M. Scott Martin

The court sentenced Jerome Crawford for human trafficking and related offences, considering the circumstances of the offence, the impact on the victim, the offender’s background, and the harsh conditions of pre-trial custody.

The sentence imposed was four years in jail, less credit for pre-trial custody, with concurrent sentences for related counts.

The decision discusses the importance of proportionality, the impact of systemic racism, and the need for individualized sentencing.

This decision addresses pre-trial applications in a human trafficking case.

The accused sought production of third-party records and leave to adduce evidence of the complainant's other sexual activity under section 276(2) of the Criminal Code.

The Crown also sought leave to adduce evidence of the complainant's other sexual activity under common law principles.

The court granted the defence's application for third-party records in part, ordering specific police records to be produced.

The applications regarding other sexual history evidence were also granted in part.

The Crown was permitted to introduce evidence of the complainant's prior involvement in the sex trade, including sexual photographs and her street name.

The defence was permitted to cross-examine the complainant on whether her prior sex work was independent and on specific text messages with the accused that might contradict her narrative of being trafficked.

However, certain evidence, such as a police officer's text message and later police records suggesting independent sex work, was deemed inadmissible due to lack of relevance or not constituting a specific instance of sexual activity.

The accused, Rene Smith, applied for a stay of proceedings under section 24(1) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, alleging an infringement of his right to be tried within a reasonable time under section 11(b).

The total delay from charge to anticipated trial end was over 31 months, exceeding the 30-month presumptive ceiling for Superior Court cases.

The court found no defence delay but identified two exceptional circumstances: the court's loss of disclosure (4 months and 10 days) and a mistrial (11 days), which were beyond the Crown's control.

The appointment of an amicus was not deemed exceptional as the need was foreseeable.

After subtracting the exceptional delay, the net delay fell below the presumptive ceiling.

The court dismissed the application for a stay, concluding that the remaining delay was not unreasonable, despite the applicant's efforts to expedite proceedings, as his conduct made the case more complex.

Jahrell Edwards pleaded guilty to unauthorized possession of a loaded restricted handgun.

The Crown sought a three-year penitentiary sentence, while the Defence argued for a conditional sentence, emphasizing the impact of anti-Black racism and social context on the offender, as per R. v. Morris.

The court considered the gravity of the offence, Mr. Edwards' personal circumstances, and numerous mitigating factors, including his lack of prior record, stable employment, and engagement in counseling.

The judge found that a conditional sentence of two years less one day, to be served in the community, followed by 24 months probation, was the proportionate sentence, prioritizing rehabilitation and restraint while still addressing denunciation and deterrence.

The defendants by counterclaim brought motions to strike the plaintiff by counterclaim's pleadings for disclosing no reasonable cause of action.

The underlying dispute involved a loan to a personal injury lawyer whose practice failed due to illness.

The plaintiff by counterclaim alleged that the lender and its counsel breached undertakings and fiduciary duties by failing to take over his practice.

The court struck the counterclaim against the moving parties, finding no facts pleaded to support the alleged causes of action, but granted leave to amend.

The accused, A.S., brought an application for a stay of proceedings under s. 24(1) of the Charter, alleging a violation of his right to be tried within a reasonable time under s. 11(b).

The total delay was 40 months and 15 days.

The court applied the Jordan framework, determining the presumptive ceiling was 30 months due to the matter having been in Superior Court.

After subtracting defence-caused delay (3 months and 27 days), the net delay was 36 months and 18 days.

The court found that the remaining delay of 33 months and 13 days (after deducting 3 months and 5 days for COVID-19 impact) exceeded the presumptive ceiling and was not justified by exceptional circumstances, including the Crown's decision to add indictable charges and then consent to re-election without a waiver.

The application for a stay of proceedings was granted.

The appellant, 9383859 Canada Ltd., appealed a lower court decision that dismissed its actions for disclosing no reasonable cause of action.

The respondents, Kubeskaran Navaratnam, Ronald Lachmansingh, and Marilyn Reiter Nemetz, brought motions to dismiss the appeal due to the appellant's failure to comply with a security for costs order.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario granted the motions, dismissing the appeal.

The court found that the appellant had not provided compelling reasons for its non-compliance and that it was in the interests of justice to dismiss the appeal, given the appellant's lack of assets and the manifest weakness of the underlying appeal.

Mark Moore pleaded guilty to possession and distribution of child pornography and arranging a sexual assault on a child.

The court determined a fit sentence, considering aggravating factors such as the extreme nature of the child pornography, grooming behavior, sexual thoughts about his own daughter, and breach of recognizance.

Mitigating factors included an early guilty plea, remorse, no prior criminal record, community support, and engagement in counseling.

The court also addressed the necessity of a judge viewing child pornography material and the application of "COVID credit" for time served during the pandemic.

A global sentence of 25 months imprisonment was imposed.

The applicants sought a prescriptive easement over a portion of their neighbours' driveway to allow for parking and access to their home.

The properties were converted to Land Titles in 2001, requiring the applicants to prove 20 years of continuous, uninterrupted, open, and peaceful use without permission prior to that date.

The court found the historical evidence of the previous owners' use satisfied the requirements of the doctrine of lost modern grant.

The application was granted, establishing a prescriptive easement for ingress and egress, and the respondents were prohibited from building a fence that would obstruct this access.

The accused was charged with kidnapping, abduction, and breach of probation, all alleged to have occurred in Milton on August 25, 2017.

The Crown's case relied heavily on eyewitness identification by the victim's mother (KT) of the accused as the person who attempted to abduct her child.

Although the court found KT to be credible and sincere in her belief, the court was not satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused was the perpetrator.

