His Majesty the King v. Joacquin Rowe, 2026 ONSC 2428

CITATION: R. v. Rowe, 2026 ONSC 2428

COURT FILE NO.: 25-00000089-0000

DATE: 20260424

ONTARIO

SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE

BETWEEN:

HIS MAJESTY THE KING

Respondent

– and –

JOACQUIN ROWE

Applicant

Monica Gharabaway and Brigid McCallum, for the Respondent

Patrick Carl and Alison Craig, for the Applicant

HEARD at Toronto: April 20 & 23, 2026

Mainville, J.

REASONS FOR DECISION ON DISCLOSURE MOTION

1Mr. Rowe is charged with various human trafficking and sexual services offences relating to nine complainants. He brings an application in advance of trial for disclosure of redacted portions of a police statement taken from one of the complainants, A.J.

2The statement is heavily redacted based on what the Crown says is clearly irrelevant information. The information falls into different categories, but the central dispute concerns information that the Crown says relates to an unrelated criminal investigation, some of which involves the complainant’s unrelated sexual history and victimization.

3The defence argues that the redacted information is largely interwoven with the information that has been disclosed. It says that the complainant’s unredacted answers to questions are difficult to assess in a meaningful way without at times knowing what question was asked, and without the broader context. It also argues that what the defence has been given is incomprehensible in the absence of what has been withheld. Of course, the defence cannot see what has not been disclosed so cannot speak to the potential relevance of that information in any meaningful way, but it argues that what may appear to be extraneous detail in the context of a witness statement can become significant when viewed in the context of the matter as a whole.

4I am unable to find that the redacted portions of the complainant’s statement are clearly irrelevant. Accordingly, they must be disclosed pursuant to R. v. Stinchcombe, 1991 45 (SCC), [1991] 3 S.C.R. 326.

The Law on First Party Disclosure

5The Crown of course has a general obligation to disclose the fruits of the investigation pursuant to s. 7 of the Charter. This is to enable the accused to make full answer and defence, which is a principle of fundamental justice we heavily depend on to ensure that the innocent are not convicted: Stinchcombe, at p. 336.

6As articulated in R. v. Chaplin, 1995 126 (SCC), [1995] 1 S.C.R. 727, at para. 21:

… the Crown is under a general duty to disclose all information, whether inculpatory or exculpatory, except evidence that is beyond the control of the prosecution, clearly irrelevant, or privileged: R. v. Stinchcombe, supra, at p. 339; R. v. Egger, 1993 98 (SCC), [1993] 2 S.C.R. 451.

7The Crown must err on the side of inclusion. Still, it need not produce what is clearly irrelevant.

8Although this is a defence application for disclosure, it relates to portions of a complainant’s police statement that is known to exist and that generally needs to be disclosed as first party disclosure. The Crown must therefore justify its non-disclosure of the information:

The Crown’s disclosure obligation is subject to a discretion, the burden of justifying the exercise of which lies on the Crown, to withhold information which is clearly irrelevant or the nondisclosure of which is required by the rules of privilege, or to delay the disclosure of information out of the necessity to protect witnesses or complete an investigation: Stinchcombe, supra, at pp. 335-36, 339-40. As was said in Stinchcombe, supra, at p. 340, “(i)nasmuch as disclosure of all relevant information is the general rule, the Crown must bring itself within an exception to that rule”. [Egger, at p. 466 (emphasis added)]

9There is no claim of privilege in respect of the redacted information in this case. Nor does the Crown take the position that disclosure of some of the information must be delayed because of an ongoing investigation. Its position is that the information is clearly irrelevant. The Crown must therefore justify its redactions on that basis.

10Relevance in this context is generally determined in relation to its use by the defence:

One measure of the relevance of information in the Crown’s hands is its usefulness to the defence: if it is of some use, it is relevant and should be disclosed — Stinchcombe, supra, at p. 345. This requires a determination by the reviewing judge that production of the information can reasonably be used by the accused either in meeting the case for the Crown, advancing a defence or otherwise in making a decision which may affect the conduct of the defence such as, for example, whether to call evidence. [Egger, at pp. 466-67 (emphasis added)]

11As set out in Stinchcombe, at p. 340, I am to be guided “by the general principle that information ought not to be withheld if there is a reasonable possibility that the withholding of information will impair the right of the accused to make full answer and defence, unless the non-disclosure is justified by the law of privilege.”

