Reasons for Sentence

Court File No.: CR-24-30
Date: 2025-06-02
Ontario Superior Court of Justice

Between:
His Majesty the King
and
K.P., Defendant

Sarah Burton, for the Crown
David Holmes, for the Defence

Heard: June 2, 2025

Publication Ban

An Order has been made pursuant to s. 486.5 of the Criminal Code, RSC 1985, c C-46, directing that the identity of the complainant and information that could disclose such identity shall not be published or broadcast or transmitted in any way.

Mandhane J.

Introduction

[1] K.P. is a 33-year-old man who appeared before me for an 18-day trial by jury on the following charges: attempt murder (s. 239(1)(b), Criminal Code), assault by suffocation (s. 267(c)), administer noxious substance (fentanyl) with intent to endanger life (s. 245(1)(a)), criminal harassment (s. 264(1)), break and enter and commit an indictable offence (s. 348(1)(b)), and possession of fentanyl for the purpose of trafficking (s. 5(2), Controlled Drugs and Substances Act, SC 1996, c 19).

[2] The offender and the complainant, T.C., were in an intimate partner relationship from 2019 onwards and were running a business together at the time of these allegations in 2022. The Crown alleged that the offender engaged in a serious and escalating pattern of intimate partner violence (IPV) after the complainant tried to break up with him and threatened to shut down the business they ran together. The Crown alleged that the offender stalked the complainant at her home and office and repeatedly texted her threatening to end his life if she did not take him back. After she continued to rebuff him, the offender tried unsuccessfully to poison the complainant with fentanyl seven times before hiring a hitman to kill her while she slept. The offender gave the hitman a key to the complainant’s house and the hitman entered while her whole family slept inside. The hitman went into the complainant’s bedroom and began suffocating her with his bare hands. After the family dog started to bark, the complainant’s sister walked into the room and startled the hitman who ultimately fled the scene. The complainant immediately called the offender and accused him of trying to kill her; her sister called 9-1-1 and the police arrived on the scene shortly thereafter.

[3] The offender pleaded not guilty and took the stand in his own defence. He admitted to accidentally poisoning the complainant once and to hiring a hitman to “scare” her but denied intending to kill her. In his closing submissions to the jury, defence counsel conceded that the Crown had proven the charges of criminal harassment, break and enter, and assault by suffocation beyond a reasonable doubt, but argued that the jury should find the offender not guilty of attempted murder and administering a noxious substance.

[4] The key issues for the jury to decide were whether the offender intended to administer fentanyl to the complainant, and whether he intended to kill her either by poisoning her or hiring a hitman to kill her.

[5] The jury found the offender guilty of all six counts in the Indictment on December 16, 2024. The offender now appears before me for his sentencing hearing. I had before me a pre-sentence report, dated February 17, 2025; a Form 6 psychiatric report prepared by Dr. Juliette Dupré, a forensic psychiatrist with the Centre for Addiction and Mental Health, dated January 16, 2025; institutional records from Maplehurst Correctional Complex (“Maplehurst”) and Toronto South Detention Centre; an affidavit from the offender about his conditions of pre-trial detention; a victim impact statement from the complainant; and the offender’s criminal record.

[6] The Crown submits that a total sentence of between fifteen and seventeen years in custody is appropriate on all the charges, and asks for ancillary DNA, non-communication, and weapons-prohibition orders. The Defence asks for a sentence of between ten and twelve years; it consents to the ancillary orders being made.

[7] To determine the appropriate sentence, I must answer the following questions:

a) What are the facts upon which the offender should be sentenced?
b) What are the relevant sentencing principles and factors?
c) What is the proportionate sentence?
d) What recommendations do I have for correctional authorities?

[8] I answer these questions below.

What Are the Facts Upon Which the Offender Should Be Sentenced?

[9] After a jury renders a guilty verdict, I must decide the facts upon which the offender is to be sentenced: Criminal Code, s. 724(2). I am bound by the express and implied factual implications of the jury’s verdict, and cannot accept any facts that are only consistent with a verdict that the jury rejected: R. v. Ferguson, 2008 SCC 6, paras. 17-18; R. v. Aragon, 2022 ONCA 244, paras. 104-106; R. v. Nelson, 2014 ONCA 853, para. 56; R. v. Forsellino, 2022 ONSC 262. To rely upon an aggravating factor, I must be convinced of the existence of the fact beyond a reasonable doubt: Criminal Code, s. 724(3)(e); R. v. Hassan, 2024 ONCA 782, para. 4, citing R. v. Gardiner, [1982] 2 S.C.R. 368.

