Anthony Marchetti

The court considered whether Seedjan Sulaiman Khail, who stabbed his father to death, was not criminally responsible by reason of mental disorder.

The only issue in dispute was whether the accused’s mental disorder rendered him incapable of knowing that his actions were wrong.

After reviewing the psychiatric evidence and the accused’s history, the court found that while Mr. Sulaiman Khail suffered from a mental disorder at the time of the offence, he did not lack the capacity to know that his actions were wrong according to the ordinary moral standards of society.

The court found him guilty of second-degree murder.

The accused was charged with making and possessing child pornography, specifically text messages, contrary to sections 163.1(2) and 163.1(4) of the Criminal Code.

The trial focused on whether the Crown proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the person depicted in the messages was under 18 years old.

The court reviewed the evidentiary record, including an agreed statement of facts and the text messages exchanged between the accused and an undercover officer.

The court applied the principles from R. v. Villaroman and R. v. Starr regarding circumstantial evidence and the standard of proof.

Ultimately, the court found that the only reasonable inference was that the numbers "13" and "14" in the messages referred to age, and convicted the accused on both counts.

The accused, Khalid Mohamed, was charged with second degree murder in the stabbing death of Steven Burns.

The facts were largely undisputed: Mohamed stabbed Burns, causing his death.

The central issue was whether Mohamed acted in self-defence or whether provocation would reduce the charge to manslaughter.

The court found that Mohamed had been robbed and assaulted by Burns and others, and that Mohamed stabbed Burns during a struggle for control of a knife.

The court concluded that the Crown had not proven beyond a reasonable doubt that Mohamed’s actions were unreasonable in the circumstances, and acquitted him of second degree murder.

The applicant, who pleaded guilty in Washington State in 2014 to communication with a minor, sought an exemption from Sex Offender Information Registration Act (SOIRA) obligations in Canada.

The Attorney General of Ontario had deemed his foreign offence equivalent to child luring.

The court, without deciding on the equivalence of the foreign offence, focused on whether the applicant met the criteria for exemption under the amended s. 490.02905(2)(c) or (d) of the Criminal Code.

Based on expert psychological assessment indicating a very low likelihood of re-offending, no prior criminal record, and significant personal hardship caused by SOIRA obligations (travel and employment restrictions), the court found that there was no connection between the obligation and SOIRA's purpose, and the impact on the applicant was grossly disproportionate to the public interest.

The application for an exemption order was allowed.

Melanie Pereira was found guilty of conspiracy to traffic cocaine, conspiracy to traffic fentanyl, and possession for the purpose of trafficking in both drugs.

The court considered aggravating factors, including the significant amounts of fentanyl and cocaine, and mitigating factors, such as her status as a first offender, her remorse, and the impact of incarceration on her two young children.

The Crown sought an eight-year sentence for fentanyl and a 5-6 year concurrent sentence for cocaine, while the defence sought a reformatory sentence of two years less a day.

The court sentenced Ms. Pereira to 60 months (5 years) imprisonment for each count, to be served concurrently, along with a 10-year section 109 order and a DNA order.

The Crown appealed the conditional sentence imposed on R.S. for violent sexual assault and choking, arguing it was demonstrably unfit and below the appropriate penitentiary range.

The majority of the Court of Appeal agreed the sentence was demonstrably unfit, finding a 3-year penitentiary term would have been proportionate.

However, the appeal was dismissed to avoid reincarceration and to preserve the probation order, as R.S. had completed the conditional sentence.

A concurring judge found the original sentence fit, emphasizing the significant mitigating impact of Gladue principles on the offender's moral culpability and the deference owed to trial judges in sentencing.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault and sexual interference, arguing the trial judge erred in analyzing the statutory fault element, rejecting the mistake of age defence, and misusing the complainant's prior consistent statements.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's conclusions regarding the appellant's knowledge or recklessness as to the complainant's age, the rejection of the mistake of age defence due to lack of reasonable steps, and the credibility/reliability findings concerning the complainant's drug use and prior consistent statements.

This is an appeal from a Superior Court order granting certiorari.

The decision itself is subject to a statutory non-publication order under section 539 of the Criminal Code, pending the outcome of the trial.

The full text of the reasons is not publicly available.

The appellant appealed a 15-year prohibition order imposed under s. 161(1)(d) of the Criminal Code, following convictions for possessing, accessing, and making available child pornography.

The appellant argued the order was too long, beyond statutory provisions, too onerous, and insufficiently tailored.

The Court of Appeal upheld the sentencing judge's discretion, finding no error in principle or unreasonableness in the 15-year duration or the general conditions.

The court accepted two minor concessions from the Crown regarding specific conditions: a clarification on reporting IP addresses and a two-year maximum duration for inspection and monitoring requirements.

The appeal was largely dismissed, with the original order replaced by a new one incorporating these minor changes.

The offender, an Indigenous man, was convicted of sexual assault and choking.

At sentencing, he challenged the constitutionality of s. 742.1(f)(iii) of the Criminal Code, which prohibited conditional sentences for sexual assault.

The court found the provision violated ss. 7 and 15 of the Charter and was not saved by s. 1, declaring it of no force and effect.

Applying Gladue principles, the court considered the offender's severe childhood trauma, intergenerational trauma, and alcoholism, which reduced his moral blameworthiness.

The court imposed a blended sentence of a 2-year less a day conditional sentence for the sexual assault and a concurrent 90-day intermittent jail sentence for the choking.

The appellant, Boris Rajkovic, appealed a global sentence of 13 years for six offences, including kidnapping, bank robbery, and discharging a firearm at police.

