R. v. Augustin, 2026 ONSC 573
COURT FILE NO.: CR-24-50000088-0000 CR-24-50000093-0000
ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
BETWEEN:
HIS MAJESTY THE KING
– and –
SAMUEL AUGUSTIN
COUNSEL:
Brigid McCallum, for the Crown
Samuel Augustin, self-represented Sherif Foda, amicus curiae
HEARD: December 12, 2025
REASONS FOR SENTENCE
(Subject to a publication ban that applies to any information that might identify the complainant, pursuant to section 486.4 of the Criminal Code)
VERMETTE J.
1On February 21, 2024, Samuel Augustin was found guilty by a jury of the following offences committed in Toronto during the period of February 27 to April 11, 2020:1
a. Count 1 (Human trafficking): Did recruit, transport, transfer, receive, hold, conceal or harbour I.P., or did exercise control, direction or influence over her movements for the purpose of exploiting her or facilitating her exploitation, contrary to subsection 279.01(1) of the Criminal Code.
b. Count 2 (Receiving a material benefit from human trafficking): Did receive a financial or other material benefit knowing that it was obtained by the commission of an offence under subsection 279.01(1) of the Criminal Code, contrary to subsection 279.02(1) of the Criminal Code.
c. Count 3 (Receiving a material benefit from sexual services obtained for consideration): Did receive a financial or other material benefit knowing that it was obtained by the commission of an offence under subsection 286.1(1) of the Criminal Code, contrary to subsection 286.2(1) of the Criminal Code.
d. Count 5 (Procuring): Did procure I.P. to offer or provide sexual services for consideration or, for the purpose of facilitating an offence under subsection 286.1(1), did recruit, hold, conceal, or harbour I.P., who offered or provided sexual services for consideration, or did exercise control, direction or influence over her movements, contrary to subsection 286.3(1) of the Criminal Code.
2The jury found Mr. Augustin not guilty with respect to the following charge (in relation to the same location and time period):
a. Count 4 (Advertising sexual services): Did knowingly advertise an offer to provide sexual services for consideration, contrary to section 286.4 of the Criminal Code.
3On December 12, 2025, based on the verdict of the jury, the evidence at trial and the prior agreement of counsel,2 I found Mr. Augustin guilty of failing to comply with a probation order, namely the condition to keep the peace and be of good behaviour, during the period of February 27 to April 11, 2020, in Toronto, contrary to subsection 733.1(1) of the Criminal Code.3
4On December 12, 2025, I heard sentencing submissions and reserved judgment. These are my reasons for sentence.
A. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
1. Circumstances of the offences
5Following a trial with a jury, the sentencing judge must do their best to determine the facts necessary for sentencing from the issues before the jury and from the jury’s verdict. The sentencing judge is required to make only those factual determinations necessary for deciding the appropriate sentence in the case at hand. In doing so, the sentencing judge: (a) is bound by the express and implied factual implications of the jury’s verdict; and (b) must accept as proven all facts, express or implied, that are essential to the jury’s verdict of guilty, and must not accept as fact any evidence consistent only with a verdict rejected by the jury. See R. v. Ferguson, 2008 SCC 6 at paras. 16-17.
6When the factual implications of the jury’s verdict are ambiguous, the sentencing judge should not attempt to follow the logical process of the jury. It would be speculative and artificial to attempt to do so because jurors may arrive at a unanimous verdict for different reasons and on different theories of the case: see Ferguson at para. 22. Rather than attempt to follow the logical process of the jury, the sentencing judge should come to their own independent determination of the relevant facts. In doing so, the sentencing judge may find any other relevant fact that was disclosed by evidence at the trial. To rely upon an aggravating fact, the sentencing judge must be convinced of the existence of that fact beyond a reasonable doubt. To rely upon any other relevant fact, the sentencing judge must be persuaded on a balance of probabilities. See Ferguson at para. 18 and section 724 of the Criminal Code.
7In order to reach its verdict in this case, the jury would have had to find, among other things, that Mr. Augustin: (a) engaged in conduct for the purpose of exploiting the complainant or facilitating her exploitation; and (b) received a financial or material benefit that he knew was derived from human trafficking and from sexual services obtained for consideration.
8The following are some of the relevant facts. To the extent that any of the facts are aggravating in nature, I have kept in mind the applicable standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt in finding them as facts.
9The complainant, I.P., was 20 years old at the relevant time and she had a young daughter. She grew up in Montreal and does not speak English.
10Salma Mezouari and Mr. Augustin were in a romantic relationship at the relevant time. Ms. Mezouari was originally charged with the same offences as Mr. Augustin (except for the offence of failing to comply with a probation order), but she pled guilty in January 2022, as discussed further below.
11After communicating with Ms. Mezouari through another person, I.P. first met Mr. Augustin and Ms. Mezouari when they picked her up in Montreal on February 28, 2020. They drove to Toronto. I.P. understood that she was going with them to Toronto to work as an escort and that they would help her to make money.
12Once in Toronto, Ms. Mezouari took pictures of I.P., which were posted on a website. They then waited to receive text messages from clients.
13Between February 28 and April 11, 2020, I.P. was mostly with Mr. Augustin and Ms. Mezouari in Toronto, although she returned to Montreal for a short period of time at least once. While I.P. was with Mr. Augustin and Ms. Mezouari in Toronto, she stayed with them at motels or hotels and Airbnbs. Mr. Augustin drove her to clients’ places with Ms. Mezouari. I.P. performed acts on clients that were of a sexual nature. She gave money that she received from clients to Mr. Augustin and Ms. Mezouari. The money went into Ms. Mezouari’s bank account. Mr. Augustin had access to Ms. Mezouari’s account. Ms. Mezouari paid for I.P.’s expenses.
14During the relevant period, I.P. exchanged text messages with both Ms. Mezouari and Mr. Augustin. In some of the messages that she exchanged with Mr. Augustin, Mr. Augustin told I.P. what she should do with clients and for what amount of money, and he asked I.P. to give him the money that she had received from one client before going to another call.
15I.P. called 911 on April 11, 2020. Before calling 911, she texted Mr. Augustin. She told him that she wanted to leave for good and that she needed him to send her her money. Mr. Augustin did not respond.
2. Pre-sentence report
16A pre-sentence report (“PSR”) was prepared in this case. The following information is set out in the PSR.
17Mr. Augustin is 28 years old. He is a Canadian citizen. He currently lives in Montreal with his parents, who are his sureties. Two of his brothers also live with them.
18Mr. Augustin has five siblings. He is the third child in the family. He reported that he had a happy childhood and that his parents gave him a balanced lifestyle. He still has a good relationship with his parents, and his father is his confidant. Mr. Augustin feels that he can always count on his parents. His social circle is composed of members of his family and a few longtime friends.
