Restriction on Publication
Pursuant to an order of this court, issued under s. 486.4(1) of the Criminal Code, no information that could serve to identify the complainant in this prosecution shall be published in any document or broadcast or transmitted in any way.
Introduction
On July 2, 2024, a jury found Jerome Crawford guilty of the following offences:
- Count 1: Human trafficking – exploitation (s. 279.01(1))
- Count 2: Material benefit from human trafficking (s. 279.02(1))
- Count 4: Procuring the sale of sex (s. 286.3(1))
- Count 5: Financial benefit from the sale of sex (s. 286.2(1))
- Count 6: Advertising sexual services (s. 286.4)
He was acquitted of uttering a threat to cause bodily harm (Count 3).
The sentencing submissions were heard on December 9, 2024.
Counsel provided concise written briefs based on my directions. This practice facilitates an informed and efficient sentencing hearing that strengthens criminal procedure.
Circumstances of the Offence
Based on the totality of evidence and corroboration from the text messages, I find that the following circumstances are proven beyond a reasonable doubt. See Criminal Code, s. 724(2).
Over a period of about three weeks, Mr. Crawford trafficked AAP in the sex trade so that he could take most of her earnings.
Between August 20 to September 14, 2021, Mr. Crawford transported AAP to locations for the purpose of exploiting her in the sex trade. In addition, he used different forms of control, direction, or influence for the purpose of exploiting her. Further, he advertised her sexual services for money. There were some breaks for different reasons during the 3.5 weeks.
He exercised control over a vulnerable AAP. While working, she was required to report to Mr. Crawford through frequent text message updates. She was expected to service many clients daily. He took most of the money she earned and controlled how the money would be dealt with thereafter.
He gave AAP a phone to track her and to ensure that she remained in touch when she was with clients, in the hospital, or at the shelter. Mr. Crawford either drove AAP or arranged for her transport for most of the locations. She could not permanently leave. To facilitate the control, Mr. Crawford paid for contraception and food.
He exercised direction over AAP by giving her the rule of informing him every time she had a client and when she got the money. He also gave her directions on how to deal with clients and where to send money. In relation to an “outcall”, she asked for permission.
He exercised influence by persuading her to keep working with clients to earn money including when she felt ill or tired.
He repeatedly posted the advertisements for her to work for him. Although they were posted with AAP’s input and they decided the cities that AAP would work, Mr. Crawford influenced AAP to continue working for him by taking the role of posting the ads, arranging transportation and hotels, all while taking the money earned. This shows how different forms of coercion such as influence and control can be used together to exploit.
AAP felt psychological pressure to work for Mr. Crawford. In the total circumstances, she reasonably feared that her safety was threatened if she did not do what she was told and perform sexual services for Mr. Crawford’s profit. I am satisfied that in finding Mr. Crawford guilty, the jury accepted that her fear of a threat to her physical or psychological safety was reasonable, even though they found her safety was not actually threatened. This element is assessed on an objective basis. Actual exploitation is not necessary. R. v. A.A., 2015 ONCA 558, paras. 71-73; R. v. Gallone, 2019 ONCA 663, paras. 53-54. I accept AAP’s evidence that during the relationship, Mr. Crawford communicated to her that he had experience in jail to cause her to be fearful so that she would do what she was told. R. v. Sinclair, 2020 ONCA 61, para. 15.
Mr. Crawford was found not guilty of threatening AAP. As a result, for sentencing there is no evidence she was threatened with actual harm and no evidence she was physically abused.
Mr. Crawford’s transporting and exercise of control, direction and influence must be viewed in context that he knew AAP was vulnerable and he took advantage. She had financial and housing insecurity.
She had mental health conditions: bipolar, anxiety and depression. She also had Crohn’s. She was ill at times. In the messages, at various times, she discussed with Mr. Crawford feeling overwhelmed, taking meds, and concerns about her Crohn’s flaring up.