[10] The Crown’s theory of the case was summarized in the charge to the jury as follows — these were the Crown’s words, not mine:

K.P. tried to kill T.C. By October 23, 2022, he was extremely possessive. When T.C. tried to end the relationship, he refused. He made it seem as if it was all or nothing – either they were together or they would die together.

On October 24th, K.P. began searching “if fentanyl is put with a drink can it kill u.” In the following months, there were seven occasions where T.C. noticed a chemical taste and particles in her food or drinks. On each occasion, K.P.’s food and drinks were fine. K.P. admitted to putting fentanyl into her tea, which had the exact same taste and particles as all the others. On November 13th and 17th, K.P. visited two websites which confirmed that fentanyl is lethal. On the 17th, K.P. brought T.C. food in two separate containers. It tasted like chemicals. She became sick and went to the hospital. K.P. tried to convince her and her sister not to go. On the same day, K.P. was sending T.C. text messages such as “It’s me and u till the end till death do us part.”

According to [the hitman], K.P. confessed that he tried to kill T.C. with fentanyl. When T.C. threatened to call the police, K.P. hired him to kill her. … [The hitman] testified that he received an email from K.P. asking him to call him, which is corroborated by the email extracted from their cellphones. K.P. then picked [the hitman] up at an Esso Gas Station at Morningside and Sheppard, and they went to the Red Fox Bar and Grill. The cell phone locations confirm these events, as does video surveillance from the bar. They then drove to Brampton and stopped at GoSmash along the way. The cell phone locations again confirm this, as does the Wifi Connection on K.P.’s cell phone, which had GPS coordinates. Afterwards, they stopped at T.C.’s house. Their cell phone locations confirm this, as does video surveillance from the neighbourhood which captures K.P.’s truck. Next, they went to a bar called Jack Rollers, where video surveillance captures them attending and leaving the bar together. [The hitman] testified that they waited at a park for T.C. to fall asleep. The cell phone location records place them near a park at Highway 407 and Martin Grove.

K.P. then dropped [the hitman] off at T.C.’s house. Video surveillance from the area captures K.P.’s truck driving around the neighbourhood and someone breaking into T.C.’s home. [The hitman] testified that K.P. gave him a key to enter T.C.’s house, which was later located in [the hitman’s] residence. Afterwards, [the hitman] fled to a nearby gas station, which again is corroborated by video surveillance. …

Furthermore, at the preliminary hearing in January of 2024, K.P. asked [the hitman], “Why didn’t you just grab a knife from the kitchen and finish her off.” These words cannot be misinterpreted. Their meaning is very clear — why didn’t you kill her.

[11] It is clear from the jury’s verdict that they accepted the Crown’s theory of the case and rejected the offender’s evidence. Indeed, the Crown’s case against the offender was overwhelming. The Crown called the complainant, her sister, and the hitman as witnesses. While the jury was warned that it was dangerous to rely on the hitman’s evidence without corroboration, nearly every aspect of each of the Crown witnesses’ testimony was corroborated by one or more of the following exhibits:

• text messages retrieved from the offender and the hitman’s cell phones;
• video surveillance footage of the offender and the hitman individually and together on the night of the offence, along with cellular and geolocation information showing their whereabouts;
• the key found in the hitman’s apartment, which matched the lock from the complainant house;
• the 9-1-1 call and police’ body-worn camera footage showing the complainant’s demeanor immediately after the incident;
• toxicology reports showing that the offender had fentanyl in his apartment, and showing that a Tim Horton’s coffee cup that the offender gave the complainant was laced with fentanyl;
• medical reports showing that the complainant had fentanyl in her system immediately after the strangulation; and
• photographs of soft-tissue injuries to the complainant’s lips, mouth, face, eyes, neck, and lower back.

[12] To arrive at a verdict of guilty on the count of administer noxious substance, the jury must have rejected the offender’s evidence that he had only ever administered fentanyl to the complainant by accident. Indeed, the offender was not a credible witness: he admitted to repeatedly lying to police during their investigation, and also admitted under cross examination to lying to the jury during his examination in chief.

