SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE – ONTARIO
Court File and Appearances
COURT FILE NO.: CR-24-10000025
DATE: 20260212
RE: R v. Hauntley Daniel and salim Edward ,
BEFORE: S.F. Dunphy J.
COUNSEL: Brigid McCallum , for the Crown
Carlos Rippell , for Hauntley Daniel
Luka Rados for Salim Edward
HEARD at Toronto: September 23, 2025 and November 10, 2025 and January 30, 2026.
REASONS FOR DECISION – SENTENCING
Notice: These reasons are subject to a publication ban pursuant to s. 486.4 of the Criminal Code prohibiting the publication of names or identifying information of the complainant. The name of the complainant has been anonymized in these reasons which may accordingly be published in any recognized digest or general collection of decisions of this court.
[ 1 ] Following their trial before me, sitting with a jury, Mr. Daniel and Mr. Edward were found guilty of Human Trafficking (s. 279.01(1) and of procuring the complainant SH a person under the age of 18 years (s. 286.3(2)) but they were both acquitted on the charge of sexual interference with the complainant being a person under 16 years of age (s. 151). Mr Daniel was also acquitted of assaulting the same complainant with a weapon (s. 267(a)). Both of them are before me for sentencing.
[ 2 ] A Gardiner hearing was held on September 23, 2025 and the matter was adjourned until November 10 for sentencing. That hearing was in turn adjourned to permit the defence to provide notice of its intention to challenge the constitutionality of the Sex Offenders Registration Information Act being applied to the crime of Human Trafficking. The adjourned sentencing hearing was resumed and completed on January 30, 2026.
[ 3 ] It turned out that the constitutional issue intended to be raised was the product of a simple misunderstanding that was soon resolved when the hearing resumed. Although the complainant was in fact 15 years of age at the time of the offence, the human trafficking count in the indictment did not refer to her age and was laid under s. 279.01(1) rather than under s. 279.011(1). The latter charge not having been laid, the mandatory SOIRA order applicable to such cases does not apply. While the evidence would have supported such a charge and conviction, both were in fact charged under s. 279.01(1) and a SOIRA order is only available upon application and requires specific findings regarding intent. Accordingly, I saw no need to examine the constitutional challenge question further.
[ 4 ] For the reasons that follow, I find that a six-year prison sentence is a fit and proper sentence after consideration of the aggravating and mitigating circumstances. The gravity of the offence of human trafficking, the aggravating circumstances of the youth of the victim, the exploitation of her vulnerability and the devastating impact of the crime upon its victim all require a significant sentence relative to the range of cases the parity principle requires to be considered. The significant mitigating circumstances present here, including the youth of one of the two offenders, their absent (or largely so) criminal records and their relatively subordinate role in the crime call for moderation. I find a penitentiary sentence of six years achieves a reasonable balance of the applicable sentencing objectives.
Circumstances of the offences
[ 5 ] The complainant SH turned 15 three months before the events of August 2020. She told both offenders that she was 19 years old. However, the jury’s verdict establishes that both offenders knew she was under the age of 18, although the Crown did not prove that either knew she was under 16. For sentencing purposes, I must therefore treat the complainant as being 16 or 17 years of age at the relevant time.
[ 6 ] SH was a single mother living at home with her own mother amid significant family conflict. She was eager to leave that home. She struggled academically and was later diagnosed with mild to moderate intellectual disability [^1] , which left her reading and mathematics skills well below age level. These combined circumstances rendered her exceptionally vulnerable. Both offenders recognized that vulnerability and deliberately exploited it.
[ 7 ] In the summer of 2020, SH began spending time at parties in an area known as the “Gully.” She socialized there with three other young girls and a number of older men, including Mr. Daniel (then 20), Mr. Edward (then 28), and Mr. Seraphin (known as “GT,” then in his 40s). These gatherings occurred almost nightly. Alcohol, narcotics, and food were given to her. These parties frequently moved from the Gully to an apartment complex associated with Mr. Seraphin, known as “After Hours,” and continued into the early morning hours. SH often stayed out late at these parties to avoid returning to her strained home environment.
[ 8 ] In mid-August 2020, after one such gathering at After Hours, SH and two other girls entered Mr. Seraphin’s vehicle at his suggestion. En route to a nearby motel (at his suggestion), he provided the complainant with MDMA (“molly”), a drug SH had never used before. The MDMA quickly disinhibited her. Inside the motel room, Mr Seraphin took off his clothes and proposed to the by-now quite intoxicated SH that they have sex. They did so. Later he also suggested that she and the other girls should work for him in the sex trade. He explained what this would entail getting naked in front of some men and chilling with them while getting paid. He would take care of the money. In the moment and under the influence of the MDMA that had been provided to her, all of this seemed like a good idea to the complainant at the time.
