transported, harboured, and exploited the complainant for the purpose of providing sexual services.

The accused was found guilty on all eight counts.

The applicant, Marcus Bryan, facing charges including human trafficking, sought a Stage 2 ruling under s. 276 of the Criminal Code regarding the admissibility of evidence concerning the complainant's prior sexual activity.

The court granted the application in part, allowing limited questioning on the complainant's prior and ongoing involvement in sex work, her use of advertising websites, earnings, and work for other individuals, as well as the nature and conclusion of her relationship with the applicant.

The court found this evidence relevant to the defence narrative and to challenge the complainant's credibility, provided it did not engage the "twin myths" and had significant probative value.

The applicant, found guilty of human trafficking related offences, challenged the constitutionality of the mandatory minimum sentence of two years for receiving a material benefit from trafficking a person under 18 years of age, contrary to s. 279.02(2) of the Criminal Code.

The applicant argued that the mandatory minimum violated sections 7 and 12 of the Charter, constituting cruel and unusual punishment and an arbitrary deprivation of liberty due to the unavailability of a conditional sentence.

The Crown argued the constitutional issues were unnecessary as the overall sentence would exceed the minimum.

The court found that the broad range of hypothetical situations captured by the offence, and the fact that similar mandatory minimums for human trafficking offences had been struck down, led to the conclusion that the provision contravened sections 7 and 12 of the Charter and could not be saved by section 1.

The mandatory minimum sentence was struck down.

The accused applied for the production of private records relating to the complainant, specifically data extracted from the complainant's phone.

Following a Stage One order where the records were produced to the court for review, the court conducted a Stage Two analysis to determine if production to the defence was necessary in the interests of justice.

Balancing the accused's right to make full answer and defence against the complainant's privacy rights, the court ordered some records produced, some produced with redactions, and others withheld.

This pre-trial ruling addresses the applicability of the s. 276 regime of the Criminal Code to charges including human trafficking, firearm offences, kidnapping, and uttering threats.

The defence sought an order that s. 276 does not apply or, alternatively, to permit cross-examination on the complainant's past sexual history.

Following the guidance from R. v. A.M., the court determined that while the charges are not explicitly listed in s. 276, the Crown's allegations of violence and threats compelling sexual services implicate sexual assault, thereby engaging the s. 276 regime.

The court directed the parties to proceed to a Stage 1 / Stage 2 s. 276 hearing to determine the scope and admissibility of evidence related to the complainant’s sexual activities.

The applicant sought a stay of proceedings for human trafficking charges due to alleged unreasonable delay under s. 11(b) of the Charter.

The total delay from arrest to anticipated trial conclusion was 33.3 months.

The court applied the Jordan framework, deducting defence-attributable delay, which included time for prioritizing other matters, unavailability for earlier judicial pre-trials, and unavailability for court-offered summer 2024 trial dates.

The net delay was calculated to be approximately 28.3 months, falling below the Jordan ceiling.

The court found that the case, involving human trafficking, did not take "markedly longer than it reasonably should have" and was not a "clear case" warranting a stay.

The application for a stay was dismissed.

The Crown brought a pre-trial motion to admit statements made by the defendant, Moesha Woodley, during police interactions on February 25, 2021, and following her arrest on March 25, 2021, in a human trafficking investigation.

The court applied the voluntariness rule, considering factors such as threats, promises, oppression, operating mind, and police trickery.

The court found that the statements from both dates were made voluntarily and were admissible, dismissing the defence's arguments regarding inadequate caution, alleged trickery, inducements, and the defendant's health concerns.

This decision addresses three pre-trial applications in a criminal proceeding involving charges of human trafficking, firearm offences, and kidnapping.

The court granted the Crown's application for the complainant to testify via CCTV, finding it would facilitate a full and candid account given the nature of the offences and the complainant's expressed anxiety.

The court also ruled that the complainant's 911 call was admissible under the res gestae exception, the principled approach to hearsay, and as narrative circumstantial evidence.

However, the admissibility of the complainant's statements to her aunt was deemed premature.

The Defence's application regarding the applicability of the s. 276 regime to human trafficking was deferred pending a Court of Appeal decision.

Nahom Mussie pleaded guilty to human trafficking, possession of fentanyl for trafficking, and obstruct justice.

The human trafficking involved the exploitation of a vulnerable, drug-addicted young woman (S.M.) over several months, with the accused controlling her activities and providing her with fentanyl.