12To be sure, the defence at this juncture is not required to articulate a particular use of the evidence at trial. It would certainly be difficult to do so without knowing what the information is. The Crown must instead justify non-disclosure on the basis that, in effect, it could not conceivably be of use to the defence – not only in presenting the case in court but in understanding the case, investigating potential defences, or making decisions about the conduct of the defence including deciding to pursue or not pursue certain lines of inquiry or approaches at trial or in the lead-up to trial. It is relevance writ large.

The Redacted Portions of the Statement Are Not Clearly Irrelevant

13I have great difficulty in accepting that the redacted information, generally speaking, is clearly irrelevant.

14The allegations against Mr. Rowe do not relate to a specific date or incident. They relate to a coercive and sustained course of conduct spanning a period of time, which varies depending on the complainant. For several of the complainants, the charges span a period of years.

15It is true that as it relates to A.J., the indictment refers to a discrete period from July 1st to July 22nd, 2018, when she would have left Toronto and been in the area of Vancouver. The Crown points to this context to argue that the broader context and unrelated allegations relating to a third person referenced by A.J. in her statement have no bearing on the allegations against Mr. Rowe.

16The main difficulty with this argument is that the information relating to this other individual overlaps in time with the allegations relating to Mr. Rowe. It spans a time period that both pre-dates and post-dates the July 2018 period that pertains to Mr. Rowe. In that context, the statement covers a broad range of topics relating to A.J.’s life and activities in 2018, much of which could have some relevance to Mr. Rowe’s defence. Whether exculpatory or not, it relates to information that bears on issues that I understand will or may well feature in this trial, such as A.J.’s vulnerabilities that may have been exploited, including drug addiction, her financial situation including her spending habits and access or lack of access to money and bank accounts, her housing situation, her employment situation, and her access to identity cards.

17The Crown submits that the defence is already in possession of relevant information on these points. But that does not speak to the test that I must engage with, which is whether those same topics including additional details on these points are clearly irrelevant: in my view, they are not.

18In application materials filed with the court, the Crown itself points to some of these issues such as A.J.’s vulnerabilities including as it relates to drugs and housing, as well as the fact that Mr. Rowe would have taken her identification, birth certificate and bank cards. Yet information pertaining to these same points is redacted. Granted, A.J.’s statement relates to a much broader time period than the July 2018 period that directly relates to Mr. Rowe. But much of the information at least also encompasses the relevant period or may have some bearing on it given that it immediately pre-dated or post-dated it.

19In its materials, the Crown also recounts A.J.’s allegations that she was led to believe she would make more money in Vancouver than she did at the spa where she worked in Toronto, but this did not happen: she earned less and the Applicant took all her earnings. While the issue of whether she made more or less in Toronto than Vancouver clearly doesn’t provide a defence to Mr. Rowe, the point is that A.J.’s financial circumstances, whether she was misled, and what happened to her income is a central aspect of the Crown’s case against Mr. Rowe. Much of the redacted information pertains to these issues, even though they pertain to a broader time period. Amongst other things, the information may well serve to assess A.J.’s credibility or reliability. In my view, it may well have some relevance to the defence.

20Moreover, some redacted passages bear directly on issues pertaining to A.J.’s reliability. She at times speaks directly to her ability to recall certain types of things or not given specific factors – again, as it relates to a period that overlaps with her allegations against Mr. Rowe. There is also information relating to her prior interactions with the criminal justice system and the police, which is generally considered relevant in respect of witnesses who will be called to testify.

21The Crown argues that even if I deem some information to not be clearly irrelevant and thus disclosable, I should evaluate each redacted passage with this threshold in mind. I now turn to this argument.

The Low Threshold for Disclosure Mandates Disclosure in Full

22The Crown submits that I should parse out clearly irrelevant information relating to the other person and events referenced by A.J., and information regarding her victimization in that context which raises privacy concerns. It has highlighted particular areas of concern from a privacy perspective.

23The defence, on the other hand, argues that it needs to be able to see the entire police statement to assess its case, and that to take it apart piecemeal forecloses full answer and defence.

24There are certainly aspects of what is relayed to the police by A.J. about what the Crown calls a “separate investigation” that is less obviously relevant to Mr. Rowe’s case and his defence. Leaving aside the fact that it is difficult for me at this stage in the proceedings to assess this with any level of precision, I go back to foundational principles relating to first party disclosure.

25As stated in R. v. Dixon, 1998 805 (SCC), [1998] 1 S.C.R. 244, at para. 23, “[t]he right to disclosure of all relevant material has a broad scope and includes material which may have only marginal value to the ultimate issues at trial”.

