Ngai On Young

The court considered whether Seedjan Sulaiman Khail, who stabbed his father to death, was not criminally responsible by reason of mental disorder.

The only issue in dispute was whether the accused’s mental disorder rendered him incapable of knowing that his actions were wrong.

After reviewing the psychiatric evidence and the accused’s history, the court found that while Mr. Sulaiman Khail suffered from a mental disorder at the time of the offence, he did not lack the capacity to know that his actions were wrong according to the ordinary moral standards of society.

The court found him guilty of second-degree murder.

The decision addresses three main issues: (1) the application to re-open the trial to reconsider the s. 24(2) Charter analysis in light of the Ontario Court of Appeal’s decision in R. v. McGowan-Morris, (2) the application for a stay of proceedings due to delay in conducting the accused’s bail hearing, and (3) the appropriate sentence for the accused, Ivor Shawn Young, following his conviction for unauthorized possession of a loaded restricted firearm, possession of a restricted firearm in a motor vehicle, and possession of cocaine.

The court found a breach of the accused’s s. 10(b) Charter rights but concluded that exclusion of the evidence was not warranted.

The application for a stay of proceedings was dismissed, and a sentence of three years’ imprisonment (less credit for pre-sentence custody and Downes credit) was imposed.

The Crown brought an application to admit statements made by the accused during a nine-month 'Mr. Big' undercover operation, as well as a subsequent post-arrest statement, in a trial for manslaughter and indignity to a human body.

The accused had admitted to undercover officers that the victim died of a drug overdose and that he buried her body.

Applying the framework from R. v. Hart, the court found that the probative value of the undercover statements outweighed their prejudicial effect, noting the lack of coercion and the presence of markers of reliability.

The court also found the post-arrest statement to be voluntary under the confessions rule, rejecting arguments that the police created an atmosphere of oppression or offered inducements.

Both statements were ruled admissible subject to editing for discreditable conduct.

The Crown brought a motion to introduce evidence of prior discreditable conduct and ante-mortem hearsay statements in a trial for manslaughter.

The Crown sought to admit statements made by the deceased indicating she wanted to leave the accused and that he had previously choked her, as well as evidence of the accused's post-offence suicide attempt.

The court admitted the statements regarding the deceased's desire to leave the relationship and one specific recounting of a choking incident, finding them sufficiently reliable and probative of motive and animus.

Other hearsay statements regarding prior assaults were excluded due to insufficient reliability or excessive prejudicial effect.

The evidence of the suicide attempt was also ruled admissible.

The accused, charged with manslaughter, brought a motion to exclude evidence obtained from his cell phone and associated tower records, arguing his s. 8 Charter rights were breached when police seized his phone without a warrant following a polygraph test.

The court found that while the police had grounds to seize the phone, they created the exigent circumstances, resulting in a s. 8 breach.

However, applying the Grant framework, the court declined to exclude the phone's contents under s. 24(2), noting the police acted in good faith and the impact on the accused's privacy was minimal since the phone was not searched until a warrant was obtained.

The court also held that the tower records were not obtained in a manner that infringed the Charter and were admissible.

The Crown appealed a trial judge's decision to stay proceedings against the respondent, an Indigenous offender who pled guilty to domestic assault and breach of recognizance.

The trial judge had stayed the charges, finding the respondent's s. 7 Charter rights were breached due to over-incarceration while awaiting a Gladue report that Aboriginal Legal Services (ALS) ultimately could not produce, and because ALS allegedly breached a court order to provide the report.

The Superior Court allowed the appeal, finding the respondent was actually detained on other charges, not just awaiting the report.

Furthermore, the trial judge only requested, not ordered, the report, and had no jurisdiction to order a non-party like ALS to produce one.

The stay was set aside and the matter remitted for sentencing.

The defendant brought a motion for a judicial stay of proceedings on the grounds that the Crown failed to comply with court orders for a Gladue Report, which is mandatory when sentencing an Indigenous offender.

The defendant had pleaded guilty to assault and mischief in July 2017.

Two separate court orders for a Gladue Report were issued but never fulfilled.

The defendant remained in custody for approximately two months longer than any anticipated custodial sentence while awaiting the report.

The court found that the failure to provide the ordered Gladue Report, combined with the defendant's prolonged incarceration and the state's non-compliance with judicial orders, constituted breaches of the defendant's Charter rights and state misconduct that undermined the integrity of the justice system.

The court granted the stay of all charges.

The offender was found guilty by a jury of attempted murder, pointing a firearm, and possession of a firearm while prohibited.

The offender shot the victim multiple times over a drug debt.

The Crown sought a life sentence, while the defence sought 10 to 12 years.

The court found the offender's lengthy and violent criminal record to be a significant aggravating factor, but concluded this was not the 'worst offence' requiring a life sentence.

The court imposed a global sentence of 16 years, less credit for pre-sentence custody, resulting in 11 years and 4 months to be served.