19Mr. Augustin completed high school with good academic results. He subsequently attended college in Montreal (CÉGEP). However, he stopped attending college after two semesters because he was suffering from depression following a romantic break-up. Instead of going to school, he focused on his job in a restaurant. He later attended a different college for two semesters. He abandoned his studies after that. Mr. Augustin said that he was influenced by people with bad intentions. Mr. Augustin has not gone back to school since then.
20Mr. Augustin has been unemployed for the last five years. Prior to that, he had been continuously working since he was 16 yeas old. He worked on a part-time basis while he was a student. He worked in the areas of customer service, retail, and telecommunications. Mr. Augustin stated that he has not been able to find a job or go back to school since his arrest because of his bail conditions which require him to be in the presence of one of his parents at all times. He looks forward to the end of the judicial process so that he can go back to school or find a job.
21Mr. Augustin occasionally drinks alcohol. He stopped using marijuana approximately two years ago. Prior to that, he was using marijuana on a regular basis since his romantic break-up when he was 19 years old.
22Mr. Augustin has had three intimate partners. His first relationship started when he was 18 years old and lasted approximately two years. His second relationship was with Emie Perreault. They met at the second college that Mr. Augustin attended. They were together for approximately three years, until Mr. Augustin met Ms. Mezouari, who was his co-accused in this case. Mr. Augustin broke up with Ms. Perreault and started a relationship with Ms. Mezouari. Their relationship lasted two years and they lived together for eight months. For the last two years and a half, Mr. Augustin has been in a relationship with Emie Perreault again. He says that their relationship is harmonious.
23Mr. Augustin told the probation officer who prepared the PSR that it was Ms. Mezouari who wanted to start an escort business in Ontario, and that he followed her lead. He stated that Ms. Mezouari was responsible for organizing and managing everything, including accommodation, meals, advertisement, make-up and scheduling appointments. Mr. Augustin said that his role was mainly to drive the girls to the scheduled appointments.
24According to the probation officer, Mr. Augustin partially recognizes his participation in the alleged acts, in particular receiving a benefit from human trafficking. However, he does not understand why the accusations were against him alone as he only played a minor role in the organization. Mr. Augustin knew that the activities were illegal, but he said that he was influenced negatively by Ms. Mezouari, his partner at the time, as he was trying to please her. Five years later, he now regrets his actions as they are contrary to his family’s values and his education.
25The probation officer who prepared the PSR assessed Mr. Augustin’s risk of recidivism to be low or moderate.
3. Bail conditions
26Mr. Augustin was arrested on April 11, 2020. On May 4, 2020, he was released following a contested bail hearing. His mother and his father were his sureties. The release order contained a number of conditions, including the following:
a. to reside with his sureties;
b. to remain in his residence at all times, except when he was in the direct and continuous presence of one of his sureties;
c. not to enter the Province of Ontario, except when he was in the direct and continuous presence of one of his sureties for the purposes of attending court and counsel meetings;
d. not to possess or use any electronic device, whether mobile or otherwise, that is capable of accessing the internet; and
e. not to attend at or rent any motel, hotel or Airbnb.
4. Mr. Augustin’s evidence at the sentencing hearing
27Mr. Augustin gave evidence at the sentencing hearing, both by way of affidavit and orally.
28As stated above, Mr. Augustin was arrested on April 11, 2020, and he was released on May 4, 2020. He was incarcerated at the Toronto South Detention Centre (“TSDC”) for almost four weeks. The records produced by the TSDC indicate that during his stay, Mr. Augustin was only subject to two lockdowns, and that he was never “triple bunked”. However, Mr. Augustin disputes the accuracy of the records.
29Mr. Augustin stated that when he arrived at the TSDC, he spent the first seven to ten days in a complete lockdown, which was for the purpose of ensuring that he did not have COVID-19. After that, Mr. Augustin was transferred to a different range and was placed in a cell with two other inmates. One of the inmates had a medical condition and had three or four seizures while Mr. Augustin was sharing a cell with him and another inmate.
30After the initial lockdown of seven to ten days, Mr. Augustin spent the rest of his time at the TSDC with two people with him in his cell, except maybe during the last week. He also spent multiple days a week in lockdowns, during which he was not allowed to leave his cell, shower or make telephone calls. Mr. Augustin does not remember the exact number of days on which there were lockdowns.
31While at the TSDC, Mr. Augustin was concerned about getting COVID-19. He got sick for four days, but he recovered with no complications.
32Mr. Augustin’s evidence is that after he was released, he could not find a job or pursue post-secondary education because of his bail conditions of house arrest and prohibition on possessing electronic devices capable of accessing the internet. He stated that the past five years have been difficult for him and that he often felt isolated and lonely. He hopes to be able to reintegrate into society, make an honest living, support his parents, and have children with his girlfriend.
33During his cross-examination, Mr. Augustin maintained that he was essentially just a driver for I.P. and he was not involved in the sex work of I.P. During his re-examination, he clarified that he recognizes his involvement and role in the offences of which he was convicted. However, he said that he played a minor role in the organization. He also stated that his co-accused was violent with I.P., but that he was not. Mr. Augustin testified that he was remorseful for his conduct that led to his convictions.
34Mr. Augustin acknowledged that he breached his bail conditions in August 2021. He was in a car that was stopped in the area of Kingston, Ontario, and he had a cell phone. There were two women and two other men in the car with him.
35Mr. Augustin testified that he tried many times to change his bail conditions with two of his lawyers before trial, and once during the trial. However, no change was made. Mr. Augustin stated that, before trial, he asked to seek a bail variation to go to school. He said that he did not make any formal applications to go to school because they never wanted to change his bail conditions.
36Mr. Augustin stated that he did not go out with his sureties to seek out employment. He said that his father had found him a job in a garage several months before the trial, but he could not go and work there as his father would have had to accompany him to work. He brought this job offer to his lawyer’s attention, but his lawyer did not seek a formal variation of his bail conditions.
37Mr. Augustin acknowledged that the Crown never refused a variation of his bail conditions.
38Mr. Augustin said that he attempted to make the best use possible of his time while on bail, but there was nothing to do.
5. Criminal antecedents
39On February 8, 2019, Justice Le Dressay of the Ontario Court of Justice conditionally discharged Mr. Augustin and made a two-year probation order against him in relation to two offences committed in March and June 2018: theft or forgery of credit card (contrary to subsection 342(3) of the Criminal Code) and failure to re-attend court (contrary to subsection 145(2)(b) of the Criminal Code). One of the conditions in the probation order was to keep the peace and be of good behaviour.
40Mr. Augustin has been convicted of two offences after he was arrested for the offences in this case:
a. On September 23, 2021, he was convicted on two counts of failing to comply with a release order (contrary to subsection 145(5)(a) of the Criminal Code). He was sentenced to one day’s imprisonment, and was given credit for the equivalent of 38 days of pre-sentence custody.
b. On October 13, 2021, he was convicted of obstructing a peace officer (contrary to subsection 129(a) of the Criminal Code). He was sentenced to one day’s imprisonment.4
6. Support letter
41Emie Perreault, Mr. Augustin’s girlfriend, wrote a letter in support of Mr. Augustin.