26In other words, I should not be segregating out portions of the statement even if it may be of marginal value to the ultimate issues at trial. Even information that may be inadmissible at trial must be disclosed if it may be of some use to the defence, including as it relates to making a decision that may affect the conduct of the defence, deciding whether to advance a defence, and deciding whether to call evidence, not to mention meeting the case for the Crown: Stinchcombe, at para. 33; Egger, at paras. 19-20.

27In Stinchcombe, Justice Sopinka explained at p. 333 that the fruits of the investigation which are in the possession of counsel for the Crown are not the property of the Crown for use in securing a conviction but the property of the public to be used to ensure that justice is done.

28In my view, the low threshold for general disclosure set out in Stinchcombe was precisely intended to avoid this type of parsing out aspects of the investigative file that are generally accepted as representing the fruits of the investigation – such as a complainant’s police statement. Trial judges are not well suited or equipped to determine at this very early stage what material may be useful to the defence and in what way. For that reason, among others, it is crucial not to conflate the Stinchcombe “not clearly relevant” threshold with the tests for relevance and admissibility that apply much later, at trial.

29Indeed, at pp. 340-41 of Stinchcombe, Justice Sopinka expressed confidence “that disputes over disclosure will arise infrequently when it is made clear that counsel for the Crown is under a general duty to disclose all relevant information.” [Emphasis in original.]

30At p. 334, the Court considered the argument that a general duty to disclose all relevant information would impose onerous obligations on Crown prosecutors resulting in increased delays in bringing accused persons to trial. The Court concluded the opposite: that the adoption of uniform and comprehensive rules for disclosure by the Crown would add to the workload of some Crown counsel who did not at that time have a general disclosure practice, but this would be offset by the time saved which is now spent resolving disputes surrounding the extent of the Crown’s obligation and dealing with matters that take the defence by surprise.

31The Court dealt with many arguments from opponents of a broad duty to disclose, including one that disclosure may put at risk the security and safety of persons who have provided the prosecution with information. Ultimately, the Court found at p. 336 that its “review of the pros and cons with respect to disclosure by the Crown shows that there is no valid practical reason to support the position of the opponents of a broad duty of disclosure.” It endorsed the Marshall Commission Report’s finding that “anything less than complete disclosure by the Crown falls short of decency and fair play” and its recommendation that, amongst other things, the accused is entitled to receive “a copy of any statement made by a person whom the prosecutor proposes to call as a witness or anyone who may be called as a witness, and recorded in writing or, in the absence of a statement, a written summary of the anticipated testimony of the proposed witness, or anyone who may be called as a witness” : Stinchcombe, at p. 337 [Emphasis added].

32The Court spoke of instances in which disclosure may be limited, primarily based on considerations relating to the risk that disclosure will endanger the life or safety of a person. The Court did not speak of privacy in any respect.

33This wisdom has stood the test of time. Subject to the exceptions set out in Stinchcombe and any statutory regime bearing on disclosure, courts should not be engaging in parsing out passages contained in the fruits of the investigation for particular privacy interests.

34As Justice Charron explained at para. 21 of R. v. McNeil, 2009 SCC 3, Parliament can and has devised statutory regimes that differ from the common law Stinchcombe regime when it deems that a different balance must be struck between the accused’s right and the privacy interests engaged by the fruits of the investigation:

Although the common law regime of disclosure under Stinchcombe generally strikes the appropriate balance between the accused’s right to make full answer and defence and the residual privacy interests of other persons in the fruits of the investigation, it is not the only regime that meets constitutional standards. As this Court concluded in Mills, it was open to Parliament to enact, as it did, a statutory regime for the disclosure of records containing personal information of complainants and witnesses in proceedings for sexual offences under ss. 278.1 to 278.91 of the Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46 (commonly referred to as the “Mills regime”).

35I will return below to the Mills exception to the common law regime of “automatic” Crown disclosure under Stinchcombe, as it applies to this case.

36As it relates to relevance and parsing out what is clearly irrelevant, the law is clear that the Crown must err on the side of inclusion. And when it comes to witness statements, these are presumed relevant, irrespective of privacy interests that are no doubt engaged: McNeil, at paras. 18 to 20 and 56.

37The Court in Stinchcombe, at p. 344, stated that “[t]here is virtually no disagreement that statements in the possession of the Crown obtained from witnesses it proposes to call should be produced.” In R. v. Taillefer; R. v. Duguay, 2003 SCC 70, at para. 59, the Court reiterated that “all statements obtained from persons who have provided relevant information to the authorities should be produced notwithstanding that they are not proposed as Crown witnesses”.