In the broader context of assessing the degree of control and coercion in this case, AAP made some decisions while working for Mr. Crawford. She set her own restrictions, communicated with friends and family, and was permitted to stop working when she felt unwell. There were days when no money was earned such as when business was slow, or she stayed with her mother or was ill. She did not live with Mr. Crawford, staying at a shelter or for brief periods with family or friends. She provided photographs for advertisements and gave input about their posting.
Victim Impact
AAP is Indigenous. She was 24 years old at the time of the offences. As noted above she has significant mental and physical health issues.
She describes emotionally and physically suffering from the crimes.
She states that it has left her feeling powerless and dehumanized.
She is afraid and feels unsafe.
She says that her mental health problems have been exacerbated.
Offender’s Circumstances
Mr. Crawford is 34 years old.
He came to Canada from Jamaica when he was 9 years old.
When he was young and still in Jamaica, his parents separated. His father left for Canada, while he remained in Jamaica with his mother and two brothers.
When he came to Canada, he grew up in the Islington and Finch neighbourhood and was raised by his paternal grandmother.
Mr. Crawford’s father had remarried and lived with his wife and half-siblings. Mr. Crawford’s father was not a constant presence in his life, but Mr. Crawford says that they had a good relationship.
His grandmother was very involved in her Church. As a youth, Mr. Crawford would attend worship services with her. She also enrolled him in Sunday school and the Church youth group. He describes his grandmother with reverence. His grandmother was a positive influence on him growing up and provided structure and life lessons.
However, when Mr. Crawford was 16 years old, his grandmother kicked him out of the house after they got into an argument. He did not have anywhere to live and moved into homeless shelters before he was able to afford his own place to live.
He worked a series of low-wage jobs including working for the City of Toronto for the Parks and Forestry department and at a Day Camp program. He also worked in warehouses picking orders and at a Tim Hortons. He earned his forklift license and returned to the warehouse and manufacturing sector thereafter.
Mr. Crawford has two children. His eldest son was born in 2016 and youngest was born in 2018.
His eldest child is on the Autism spectrum and is non-verbal. As a result, he requires a significant amount of care and supervision. His youngest son is six years old.
When his sons were born, he needed to start earning a greater income and obtained a job with a concrete company.
Prior to his arrest he worked in landscaping and then joined the Carpenter’s union Local 27 to earn a better income. He was able to earn some further certificates but did not complete his education due to the COVID pandemic. The offences were committed during the pandemic where safe and health protocols were still required.
He left Local 27 and joined Local 183, to work on high rise construction and occasionally on roadwork projects.
His plans for the future are that he would like to continue working in the skilled trades and upgrade his credentials through the union.
Mr. Crawford has two brothers. They submitted letters of support describing a close relationship. His brothers say that he is a dedicated father and helpful sibling. His brothers have paid his union fees so that they are up to date, with the hope that he may return to skilled work upon release.
His partner also submitted a letter of support that describes him as a hard worker, and kind, patient and supportive father to his children, especially his son with special needs.
Experiences with Anti-Black Racism
Mr. Crawford stated in his affidavit that he has experienced discrimination at the workplace, most particularly when he began working in the construction trades. The Crown accepted this background information.
He stated there were not many other Black people who worked on job sites with him, and he experienced discriminatory comments about his race and culture which caused him to feel excluded.
He was treated differently than his co-workers based on his race. He was also tasked with more difficult jobs. He believed that he had to work harder than non-Black employees to prove himself as competent and capable at his job.
Criminal Record
Mr. Crawford has a criminal record.
In 2013, he was found guilty of fail to comply with recognizance and received a suspended sentence and probation.
In 2014, he was found guilty of fail to comply with probation and received a sentence of 41 days intermittent with 4 days of pre-trial custody noted.
In 2015, he was found guilty of possession of property obtained by crime under five thousand for which he received two months pre-trial custody credit; and for possession of a schedule 1 substance for the purpose of trafficking, which he was sentenced to 135 days of pre-sentence custody.
