Brigid McCallum

The Crown applied for a voir dire to determine the admissibility of a 911 call made by the complainant and a statement given by the accused to police.

The court found the 911 call admissible under the res gestae and principled exceptions to the hearsay rule, noting its necessity due to challenges in domestic violence cases and high reliability.

The accused's statement was found voluntary and admissible, as the accused possessed an operating mind despite mistaken beliefs about the law, and there was no evidence of threats, inducements, oppression, or police trickery.

Both Crown applications were allowed.

The accused was charged with impaired driving and over 80 following a traffic stop at approximately 5:05 a.m. on April 12, 2015.

Police received a radio call about a possible impaired driver who appeared to be asleep at the wheel.

Upon stopping the vehicle, the officer observed signs of impairment and arrested the accused.

A Charter application was brought challenging the lawfulness of the arrest and the seizure of breath samples.

The trial judge found reasonable and probable grounds for the arrest existed based on the totality of circumstances.

However, the trial judge found a violation of section 8 of the Charter because the officer gave an approved screening device demand rather than the required approved instrument demand.

Despite this violation, the evidence was admitted under section 24(2) of the Charter.

The accused was found guilty of impaired driving, and the over 80 charge was stayed pursuant to the Kienapple principle.

The accused was charged with firearms offences after police found a handgun in a plastic bag during a "wellness check" in a residential building stairwell.

The accused brought a Charter application to exclude the evidence, arguing the search violated his s. 8 rights.

The court found the accused had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the bag and that the police lacked reasonable suspicion for an investigative detention or grounds for an arrest under the Trespass to Property Act.

Finding that the officers fabricated an after-the-fact justification for the search and were not forthright with the court, the judge excluded the firearm under s. 24(2) of the Charter, leading to the dismissal of the charges.

During a trial for offences related to a stabbing outside a bar, a miscommunication arose between the Crown, defence counsel, and the trial judge regarding whether the accused had admitted identity and presence at the scene.

After the Crown closed its case without calling identification evidence, the misunderstanding became apparent.

The Crown brought an application to enforce pre-trial admissions made by defence counsel.

The court allowed the Crown to re-open its case, held one accused to his pre-trial admission of presence, but released the other accused from an admission regarding the voluntariness of a statement because the Crown had changed its position on how the statement would be used.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle with excess alcohol in the blood following a roadside stop.

The court conducted a Charter voir dire to determine whether breath sample evidence should be excluded.

The court found that the police failed to make a proper and timely demand for an approved screening device sample at the roadside, violating sections 8, 9, and 10(b) of the Charter.

Additionally, the police failed to provide the accused with a reasonable opportunity to contact counsel of choice, instead putting him on the phone to duty counsel after only 13 minutes and then dismissing his subsequent request for further assistance.

The court excluded the breath sample evidence pursuant to section 24(2) of the Charter and dismissed the charge.

The applicant brought a motion under s. 24(1) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms alleging that her right to trial within a reasonable time under s. 11(b) had been infringed in a charge of operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol level over the legal limit.

The court examined the length of delay, waiver, reasons for delay, prejudice, and societal interests.

The court found that the operative institutional delay of approximately 8 months and 21 days fell within the Morin guidelines, that actual prejudice to the applicant was minor, and that the applicant failed to discharge the onus of proving a violation.

The motion was dismissed.