[13] Because it is aggravating, I find that the Crown has proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the offender administered fentanyl to the complainant at least seven times between October and December 2022, and that he intended to kill the complainant each time he administered the fentanyl to her. This finding is supported by the complainant’s direct evidence about being poisoned, the offender’s google search history, text messages wherein the offender actively dissuaded the complainant from seeking medical attention when she was feeling unwell, and the toxicology reports which found fentanyl in the Tim Horton’s cup the offender gave the complainant and in the joints that they smoked together at his apartment.

[14] I also find that the Crown has proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the offender instructed the hitman to kill the complainant because she had threatened to go to the police and shut down their business. These findings are consistent with the totality of the evidence, including the offender’s out of court statement to the hitman wherein he lamented that the hitman had not “just grabbed a knife and finished her off.” I reject the offender’s evidence that he merely asked the hitman to “scare” the complainant because his evidence was self-serving and contrived to explain the Crown’s case.

[15] Finally, the offender’s mental health disabilities and addictions were important contextual factors, which the Crown admitted contributed to the commission of the offences. According to Dr. Dupré, the offender reported a history of mental illness and suicidal ideation, with multiple hospital visits between 2014 and 2022. In 2018, after being charged criminally for the first time, the offender attempted suicide twice and was subsequently hospitalized for five days. Despite meeting with a mental health worker once every week throughout the timeframe of these incidents, the offender again attempted suicide by threatening to jump off a bridge while dating the complainant. During the fall and winter of 2022, the offender testified that he was using alcohol, and large quantities of cannabis, cocaine, and fentanyl. Both the offender and the hitman testified that they consumed alcohol, cannabis, and cocaine together on the night of the strangulation, but the offender testified that he was not blacking out and could remember what happened.

[16] The offender told Dr. Dupré that he has an intense fear of abandonment that could be “activated” if he did not hear back immediately from his girlfriend or parents, and that this would lead to intense depression, sadness, and loneliness. The offender’s sister told Dr. Dupré that “romantic relationships were a trigger” for her brother, and identified a pattern of behavior whereby he would become obsessed with his partner and then react negatively when they tried to distance themselves from him. Dr. Dupré found that the offender has a history of an “unstable sense of self, particularly when in romantic relationships” and that his main stressors were relationships and financial problems. While Dr. Dupré did not go as far as to opine that the offender’s mental health disabilities or addictions caused the offences, I do find that his disabilities go some way towards explaining his extreme and obsessive reaction to the complainant’s decision to break up with him in the fall of 2022.

What Are the Relevant Sentencing Principles and Factors?

[17] The fundamental purpose of sentencing is to protect society and contribute “to respect for the law and the maintenance of a just, peaceful and safe society”: Criminal Code, s. 718. To do this, judges must impose “just sanctions” that reflect one or more traditional sentencing objectives, including denunciation, general and specific deterrence, separation of offenders from society, rehabilitation, reparation to victims, promoting a sense of responsibility in offenders, and acknowledging the harm done to victims and the community: s. 718(a)-(f).

[18] Sentencing is highly discretionary, and there is no set formula for fixing the correct sentence: R. v. Parranto, 2021 SCC 46, para. 13. Proportionality is the organizing principle to reach the ultimate goal of imposing a fair, fit, and principled sentence: Parranto, para. 10. The starting point is that the sentence must be proportionate to the gravity of the offence and the degree of responsibility of the offender. While important, the principles of parity and individualization are secondary but must be reconciled for a sentence to be proportionate: R. v. Lacasse, 2015 SCC 64, para. 53.

[19] Attempted murder in a domestic context is particularly “monstrous” and “heinous”: R. v. Islam, 2025 ONSC 291, para. 55; R. v. Kormendy, 2019 ONCA 676, para. 28. The primary sentencing principles for attempted murder in an intimate partner context are denunciation and deterrence, and it is an error to give rehabilitation too much weight: R. v. Cunningham, 2023 ONCA 36, paras. 2, 32.