He challenged the fitness of the sentence, the imposition of a consecutive sentence for discharging a firearm, and the sufficiency of credit for pre-trial custody conditions, including alleged poor medical care.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the global sentence fit given the gravity and number of offences, upholding the consecutive sentence due to the distinct nature of the firearm discharge, and affirming the sentencing judge's decision on pre-trial credit as the medical records did not support the appellant's claims.

The appellant appealed his conviction for possession of child pornography, arguing the trial judge erred in admitting evidence under section 24(2) of the Charter after finding the search warrant invalid.

The trial judge had excised a paragraph from the Information to Obtain (ITO) because it lacked support for the affiant's belief that the suspect was a collector, rendering the warrant invalid.

However, the trial judge admitted the evidence, finding the police conduct was inept but not blatant, and the balance of factors favoured admission.

The Superior Court of Justice found no error in the trial judge's application of the Grant framework and dismissed the appeal.

The applicant, Zaaman Yusuf, sought a bail review after being denied bail on secondary and tertiary grounds for serious charges including kidnapping, forcible confinement, extortion, aggravated assault, and firearm and drug offences.

The defence argued for release based on a revised supervision plan with two sureties and the material change in circumstances presented by the COVID-19 pandemic.

The court found the addition of a second surety did not constitute a material change and expressed concerns about the sureties' naiveté regarding the applicant's activities and the plan's ability to prevent re-offending or interference with justice.

While acknowledging the pandemic as a material change, the court found no specific health vulnerability for the applicant and noted the correctional facility's measures.

Ultimately, the application for release was denied, concluding that public confidence in the administration of justice would be eroded by the applicant's release given the gravity of the offences, the strength of the Crown's case, and the deficiencies in the proposed supervision plan.

The defence brought a motion for a directed verdict on a charge of making child pornography, arguing that the Crown lacked sufficient evidence for the actus reus without direct documentary proof of the alleged video.

The court dismissed the motion, holding that the complainant's testimony, if believed, provided a sufficient evidentiary basis for a reasonable jury to infer that a video depicting explicit sexual activity by a person under 18 was made.

The decision clarified that direct documentary evidence is not an absolute requirement for conviction, as circumstantial evidence can be sufficient.

The accused was charged with dangerous driving, failing to stop for police, driving while disqualified, and failing to comply with a probation order arising from an incident on February 3, 2016.

The central issue was whether the Crown had proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused was the driver of a vehicle involved in a dangerous pursuit in Brampton.

The court found the eyewitness identification evidence of a police officer, based on a single photograph viewed two days after a ten-second observation, was unreliable and insufficient to support a conviction.

The court also found the circumstantial evidence, while suspicious, did not compel the only reasonable inference of guilt.

Additionally, the Crown failed to prove the accused's knowledge of the terms of the probation order and driving prohibition.

All charges were dismissed.

The defendant was convicted of possession of child pornography following a trial.

At sentencing, the defendant challenged the mandatory minimum sentence of six months imprisonment under section 163.1(4) of the Criminal Code as a violation of section 12 of the Charter (cruel and unusual punishment).

The court determined that the appropriate sentence was seven months imprisonment followed by three years probation.

The court found that the mandatory minimum was not grossly disproportionate and therefore did not constitute a Charter breach.

The court declined to impose a section 161.1(a)-(c) order, finding the defendant posed a low risk to reoffend based on expert evidence.

The appellant was convicted of break and enter of a dwelling house and other offences based primarily on DNA evidence found in a glove discovered at the crime scene.

The Crown admitted in an agreed statement of fact that the appellant's DNA was found in the glove but called no expert evidence regarding DNA transfer characteristics or whether the appellant's DNA was the sole profile on the glove.

The Court of Appeal found the verdicts unreasonable, holding that the DNA evidence alone was incapable of bearing the burden of proving the appellant left the glove at the scene.

The convictions were set aside and acquittals entered.

The applicant, charged with second-degree murder, applied for a Rowbotham order after being denied Legal Aid.

The Crown had previously offered to fund his defence, but the applicant refused due to objections to two proposed terms.

The applicant sought a conditional stay and an order imposing specific funding terms.

The court granted the conditional stay, finding the applicant met the Rowbotham criteria since no funding arrangement was currently in place.

However, the court held it lacked jurisdiction to impose specific funding terms absent a Charter breach.

The court also granted a limited sealing order over the settlement communications and the terms of the Crown's offer, finding they were protected by settlement privilege.

The accused, Khalife Bartholomew, was found guilty by a jury of multiple firearm-related offences, including break and enter and theft of a firearm, conspiracy, possession of firearms in a vehicle, possession of firearms without a license, possession of firearms obtained by crime, and possession of property obtained by crime.

This decision outlines the sentencing, considering aggravating factors such as the involvement of firearms and mitigating factors including the accused's youth, lack of prior criminal record, family ties, and participation as an aider rather than instigator.

The court applied sentencing principles of deterrence, denunciation, proportionality, and restraint, ultimately imposing a global sentence of two years less a day, with credit for pre-trial custody, resulting in 18 months in custody, followed by three years of probation, a 10-year weapons prohibition, and a DNA order.

During a trial, the Crown sought a ruling on the voluntariness of a video statement made by the accused to police, intending to use it for cross-examination.

The accused argued the statement was induced by a promise of release and that his section 10(b) Charter rights were violated because police failed to give a Prosper warning when he waived his right to counsel.

The court found no inducement, as the accused already knew he would be released on a promise to appear.

The court also held that the accused's waiver of his right to counsel was informed, unequivocal, and voluntary, dismissing the Charter application and ruling the statement admissible.