38This has generally been viewed as a categorical right to disclosure – seldom are witness statements vetted for anything short of privileged information and the occasional discrete piece of personal information that is deemed to be clearly irrelevant to the case. In Taillefer and Duguay, at para. 60, the Court confirmed that “the concept of relevance favours the disclosure of evidence. Little information will be exempt from the duty that is imposed on the prosecution to disclose evidence. … [T]he threshold requirement for disclosure is set quite low…”.

39The Crown points to aspects of the complainant’s statement that bear on prior sexual history, and concerns relating to the discriminatory use of that information.

40But while the majority in R. v. Seaboyer, 1991 76 (SCC), [1991] 2 S.C.R. 577 highlighted the danger of discriminatory use of sexual history evidence, in particular by relying on what is known in legal circles as the “twin myths”, it very clearly stated that blanket exclusion of sexual history evidence is unacceptable under the Charter. There are many situations where the sexual history might be critical to the defence without relying on any myths or stereotypes. As expressed at p. 618 of Seaboyer, “the evil to be addressed” is not evidence of sexual activity, but “the narrower evil of the misuse of evidence of sexual activity for irrelevant and misleading purposes”.

41Yet we are not here concerned with use of the evidence or even its admissibility at trial. The issue before me is solely disclosure of the information to the defence. Seaboyer never purported to preclude initial disclosure of this type of information to the defence, when referenced in the fruits of the investigation.

42Based on what is before me, I am not in a position to find that the sexual history information contained in A.J.’s police statement is clearly of no relevance to the defence. Again, we are not at this juncture dealing with the ultimate issue of relevance or admissibility at trial, but with first-party disclosure.

43In the context of the statement before me, there is also a comprehension issue with redacting various portions amid the broader statement. Indeed, as the defence submits, it is often difficult to understand a portion of a statement without the overall context and narrative. To remove bits and pieces of the statement may skew a person’s understanding of what is being said and why.

44Moreover, as already stated, it is exceedingly difficult at this juncture and in the context described above for me to parse out what is clearly irrelevant from what may not be – including what is potentially irrelevant but not clearly so, and what may be relevant. The bar is set quite low – at clear irrelevance – precisely because of how difficult it is for a judge with limited information about a case – both as it relates to the Crown’s specific allegations and the position of the defence – to make this assessment.

45I am also concerned that the type of parsing being advocated for here will only serve to raise unnecessary disputes and delay trials. It is a Pandora’s box that the Supreme Court in Stinchcombe wisely endeavoured not to open. To enable the fair and orderly conduct of criminal trials, the Crown must take an inclusive approach to first-party disclosure. Any other approach invites mid-trial disclosure disputes, adjournments, mistrials, or worse.

46I have considered those passages that the Crown urges me to consider most particularly and assessed them against the threshold of clear irrelevance. Ultimately, I am not in a position to determine that these would be clearly irrelevant to the defence.

Information Related to a Separate Investigation: the O’Connor/Quesnelle Argument

47The Crown argues that the present situation should be viewed as one akin to the accused seeking disclosure of a separate occurrence or investigation unrelated to him and therefore be informed by the principles set out in R. v. Quesnelle, 2014 SCC 46 relating to police occurrence reports prepared in the context of unrelated investigations. Where this arises in cases involving particular sexual offences, as it did in Quesnelle, the reports are considered “records” under s. 278.1 of the Criminal Code and their disclosure will be subject to the statutory Mills regime. In other contexts, such records would be considered third party records for which production can only be ordered pursuant to what is referred to as an O’Connor application, further to R. v. O’Connor, 1995 51 (SCC), [1995] 4 S.C.R. 411.

48The Crown makes the point that the complainant’s statement in this case was taken on September 18, 2018, whereas the investigation into Mr. Rowe did not begin until approximately five years later, in 2024. This is in part informed by the fact that A.J. did not know Mr. Rowe’s true identity. In her police statement, A.J. began by talking about her circumstances in Toronto which focused on a separate individual but then came to talk about her allegations relating to Mr. Rowe.