42Ms. Perreault met Mr. Augustin in 2018, when she was 20 years old. They were both in college and had the same courses. They were in a relationship for two years. Their relationship was harmonious, healthy and respectful.
43Ms. Perreault and Mr. Augustin met again two years after the end of their relationship, and Ms. Perreault’s feelings for Mr. Augustin came back. They have been in a relationship since then, but their relationship has been more complex and difficult because of Mr. Augustin’s situation. Ms. Perreault is saddened by the fact that she cannot live their relationship fully because of the house arrest condition imposed on Mr. Augustin.
44Ms. Perreault states that Mr. Augustin is generous, caring, attentive, trustworthy and of good character. She looks forward to being able to have a normal daily life with him and build a healthy future together. She wants to be with him in the future and to have a family.
7. Victim input
45I.P. did not provide a victim impact statement. She advised a victim support worker that she felt a bit uncomfortable writing one. However, she told the victim support worker that she had been working for money to support her young daughter, but she did not see any of the money that she earned. She feels that Mr. Augustin owes her $3,000.00, and she said that she needs the money to support her family. She wants Mr. Augustin to give her back her money. If a sum of money is awarded by way of restitution, she plans to use it to purchase items for her daughter and assist with her basic daily needs.
8. Sentence imposed on Ms. Mezouari
46On January 10, 2022, Ms. Mezouari pleaded guilty to the offences of procuring and receiving a financial benefit from sexual services obtained for consideration. On January 26, 2022, Justice Goldstein heard submissions on sentencing. The Crown and the defence had a joint submission for a conditional sentence of two years less a day – the first one-third with a house arrest condition, the second third with a curfew, and the final third with the statutory terms – and a two-year probation. Justice Goldstein was advised that Ms. Mezouari was also a sex worker who worked for Mr. Augustin.
47Justice Goldstein gave the following reasons, in part, for acceding to the joint submission of the parties:
Ms. Mezouari herself was in a relationship with her co-accused. She gave him an ultimatum about her seeing other people. He then began to blame her for losing revenue, threatened her, and had her perform sexual services as well for money. It appears that the co-accused was controlling her and forced her to do some of the work.
There is a joint submission for a conditional sentence of two years less a day, and two years of probation. Ordinarily an offence such as this, especially if it were to involve the potential for violence or the threat of violence against the victim, would merit a penitentiary sentence.
However, there are mitigating factors. The first mitigating factor of course is the guilty plea.
The second mitigating factor is Ms. Mezouari’s age. She is only 21 years old. It is also mitigating that she is a first offender. It is mitigating that she appears to have important family support. It appears that she did breach her bail on one occasion, but on the other hand she was able to start a business and appears to be pursuing that. Of course, what’s aggravating is the nature of the offence and as the Crown pointed out, the threat of violence against another escort.
In my view, having heard the facts and heard about Ms. Mezouari from Mr. El Turaby, and having heard from Ms. Mezouari herself, I think the joint submission is appropriate. As I said, take away some mitigating factors, add another aggravating factor and regrettably she would be going to the penitentiary, and people should understand that. But in this case I think that it’s not contrary to the public interest to accede to the joint submission. I certainly don’t think it would bring the administration of justice into disrepute, given the very young age and antecedents of Ms. Mezouari, and so I will go along with the joint submission.
9. Mr. Augustin’s statement
48Pursuant to section 726 of the Criminal Code, Mr. Augustin was asked whether he had anything to say regarding his sentence.
49Mr. Augustin said that he was aware of the gravity of the situation. He apologized to everyone in the courtroom, including his parents and his girlfriend. He also apologized to the victim and he hopes that she can forgive him.
50Mr. Augustin stated that at this point in his life and at his age, this situation has been long and difficult. He wants this case to end so that he can go forward with his life with his girlfriend.
B. POSITIONS OF THE PARTIES
1. Position of the Crown
51The Crown seeks a custodial sentence of seven years, and the following ancillary orders:
a. an order for non-communication with the complainant during the custodial period of the sentence, pursuant to section 732.21 of the Criminal Code;
b. an order authorizing the taking from Mr. Augustin of such bodily substances as are necessary for the purposes of a forensic DNA analysis, pursuant to section 487.04 of the Criminal Code;
c. an order pursuant to section 109 of the Criminal Code prohibiting the possession of weapons for 10 years; and
d. an order for restitution in the amount of $3,000.00 pursuant to subsection 738(1) of the Criminal Code.
52The Crown submits that the sentencing principles that are at the forefront in this case are deterrence and denunciation. The Crown states that while the four-year mandatory minimum for human trafficking of a person over 18 years old was struck down by the Superior Court of Justice of Ontario, the range of sentence was said to be between four and eight years. The Crown argues that the range of sentences has since increased and relies, among other things, on R. v. Bedi, 2024 ONSC 5320 at para. 88 (“Bedi”). The Crown notes that she communicated her sentencing position to Mr. Augustin before Bedi and that, in fairness to Mr. Augustin, she is not seeking a longer custodial period. However, her sentencing position would be different today.
53The Crown argues that conditional sentences have only been imposed in human trafficking cases where there were exceptional circumstances.
54The Crown points out that sex workers have been recognized as vulnerable individuals. The Crown submits that Mr. Augustin took advantage of I.P.’s emotional and financial vulnerability, and exploited her weaknesses.
55The Crown identifies the following aggravating factors:
a. Mr. Augustin instructed I.P. to provide sexual services when she was in pain.
b. Mr. Augustin instructed I.P. to provide sexual services that she specifically did not want to do (“duos”).
56The Crown notes that one instance of non-consensual penetrative sex has a sentencing range between three and five years. The Crown states that Mr. Augustin organized, controlled and benefitted from multiple events of I.P. having sex in circumstances that she did not want to.
57The Crown submits that the role of a co-accused does not reduce Mr. Augustin’s moral blameworthiness and that the text messages demonstrate his primary role.
58The Crown argues that the fact that Mr. Augustin is portraying himself as a driver goes to his credibility and shows a lack of insight into what he really did.
59The Crown points out that Mr. Augustin has taken no rehabilitative steps.
60With respect to the issue of pre-sentence custody and bail conditions, the Crown states that these mitigating circumstances should not be used to overwhelm the sentencing process. The Crown does not contest the giving of enhanced credit for pre-sentence custody in jail during the COVID-19 pandemic. However, the Crown contests the giving of credit for time spent on bail.
61The Crown states that with respect to the period from May 2020 to August 2021, Mr. Augustin demonstrated that he was not complying with his bail conditions since he was found in the Province of Ontario with a cell phone in a car that had receipts for a hotel, which was not a momentary lapse of judgment.