[20] Sentences for IPV must foster an environment where individuals have the autonomy and freedom to leave intimate partner relationships without fear of harassment, harm, or violence: R. v. Boucher, para. 27. Denunciation is warranted because perpetrators of IPV prey on their victim’s vulnerability; for example, violence that takes place in the victim’s home is a clear breach of trust: Cunningham, paras. 27-28, 34. Deterrence is required because IPV is harmful to victims and society while also being pervasive and invisible. In 2023, Peel Regional Police Service responded to just over 16,000 incidents of IPV, prompting the region to declare it an “epidemic”: Peel Region, Family and Intimate Partner Violence.

Background of the Offender

[21] The offender is a 33-year-old Brown man of Tamil ancestry. He was born in Toronto and raised by Tamil immigrant parents. He has a younger brother and older sister. In his allocution, the offender noted that his family has been supportive of him while he has been in pre-trial custody, calling him regularly and assuring him of their ongoing support.

[22] The offender reported to Dr. Dupré that he was bullied in school, would often fight, and started to drink alcohol at 16. Despite attending an anger management program weekly for two years in 2017 and 2018, the offender admitted to Dr. Dupré that he has always struggled to manage his anger, that he is easily offended, and that small things can set him off. He told Dr. Dupré that “not listening to me or not following instructions” made him angry. While he denied being violent, the offender acknowledged to Dr. Dupré that he would punch walls, get into fights, engage in road rage, and become verbally abusive when angered. Since being detained at Maplehurst on these charges, the offender has incurred twelve internal institutional charges (“misconducts”) for fighting—he refused to accept any responsibility for these incidents when the psychiatrist asked him about them.

[23] The offender was married in 2016, divorced in 2017, and convicted of uttering threats against his former spouse in 2019. He was also convicted of failing to comply with his bail conditions because he continued to contact a former girlfriend after being charged.

[24] The offender has a sporadic work history with his most recent employment being co-ownership of a business with the complainant. At trial, the complainant testified that she bought the business with her own savings, and that the offender was responsible for the day-to-day operations. The complainant had a full-time job as an accountant, and helped with the business on evenings and weekends.

[25] After being convicted of these offences, consistent with his previous diagnoses, Dr. Dupré diagnosed the offender with severe borderline personality disorder with anti-social traits. Borderline personality disorder is diagnosed based on a “pervasive pattern of instability of interpersonal relationships, self-image, and affects, and marked impulsivity that begins in early adulthood and presents in a variety of contexts,” while “antisocial personality traits” refers to the offender’s history of violence, lack of remorse, failure to conform to laws and social norms, and a history of manipulation and malingering during psychiatric evaluations. Dr. Dupré noted that people with borderline personality disorder may also suffer from affect dysregulation, suicidality, anger, and micro-psychotic experiences without being formally diagnosed with a mood or psychotic disorder.

[26] While incarcerated, the offender has completed institutional programming related to anger management, substance use, managing stress, and understanding feelings. He told the court that he is committed to addressing his mental health disabilities while he is incarcerated so that he can “become a better person and live a productive life.”

Gravity of the Offence and Degree of Responsibility

[27] The moral blameworthiness for attempt murder is the same as murder: Cunningham, para. 24. Because of the vulnerability of the complainant and the breach of trust inherent in the crime, moral blameworthiness is heightened for attempted murder of an intimate partner: Cunningham, paras. 26-27.

[28] The offender’s moral blameworthiness is high in this case. The attempted murders were planned, deliberate, cold-hearted, and heinous. After the complainant tried to end the relationship, the offender took advantage of the fact that they owned a business together to continue to stalk and harass her. The offender was plotting to kill the complainant for three months, and the crimes took place in the context of an increasingly coercive and controlling relationship.

[29] After poisoning her the first time, the offender tried to dissuade the complainant from seeking medical attention and gaslighted her by telling her she was overreacting. When the complainant continued to rebuff him, he did not leave her alone but rather escalated his violent behaviours by hiring a hitman to strangle her. Over the course of the many hours that he spent with the hitman on the night of the strangulation, the offender never waivered or second-guessed his plans to kill the complainant. While the offender was using cannabis, cocaine, and fentanyl during the time period of the offences, the jury must have found that he was sober enough to know exactly what he was doing.