[ 9 ] While Mr. Seraphin made arrangements, the girls remained in the room. Later that day, seven to ten men, including Mr. Daniel and Mr. Edward, arrived and group sexual activity commenced. Over the following two weeks, the pattern repeated. MDMA and alcohol were supplied to encourage SH to continue providing sexual services. Food was delivered or the girls were driven to nearby fast-food outlets. Groups of seven to ten men were brought to a rented motel room where SH and others engaged in sex with multiple men each night. There was little attention paid to the subject of protection from pregnancy or sexually transmitted disease. SH quickly became addicted to MDMA. Mr. Daniel and Mr. Edward [^2] each had sexual intercourse with her on different occasions, knowing she was under 18.
[ 10 ] Mr. Seraphin was out of custody at the time but wearing an ankle bracelet and under curfew release conditions. This instilled both fear and some degree of awe in SH. He checked in with her in person or via text or telephone frequently. While he was away, Mr. Daniel and Mr. Edward acted in effect as his lieutenants.
[ 11 ] Money did change hands in exchange for the sexual services of the complainant even if the evidence is unclear as to how much or how frequently. There is also evidence that the complainant was admonished from time to time by Mr. Seraphin via text messages for not always taking care to ensure that the men had in fact paid for her services. The men who came were clearly the product of arrangements made by the trio.
[ 12 ] Through this time period, Mr. Daniel and Mr. Edward in concert with Mr. Seraphin actively participated in controlling and directing the complainant’s activities even if Mr. Seraphin was clearly the senior one to whom the complainant primarily looked. The tools of their control included their ability to provide her with the necessities she lacked: food, shelter, alcohol, drugs and occasionally transport. She was largely dependent upon them and they exploited that fact.
[ 13 ] The jury rejected the defence contention that these events constituted consensual gatherings among friends that spontaneously evolved into group sex events on repeated occasions. The convictions rest on the finding that both offenders intentionally procured SH to engage in sexual activity with others for consideration and participated in her exploitation as part of a joint enterprise led by Mr. Seraphin. The offending conduct began on or about August 16, 2020 and ended on September 1, 2020 when the offenders learned police were searching for SH as a 15-year-old runaway.
[ 14 ] The degree of culpability of the two men before me is in no way the product of how efficient or profitable SH was to them. Their intent to exploit her and to procure her to have sex with others for consideration was found by the jury to have been proved beyond reasonable doubt.
[ 15 ] It is also clear that Mr. Daniel and Mr. Edward were not full-time keepers of the complainant or the other girls present with her through this time frame. Mr. Edward had a day job to go to even if most of the relevant activities took place at night. Mr. Daniel too was working at least some of the days for cash in a friend’s roofing business. However, they attended most, if not all, of the relevant sessions in the motel room over the two-week period. The complainant’s understandable vagueness about exact frequency does not undermine the established gravity of the exploitation or its profound impact on her.
Circumstances of the offenders
[ 16 ] Mr. Daniel was 20 years old at the time of the offences and is now 25. He immigrated from St. Lucia to Canada in 2011 at age 12 and has not returned. He has not acquired Canadian citizenship. Until his arrival, his grandmother was his primary caregiver; his father was largely absent and his mother frequently away. His mother, who had immigrated the previous year, became his primary caregiver upon his arrival. She faced significant financial hardship as a low-income single parent. Mr. Daniel grew up exposed to considerable community violence.
[ 17 ] He completed elementary school in Toronto and attended George Harvey Collegiate Institute but left four credits short of graduation. He described positive high-school experiences overshadowed by distraction from friends and pervasive gang-related violence involving knives and firearms. His pre-sentence report indicates that he admired peers involved in criminal activity during those years.
[ 18 ] His employment history consists of part-time and seasonal work in landscaping and construction, some arranged through temporary agencies and some cash-based. At the time of his arrest, he lived with his mother and contributed to household expenses. He has a young daughter from a teenage relationship and maintained custody every second weekend while on bail.
[ 19 ] His only prior convictions are two unrelated impaired-driving offences. For sentencing purposes in this matter, I treat him essentially as a first-time offender. Subsequent charges and sentences are irrelevant to this disposition.