62With respect to the strictness of the bail, the Crown notes that the onus is on the accused to demonstrate hardship on bail and that hardship cannot be presumed. The Crown states that Mr. Augustin’s trial counsel did not try to vary his bail conditions, and that Mr. Augustin never sought a variation for the purposes of working or going to school. The Crown also points out that it was the Crown who was pushing to conclude this case and get to sentencing, not Mr. Augustin. The Crown submits that Mr. Augustin was responsible for 20 months of the delay to sentencing. The Crown asserts that Mr. Augustin has not demonstrated any initiative in concluding this case earlier or in varying his bail conditions.
63The Crown argues that the defence is overemphasizing the importance to be given to the pre-sentence custody and the time spent on bail. The Crown relies on the decision of the Court of Appeal in R. v. Marshall, 2021 ONCA 344 (“Marshall”). The Crown submits that the time spent on bail cannot be used to “devour” the entire sentence as this would result in an unfit sentence.
64With respect to the sentence imposed on Ms. Mezouari, the Crown points out that Ms. Mezouari pleaded guilt at the height of the COVID-19 pandemic, which was an important consideration for the Court. The Court also relied on the allegation that Mr. Augustin controlled Ms. Mezaouri and forced her to do sex work. Thus, the Crown states that the principle of parity does not apply as between Ms. Mezouari and Mr. Augustin.
65The Crown seeks restitution in the amount of $3,000.00, based on I.P.’s estimate of her earnings and text messages exchanged between I.P. and Ms. Mezouari and Mr. Augustin. The Crown relies on other human trafficking cases where restitution was ordered. No restitution order was imposed on Ms. Mezouari. The Crown argues that the money was taken from the victim and that it does not matter what Mr. Augustin and Ms. Mezouari did with the money.
2. Position of Mr. Augustin advanced by amicus curiae
66The defence’s position is that an appropriate sentence is a conditional sentence with a strict house arrest condition, with an exception allowing Mr. Augustin to go to work or to school.
67The defence submits that the seven-year sentence sought by the Crown is unduly harsh and outside the range of what would be appropriate in this case. The defence argues that without the mitigating factors, an appropriate sentence in this case would be within the range of three to four years. Based on the case law, the defence states that the sentencing range for human trafficking is between three and eight years, and that Mr. Augustin is not at the higher end of the range.
68The defence submits that Mr. Augustin is a youthful offender with a very minor criminal record (conditional discharge with a probation order imposed in February 2019).
69The defence notes that Mr. Augustin is a Black man whose parents immigrated from Haiti. The defence states that Mr. Augustin has a very positive and supportive relationship with his parents.
70The defence submits that the principle of parity is important and notes that Mr. Augustin’s co-accused received a conditional sentence. The defence argues that it is an implicit finding of the jury that the co-accused was more directly involved, at least with respect to advertising. The defence asserts that the co-accused participated equally or more in the offences.
71The defence states that Mr. Augustin has expressed remorse, he has insight into his conduct, he has the support of his family and girlfriend, and he will never commit this type of offences again.
72The defence points out that Mr. Augustin spent 24 “real days” at the TSDC, which entitles him to a Summers credit of 36 days. However, the defence argues that Mr. Augustin should be given a credit of 50-60 days given the harsh conditions at the TSDC. The defence also points out that Mr. Augustin has experienced difficult pre-sentence conditions for over 65 months (house arrest with no access to internet), which entitles him to a significant credit. The defence notes that if a credit of 0.4 day is given for the 65 months of house arrest, this corresponds to a credit of 26 months. The credit would be 32 months if 0.5 is used instead of 0.4.
73Given this, and based on a four-year sentence, the defence submits that a conditional sentence is available and should be imposed in light of the principle of restraint. The defence argues that the principles of deterrence and denunciation can be achieved with a conditional sentence.
74The defence’s position is that the breach of bail conditions in August 2021 is irrelevant because Mr. Augustin has already been punished for that, and there is no evidence that Mr. Augustin was not complying with his bail conditions for the entire period of May 2020 to August 2021. The defence emphasizes that Mr. Augustin pleaded guilty with respect to a specific event. The defence argues that there is no way that the Crown would have consented to any modification of Mr. Augustin’s bail conditions that would have allowed him to work not in the presence of his parents given that the Crown did not even consent to have Mr. Augustin come to his trial alone, without his father who has a medical condition. The defence states that Mr. Augustin swore under oath that he asked his lawyers to seek a bail variation, and submits that this meets his onus on a balance of probabilities.
75The defence argues that the Crown’s request for a restitution order is an unusual request that would expand the case law on this issue. The defence states that proceeds from sexual services are proceeds of crime. The defence points out that the money did not go into Mr. Augustin’s account. The defence also points out that Ms. Mezouari testified that the amount of $3,000.00 that was in her bank account at the time of her arrest was her own money, not I.P.’s money, and she did not testify that Mr. Augustin took the money. The defence submits that there is an insufficient link between the money and Mr. Augustin to make a restitution order. The defence notes that restitution orders should be made with restraint and caution. According to the defence, a better evidentiary record would be required to make such an order.
76With respect to the weapons prohibition requested under section 109 of the Criminal Code, the defence points out that I.P. never accused Mr. Augustin of being violent. The defence states that it is not open to the court to impose this prohibition.
C. DISCUSSION
77I accept the Crown’s submission (with which amicus curiae agreed) that the convictions on count 3 (receiving a material benefit from sexual services obtained for consideration) and count 5 (procuring) should be conditionally stayed pursuant to the principles set out in R. v. Kienapple, 1974 14 (SCC), [1975] 1 S.C.R. 729. The stay is conditional on the final disposition of the related charges which are not stayed, and will become a permanent stay upon the dismissal of all appeals or the expiry of the appeal period.
78Therefore, Mr. Augustin must be sentenced on three counts: human trafficking, receiving a material benefit from human trafficking, and failing to comply with a probation order.
1. Relevant legal principles
a. General principles
79The fundamental purpose of sentencing is to protect society and to contribute to respect for the law and the maintenance of a just, peaceful and safe society: see section 718 of the Criminal Code. The main principles of sentencing are set out in sections 718, 718.1 and 718.2 of the Criminal Code. Section 718 recognizes that “just sanctions” will have one or more of the objectives identified in subsections (a) to (f), including denunciation, general and specific deterrence and rehabilitation. However, those objectives will not necessarily point toward the same sentencing disposition. The individualization of the sentencing process requires the sentencing judge to prioritize and blend the different objectives of sentencing so as to properly reflect the seriousness of the offence and the responsibility of the offender. The search for a just sanction that reflects a proper blending of the objectives of sentencing is guided by the principle of proportionality. See R. v. Morris, 2021 ONCA 680 at paras. 58-59 (“Morris”).
80The goal in every case is a fair, fit and principled sanction, and proportionality is the organizing principle in reaching this goal. All sentencing starts with the principle that sentences must be proportionate to the gravity of the offence and the degree of responsibility of the offender. Individualization is central to the proportionality assessment. The question is always whether the sentence reflects the gravity of the offence, the offender’s degree of responsibility and the unique circumstances of each case. See R. v. Parranto, 2021 SCC 46 at paras. 10, 12, and R. v. Ipeelee, 2012 SCC 13 at para. 37 (“Ipeelee”).