In his affidavit, he states that on October 1, 2024, (post-dating these offences) he pled guilty to fail to comply and received credit for 39 days of presentence custody.
Bail Conditions
Mr. Crawford was initially arrested on September 24, 2021, and released on October 1, 2021. That is 8 days. While on bail, Mr. Crawford was under house arrest with exceptions for work. He remained on the house arrest conditions between October 1, 2021, and May 24, 2024. That is almost 8 months.
He was incarcerated again on May 24, 2024, and remains in custody at Maplehurst Correctional Complex (Maplehurst).
Pre-trial Custody Conditions
After factoring his plea and sentence for another case in October 2024, he has a remaining balance of 208 days in custody as of January 16, 2025.
According to the institutional records, he spent 101 days total on lockdown as of December 3, 2024. Of those days, 69 of them were “full” lockdowns.
During lockdowns, depending on the length of the lockdown, he would not be permitted to leave the cell, to use the phone, to shower, or to get any fresh air. When there were full lockdowns, occasionally there was a “shower program” where he would be let out of his cell for up to 30 minutes to either use the phone or take a shower.
There was not enough time to do both, so he would have to choose between taking a shower and using the phone to contact family. The shower program was not always available during lockdowns, and he would sometimes go days without access to a shower or phone.
In addition to the lockdowns, he has been subjected to triple-bunking at Maplehurst. According to the institutional records, he has been triple bunked for a total of 133 days as of December 3, 2024. While being triple bunked, the cells are especially crowded, and lockdowns are more stressful. Because many of the cells on his range are being triple bunked, this means that there is overcrowding, and it is more difficult to access the phone to speak to family or to contact legal counsel when his unit is not on a lockdown.
Due to the lockdowns and overcrowding, there are frequent fights on his unit. He was assaulted by other inmates on June 10, 2024, and again on November 28, 2024.
On November 28, 2024, he was jumped by several other inmates and punched repeatedly in the head. He suffered an injury to the eye and a broken nose. He was placed in segregation and told that it was due to a broken nose. He remained in segregation until January 7, 2025. He included medical records regarding these incidents in his affidavit.
Two days after his father passed away, on August 9, 2024, a fellow inmate on Mr. Crawford’s unit died of a suspected fentanyl overdose. At approximately 5:00 AM, guards went through the cells on his range to conduct wellness checks. The unit was placed on a lockdown. Later that morning, he saw his fellow inmate’s body being removed on a stretcher in a body bag. This event was especially upsetting for him to witness. His father had passed away a few days prior.
Positions
The Crown initially submitted that a sentence of seven years is warranted.
However, after receiving and considering Mr. Crawford’s circumstances identified in the Defence materials including Morris factors and jail conditions, the Crown sought a sentence of six years custody (less pre-sentence custody credit).
The Crown acknowledges that the pre-trial custody conditions in totality are unacceptable and harsh, deserving of mitigation.
The Crown’s position of six years is broken down as follows:
- Count 1: 6 years jail.
- Count 2: 4 years concurrent.
- Count 6: 2 years concurrent.
The Crown submits that there was a lot of advertisement posting, which situates it on the more aggravating part of the scale.
In addition to the custodial period identified above, the Crown also seeks several ancillary orders, including a DNA Order, s. 109 Weapons Prohibition (10 Years) and a s. 743.21 Non-Communication Order.
The Defence submits that a fit sentence is 4 years of jail after factoring the total circumstances. They submit that Mr. Crawford’s offences conduct generally warrants a sentence of 5 years but it should be reduced to 4 years due to his total background and mitigating factors. Then pre-trial custody credit should be subtracted.
The Defence breaks the sentence down as follows. For the human trafficking offence (s. 279.01) they submit 4 years of jail less time spent in pre-sentence custody.