[ 20 ] Mr. Daniel presented at trial as intelligent and articulate even if his lack of self-discipline and poor choices have impeded him from exploiting his true potential. However, his testimony also revealed a troubling lack of insight on his part: he admitted witnessing the sexual exploitation of at least one girl he knew to be under 18 without apparently being troubled at all by it.
[ 21 ] Mr. Edward was 28 at the time of the offences and is now 33. He is also from St. Lucia and has not acquired Canadian citizenship since arriving in his early twenties. His parents separated when he was young; his mother emigrated to Canada with two siblings, leaving him with his steadily employed father in a violent community. He witnessed several violent incidents in his youth but was not directly victimized.
[ 22 ] He has a large extended family, most of whom now live in Toronto. Recent legal difficulties have strained his relationships with both parents. He married in 2016 and had a son; the marriage ended before these offences. He later formed a relationship that produced a daughter in 2023; that relationship ended in 2024. He maintains cordial relations with both mothers. The mother of his daughter acted as his surety until recently and reports that he has been a responsible father.
[ 23 ] Mr. Edward left school at 15 in St. Lucia and has recently begun pursuing a high-school equivalency in Ontario. He worked in the fishery and landscaping there before coming to Canada, where he was employed as a mechanic, in a factory, and in construction. Employment has been unsteady in recent years while awaiting trial.
[ 24 ] He has no prior criminal record. Trial evidence established significant MDMA and marijuana use during the offending period, which he attributed to self-medication for depression following his marriage breakdown. Substance use played a material role in the offences but does not appear to be an ongoing issue.
Victim impact statement
[ 25 ] The victim impact statement from SH, together with my observations of her during nearly four days of testimony and cross-examination, demonstrates profound and enduring harm. She has required years of therapy and rehabilitation to address trauma, addiction, self-harm, low self-esteem, suicidal ideation, disrupted schooling, difficulties in intimate relationships, and challenges in parenting her own daughter. Flashbacks continue to affect her. With therapy and renewed support from her mother, she has made meaningful progress and is determined not to let these events define her future.
[ 26 ] As optimistic and hopeful about the future as she may be, her sentence will undoubtedly be longer – and considerably so – than any sentence I might hand down here to the two men who contributed significantly to the harm inflicted upon her.
Aggravating circumstances
[ 27 ] The following aggravating circumstances have been proved beyond reasonable doubt (aspects of some of these are of course duplicative on occasion):
a. The age of the complainant at the time of the offence : the jury’s verdict necessarily implies that both knew the complainant to be 16 or 17 years of age in August 2020 even if they did not know her true age to be 15 at the time.
b. The extreme vulnerability of the victim : The complainant was a young person who was almost completely dependent upon the defendants and their colleague Mr. Seraphin for food and shelter as well as for alcohol and drugs to supply her growing dependence on these. Her situation was particularly precarious position as a young, single mother living at home with a mother with whom she was in conflict. Her vulnerability was not a by-product or accidental circumstance – it was a feature of this victim which this highly predatory crime intentionally exploited.
c. Exploitation of position of trust or authority (s. 718.2(a)(iii)) : the significant level of dependence of the complainant upon the defendants and Mr. Seraphin to provide her with food and shelter also placed the defendants in a position of trust or authority over her. The exploitation of that position played a very material role in the crimes for which they have been convicted. Narcotics and alcohol are frequently employed instruments of control in human trafficking cases and played a particularly significant role here.
d. Evidence of significant impact upon the victim (s. 718.2(a)(iii.1)) : the impact of this crime of exploitation on the complainant has been significant and long-lasting. She was administered a narcotic with which she had no experience and became addicted. She was trafficked to large numbers of men and exploited. She has required years of extensive therapy and drug rehabilitation with an uncertain outlook.
e. Coercion : Exploitation lies at the core of human trafficking and coercion – whether subtle or overt – is its frequently-found companion. The present case displays many elements of coercion. The vulnerability and dependence of the victim for food, shelter and narcotics were particularly effective tools in that direction. The parading-in of large numbers of clients to be serviced by the complainant with or without protection and certainly without her input or inquiry as to her wishes was a further manifestation of that coercive control.
f. Motive of Greed : while there is little reliable evidence of the amount of money that changed hands consequent upon the sexual exploitation of the complainant, clients paying money for sex certainly was at the core of the enterprise and with rare exceptions none of it found its way into the hands of the complainant.