The identification suffered from significant frailties, including limited observation time, cross-racial identification, and inconsistencies between KT's description and the accused's appearance.

The court acquitted the accused on all charges.

The appellant construction company appealed a decision by the application judge who found that the respondents had made lasting improvements to property sufficient to trigger claims under the Conveyancing and Law Property Act, s. 37, and in one case, proprietary estoppel.

The appellant argued the application judge erred by failing to direct a trial of the contested factual issues or convert the application into an action.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in proceeding by application where the respondents had not objected and the factual issues were apparent from the outset.

The Court also found no palpable and overriding error in the application judge's factual findings regarding the lasting improvements made by the respondents.

The accused was charged with kidnapping, abduction, and breach of probation.

The accused brought applications to exclude eyewitness identification evidence on three grounds: (1) to ensure a fair trial; (2) on the basis that probative value was outweighed by prejudicial effect; and (3) pursuant to section 24 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms based on detention exceeding 24 hours.

The court found that while the photo lineup process had some deficiencies relative to the Sophonow Inquiry recommendations, these did not warrant exclusion but rather affected the weight to be given the evidence.

The court also found that although the accused's Charter rights were infringed by detention beyond 24 hours, the identification evidence was not obtained in a manner that infringed Charter rights and admission would not bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

All applications were dismissed.

The appellants, defendants in a mortgage guarantee action, commenced third party claims against their former lawyer for contribution and indemnity, alleging he failed to obtain releases of their personal guarantees as instructed.

The motion judge granted summary judgment dismissing the claims as statute-barred under section 18 of the Limitations Act, 2002, finding an absolute two-year limitation period.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that section 18 does not establish an absolute limitation period but rather works with sections 4 and 5 of the Limitations Act to create a presumed start date subject to discoverability principles.

The court also found the motion judge erred in principle by not fully appreciating the complexity of the discoverability issue when deciding to proceed by summary judgment.

The Third Parties, Jimmy K. Sun and Sun Partners, brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the defendants' Third Party Claim for contribution and indemnity.

The motion was based on the expiry of the limitation period under the Limitations Act, 2002.

The court found that Section 18 of the Act establishes an absolute two-year limitation period from the date the first alleged wrongdoer was served with the claim, and that the doctrine of fraudulent concealment did not apply to extend this period.

The Third Party Claim was commenced more than two years after the defendants were served with the Statement of Claim.

The applicants sought a declaration of a prescriptive easement over a portion of the respondents' adjacent property for vehicle and pedestrian ingress and egress to their garage and parking area.

The court applied the four-part test for prescriptive easements, including the requirement of 'reasonable necessity' and continuous, uninterrupted, open, peaceful, and 'as of right' use for 20 years prior to land titles registration.

Finding the applicants' evidence compelling and the respondents' counter-arguments insufficient, the court granted the easement and ordered the removal of a fence erected by the respondents.

The accused was charged with sexual assault of a 19-year-old Algonquin College student on January 16, 2016.

The complainant was walking on campus with a crutch when the accused, a 21-year-old University of Ottawa student, approached her and touched her buttock without consent.

The central issue was whether the accused held an honest but mistaken belief in consent.

The court applied the W.(D.) framework and found that there was an air of reality to the defence of mistaken belief in consent.

The court concluded that the Crown had not proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused knew the complainant was not consenting, and that the accused had taken reasonable steps to ascertain consent by asking permission before touching.

The accused was acquitted.

The accused was tried on a single count of breaching condition (iv) of his recognizance of bail, which required him not to be away from his place of residence except in the company of one of his sureties.

The accused was charged with first-degree murder and released on bail with strict conditions including electronic monitoring.

The issue was whether the accused was in breach when he left his surety in a parked car outside a school and entered the building alone to speak with his former basketball coach for approximately 5-10 minutes.

The court found the accused guilty, rejecting arguments that he was in compliance with the condition, that his misunderstanding constituted a mistake of fact rather than law, and that any breach was de minimis.

The accused was originally charged with second-degree murder in the death of his son but pleaded guilty to manslaughter.

The Crown sought a penitentiary sentence, while the defence sought a non-custodial sentence.

The court found that the accused's wrongful conduct was in mixing alcohol with prescription sleeping pills, which he knew he should not do.

The court determined this was an exceptional case where denunciation and general deterrence could be achieved without further custody, given the accused's approximately one year of pre-trial credit, his lack of criminal record, his remorse, and the absence of any history of conflict with the victim.

The court imposed a suspended sentence with maximum probation and community service.

The accused was charged with possession for the purpose of trafficking cocaine and oxycodone following a vehicle stop and search.

The accused brought a Charter motion seeking exclusion of evidence based on alleged breaches of sections 7, 8, 9, 10(b), and 24(2) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The court found that while the accused's section 10(b) rights were breached (failure to inform of right to counsel immediately upon investigative detention), the evidence should be admitted under section 24(2) of the Charter.

The court determined that the investigative detention was justified on reasonable grounds to suspect involvement in drug trafficking, the search was lawful as a protective pat-down search based on safety concerns, and the brief delay in providing rights to counsel was reasonable given officer safety considerations.

The plaintiff brought a motion seeking leave to amend a statement of claim in a solicitor’s negligence action by adding numerous allegations and increasing the damages claimed by more than $400,000.

The court considered whether the proposed amendments complied with the rules governing pleadings, including whether they improperly pleaded evidence, withdrew admissions, introduced new causes of action outside the limitation period, or caused non‑compensable prejudice.

Most proposed amendments were found to be improper, scandalous, or statute‑barred, including allegations relating to unrelated litigation matters and claims for damages long after the relevant events.

The court permitted only a single unopposed amendment while denying the remainder of the motion.