[30] On the facts of this case, while it is clear that his mental health disabilities and addictions contributed to the crime, I do not find that they significantly diminish the offender’s degree of responsibility for the crimes: R. v. Milne, 2021 BCCA 166, paras. 45-46. The manner by which mental health disabilities and addictions constrain individual choice and therefore impact individual moral blameworthiness will vary from case to case: R. v. Sanchez-Neria, 2025 ONCJ 209, para. 46. While it is clear that the offender’s personality disorder might have made it more difficult for him to process the complainant’s decision to end the relationship, Dr. Dupré never opined that the offender’s disability caused or significantly contributed to his commission of the crimes: R. v. Ellis, 2013 ONCA 739, para. 116; Milne, para. 48. The crimes committed against the complainant were planned and deliberate, and committed over the course of months—not hours or days. Not all the crimes were committed while the offender was intoxicated, and there was no evidence that he was suffering from any sort of psychotic episode or mania during their commission. The offender was clearly depressed and having thoughts of suicide after the complainant said she was leaving him, but he was not “out of touch with reality” or so ill that he did not know right from wrong. The fact remains that the offender exercised a high degree of volitional choice in planning to kill the complainant: Sanchez-Neria, para. 46.

Victim Impact

[31] The complainant filed a victim impact statement with the court, which I have quoted from below under various headings.

Betrayal of Trust

• “The fact that someone close to me could have tried to drug me—more than once—and then make me feel like it was all in my head is an overwhelming betrayal that’s incredibly difficult to overcome.”
• “I have become paranoid and constantly on edge. I no longer feel safe in my home or surroundings.... Entering or staying in new environments is particularly difficult for me.”
• “I find it hard to trust new people” and “Some people have distanced themselves from me…due to fear of being associated with either me or the accused.”
• “I’ve also become much more cautious when it comes to my food and drinks.”

Impact on Health

• “Being exposed to fentanyl left my body in a severely weakened state.”
• “I needed time for my facial scars and voice to heal…”
• “The trauma impacted my ability to function normally, and the healing process is ongoing.”

Impact on Finances

• “I was forced to shut down the business we shared for two months…[which] resulted in a loss of income, customers, and momentum…”
• “I had to take several weeks off from my other job after the incident.”

Impact on Future Prospects

• “I had plans, goals, and a future that I was working towards, but this experience robbed me of so much—especially time. Time I had to spend just trying to heal from the trauma instead of living my life.”
• “While the accused is currently behind bars, I find some comfort in knowing he is not able to reach me. However, the thought of his eventual release brings on waves of anxiety…Sometimes, I feel like I'll have no choice but to uproot my life completely if and when he is released.”
• “The truth is, I don't even know the full extent of the damage yet. As life goes on and I face different situations, I'll likely continue to discover new layers of trauma and new challenges to overcome. I know it will take time, support from family and friends, and ongoing therapy to even begin to rebuild the sense of safety and trust that was taken from me.”

Aggravating Factors

[32] The most aggravating factor is the level of planning and deliberation involved in the multiple murder attempts and the fact that they took place in the context of an intimate partner relationship. While the offender was undoubtedly motivated by his desire to control the complainant, he was also motivated by financial gain and the desire to evade criminal responsibility. After the complainant threatened to close their business together, the offender escalated his attempts on her life, presumably so that he could retain control over the business after her death and so that she could not go to the police.

[33] The offender has also shown little to no insight into the crime which stands as a barrier to his rehabilitation. He did not plead guilty, and when he was caught by police, the offender lied to them repeatedly over the course of three different statements. In cross-examination at trial, he admitted that he lied to the jury in his examination-in-chief. The author of the pre-sentence report indicates that the offender minimizes his responsibility for the acts. The offender initially told Dr. Dupré that he did not commit the offences, but when challenged on this point, he explained that he was unstable and intoxicated at the time. When asked about his relationship with the complainant, after having been found guilty, the offender told Dr. Dupré that he “wasn’t dangerous” and “wasn’t doing anything wrong.” In his allocution before this court, the offender did not accept responsibility for the offence or apologize for the harm he caused the complainant.

[34] The offender is not youthful and was previously married before dating the complainant. He has a criminal record from 2019 for uttering threats in the context of his relationship with his former spouse. He received a suspended sentence and 12 months probation for that offence, after accounting for the 102 days that he spent in pre-sentence custody. Considering that the offender and the complainant started dating in 2019, it is very troubling that the offender’s previous conviction and sentence for threatening his spouse did not deter him from engaging in the same behaviour with the complainant.