g. The working conditions to which she was subjected : The exploitation of the complainant involved sex with multiple strangers often without protection against pregnancy or sexually transmitted diseases, working out of a single motel room at a time with multiple men and women in varying states of undress throughout the night and this without regard to how tired or willing she was.
h. The scope of the operation : This operation involved seven to ten clients brought in at a time and evident co-ordination of the defendants with Mr. Seraphin. There is no doubt that the three men acted jointly or in concert in relation to the exploitation of the complainant. Each was aware of the object of the joint enterprise being the exploitation of the complainant and played a knowing and deliberate role in it.
i. The duration of the exploitation : The relevant time frame was approximately two weeks and involved multiple “clients” multiple times per week. By comparison to other human trafficking cases, this would be considered to be towards but not at the short end of the time spectrum. On the other hand, the duration was certainly long enough to inflict deep and long-lasting damage upon its underage victim.
[ 28 ] The Criminal Code requires that primary consideration be given to the objectives of denunciation and deterrence where, as here, the crime involves the abuse and exploitation of an underage female: s. 718.01, 718.0. A sentence ought to be increased to account for aggravating circumstances including the fact that the victim abused in this case was a female person under the age of 18 years: 718.2(a)(ii.1), s. 718.2(a)(iii) and (iii.1).
Mitigating circumstances
[ 29 ] Mr. Edward has no prior criminal record.
[ 30 ] Mr. Daniel’s youth at the time of the offences (20 years of age) and his relatively clear prior record (two instances involving impaired driving) are a mitigating circumstance in his favour. I treat him essentially as a youthful first-time offender for sentencing purposes.
[ 31 ] Mr. Daniel’s entanglements with the law subsequent to his arrest in this matter are of no materiality to his sentencing here. The defence has asked me to consider neither the circumstances of those other offences nor the sentence imposed and I have not done so other than to clarify which pre-sentence custody credit applies where.
[ 32 ] Both offenders played subordinate roles to Mr. Seraphin, who was older and clearly the guiding mind of the enterprise. This hierarchy is evident in the complainant’s testimony and in the preserved text communications. While subordinate, neither Mr. Edward nor Mr. Daniel can be considered as “bit players” in the exploitation that took place. Mr. Edward supplied the MDMA that played a key role in maintaining a compliant and disinhibited SH in the role they intended her to play. Mr Daniel was involved in discussions about a paying client who wished to purchase her services. They were both more than mere pawns and acted as the facilitators for Mr Seraphin when he was required to be under curfew which represented a significant part of the time when these parties were underway.
[ 33 ] Each offender also faced significant challenges in his formative years. While these background factors do not excuse the offences, they provide context for assessing moral blameworthiness and rehabilitation potential.
Sentencing positions of the parties
[ 34 ] The Crown seeks a global custodial sentence of 12 years for each of Mr. Edward and Mr. Daniel. The Crown also seeks the following ancillary orders: (i) non communication with victim s. 743.21; (ii) lifetime SOIRA order s. 490.013(3); (iii) bodily substances order s. 487.04; (iv) s. 109 weapons prohibition for life; and (v) an order pursuant to s. 161(b)(c) and (d) prohibiting employment, or volunteer work involving position of trust with person under 16 years of age, prohibiting communication with a person under 16 years of age and prohibiting access to the internet for 20 years except subject to conditions.
[ 35 ] Mr. Daniel proposed a conditional sentence of one year and opposed the proposed SOIRA order and the s. 161 orders. No objection was taken to the DNA order or the s. 743 non-communication orders sought. This crime being unconnected to firearms, the defence suggested that the mandatory 10-year weapons prohibition was sufficient and ought not to be extended further to life.
[ 36 ] Mr. Edward endorsed the sentencing position of Mr. Daniel and emphasized the mitigating circumstances of Mr. Edward’s recently collapsed marriage and state of depression at the time of the offence as well.
Impact of immigration status on sentencing
[ 37 ] Neither of Mr. Daniel nor Mr. Edward is a Canadian citizen. Both came to Canada from St. Lucia. The degree of responsibility of these offenders, the severity of the impact upon the victim and the aggravating circumstances present all require a custodial sentence well in excess of six months and indeed well into penitentiary range. Both of these offenders are thus certainly subject to potential proceedings for their removal from Canada upon their release from custody.