81The objectives of individual deterrence and rehabilitation are paramount with respect to the sentencing of first offenders, particularly youthful first offenders. The principle of restraint serves to minimize a youthful first offender’s sentence in that it requires a sentencing judge to consider all sanctions apart from incarceration and, where incarceration is required, make the sentence as short as possible and tailor it to the individual circumstances of the offender. Further, a first penitentiary sentence should be as short as possible. See R. v. Priest, 1996 1381 (Ont. C.A.), R. v. Desir, 2021 ONCA 486 at paras. 31, 41 (“Desir”) and R. v. Borde, 2003 4187 at para. 36 (C.A.). The principle of restraint also requires the sentencing judge to consider rehabilitation in determining the appropriate length, recognizing that in very serious cases and cases involving violence, rehabilitation alone is not the determinative factor and general deterrence and denunciation must also be considered. See Desir at para. 41 and R. v. Thurairajah, 2008 ONCA 91 at para. 41.
b. Human trafficking cases
82The objectives of denunciation and deterrence must be given primary consideration in arriving at a fit and proper sentence for human trafficking and sex trade offences. See Bedi at para. 66 and R. v. Lucas-Johnson, 2018 ONSC 4325 at para. 26.
83Not every case of human trafficking displays the same degree of control and exploitation, but control and exploitation are the hallmarks of human trafficking. See Bedi at para. 68. The following factors (often referred to as the Tang-Miller factors) have been found to be relevant considerations in the determination of sentence with respect to human trafficking and related offences:
a. the degree of coercion or control imposed by the offender on the victim’s activities;
b. the amount of money received by the offender and the extent to which he allowed the victim to retain her earnings;
c. the age of the victim and the number of sex workers;
d. any special vulnerability the victim may have;
e. the working conditions in which the victim was expected to operate, including health and safety concerns;
f. the degree of planning and sophistication, including whether the offender was working in concert with others;
g. the size of the offender’s operations, including the number of customers the victim was expected to service;
h. the duration of the exploitative conduct;
i. the degree of violence, if any, apart from that inherent in the offender’s parasitic activities;
j. the extent to which “inducements” such as drugs or alcohol were employed by the offender;
k. the extent to which the offender demanded or compelled sexual favours for himself from the victim;
l. any attempts by the offender to prevent the victim from leaving his employ;
m. steps taken by the offender to evade detection by authorities; and
n. the impact on the victim of the offender’s exploitation.
See R. v. Tang, 1997 ABCA 174 at para. 11, R. v. Miller, [1997] O.J. No. 3911 at para. 38 (Gen. Div.), Bedi at para. 65, R. v. K.P., 2023 ONSC 6767 at para. 32 (“K.P.”), R. v. A.E., 2018 ONSC 471 at paras. 56-58 (“A.E.”), and R. v. Antoine, 2020 ONSC 181 at paras. 37-38.
84The range of sentence for human trafficking and related offences is broad because the offences can be committed in different ways. Many cases suggest that, in general, the sentencing range is four to eight years in jail. See, e.g., R. v. Crawford, 2025 ONSC 345 at para. 86 (“Crawford”), R. v. Swaby, 2024 ONSC 6141 at para. 35, K.P. at para. 27, and A.E. at para. 65. Depending on aggravating factors, courts have imposed sentences beyond eight years. See R. v. Downey, 2023, ONSC 3776 at paras. 11-13 and R. v. S.L., 2024 ONSC 2263 at paras. 32-34. In Bedi, Justice Dunphy expressed the view that sentences for human trafficking have been evolving from a range of 6-8 years to a higher range of 10-12 years. See Bedi at para. 88. I have not seen other cases in which this much higher range has been adopted. However, I accept that the sentences for human trafficking have, generally speaking, been on an upward trajectory.
85It has been noted that the sentences imposed in cases at the higher end of the range consistently involve aggravating factors such as physical or threatened violence, controlling methods designed to harm or break the victim, abuse of trust relationships, forced use of drugs and exploitation of addictions, and long periods of exploitation before police intervention. See Crawford at paras. 87-88.
c. Conditional sentence
86A conditional sentence is a meaningful alternative to incarceration for less serious and non-dangerous offenders: see R. v. Proulx, 2000 SCC 5 at para. 21 (“Proulx”). Conditional sentences should generally include punitive conditions that are restrictive of the offender’s liberty. Thus, conditions like house arrest should be the norm, not the exception. The offender should be confined to their home except when working, attending school, fulfilling other conditions of their sentence or pursuant to other exceptions such as medical emergencies. See Proulx at paras. 36, 103.
87There are four criteria that a court must consider before deciding to impose a conditional sentence (see Proulx at para. 46 and section 742.1 of the Criminal Code):
a. The offender must be convicted of an offence that is not punishable by a minimum term of imprisonment and that is not listed in subsections 742.1(c) or (d).
b. The court must impose a term of imprisonment of less than two years.
c. The safety of the community would not be endangered by the offender serving the sentence in the community.
d. A conditional sentence would be consistent with the fundamental purpose and principles of sentencing set out in sections 718 to 718.2 of the Criminal Code.
88No offences are excluded from the conditional sentencing regime, except those with a minimum term of imprisonment and the offences that are listed in section 742.1 of the Criminal Code: see Proulx at para. 127(3). Serious consideration should be given to the imposition of a conditional sentence in all cases where the first three prerequisites listed above are satisfied: see Proulx at paras. 90 and 127(7).
89The prerequisite that the court impose a term of imprisonment of less than two years only requires the sentencing judge to make a preliminary determination rejecting a penitentiary term and probationary measures as inappropriate. Having determined that the appropriate range of sentence is a term of imprisonment of less than two years and being satisfied that the offender would not endanger the community, the judge should then consider whether it is appropriate for the offender to serve their sentence in the community. A conditional sentence need not be of equivalent duration to the sentence of incarceration that would have otherwise been imposed. The sole requirement is that the duration and conditions of a conditional sentence make for a just and appropriate sentence. See Proulx at paras. 127(4) and (5).
90While this case is not a sexual assault case, I note that the Court of Appeal has stated that conditional sentences are rarely proportionate in sexual assault cases involving penetration. See, e.g., R. v. C.P., 2024 ONCA 783 at para. 38 and R. v. S.W., 2024 ONCA 173 at para. 46.
d. Pre-sentence custody
91In determining a sentence, a court may take into account any time spent in custody by the person as a result of the offence, but the court shall limit any credit for that time to a maximum of 1.5 days for each day spent in custody: see subsections 719(3) and (3.1) of the Criminal Code and R. v. Summers, 2014 SCC 26 at para. 70 (“Summers”). In order to ensure that an offender who spent time in pre-sentence custody does not serve longer in jail than an identical offender who was granted bail, a day of incarceration requires at least a credit of one day towards the sentence. See Summers at para. 21. Courts generally give enhanced credit to account for: (a) lost eligibility for early release and parole during pre-sentence custody, and (b) the relative harshness of the conditions in detention centres. See Summers at para. 70.