[35] I also find beyond a reasonable doubt that the offender poses a risk to the complainant and to any future intimate partner. The officer in charge of this investigation told the author of the pre-sentence report that he believes that the offender poses an ongoing safety risk to the victim and the community. Moreover, the offender’s borderline personality disorder, anti-social traits, lack of insight, and limited engagement in past mental health interventions are barriers to his future rehabilitation.

Mitigating Factors: Pre-sentence Conditions of Confinement

[36] Beyond his mental health disabilities and addictions, the only other significant mitigating factor in this case is the offender’s presentence conditions of confinement. In R. v. Duncan, 2016 ONCA 754, para. 6, the court found that “particularly harsh presentence incarceration conditions” can be a mitigating factor beyond the 1.5 credit referred to in s. 719(3.1) of the Criminal Code. I must consider the “conditions of the presentence incarceration and the impact of those conditions on the accused”: Duncan, para. 6.

[37] The offender has been in custody since his arrest on December 13, 2022. As of today, he has spent a total of 903 days (or nearly two and a half years) in pre-trial custody. According to his institutional records from Maplehurst, as of March 11, 2025, the offender spent nearly 80% of his time in custody triple-bunked, with one prisoner sleeping on the floor (651 days); nearly a third of his time in custody confined to a cell for 24 hours per day while in full lockdown (232 days); 126 days in partial lockdown with limited access to a dayroom; and 18 days in segregation. The jail records state that the lockdowns were the result of “correctional officers/staff shortages or redeployment, searches, contraband issues, unscheduled maintenance repairs on unit, etc.” The offender also spent 13 days in lockdown and nine days triple-bunked at Toronto South Detention Centre after being transferred there in April 2025.

[38] The offender swore an affidavit about his conditions of confinement while at Maplehurst Institution, and his evidence was not challenged by the Crown. The offender testified that he is only able to shower once or twice a week, and that the institution only provides him with hygiene products at most once a week. While triple bunked, the offender said that he sometimes had to sleep on the floor and was exposed to faeces and urine on the walls of his cell. He testified that he has been physically assaulted by inmates on more than one occasion, is regularly harassed, and has been subjected to “racist commentary.” He has been charged twelve times with institutional misconducts for fighting.

[39] The offender testified that he was placed in segregation—or solitary confinement—because of his mental health difficulties for “a number of weeks” and only allowed to shower once during that time. He says that he was placed in solitary confinement while on “suicide watch” and that he did not have access to a mattress or bedding, a change of clothes, toiletries, or toilet paper. The offender said that he was once subjected to three strip searches in one week for reasons that were not explained to him. The offender has been prescribed anti-depressants as well as medication to help him sleep because of his anxiety brought on by the institutional conditions. The offender says that his requests to see doctors and social workers are often ignored.

[40] In R. v. Crawford, 2025 ONSC 345, para. 183, Justice Mirza cited numerous recent cases where Ontario judges have highlighted the unacceptable and intolerable conditions at both Maplehurst and Toronto South Detention Centre, with multiple judges characterizing them as “inhumane” and “torture”: See R. v. Perez, 2024 ONSC 2247, paras. 43-45; R. v. Vincent, 2024 ONCJ 178, paras. 102-108; R. v. Findley, 2023 ONSC 1273, paras. 21-23; R. v. Bell, 2020 ONSC 2632; R. v. Wells, 2024 ONSC 3067, paras. 66-67; R. v. Persad, 2020 ONSC 188, para. 29; R. v. Powell, 2020 ONCA 743, paras. 30-33.

[41] The recent cases highlight the following systemic and ongoing problems within the provincial correctional system:

• Extended periods of full and partial lockdown because of ongoing staff shortages: Perez, para. 45; R. v. A.K., 2025 ONSC 2469, para. 75.
• Inadequate hygiene in terms of unsanitary sleeping quarters and toileting facilities, and inadequate access to clean bedding: Vincent, paras. 104-105.
• Public health concerns, including outbreaks of communicable diseases: Sanchez-Neria, para. 49.
• Inadequate access to fresh air and yard time: Vincent, para. 106.
• Inadequate access to family and community supports: Findley, paras. 21-23.
• Increased tension and fighting on the ranges due to frequent lockdowns: Wells, paras. 66-67.