[ 38 ] I cannot assess whether the Minister may exercise discretion to seek Mr. Daniel’s or Mr. Edward’s removal nor is it any part of my role as sentencing judge to seek ways to remove a discretion which Parliament has expressly conferred upon the Minister.
[ 39 ] Indeed, the Minister’s discretion could potentially be exercised in a manner that would mitigate the severity of any sentence I might impose since the Minister might seek early release in order to remove an offender prior to the expiry of a sentence. These are all things that are quite external to and beyond the control of the criminal sentencing process.
[ 40 ] I can only observe that the circumstances of this case simply do not bring into prospect a fit and proper sentence for the crimes for which both of them have been convicted that would result in a sentence below the six-month threshold that is the primary potential trigger for immigration action. At all events, the Supreme Court in R. v. Pham , 2013 SCC 15 , [2013] 1 SCR 739 cautioned against fashioning a sentence to avoid collateral immigration consequences on the offender or to circumvent Parliament’s will (at paras. 17-20).
[ 41 ] I am in no position to handicap the likelihood of immigration enforcement in future, how Ministerial discretion might be applied and still less to guess at the impact of any of this upon the rehabilitation prospects of either offender should they remain in Canada or be returned to St. Lucia. The gravity of this offence, the impact upon the victim, the aggravating circumstances found and the degree of responsibility of these offenders renders the consideration of immigration consequences upon either to be a neutral fact or something very close to it. I acknowledge the circumstance but find I cannot give it any material weight here.
Application of sentencing principles
[ 42 ] The Crown’s sentencing proposal gives insufficient weight to the mitigating factors and to the offenders’ subordinate roles relative to Mr. Seraphin. The defence position, which characterizes the events as harmless consensual gatherings and seeks a reformatory or conditional sentence, is irreconcilable with the jury’s verdict and with the established facts. There are no exceptional circumstances present here which might realistically permit consideration of the prospect of a reformatory level sentence, whether served in the community or otherwise being applied as was the case in R. v. A.L., 2025 ONCA 9 .
[ 43 ] Recent authorities indicate an upward trend in sentencing ranges for human trafficking offences, with the higher end moving from six to eight years toward ten to twelve years in more serious cases: R. v. Bedi , 2024 ONSC 5320 at paras. 88-90 . However, s entencing ranges are tools not calculators deployed in a mechanical process. It must be borne in mind that each of the individual cases that go into a consideration of appropriate ranges contains its own unique mix of aggravating and mitigating circumstances.
[ 44 ] R. v. Friesen , 2020 SCC 9 , while not a trafficking case, provides essential guidance on the gravity of sexual offences against children and the need to protect their development free from exploitation and sexual violence. Friesen also emphasized that understanding the wrongfulness and harmfulness of sexual violence against children is critical to avoiding errors in the sentencing process and to ensure against bias and myth filtering the sentencing process ( Friesen , para. 50 ). The shift in approach to this category of crime recognizes that sexual violence “can interfere with children’s self-fulfillment and healthy and autonomous development to adulthood precisely because children are still developing and learning the skills to overcome adversity” and “even a single instance of sexual violence can permanently alter the course of a child’s life” (at para. 58). My observations of SH in her extensive time on the witness stand were strongly reinforced by her victim impact statement both of which in turn underscore the applicability of the observations made by the Supreme Court above.
[ 45 ] This was a very serious crime and the degree of responsibility of both offenders is significant even if subordinate to Mr. Seraphin. The aggravating factors here—particularly the complainant’s youth and extreme vulnerability as well as the very significant impact of this crime upon her—require strong emphasis on denunciation and both general and specific deterrence. The mitigating factors, including the offenders’ clear or relatively clear records, their relatively subordinate roles, youth (in Mr. Daniel’s case), length of time in restrictive pre-sentence house-arrest conditions (in Mr. Edward’s case) and background challenges, all call for some moderation. The pre-sentence reports provide social context but do not establish a sufficient nexus to materially diminish moral culpability: R. v. Morris , 2021 ONCA 680 .
[ 46 ] Both offenders displayed troubling indifference to the obvious exploitation of the complainant whom they knew to be under 18. There is no sign of any significant insight of either into the wrong they admitted witnessing and were found by the jury to have also facilitated and participated in. Nevertheless, Mr. Daniel’s unexploited potential and Mr. Edward’s demonstrated work ethic, together with voluntary courses completed by both while awaiting trial and future access to federal programming, leave room for guarded optimism on the subject of rehabilitation prospects.
