Anthony Marchetti

The court considered whether Seedjan Sulaiman Khail, who stabbed his father to death, was not criminally responsible by reason of mental disorder.

The only issue in dispute was whether the accused’s mental disorder rendered him incapable of knowing that his actions were wrong.

After reviewing the psychiatric evidence and the accused’s history, the court found that while Mr. Sulaiman Khail suffered from a mental disorder at the time of the offence, he did not lack the capacity to know that his actions were wrong according to the ordinary moral standards of society.

The court found him guilty of second-degree murder.

The accused was charged with making and possessing child pornography, specifically text messages, contrary to sections 163.1(2) and 163.1(4) of the Criminal Code.

The trial focused on whether the Crown proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the person depicted in the messages was under 18 years old.

The court reviewed the evidentiary record, including an agreed statement of facts and the text messages exchanged between the accused and an undercover officer.

The court applied the principles from R. v. Villaroman and R. v. Starr regarding circumstantial evidence and the standard of proof.

Ultimately, the court found that the only reasonable inference was that the numbers "13" and "14" in the messages referred to age, and convicted the accused on both counts.

The accused, Khalid Mohamed, was charged with second degree murder in the stabbing death of Steven Burns.

The facts were largely undisputed: Mohamed stabbed Burns, causing his death.

The central issue was whether Mohamed acted in self-defence or whether provocation would reduce the charge to manslaughter.

The court found that Mohamed had been robbed and assaulted by Burns and others, and that Mohamed stabbed Burns during a struggle for control of a knife.

The court concluded that the Crown had not proven beyond a reasonable doubt that Mohamed’s actions were unreasonable in the circumstances, and acquitted him of second degree murder.

The applicant, who pleaded guilty in Washington State in 2014 to communication with a minor, sought an exemption from Sex Offender Information Registration Act (SOIRA) obligations in Canada.

The Attorney General of Ontario had deemed his foreign offence equivalent to child luring.

The court, without deciding on the equivalence of the foreign offence, focused on whether the applicant met the criteria for exemption under the amended s. 490.02905(2)(c) or (d) of the Criminal Code.

Based on expert psychological assessment indicating a very low likelihood of re-offending, no prior criminal record, and significant personal hardship caused by SOIRA obligations (travel and employment restrictions), the court found that there was no connection between the obligation and SOIRA's purpose, and the impact on the applicant was grossly disproportionate to the public interest.

The application for an exemption order was allowed.

Melanie Pereira was found guilty of conspiracy to traffic cocaine, conspiracy to traffic fentanyl, and possession for the purpose of trafficking in both drugs.

The court considered aggravating factors, including the significant amounts of fentanyl and cocaine, and mitigating factors, such as her status as a first offender, her remorse, and the impact of incarceration on her two young children.

The Crown sought an eight-year sentence for fentanyl and a 5-6 year concurrent sentence for cocaine, while the defence sought a reformatory sentence of two years less a day.

The court sentenced Ms. Pereira to 60 months (5 years) imprisonment for each count, to be served concurrently, along with a 10-year section 109 order and a DNA order.

The Crown appealed the conditional sentence imposed on R.S. for violent sexual assault and choking, arguing it was demonstrably unfit and below the appropriate penitentiary range.

The majority of the Court of Appeal agreed the sentence was demonstrably unfit, finding a 3-year penitentiary term would have been proportionate.

However, the appeal was dismissed to avoid reincarceration and to preserve the probation order, as R.S. had completed the conditional sentence.

A concurring judge found the original sentence fit, emphasizing the significant mitigating impact of Gladue principles on the offender's moral culpability and the deference owed to trial judges in sentencing.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault and sexual interference, arguing the trial judge erred in analyzing the statutory fault element, rejecting the mistake of age defence, and misusing the complainant's prior consistent statements.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's conclusions regarding the appellant's knowledge or recklessness as to the complainant's age, the rejection of the mistake of age defence due to lack of reasonable steps, and the credibility/reliability findings concerning the complainant's drug use and prior consistent statements.

This is an appeal from a Superior Court order granting certiorari.

The decision itself is subject to a statutory non-publication order under section 539 of the Criminal Code, pending the outcome of the trial.

The full text of the reasons is not publicly available.

The appellant appealed a 15-year prohibition order imposed under s. 161(1)(d) of the Criminal Code, following convictions for possessing, accessing, and making available child pornography.

The appellant argued the order was too long, beyond statutory provisions, too onerous, and insufficiently tailored.

The Court of Appeal upheld the sentencing judge's discretion, finding no error in principle or unreasonableness in the 15-year duration or the general conditions.

The court accepted two minor concessions from the Crown regarding specific conditions: a clarification on reporting IP addresses and a two-year maximum duration for inspection and monitoring requirements.

The appeal was largely dismissed, with the original order replaced by a new one incorporating these minor changes.

Sentencing decision following guilty pleas to possession of child pornography and making child pornography available.

After a Gardiner hearing, the court found beyond a reasonable doubt that the offender had downloaded, possessed, shared, and had a sexual interest in the child pornography found across multiple devices over an extended period.

Applying the sentencing principles in the Criminal Code and emphasizing denunciation and deterrence for sexual offences against children, the court held that a conditional sentence or shorter term would be unfit.

A global concurrent sentence of three years' imprisonment was imposed, less 10 months' pre-sentence custody credit, together with DNA, lifetime SOIRA, and s. 161 orders.

The offender, an Indigenous man, was convicted of sexual assault and choking.