The Defence submits that the sentences for obtaining material benefits from human trafficking (s. 279.02) and advertising sexual services (286.4) should be served concurrent to the four years for human trafficking. The concurrent sentences imposed should not be as high as sought by the Crown based on the total circumstances.
Both parties agreed that all sentences should run concurrently to the global sentence imposed on the offence of human trafficking.
The Defence does not oppose the ancillary orders proposed by the Crown: the DNA order, the s.109 weapons prohibition order, or the s. 743.21 non-communication order. It is accepted that a DNA order is mandatory for the primary designated offences.
Overall, both the Crown and Defence agreed that Mr. Crawford’s total background and mitigating circumstances warranted a reduction of around one year. I found it helpful in this case that both sides turned their mind to this issue and ultimately agreed on this point.
The parties also agreed that the sexual services offences (ss. 286.2 and 283.3) should be stayed pursuant to the principle in R. v. Kienapple.
Sentencing Law and Principles
Fundamental Principles
Section 718 of the Code outlines the multidimensional objectives of sentencing: protection of society and the maintenance of a just, peaceful and safe society through the denunciation of unlawful conduct; general deterrence; specific deterrence; the separation of the offender from society where necessary; rehabilitation; reparation for harm done to the victims or the community; and promotion of a sense of responsibility in offenders and acknowledgement of the harm done.
Proportionality is both the cardinal principle of sentencing and goal of every sentence imposed: R. v. Parranto, 2021 SCC 46, para. 10.
A sentence must be proportionate to the gravity of the offence and the degree of responsibility of the offender. Section 718.2 provides that a sentence should be increased or decreased to account for any aggravating and mitigating circumstances. It also requires that a sentence be similar to those imposed on similar offenders in similar circumstances.
An exploitative purpose, as defined in s. 279.04, is a requisite element of human trafficking offences. This added and aggravating mental element must be reflected in the sentence imposed for an offence under s. 279.01.
The exploitative purpose elevates the nature of the offence from sexual commodification and procuring offences under s. 286.3 of the Code.
This is because an offence under s. 286.3 may be committed without an exploitative purpose as a requisite element, though that purpose may exist and where it is proven may be an aggravating factor on sentence. The same applies between offences under s. 279.02 and s. 286.2 which deal with receiving material benefits. R. v. McEwan, 2023 ONSC 1608, para. 77.
Section 279.04(1) of the Criminal Code defines exploitation and states:
a person exploits another person if they cause them to provide, or offer to provide, labour or a service by engaging in conduct that, in all the circumstances, could reasonably be expected to cause the other person to believe that their safety or the safety of a person known to them would be threatened if they failed to provide, or offer to provide, the labour or service.
Safety, in this definition, is not limited to being protected from physical harm, and extends to psychological harm. The person’s safety need not be actually threatened: R. v. A.A., 2015 ONCA 558, paras. 70-71.
The human trafficking provisions were intended “to criminalize a wide range of intentional conduct that has, as its purpose, the exploitation of vulnerable persons”: A.A., para. 88; Gallone, para. 35.
For human trafficking offences, the paramount sentencing considerations are denunciation and deterrence. This is because the crimes are predatory.
A person’s rights to dignity, equality and freedom over their body are violated by an offender that seeks to control them physically, psychologically, and financially, using various tactics. In so doing, the victims suffer violations of their personal autonomy, security and psychological well-being. Many victims are financially insecure and may have other vulnerabilities that are taken advantage of through various degrees of coercion and methods employed by their oppressor.
AAP identifies as Indigenous. Pursuant to section 718.04 of the Code when a court imposes a sentence for an offence that involved the abuse of a person who is vulnerable because of personal circumstances — including because the person is Aboriginal and female — the court shall give primary consideration to the objectives of denunciation and deterrence of the conduct that forms the basis of the offence.
With the primary emphasis on deterrence and denunciation, rehabilitation and restraint must still be considered. The principle of restraint as reflected in sections 718.2(d) and (e), means that even when jail is required, the quantum of jail must only be to the extent necessary to fulfill punitive, remedial and restorative objectives and deterrence of criminal behavior. This respects sentencing’s fundamental goals of fairness and proportionality.