92The “Summers” credit is a deduction from what the court determines to be the appropriate sentence for the offence. The credit is calculated to identify and deduct from the appropriate sentence the amount of the sentence that the accused has effectively served by virtue of the pre-sentence incarceration. See Marshall at para. 51.
93Where an offender has experienced particularly difficult and punitive conditions during their pre-sentence custody, the punishment they receive should be reduced to take this into account. However, the degree of mitigation is a matter of discretion in all the circumstances, and not a matter of mathematical precision. The court will consider both the conditions of the pre-sentence incarceration and the impact of those conditions on the accused. Judges are not required to quantify mathematically the mitigating effect that they assign to the mitigating effects of harsh conditions of incarceration. See R. v. Brown, 2025 ONCA 164 at paras. 4, 8 and R. v. Duncan, 2016 ONCA 754 at para. 6. Because this “credit” is one of the mitigating factors to be taken into account, it cannot justify the imposition of a sentence which is inappropriate, having regard to all of the relevant mitigating or aggravating factors. See Marshall at paras. 52-53.
e. Restrictive bail conditions
94Time spent under stringent bail conditions, especially under house arrest, must be taken into account as a relevant mitigating circumstance. This factor must be considered along with all the other mitigating and aggravating circumstances that may impact on the sentence in a given case. The criteria to be considered in assessing the weight of the mitigation include the amount of time spent on bail under house arrest, the stringency of the conditions, the impact on the offender’s liberty, and the ability of the offender to carry on normal relationships, employment and activities. See R. v. Downes (2006), 2006 3957 (ON CA), 79 O.R. (3d) 321 at paras. 33, 36, 37 (“Downes”), R. v. Joseph, 2020 ONCA 733 at para. 108 (“Joseph”) and R. v. C.C., 2021 ONCA 600 at para. 4.
95The mitigating effect that bail considerations have on the sentence to be imposed falls within the discretion of the trial judge. There is no prescribed formula for taking this mitigating factor into account. See Downes at para. 37 and R. v. Campbell, 2023 ONCA 483 at para. 25. However, a trial judge should not place unreasonable emphasis on any mitigating factor, including bail conditions under which the offender was. The calculation of the ultimate sentence should not be skewed by giving this factor unwarranted significance. See Joseph at para. 108 and R. v. Lowe, 2025 ONCA 475 at para. 17.
96Where the offender asks the trial judge to take pre-sentence bail conditions into account, the offender should supply the judge with information as to the impact of the conditions. If there is a dispute as to the impact of the conditions, the onus is on the offender to establish those facts on a balance of probabilities. See Downes at para. 37.
97The relevant inquiry is whether bail conditions were punitive enough to be akin to punishment, thereby warranting mitigation. Focus should be on the effect of the conditions, not whether the Crown acted reasonably in promoting or perpetuating those conditions. The appropriateness of the bail conditions is not relevant. See Joseph at para. 114.
f. Anti-Black racism
98Evidence of anti-Black racism and its impact on the specific offender can be an important consideration when determining the appropriate sentence: see Morris at para. 87. Social context evidence relating to the offender’s life experiences may be used where relevant to mitigate the offender’s degree of responsibility for the offence and/or to assist in the blending of the principles and objectives of sentencing to achieve a sentence which best serves the purposes of sentencing set out in section 718 of the Criminal Code. Courts may acquire relevant social context evidence through the proper application of judicial notice or as social context evidence describing the existence, causes and impact of anti-Black racism in Canadian society, and the specific effect of anti-Black racism on the offender. However, an offender’s experience with anti-Black racism does not impact on the seriousness or gravity of the offence. See Morris at para. 13.
99While an offender does not have to show a causal connection between anti-Black racism and the offence before anti-Black racism can be treated as a mitigating factor, some connection must be demonstrated. The Court of Appeal stated the following in Morris at para. 97:
There must, however, be some connection between the overt and systemic racism identified in the community and the circumstances or events that are said to explain or mitigate the criminal conduct in issue. Racism may have impacted on the offender in a way that bears on the offender’s moral culpability for the crime, or it may be relevant in some other way to a determination of the appropriate sentence. Absent some connection, mitigation of sentence based simply on the existence of overt or institutional racism in the community becomes a discount based on the offender’s colour. Everyone agrees there can be no such discount […].
100Even if there is no connection between anti-Black racism and the commission of the offence that explains or mitigates the criminal conduct in issue, evidence of anti-Black racism can still be relevant. The Court of Appeal stated the following in Morris at para. 102:
Social context evidence can also be relevant on sentencing even if it does not tend to mitigate the offender’s moral culpability. As indicated earlier, social context evidence can provide valuable insight, both with respect to the need to deter the offender from future conduct, and the rehabilitative prospects of the offender. Evidence about an offender’s background and circumstances allows the sentencing judge to more accurately assess how sometimes competing objectives of sentencing, such as rehabilitation and denunciation, can best be blended to produce a sentence that accords with the proportionality principle and serves the fundamental purpose of sentencing articulated in s. 718.
2. Aggravating factors
101There are some aggravating circumstances in this case.
102The vulnerability of the complainant is an aggravating factor. It has been recognized that sex workers are vulnerable persons. In this case, the vulnerability of the complainant was heightened by the fact that Mr. Augustin and Ms. Mezouari brought I.P. to another jurisdiction, Ontario, where English is spoken and I.P. did not speak English. In addition, I.P. was financially dependent on Mr. Augustin and Ms. Mezouari because she did not have control over money.
103I accept the Crown’s submissions that the following facts, which are reflected in text messages, constitute aggravating factors:
a. On one occasion, Mr. Augustin insisted that I.P. provide sexual services to a client when she did not want to do certain acts because she was in pain.5
b. Mr. Augustin arranged to have I.P. perform certain sexual services (“duos”) that she had specifically told him she did not want to do.
3. Mitigating factors
104I now turn to the mitigating circumstances relevant to sentence.
105Mr. Augustin is a relatively young offender with a minor criminal record. Prior to the offences in issue in this case, he had only been found guilty of two offences committed in 2018 for which he received a conditional discharge and a two-year probation.
106Mr. Augustin has the strong support of his family and girlfriend. Prior to his arrest in this matter, he had been continuously employed since he was 16 years old.
107Remorse can offer meaningful mitigation when accompanied by an acceptance of responsibility for one’s crimes: see Morris at para. 157. I accept that Mr. Augustin has some insight into his actions and the harm that they caused to I.P. He apologized to I.P. at the hearing. However, it is unclear whether he accepts full responsibility for his participation in the offences of which he was convicted or only part of it (e.g., driving I.P. to appointments). This affects the weight to be given to this factor. However, I am satisfied that Mr. Augustin’s overall attitude is conducive to a successful rehabilitation and does not stand in the way of such rehabilitation.