At sentencing, he challenged the constitutionality of s. 742.1(f)(iii) of the Criminal Code, which prohibited conditional sentences for sexual assault.

The court found the provision violated ss. 7 and 15 of the Charter and was not saved by s. 1, declaring it of no force and effect.

Applying Gladue principles, the court considered the offender's severe childhood trauma, intergenerational trauma, and alcoholism, which reduced his moral blameworthiness.

The court imposed a blended sentence of a 2-year less a day conditional sentence for the sexual assault and a concurrent 90-day intermittent jail sentence for the choking.

The appellant, Boris Rajkovic, appealed a global sentence of 13 years for six offences, including kidnapping, bank robbery, and discharging a firearm at police.

He challenged the fitness of the sentence, the imposition of a consecutive sentence for discharging a firearm, and the sufficiency of credit for pre-trial custody conditions, including alleged poor medical care.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the global sentence fit given the gravity and number of offences, upholding the consecutive sentence due to the distinct nature of the firearm discharge, and affirming the sentencing judge's decision on pre-trial credit as the medical records did not support the appellant's claims.

The appellants were convicted of drug trafficking offences following the execution of search warrants at two condominiums and a vehicle.

They appealed their convictions and sentences, arguing that the searches violated their s. 8 Charter rights and that a delay in facilitating access to counsel violated s. 10(b).

The Court of Appeal found that the searches were lawful, with the warrantless entry justified by exigent circumstances.

Although the court found a s. 10(b) breach due to a four-hour delay in providing access to counsel, it declined to exclude the evidence under s. 24(2), noting the breach was an isolated incident rather than systemic.

The appeals against conviction and sentence were dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence for theft under $5,000.

He had entered a bank, passed a note demanding money, and left with $600.

After a directed verdict dismissed a robbery charge, he pled guilty to the included offence of theft.

On appeal, he argued there was an insufficient factual basis for the conviction and that his sentence should have been reduced to six months to avoid collateral immigration consequences.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the elements of theft were met.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the trial judge had properly considered the immigration consequences but concluded a 12-month sentence was fit and proportionate.

The appellant appealed his conviction for possession of child pornography, arguing the trial judge erred in admitting evidence under section 24(2) of the Charter after finding the search warrant invalid.

The trial judge had excised a paragraph from the Information to Obtain (ITO) because it lacked support for the affiant's belief that the suspect was a collector, rendering the warrant invalid.

However, the trial judge admitted the evidence, finding the police conduct was inept but not blatant, and the balance of factors favoured admission.

The Superior Court of Justice found no error in the trial judge's application of the Grant framework and dismissed the appeal.

The appellant appealed his conviction for aggravated assault, arguing the trial judge erred in assessing DNA and witness evidence, and alleging ineffective assistance of trial counsel.

The Crown cross-appealed the suspended sentence and two years' probation, arguing a custodial sentence was required.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's factual findings and concluding that trial counsel's tactical decisions did not cause a miscarriage of justice.

The Court also dismissed the Crown's sentence appeal, holding that while the suspended sentence was exceptionally lenient, it was not demonstrably unfit given the offender's youth, lack of prior record, and strong community support.

The applicant, Zaaman Yusuf, sought a bail review after being denied bail on secondary and tertiary grounds for serious charges including kidnapping, forcible confinement, extortion, aggravated assault, and firearm and drug offences.

The defence argued for release based on a revised supervision plan with two sureties and the material change in circumstances presented by the COVID-19 pandemic.

The court found the addition of a second surety did not constitute a material change and expressed concerns about the sureties' naiveté regarding the applicant's activities and the plan's ability to prevent re-offending or interference with justice.

While acknowledging the pandemic as a material change, the court found no specific health vulnerability for the applicant and noted the correctional facility's measures.

Ultimately, the application for release was denied, concluding that public confidence in the administration of justice would be eroded by the applicant's release given the gravity of the offences, the strength of the Crown's case, and the deficiencies in the proposed supervision plan.

The defence brought a motion for a directed verdict on a charge of making child pornography, arguing that the Crown lacked sufficient evidence for the actus reus without direct documentary proof of the alleged video.

The court dismissed the motion, holding that the complainant's testimony, if believed, provided a sufficient evidentiary basis for a reasonable jury to infer that a video depicting explicit sexual activity by a person under 18 was made.

The decision clarified that direct documentary evidence is not an absolute requirement for conviction, as circumstantial evidence can be sufficient.

The accused was charged with dangerous driving, failing to stop for police, driving while disqualified, and failing to comply with a probation order arising from an incident on February 3, 2016.

The central issue was whether the Crown had proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused was the driver of a vehicle involved in a dangerous pursuit in Brampton.

The court found the eyewitness identification evidence of a police officer, based on a single photograph viewed two days after a ten-second observation, was unreliable and insufficient to support a conviction.

The court also found the circumstantial evidence, while suspicious, did not compel the only reasonable inference of guilt.

Additionally, the Crown failed to prove the accused's knowledge of the terms of the probation order and driving prohibition.

All charges were dismissed.

The defendant was convicted of possession of child pornography following a trial.

At sentencing, the defendant challenged the mandatory minimum sentence of six months imprisonment under section 163.1(4) of the Criminal Code as a violation of section 12 of the Charter (cruel and unusual punishment).

The court determined that the appropriate sentence was seven months imprisonment followed by three years probation.

The court found that the mandatory minimum was not grossly disproportionate and therefore did not constitute a Charter breach.

The court declined to impose a section 161.1(a)-(c) order, finding the defendant posed a low risk to reoffend based on expert evidence.