I have reviewed the cases filed. The parties agree that the range for human trafficking offences is broad since the offences can be committed in different ways. Cases submitted by both counsel and confirmed in their written submissions, suggests that in general the sentencing range is four to eight years in jail. McEwan, para. 80; R. v. Gardner, 2020 ONSC 5954, para. 99; R. v. Augustin, 2022 ONSC 5901, para. 89; R. v. A.E., 2018 ONSC 471, para. 65; R. v. T.T., 2022 ONSC 722, para. 30; R. v. Antoine, 2020 ONSC 181; R. v. K.P., 2023 ONSC 6767, para. 27; R. v. S.L., 2024 ONSC 2263, para. 32.
The sentences imposed in cases at the higher end of the range consistently involve aggravating factors such as physical or threatened violence, controlling methods designed to harm or break the victim, abuse of trust relationships, forced use of drugs and exploitation of addictions, and long periods of exploitation before police intervention.
There are cases with sentences imposed above 8 years where the facts are particularly egregious or brutal and include (but are not limited to) circumstances such as the offences continued over years, involved the complete domination and control of the victim, physical or sexual violence was used, serious psychological harms resulted, or there were multiple victims, and the offender’s moral blameworthiness was extremely high: R. v. Jordan, 2019 ONCA 607, para. 4; R. v. A.S., 2017 ONSC 802; R. v. Downey, 2023 ONSC 3776, paras. 11-13.
Overall, ranges and other cases are helpful but this court must be cautious not to over rely on ranges as they are not a substitute for proportionality. Proportionality is not achieved by ranking categories of offences or assuming presumptive sentences. It is achieved through individualized sentencing that takes into account the specific circumstances of both the offender and the offence. In Parranto, para. 12, the Supreme Court made this point crystal clear:
Individualization is central to the proportionality assessment. Whereas the gravity of a particular offence may be relatively constant, each offence is “committed in unique circumstances by an offender with a unique profile” (para. 58). This is why proportionality sometimes demands a sentence that has never been imposed in the past for a similar offence. The question is always whether the sentence reflects the gravity of the offence, the offender’s degree of responsibility and the unique circumstances of each case (citing Lacasse at para. 58).
Relevant factors to determine a fit sentence for human sex-trafficking and related offences are discussed in decisions such as R. v. Lopez, 2018 ONSC 4749, para. 53. Both the Defence and Crown relied on these factors to frame their positions, which I will address in the analysis, along with any other factors that I find relevant.
However, I recognize that the analysis must also evolve as recognition of the nature of the offences, the harms that they cause, together with social and systemic context information increases over time: R. v. Lacasse, 2015 SCC 64, para. 58.
When imposing a sentence, I am also obliged to consider evidence of harsh jail conditions. In R. v. Duncan, 2016 ONCA 754, the Ontario Court of Appeal agreed that the appropriate circumstances, particularly harsh presentence incarceration conditions, can provide mitigation apart from and beyond the one point five credit referred to in section 719(3.1) of the Code. In considering whether any enhanced credit should be given, the court will consider both the conditions of the pre-sentence incarceration and the impact of those conditions on the accused.
In addition, I must factor time spent on strict bail terms. In R. v. Downes, para. 33, the Court of Appeal held that time spent under stringent bail conditions, especially under house arrest, must be considered as a relevant mitigating circumstance.
In R. v. Marshall, 2021 ONCA 344, paras. 50-53 the Court of Appeal reviewed and affirmed the importance of Duncan and Downes mitigation to proportionate sentencing outcomes but cautioned against double counting for pre-trial custody credit and mitigation arising from those circumstances.
[The remainder of the judgment continues with detailed analysis, findings, and the final sentence as set out in the original reasons for sentence.]
Released: January 16, 2025