108In light of the foregoing and the PSR, Mr. Augustin appears to have good rehabilitative potential. In my view, the risk of Mr. Augustin engaging in similar conduct in the future is low.
109An important mitigating factor in this case is Mr. Augustin’s restrictive bail conditions for approximately 5.5 years. Mr. Augustin was subject to a house arrest condition which did not include an exception for going to work or to school. He had to remain in his parents’ residence at all times unless he was in the direct and continuous presence of one of his parents, but both of his parents work. Further, Mr. Augustin was not allowed to possess or use any electronic device that is capable of accessing the internet.
110Mr. Augustin’s bail conditions were punitive enough to be akin to punishment. I accept Mr. Augustin’s evidence that being confined to his parents’ residence without being able to use the internet and electronic devices was a difficult situation to be in for a long period of time. While the evidence before me is limited as to what Mr. Augustin would have done had he be permitted to go to work or to school, I accept his evidence that there was not much point for him to take steps to find a job or school program if he could not go to work or to school without one of his parents. Further, his ability to search for employment or school programs was hindered by his inability to access the internet.
111I also accept Mr. Augustin’s evidence that he told his lawyers that he wanted to vary his bail conditions. It is unclear why formal steps were not taken in this regard. While I agree with the Crown that Mr. Augustin could have shown more initiative to try to obtain a variation of his bail conditions, this does not change the fact that Mr. Augustin was subject to bail conditions that had a serious impact on his liberty and his ability to carry on normal relationships, employment and activities. As the Court of Appeal stated in Joseph at para. 115, the appropriateness of the bail conditions is not relevant, and the court’s focus should be on the effect of the conditions.
112However, this mitigating factor must be tempered with the fact that:
a. Mr. Augustin breached his bail conditions in August 2021. However, I do not accept the Crown’s argument that this deprives Mr. Augustin of “credit” for the entire period of May 2020 to August 2021. There is no basis to conclude that Mr. Augustin was continuously not complying with his bail conditions for that entire period of time.
b. Mr. Augustin is largely responsible for the delay in scheduling the sentencing hearing since May 31, 2024.
113Another mitigating factor is the harsh conditions during Mr. Augustin’s pre-sentence custody of 24 days at the TSDC. He was incarcerated during the COVID-19 pandemic and experienced frequent lockdowns and triple-bunking.
114Mr. Augustin is a Black man. However, there is no evidence of a connection between anti-Black racism and Mr. Augustin’s criminal conduct in this case. I also note that there is no evidence of any financial issues on the part of Mr. Augustin at the time that the offences were committed. As stated by the Court of Appeal in Morris, social context evidence can be relevant on sentencing even if it does not tend to mitigate the offender’s moral culpability. Such evidence can assist in the blending of the principles and objectives of sentencing to achieve a sentence which best serves the purposes of sentencing set out in section 718. Despite its limited role in this case, I have taken this factor into account in determining the appropriate sentence.
4. Tang-Miller factors
115I discuss the Tang-Miller factors below:
a. the degree of coercion or control imposed by the offender on the victim’s activities: There was no physical coercion or control. There was de facto financial control, and Mr. Augustin and Ms. Mezouari were the ones deciding where they and I.P. were staying. I.P. testified that she contributed input on her hourly rate and agreed with the price that was set. She decided what to do with clients when she was with them. However, as stated above, Mr. Augustin arranged to have I.P. perform certain sexual services (“duos”) that she had specifically told him she did not want to do.
b. the amount of money received by the offender and the extent to which he allowed the victim to retain her earnings: There is no clear evidence as to the amount of money received by Mr. Augustin. There is also no clear evidence as to the amount of money received by Ms. Mezouari. I am satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that I.P. gave the great majority of her earnings (if not all of them) to Mr. Augustin and Ms. Mezouari.
c. the age of the victim and the number of sex workers: I.P. was 20 years old at the relevant time. There were other sex workers who were sometimes sent to do “duos” with I.P.
d. any special vulnerability the victim may have: As stated above, I.P. was taken to Ontario and did not speak English.
e. the working conditions in which she was expected to operate, including health and safety concerns: I.P. met clients both at their place and at motels/Airbnbs where she was staying with Mr. Augustin and Ms. Mezouari. Mr. Augustin and Ms. Mezouari drove her to clients’ places.
f. the degree of planning and sophistication, including whether the offender was working in concert with others: Mr. Augustin and Ms. Mezouari were working together. There did not appear to be a high level of planning and sophistication.
g. the size of the offender’s operations, including the number of customers the victim was expected to service: As stated above, other sex workers were involved, at least for part of the time. The evidence is not clear as to the number of clients that I.P. was expected to service.
h. the duration of the exploitative conduct: I.P. was with Mr. Augustin and Ms. Mezouari for less than 43 days. Mr. Augustin and Ms. Mezouari picked her up on February 28, 2020 and I.P. called the police on April 11, 2020. However, during that period, she returned to Montreal and stayed there without Mr. Augustin and Ms. Mezouari for a short period at least once.
i. the degree of violence, if any, apart from that inherent in the offender’s parasitic activities: There is no evidence of violence on the part of Mr. Augustin.
j. the extent to which “inducements” such as drugs or alcohol were employed by the offender: Such “inducements” were not used in this case.
k. the extent to which the offender demanded or compelled sexual favours for himself from the victim: This did not occur.
l. any attempts by the offender to prevent the victim from leaving his employ: While I.P. described an incident at trial where her belongings were allegedly hidden, I am not satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that this occurred as described by I.P. This incident was raised for the first time at trial.
m. steps taken by the offender to evade detection by authorities: There is no evidence that this occurred.
n. the impact on the victim of the offender’s exploitation: As stated above, I.P. declined to provide a victim impact statement. However, it is clear that, at a minimum, the offences had a financial impact on her and her daughter.
5. The appropriate sentence
a. Term of imprisonment
116In my view, a conditional sentence is not appropriate in this case because a term of imprisonment of less than two years would be inappropriate and inconsistent with the principles of sentencing applicable in this case. Given the seriousness of the offences and the aggravating factors in this case, a term of imprisonment of less than two years would not sufficiently meet the overarching objectives of denunciation and deterrence. I agree with the Crown that imposing a term of imprisonment of less than two years based on the mitigating factor of restrictive bail conditions would be to place unreasonable emphasis on this one factor.
117While the sentence imposed on Ms. Mezouari was a conditional sentence, I find that the principle that a sentence should be similar to sentences imposed on similar offenders for similar offences committed in similar circumstances does not apply with respect to the sentence imposed on Ms. Mezouari following her guilty plea. Ms. Mezouari pleaded guilty to two offences and, notably, she did not plead guilty to the offence of human trafficking. Further, the facts presented to Justice Goldstein and on which he based his sentence are not the same as the facts that were disclosed by the evidence in Mr. Augustin’s trial. As noted by Justice Goldstein in his reasons, a penitentiary sentence would have been imposed on Ms. Mezouari had there been a different mix of mitigating and aggravating factors. I note, among other things, that the significant mitigating factors of a guilty plea and of allegedly having been forced to engage in sex work by a co-accused are not available to Mr. Augustin.
