Anthony Marchetti

The appellant was convicted of break and enter of a dwelling house and other offences based primarily on DNA evidence found in a glove discovered at the crime scene.

The Crown admitted in an agreed statement of fact that the appellant's DNA was found in the glove but called no expert evidence regarding DNA transfer characteristics or whether the appellant's DNA was the sole profile on the glove.

The Court of Appeal found the verdicts unreasonable, holding that the DNA evidence alone was incapable of bearing the burden of proving the appellant left the glove at the scene.

The convictions were set aside and acquittals entered.

The applicant, charged with second-degree murder, applied for a Rowbotham order after being denied Legal Aid.

The Crown had previously offered to fund his defence, but the applicant refused due to objections to two proposed terms.

The applicant sought a conditional stay and an order imposing specific funding terms.

The court granted the conditional stay, finding the applicant met the Rowbotham criteria since no funding arrangement was currently in place.

However, the court held it lacked jurisdiction to impose specific funding terms absent a Charter breach.

The court also granted a limited sealing order over the settlement communications and the terms of the Crown's offer, finding they were protected by settlement privilege.

The accused, Khalife Bartholomew, was found guilty by a jury of multiple firearm-related offences, including break and enter and theft of a firearm, conspiracy, possession of firearms in a vehicle, possession of firearms without a license, possession of firearms obtained by crime, and possession of property obtained by crime.

This decision outlines the sentencing, considering aggravating factors such as the involvement of firearms and mitigating factors including the accused's youth, lack of prior criminal record, family ties, and participation as an aider rather than instigator.

The court applied sentencing principles of deterrence, denunciation, proportionality, and restraint, ultimately imposing a global sentence of two years less a day, with credit for pre-trial custody, resulting in 18 months in custody, followed by three years of probation, a 10-year weapons prohibition, and a DNA order.

During a trial, the Crown sought a ruling on the voluntariness of a video statement made by the accused to police, intending to use it for cross-examination.

The accused argued the statement was induced by a promise of release and that his section 10(b) Charter rights were violated because police failed to give a Prosper warning when he waived his right to counsel.

The court found no inducement, as the accused already knew he would be released on a promise to appear.

The court also held that the accused's waiver of his right to counsel was informed, unequivocal, and voluntary, dismissing the Charter application and ruling the statement admissible.

The appellant pleaded guilty to criminal negligence causing death and driving without insurance after driving his motorcycle while intoxicated and crashing, resulting in the death of his passenger.

He was sentenced to six years' imprisonment.

On appeal, he argued the sentencing judge erred in treating his guilty plea, assessing aggravating factors, and calculating pre-sentence custody.

The Court of Appeal found an error in the pre-sentence custody calculation and increased the credit, but otherwise dismissed the appeal, finding the six-year sentence fit given the gravity of the offence.

The Crown appealed an acquittal for sexual assault under s. 271 of the Criminal Code, alleging the trial judge misapprehended the evidence, erred in applying the law of consent, and rendered an unreasonable verdict.

The prosecution theory at trial was that the complainant was unconscious due to intoxication and therefore incapable of consenting.

The appellate judge held that the trial judge was entitled to assess the complainant’s credibility, draw common‑sense inferences about intoxication and unconsciousness without expert evidence, and conclude that the Crown had not proven lack of consent beyond a reasonable doubt.

The court also held that the Crown cannot appeal an acquittal solely on the ground that it is unreasonable absent another error of law.

The appeal was dismissed.

The offender was convicted by a jury of three counts of dangerous driving causing bodily harm and three counts of failing to remain at the scene of an accident following a road rage incident on Highway 401.

The collision caused the other vehicle to roll over, resulting in catastrophic injuries to the other driver and serious injuries to two passengers.

The court weighed the offender's terrible driving record and the egregious nature of the offence against his deteriorating physical and mental health due to Huntington's disease.

The offender was sentenced to 18 months' incarceration, a 10-year driving prohibition, and ordered to provide a DNA sample.

The appellant was convicted of abducting his son in contravention of a custody order.

The indictment specifically charged him with 'taking away' his son.

At trial, the judge instructed the jury that they could convict the appellant either if he took the child away or if he failed to return the child once the custody order was made.

The Court of Appeal held that this instruction was an error because the Crown must prove the offence exactly as particularized in the indictment, which did not include detaining or harbouring the child.

The appeal was allowed, the conviction was set aside, and a new trial was ordered.

The appellant was convicted of possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking after being arrested with four kilograms of cocaine.

He appealed his conviction, arguing the trial judge erred in refusing to issue a material witness warrant for a person he believed was the confidential informant who tipped off the police.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's conclusion that there was no evidence the proposed witness was a state agent or would provide material evidence on the issue of entrapment.

The appellant appealed his convictions for participating in three fraudulent schemes, arguing the trial judge's conclusions were unsupported by the evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding substantial evidence that the appellant deliberately participated in the schemes.