49Quesnelle stands for the proposition that unrelated police occurrence reports – or indeed investigative files, including statements – prepared in the investigation of previous incidents involving a complainant or witness other than the offence being prosecuted constitute “records” and are subject to the Mills regime for production (ss. 278.1 and ff. of the Code). Given the sensitive nature of the information frequently contained in such police occurrence reports (or investigative files), and the impact that their disclosure can have on the privacy interests of complainants and witnesses, there will generally be a reasonable expectation of privacy in such reports: Quesnelle, at paras. 32-34, 39-42. See also McNeil, at paras. 19 and 33.

50But the issue is whether the information was in fact prepared in the context of a separate investigation, or the one at hand pertaining to the accused. As stated at para. 41 of Quesnelle:

That is not to say that all disclosures of personal information by the police unreasonably intrude upon privacy. Where private information becomes part of a criminal case, the disclosure of that information to the court, the accused, and to the public is reasonable and unavoidable. For example, police occurrence reports made in the course of the investigation of the offence being prosecuted must be disclosed under Stinchcombe. [Emphasis added.]

51Tellingly, in McNeil, at para. 25, Justice Charron explained that the production of criminal investigation files involving third parties usually falls to be determined in the context of an O’Connor application, which is “unsurprising because information about third party accused … is not likely to make its way into the Crown’s Stinchcombe disclosure package unless such information is in some way related to the accused’s case.” [Emphasis added.]

52That is precisely the case here. A single statement was taken about two occurrences. They are broadly about the same topic which brought the complainant to the police station on this occasion. They involve two individuals but there is some interrelationship between the two. The complainant jumps back and forth between the two, and at times speaks in generalities. On many occasions, it is unclear what time period she is referring to. At times, it is also unclear who she is speaking about.

53Again, the charges that Mr. Rowe faces do not relate to a discrete event or something that can be neatly separated from a broader context that includes A.J.’s living circumstances at the relevant time. While the time period is fairly focused as it relates to the charges involving A.J., many aspects of the statement which the Crown says pertain to a different investigation touch on these issues. On many occasions, A.J. speaks about her circumstances more generally and makes general statements about “these guys” or “these pimps”, which could include reference to Mr. Rowe.

54I need not decide a scenario where a statement relates to two clearly severable and distinct occurrences relating to two separate individuals, and the police simply failed to properly separate the two. This practice is not uncommon when a complainant attends the police station for one matter, and in the course of providing a statement, discloses an entirely unrelated matter. In those circumstances, the police frequently advise the witness that they will return to that separate issue, complete the initial statement, then commence a separate statement or investigation as warranted.

55While the police may have only decided to formally investigate Mr. Rowe in 2024, A.J.’s allegations relating to him were brought to the attention of the police in 2018, in the context of a global statement relating to sex trafficking. The police may have subsequently decided to conduct two separate investigations and not follow up on the one suspect at the time, but that later determination doesn’t mean that the initial statement concerns two separate investigations or matters, part of which doesn’t relate to the fruits of the investigation into Mr. Rowe. As indicated, the information provided in relation to both matters is intertwined in such a way that it is often difficult to parse out what aspects of the statement may arguably relate to Mr. Rowe or not.

56But there is more. In her statement, A.J. herself links the two sets of allegations. She explains – in an unredacted portion of the statement – that the Applicant and this other person are best friends, and that this other individual would say “don’t worry, [Nise] can’t touch you if you’re with me. Things like that”. The reference to Nise would be Mr. Rowe. This suggests a potential overlap in time between the two sets of allegations, but also some interrelationship between the two. A.J. also links her time in Vancouver with one or more of the same women that she interacted with in Toronto, in the context of the other set of allegations. I understand these same women to also be complainants or alleged victims in this case. In this context, much of what she says in relation to the broader period relating to this other individual may have some relevance to the defence.

57A.J. also compares Mr. Rowe and his approach to this other person. In this context, the information she provides about this other person necessarily says something about the accused.

58All of this is of course difficult for me to assess. But the test I must apply is whether the information can be said to be clearly irrelevant to Mr. Rowe’s defence. I am unable to say as much.

The Complainant’s Statement is Not a “Record” Under s. 278.1 of the Code: the Mills Argument

59To be sure, the Crown does not take the position that the complainant’s statement itself in this case falls under the definition of “record” set out in s. 278.1 of the Code, such that its disclosure is subject to the statutory Mills regime rather than the common law Stinchcombe disclosure regime.

60That section exempts from protection “records made by persons responsible for the investigation or prosecution of the offence.” The exemption applies to records made in relation to the offence before the court and bypasses the balancing process for records that Parliament recognized should always be produced: McNeil, at paras. 47 and 49 and 55-56.