S.M. later died of a fentanyl overdose.

The obstruction of justice charge stemmed from Mussie providing a fraudulent employment letter for a bail variation, obtained by exploiting another drug user.

The Crown and defence presented a joint submission for a six-year global sentence.

The court considered aggravating factors, including the victim's extreme vulnerability and the accused's misconduct while on bail, and mitigating factors such as the guilty plea and lack of prior criminal record.

The court imposed the jointly recommended six-year global sentence, granting credit for pre-sentence custody and restrictive bail conditions.

This ruling addresses Crown applications in a human trafficking trial for two complainants, aged 15 and 16 at the time of the alleged offences, to testify from outside the courtroom.

The applications were brought under section 486.2(2) of the Criminal Code, which permits such orders to facilitate a full and candid account or in the interest of the proper administration of justice.

The court considered the complainants' anxiety and fear, particularly one who experienced panic attacks during the preliminary hearing.

The court noted the lowered threshold for such orders following a 2015 amendment to the Criminal Code.

Both applications were granted, subject to technical transmission quality, with instructions to the jury not to draw adverse inferences from the use of testimonial aids.

The applicant, Nahom Mussie, facing human trafficking and fentanyl possession charges, brought an application alleging breaches of his Charter rights related to his arrest, search warrants, strip search, and right to counsel, and sought a remedy for lost police notes.

The court found that the police had reasonable grounds for arrest and that the search warrants, despite significant errors in the Informations to Obtain, were valid after amplification and redaction, as the errors were inadvertent.

The strip search was also found justified.

A minor breach of the right to counsel was found, but the remedy was limited to excluding the applicant's answer to a single question.

The application for a stay due to lost notes was deemed premature.

Ultimately, the evidence seized from the search warrants was deemed admissible.

In a sexual assault trial, the defence sought an order compelling the complainant to provide contact information for her partner and mother, arguing it was necessary to investigate the complainant's truthfulness regarding her disclosures to them.

The Crown argued the evidence was irrelevant under the collateral facts rule.

The court dismissed the application, finding the information collateral to the main issue of the sexual assault and primarily related to credibility on a minor point.

The court also noted the defence had ample opportunity for a pre-trial motion for third-party disclosure.

Kyle Marier pleaded guilty to possession of a loaded prohibited firearm.

The Crown sought 34 months imprisonment, while the defence sought an 18-month conditional sentence.

The court considered aggravating factors, including the public possession of a loaded firearm, flight from police, discarding the weapon, and being on bail for another offence.

Mitigating factors included Marier's youth (19 at the time of offence, 23 at sentencing), lack of prior criminal record, guilty plea, strong family and community support, and significant rehabilitative efforts while on house arrest bail for over four years.

The court also considered social context evidence of systemic anti-Black racism and its impact on the offender, which mitigated his moral culpability.

The judge found the appropriate sentence to be in the range of two years and, applying the principles from R. v. Morris, determined that a conditional sentence was appropriate given Marier's rehabilitative potential and the systemic factors.

Marier was sentenced to a two-year conditional sentence (less 46 days credit for pre-trial custody), with the first 12 months under house arrest and the remainder under curfew, followed by one year of probation.

Ancillary orders included a DNA order, a 10-year/lifetime firearms prohibition, and forfeiture of seized items.

The Crown applied for an order to produce the complainant's private medical and cell phone records to the defence prior to a trial for human trafficking offences.

The complainant was uncooperative and opposed the use of her records.

The court adjourned the application, ruling that the complainant must first be fully informed of her statutory rights to attend, participate, and obtain funded counsel before the common law O'Connor procedure could be applied.

The Crown sought to admit similar fact evidence from a prior sexual assault allegation (F.J.) against the accused (J.R.) in his current trial for sexual assault (D.F-H.).

The defence argued the evidence was inadmissible due to issue estoppel, abuse of process, or failure to meet the orthodox test for similar fact evidence.

The court found that a prior stay of proceedings for delay (s. 11(b) Charter) on the F.J. charges did not constitute a determination on the merits, thus issue estoppel and abuse of process did not apply.

The court further found that the F.J. evidence met the test for admissibility as similar fact evidence, demonstrating sufficient similarities in context and method, and that any prejudice was minimized in a judge-alone trial.

The Crown's application was allowed.