Kirk Dickson

The Crown brought a pre-trial motion seeking an order to permit the complainant to testify by video conference from Dartmouth, Nova Scotia, rather than attend trial in person in Oshawa, Ontario.

The defendant opposed the motion.

The court applied the test under Section 714.1 of the Criminal Code, which permits video testimony where appropriate in all the circumstances, considering the witness's location and personal circumstances, costs of physical attendance, and the nature of the anticipated evidence.

The court rejected the Crown's application, finding insufficient evidentiary foundation regarding the complainant's inconvenience and the quality of video technology, and noting that the complainant's testimony was central to the case and her credibility was crucial to the truth-seeking function of the trial.

The accused was charged with possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking.

Police observed a known drug user meeting briefly with the accused's vehicle and subsequently stopped and arrested the accused.

A search of the vehicle following the arrest yielded 5 grams of cocaine hidden in the centre console.

The accused challenged the arrest and search on Charter grounds, alleging violations of sections 8, 9, and 10(b).

While the court found a section 10(b) violation occurred when police questioned the accused without first providing rights to counsel, the evidence was not excluded under section 24(2).

However, on the merits of the possession charge, the court found the cocaine was so well hidden that the driver would not have presumptively known of its existence, and there was insufficient evidence to prove the accused had knowledge and control of the drugs.

The accused was acquitted.

The accused brought a motion for a stay of proceedings alleging that his right to trial within a reasonable time under s. 11(b) of the Charter had been infringed.

The accused was charged with possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking.

The overall delay from arrest to trial was approximately 20 months.

The court analyzed the delay using the four-part test from R. v. Morin, finding 13 months of Crown and institutional delay, 3 months of defence delay, and 4 months of neutral intake delay.

The court found minimal prejudice to the accused and considered the complexity of the case, which involved a Charter application challenging the grounds for arrest based on historical police information.

The court concluded that the 13 months of Crown and institutional delay, while exceeding the 8-10 month guideline, was not unreasonable given the case's complexity and the minimal prejudice demonstrated.

The accused pleaded guilty to possession of four Fentanyl patches, a Schedule I controlled substance under the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act.

The Crown sought a custodial sentence based on the highly addictive nature of Fentanyl and principles of general and specific deterrence.

The defence sought a discharge to preserve the accused's employment as an aircraft maintenance engineer, which requires a security clearance and conviction-free status.

The court granted a conditional discharge with 12 months of probation, finding that rehabilitation was the primary concern and that the accused's documented efforts to address his addiction significantly reduced public risk.

The accused was charged with possession for the purpose of trafficking cocaine and oxycodone following a vehicle stop and search.

The accused brought a Charter motion seeking exclusion of evidence based on alleged breaches of sections 7, 8, 9, 10(b), and 24(2) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The court found that while the accused's section 10(b) rights were breached (failure to inform of right to counsel immediately upon investigative detention), the evidence should be admitted under section 24(2) of the Charter.

The court determined that the investigative detention was justified on reasonable grounds to suspect involvement in drug trafficking, the search was lawful as a protective pat-down search based on safety concerns, and the brief delay in providing rights to counsel was reasonable given officer safety considerations.