61The Crown does however argue that some portions of the statement could relate to information that constitutes a record, such that disclosure may not be permitted under the Mills regime. It recognizes that notice of this was never previously given but points me to two cases that have interpreted the scope of the exemption and ruled that some witness statements gathered by the investigative police agency in the context of the investigation of the offence can constitute records under s. 278.1.

62In the first, R. v. Woloschuk, 2024 ONSC 6765, Holowka J. found that a witness statement taken from the complainant’s psychotherapist constitutes a record that was subject to the statutory records regime. The court observed that the fact that the counselling records had been reduced to a witness statement did not exempt the information from the regime. The judge found that while the police created the statement, the information recorded in it was created by a psychotherapist, not an investigator: para. 33.

63Similarly, in R. v. Adzin, 2026 NWTSC 18, following the reasoning in Woloschuk, Piché J. found that a witness statement given to the police from the complainant’s school counsellor based on information obtained during counselling sessions constituted a record under s. 278.1 and was thus subject to the statutory records regime. The judge noted at paras. 27 and 31 that therapeutic and counselling records are enumerated categories under s. 278.1, and the purpose of the regime would be undermined if the notes taken by the counsellor were protected but not the information obtained by the counsellor because of the way it was conveyed to the investigator.

64In other words, in both cases, the information obtained by the police by way of a witness statement was information that directly emanated from or related to a “record” – indeed an enumerated record – as defined in s. 278.1. There was no parsing of a witness statement – the conclusion was effectively that the statement was a representation of what would otherwise have clearly constituted a record under s. 278.1. It simply presented itself in the form of a witness statement – from a psychotherapist and a counsellor – as opposed to the underlying record.

65The circumstances in this case are different. At issue are passages contained in the complainant’s statement to the police regarding information that does not directly relate to any underlying record or document. They relate to information – including highly personal information – that the complainant conveyed to the police in the context of reporting the subject offences.

66In my view, even if correct, the reasoning in Woloschuk and Adzin cannot be extended to any information of a private nature – or, to be more precise, any “personal information for which there is a reasonable expectation of privacy” – relayed by the complainant or some other witness to the police. Considering long-standing principles relating to disclosure of witness statements, such an interpretation cannot stand.

67Moreover, to adopt such an interpretation would bog down the criminal process and be impossible for the courts to manage. The amount of current litigation surrounding what constitutes a record or not, and the ensuing steps in the process that apply to records, would multiply exponentially if the regime was found to apply or potentially apply to any witness statement provided in the context of sexual offence investigations, irrespective of whether the statement relates to a “record” or not.

68Nor do I accept the Crown’s submission that where a complainant in her police statement references something that appears to relate to a record, or indeed where it can be assumed that records relating to the information being conveyed exists, that that may trigger the statutory records regime as it relates to that portion of the police statement. The Crown points to a couple of passages in the present statement that reference an institution, where it may be presumed that institutional records relating to the point being discussed exist.

69The mere fact that a record may exist about something reported to the police does not bring the utterance within the ambit of the Mills regime. Nothing in Woloschuk or Adzin suggests that witness or complainant statements should be parsed for such information or potential information. We should also not lose sight of the fact that the information contained in the statement is information the witness or complainant has voluntarily shared with the police for the purpose of its investigation and potential prosecution of the case.

70The entire premise of the Stinchcombe disclosure regime is that, to enable full answer and defence, privacy interests must yield to the accused’s right to full disclosure. The information contained in a witness statement about potential records or that may stem from a record has long formed the basis on which a record application might be brought and has been the information defence counsel generally requires to assess whether it should be brought. To move the goal posts further up the chain to mere information about a record or potential record would, to my mind, hinder an accused’s ability to make full answer and defence and run afoul of the constitutional balance struck in Stinchcombe and subsequent cases.

71The bottom line is that the complainant’s statement in this case was “made” by persons responsible for the investigation of these offences against Mr. Rowe. It is not a rendition of a “record” as defined in s. 278.1. It is not subject to the Mills regime but rather to the Stinchcombe regime that mandates disclosure of complainant and witness statements to the accused, subject to clear irrelevance and other exemptions that do not apply here.

72I have already concluded that I am unable to parse out any information from the substance of the police statement as being clearly irrelevant in all the circumstances of this case.

Conclusion

73The application for disclosure is granted. An unredacted version of the complainant A.J.’s statement will be disclosed to the defence.

Mainville, J.

Released: April 24, 2026

CITATION: R. v. Rowe, 2026 ONSC 2428