[ 47 ] After balancing these principles with proportionality as the guiding consideration, and mindful of the parity principle, I conclude that a custodial sentence of six years for each offender is fit and strikes the appropriate balance. Although the offenders’ roles and personal circumstances differ, those differences largely balance out and I arrive at the same sentence for each. Mr. Edward is entitled to the R. v. Downes mitigating circumstance of extensive time spent under restrictive pre-trial release conditions whereas Mr. Daniel has the mitigating circumstance of greater youth while there was no request for Downes credit to be considered in his case given his different post-arrest history. Mr. Edward’s contributions to the joint enterprise, in particularl acting as the on-going supplier of MDMA after the first incident supplied by Mr. Seraphin are indicative of his generally more in-depth participation in the exploitation of the complainant relative to Mr. Daniel. At the end, I arrived at the same sentence for both albeit by different paths.
[ 48 ] Each sentence will be reduced by pre-sentence custody, credited at 1.5:1 pursuant to s. 719(3.1) of the Criminal Code . In the case of Mr. Daniel, that credit is 50 “real” days grossed up to 75 days. In the case of Mr. Edward, that credit is 165 real days grossed up to 248 days. For the purposes of Downes considerations, Mr. Edward spent 983 days under house arrest with an ankle monitor. The sentence accounts for that mitigating circumstance.
[ 49 ] I am not satisfied that any of the requested orders under s. 161 are appropriate on the facts of this case and I decline to make them. While the complainant was in fact under 16 years of age, the jury found that neither offender before me was aware of that fact. The offence for which both are being sentenced – s. 279.01 – is not an offence listed in s. 161(1.1). While procuring under 18 (s. 286.3(2) is a listed offence, that is not the offence under which this sentencing is taking place and it has been stayed. The sentences being handed down here are already quite significant and the likelihood of both men being removed from the country is quite high. Further orders under s. 161 appear as pointless as they are uncalled for on the facts of this case.
[ 50 ] The other requested ancillary orders are either mandatory or appropriate. No issue is taken with the requested orders under s. 109 (if limited to the mandatory ten years), s. 487.04 (DNA substance sample), non-communication (s. 743.21) and the requested orders shall be made for both defendants.
[ 51 ] Trafficking in persons (s. 279.01(1)) is a designated offence under s. 490.011 (b)(vii.1) however it is not designated under paragraph (a) and thus is not subject to a mandatory SOIRA order by reason of that conviction alone. Such a conviction does require a SOIRA order pursuant to s. 490.012(2) where the Crown requests it and it is established beyond reasonable doubt that the offender also had the necessary intent to commit an offence referred to in paragraph 490.011(a). Among the offences there listed is s. 286.3(2) namely procuring in respect of a person under 18 years of age. The jury verdict under the stayed s. 286.3(2) charge conclusively demonstrates the necessary intent here.
[ 52 ] A SOIRA order shall accordingly be made in the case of Mr. Daniel and Mr Edward. The duration of the order shall be 20 years in accordance with s. 490.013(2)(b).
Disposition
[ 53 ] For the foregoing reasons, I sentence Mr. Daniel as follows: a custodial term of 6 years less pre-sentence custody. Mr. Daniel is entitled to pre-sentence custody credit of 50 days credited at the rate of 1.5 days to 1 for a total credit of 75 days.
[ 54 ] For the forgoing reasons, I sentence Mr Edward to a custodial term of six years in prison less pre-sentence custody credit of 165 days credited at the rate of 1.5 days to 1 for a total credit of 248 days.
[ 55 ] The following ancillary orders shall be made in the case of both Daniel and Mr. Edward:
a. Non-communication with the complainant SH pursuant to s. 743.21 of the Criminal Code ;
b. An DNA order authorizing the taking of a sample of bodily substances (s. 487.04);
c. An order prohibiting the possession of weapons for 10 years (s. 109); and
d. A SOIRA order for a duration of 20 years for the reasons explained above:
[ 56 ] Orders accordingly.
S.F. Dunphy J.
Date: February 12, 2026
[^1]: There was no evidence as to whether that disability diagnosis, made following the arrest of the two offenders, also applies to August 2020 when the offences occurred. In assessing the complainant’s vulnerability, I consider only what was known to and observed by the offenders. They both observed her young age as the jury found and were aware of her home circumstances and observed her over several weeks prior to the incidents giving rise to the charge for which each was convicted.
[^2]: Mr. Edward denied having sex with her. I find that he did and the evidence established this beyond reasonable doubt.