118I have considered the cases referred to by the parties. While the cases are generally helpful, they can all be distinguished, one way or another, based on the circumstances of the case and/or the circumstances of the offender. Some of the cases that have certain similarities with this case include R. v. Burton, 2023 ONCA 44, R. v. S.M., 2023 ONCA 417, R. v. Jean, 2020 ONSC 624 and R. v. Salmon, 2019 ONSC 1574.
119A comparison of the circumstances of the instant case and the circumstances of many other human trafficking cases leads me to the conclusion that this case falls at the lower end of the range. As stated above, the sentences imposed in cases at the higher end of the range consistently involve aggravating factors such as physical or threatened violence, controlling methods designed to harm or break the victim, abuse of trust relationships, forced use of drugs and exploitation of addictions, and long periods of exploitation before police intervention. See Crawford at paras. 87-88. Among other things, the following factors distinguish the present case from many other human trafficking cases:
a. This case only involves one victim and she was over 18 years old at the relevant time.
b. The period of exploitation, while not very short, was also not very long (less than 1.5 months).
c. There was no physical violence and there was no sexual relationship between I.P. and Mr. Augustin.
d. This case does not involve the accused taking advantage of a drug or alcohol addiction on the part of the victim.
e. The degree of control involved was less important in this case than in many other cases.
f. Mr. Augustin only has a minor criminal record.
120In light of the foregoing, the principles of sentencing (including the principle of restraint), the aggravating factors and the important mitigating factors in this case, including Mr. Augustin’s restrictive bail conditions for a significant period of time, I conclude that a penitentiary sentence of four years is the appropriate sentence in this case. Mr. Augustin is entitled to a credit for pre-sentence custody at a rate of 1.5 days for each day spent in custody, i.e., 36 days. This period will be subtracted from the four-year sentence, for a total of three years and 329 days.
b. Ancillary orders and restitution order
121With respect to the ancillary orders requested by the Crown, I decline to make a weapons prohibition order. In my view, sections 109 and 110 of the Criminal Code do not apply in this case. The present case does not fall under any of the categories of cases set out in subsections 109(1) and 110(1). Among other things, the evidence does not support a finding that Mr. Augustin used, threatened or attempted violence against a person during the commission of the offences.
122In my view, aside from the restitution order, the other ancillary orders requested by the Crown are uncontroversial and do not require any discussion. I discuss below the issue of the restitution order.
123Subsection 738(1)(a) of the Criminal Code provides that where an offender is convicted, and where a person has suffered a loss of property as a result of the commission of the offence, the court imposing sentence may order that the offender make restitution to that person by paying an amount not exceeding the replacement value of the property, if the amount is readily ascertainable.
124In my view, subsection 738(1)(b) does not apply in this case because there is no evidence before me of: (a) bodily or psychological harm on the part of I.P.; and (b) pecuniary damages incurred as a result of such harm.
125An order for restitution should be made with restraint and caution. The loss should be capable of ready calculation. A sentencing judge should consider, among other things, whether civil proceedings have been initiated and the means of the offender. See R. v. Castro, 2010 ONCA 718 at para. 24, R. v. Nygard, 2024 ONSC 4837 at para. 74, and R. v. Robertson, 2020 ONCA 367 at para. 7.
126I agree with the reasoning of Justice Carnegie in R. v. Hawke, 2025 ONSC 2257 at paras. 139-141 that restitution is available in human trafficking cases, even though the victim’s loss is directly associated with the purchase of sexual services, which is a criminal activity.
127Nevertheless, I find that a restitution order is not available in this case because the amount is not readily ascertainable. Among other things:
a. There is no reliable evidence before me as to the amount of I.P’s earnings during the period in question.
b. While I accept that I.P. earned at least $3,000.00 during the relevant period, a portion of her earnings, at a minimum, was used to pay for her food and for gifts for her daughter, among other things. Had I.P had control over her earnings, she would have incurred those expenses and, as a result, they do not constitute a “loss”. There is no reliable evidence before me as to the amount of such “legitimate” expenses. Further, Ms. Mezouari testified that on two or three occasions, at I.P.’s request, she transferred money to I.P.’s mother for I.P.’s daughter. There is no reliable evidence before me as to the amount of these transfers (and whether they occurred or not).
128Therefore, I decline to make a restitution order in this case.
D. DISPOSITION
129For the reasons set out above, Mr. Augustin is sentenced as follows with respect to the indictment in Court File No. CR-24-50000088-0000:
a. Count 1 – Human trafficking: 4 years of imprisonment minus 36 days, for a total of 3 years and 329 days of imprisonment.
b. Count 2 – Receiving a material benefit from human trafficking: 2.5 years of imprisonment, concurrent.
c. Count 3 – Receiving a material benefit from sexual services obtained for consideration: conditionally stayed.
d. Count 5 – Procuring: conditionally stayed.
130Further, Mr. Augustin is sentenced as follows with respect to the indictment in Court File No. CR-24-50000093-0000:
a. Count 1 – Failing to comply with a probation order: 3 months of imprisonment, concurrent.
131In addition, I make the following ancillary orders:
a. Pursuant to subsection 487.051(1) of the Criminal Code, I make an order in Form 5.03 authorizing the taking of the number of samples of bodily substances that is reasonably required for the purpose of forensic DNA analysis from Mr. Augustin.
b. Pursuant to subsection 743.21(1) of the Criminal Code, I make an order prohibiting Mr. Augustin from communicating, directly or indirectly, with I.P. during the custodial period of the sentence.
c. Pursuant to subsections 737(1) and 737(2)(b)(ii) of the Criminal Code, I order Mr. Augustin to pay a victim surcharge in the amount of $600.00 within 18 months after his release.
Vermette J.
Released: January 29, 2026
Footnotes
- Court File No. CR-24-50000088-0000.
- Mr. Augustin was represented by counsel during his jury trial. He discharged his counsel in August 2024, a number of months after the end of his trial and prior to this Court hearing submissions regarding sentence.
- Court File No. CR-24-50000093-0000.
- I note that the PSR also refers to a conviction on October 28, 2016 for possession of property obtained by crime with a value of more than $5,000, contrary to subsection 355(a) of the Criminal Code, for which Mr. Augustin was sentenced to a one-year probation, restitution in the amount of $1,800.00 and 100 hours of community work. However, this conviction does not appear in the criminal record that was marked as an exhibit during the sentencing hearing. In the circumstances, I have not taken this information into consideration given the lack of details and the fact that it has not been proven by the Crown.
- I note that I.P. testified at trial that while she was not happy with the messages sent by Mr. Augustin, she did not do with the client what she did not want to do.