[42] The harshness of Ontario’s provincial jail conditions is best illustrated by contrasting the offender’s unchallenged evidence about his conditions of confinement with the baseline standards set out in the United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners (“Mandela Rules”): UN General Assembly, United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners (the Nelson Mandela Rules): resolution adopted by the General Assembly, 8 January 2016, A/RES/70/175.

[43] In terms of hygiene, the Mandela Rules state that prisoners shall be single bunked at night (Rule 12), sleeping conditions shall meet basic health requirements (Rule 13), prisoners shall receive separate and sufficient clean bedding (Rule 21), toilets shall be clean and decent (Rule 15), and prisoners shall be provided with basic toiletries (Rule 18). In contrast, the offender was triple-bunked and sometimes slept on the floor, his cell was filthy, he was sometimes deprived of toiletries and clean bedding.

[44] In terms of healthcare, the Mandela Rules require that prisoners enjoy the same standards of and access to health care that are available in the community: Rule 24. Prison healthcare providers must be “particularly attuned to the signs of psychological or other stress brought on by the fact of imprisonment, including but not limited to, the risk of suicide or self-harm,” and are meant to undertake individualized measures and treatment: Rule 20(c). From his evidence, I accept that the offender was not offered individualized measures or treatment when he displayed symptoms of mental illness or suicidal ideation but rather was subjected to more harsh conditions of confinement while on “suicide watch” and placed in solitary confinement.

[45] Significantly, the Mandela Rules prohibit solitary confinement of prisoners with mental disabilities, and indefinite or prolonged solitary confinement beyond fifteen consecutive days: Rules 43, 44, 45(2). I am particularly troubled that the offender was subject to solitary confinement because of his mental health issues—this constitutes cruel and unusual treatment. It was unclear on the evidence before me whether the offender spent more than 15 days in consecutive solitary confinement. Finally, the Mandela Rules require that strip searches only be undertaken when absolutely necessary: Rule 52. The fact that the offender does not know why he was strip searched three times in one week is concerning.

[46] Where an offender has experienced particularly punitive conditions during their pre-sentence custody, the punishment they receive must be reduced to take this into account, but the degree of mitigation is a matter of discretion in all the circumstances and not a matter of mathematical precision: R. v. Brown, 2025 ONCA 164, para. 4. At the same time, any reduction in sentence on account of harsh pretrial detention cannot justify imposing a sentence that is unfit: R. v. Westcott, 2025 ONCA 291, para. 13.

[47] That said, I agree with Schreck J. that I must award significant credit for the harsh conditions of confinement not only because of the particularly negative impact on the offender, but also because refusing to award significant credit in the face of the government’s continued indifference to the situation risks bringing the administration of justice into disrepute: R. v. Jogiyat, 2024 ONSC 3498, para. 107. I also agree with Lai J. that the atrocious pre-trial conditions at Maplehurst imperil public confidence in the administration of justice and undermine the state’s moral authority to deprive offenders of their liberty as a legal consequence for wrongdoing: Sanchez-Neria, para. 48.

Parity

[48] The Crown provided a sentencing chart that helpfully summarized fifteen cases that deal with sentencing for attempted murder in an intimate partner context; I have considered them all but do not propose to summarize each case here. Suffice it to say, Cunningham and the other cases provided by the Crown make it clear that the starting point for attempted murder committed within an intimate partner relationship is 15 years — with the low end of the range being 13 years and the high-end being life imprisonment.

[49] I would pull out the following salient themes from the caselaw relied upon by the Crown:

• Continuing danger to the victim or the community has resulted in sentences of life imprisonment: R. v. Simpson; R. v. Lieung.
• Use of a firearm has resulted in a sentence of 22 years: R. v. Stubbs, 2013 ONCA 514.
• Lasting, “disfiguring,” or life-threatening injuries to the victim has resulted in sentences of between 20 years and life: R. v. Kormendy, 2019 ONCA 676; R. v. Charlebois (1987), 22 O.A.C. 235 (C.A.); R. v. Mesgun.
• Harm to more than one victim and/or exposure of children to violence, is aggravating and may result in a sentence of between 17 years and life imprisonment: Kormendy; R. v. Islam, 2025 ONSC 291.
• A history of coercive and controlling behaviour can result in sentences of between 17 and 20 years: Cunningham; Kormendy; Islam.
• Planned, deliberate and “cold-blooded” attempts generally attract sentences of at least 15 years: Cunningham; R. v. Denkers; R. v. Tan, 2008 ONCA 574; R. v. Quance; Lieung.
• Even where an accused is a pro-social, first-time offender, a sentence of between 15 years and life imprisonment has been imposed: Cunningham; Islam.
• A sentence of between 13 and 15 years may be imposed where the accused pleaded guilty, accepted responsibility, and/or expressed remorse: R. v. Tan; R. v. Hoare, 2016 ONCJ 36; R. v. G. (K.), 2010 ONCA 177.

What Is the Proportionate Sentence?

[50] In fashioning a fit sentence, the following factors are aggravating:

• The offender’s history of coercive and controlling behaviour towards the complainant and past intimate partners,
• The offender’s criminal record for offences related to IPV and failure to comply with court orders;
• The planned and deliberate nature of the offence, and the fact that the offender tried to kill the complainant multiple times and in two different ways;
• The fact that the offence took place in the complainant’s home while her entire family was sleeping inside;
• The offender’s multiple motivations for trying to kill the complainant: namely, to control her, to evade criminal responsibility, and to gain financially;
• The offender’s poor chances of rehabilitation based on his failure to take responsibility or show any insight into the crime; and
• The psychological, physical, and financial impact on the complainant.

[51] That all being said, I note that this case is distinguishable from the cases that impose a life sentence as far as the offender did not use a gun and the complainant did not suffer disfiguring physical injuries.

[52] The two mitigating factors here are the offender’s mental health disabilities, and his harsh pretrial custody conditions and their particular impact on him. A proportionate sentence requires me to award credit approaching two to one because the offender was subject to cruel and unusual treatment when he was placed in solitary confinement for two weeks because of his mental health issues, and because the problems in Ontario corrections are long-standing and systemic.

[53] Considering these individual factors and the principles of parity, I find that a sentence of 21 years concurrent on all the charges would generally be appropriate in all the circumstances, even accounting for the offender’s pre-existing mental health disabilities. However, accounting for the excessively harsh presentence conditions of confinement and the particular impact that they had on the offender as a person with mental health disabilities, I would reduce the sentence to 16 years in custody.

[54] The offender is sentenced to 16 years in custody concurrent on all the charges. The Crown is staying the conviction for drug trafficking because it is duplicative of the conviction for administering a noxious substance: R. v. Kienapple.

[55] The following ancillary orders shall issue:

• Mandatory DNA order: s. 487.05(1).
• Lifetime weapons prohibition order: s. 109.
• Lifetime noncommunication order in relation to the complainant: s. 743.21.

Recommendations to Prison Authorities

[56] Consistent with the recommendations contained in the psychiatric report of Dr. Dupré dated January 16, 2025, I recommend that correctional authorities incorporate the following interventions into the offender’s correctional plan:

a) As a priority, comprehensive individual Dialectical Behavioural Therapy (DBT) to address behaviours associated with his diagnosis of borderline personality disorder;
b) Regular, psychiatric medication management, including continued treatment with antidepressant medication and ongoing assessment for anti-psychotic medication;
c) Regular, engagement with a mental health caseworker; and
d) As required and prior to release into the community, substance abuse treatment.

[57] I also find that the offender would benefit from the programming recommended in the pre-sentence report, namely: anger management, healthy relationships, and IPV.

[58] The offender would benefit from ongoing visits and support from his family which favours housing him in an institution close to Scarborough. He should be housed in a supportive or therapeutic environment wherever possible.

[59] Because of his diagnosed personality disorder and anti-social personality traits, the offender would likely benefit from peer support in terms of successfully integrating into the institutional environment. He may also benefit from any networks or programs specifically geared to Tamil, South Asian, or racialized prisoners.

[60] My reasons on sentence, the exhibits on the sentencing hearing, and the pre-sentence report shall be delivered to the Correctional Service of Canada for inclusion in the offender’s institutional file: s. 743.2.

Mandhane J.

Released: June 2, 2025