Marina Guirguis

The accused was charged with careless storage of ammunition, possession of a prohibited weapon (crossbow), production of cannabis, and possession of cannabis for trafficking purposes.

The defence brought a Charter application challenging the validity of the search warrant on the basis that there were insufficient reasonable and probable grounds.

The court found that the Information to Obtain contained misleading information, impermissible speculation, and material omissions.

The affiant drew unreasonable inferences unsupported by the evidence, particularly regarding the accused's involvement in an outdoor marijuana grow operation discovered on an adjacent property.

The court found a serious breach of section 8 Charter rights and excluded all evidence obtained from the search warrant execution.

The defendants were jointly charged with possessing a controlled substance.

During trial, they sought exclusion of heroin found in their vehicle based on alleged violations of their Charter rights (sections 8 and 9).

The central issue was whether police had reasonable grounds to arrest them.

The Crown sought to introduce a statement made by one defendant to police in 2012 during an unrelated investigation as part of the officer's grounds for arrest.

The defence objected, arguing the Crown must first prove the statement was voluntary.

The court ruled that the Crown does not need to prove voluntariness of an accused's statement prior to its admission in a Charter voir dire, following the reasoning in R v Paterson.

The accused were convicted of production of marijuana and possession of marijuana for the purpose of trafficking following a trial.

The Crown operated two large-scale hydroponic marijuana grow operations in Toronto and Mississauga, containing approximately 4,961 and 6,758 plants respectively, with an estimated annual production value in the millions of dollars.

The court imposed a custodial sentence of 5 years on the first accused and 18 months on the second accused, finding that deterrence and denunciation were the predominant sentencing objectives.

The court declined to impose a restitution order but ordered forfeiture of cash seized from the first accused.

DNA orders and weapons prohibition orders were also imposed.

The accused pleaded guilty to possession of four Fentanyl patches, a Schedule I controlled substance under the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act.

The Crown sought a custodial sentence based on the highly addictive nature of Fentanyl and principles of general and specific deterrence.

The defence sought a discharge to preserve the accused's employment as an aircraft maintenance engineer, which requires a security clearance and conviction-free status.

The court granted a conditional discharge with 12 months of probation, finding that rehabilitation was the primary concern and that the accused's documented efforts to address his addiction significantly reduced public risk.

The Crown sought to qualify a York Regional Police detective as an expert witness to provide opinion evidence regarding marijuana production, distribution, trafficking, pricing, and related matters.

The defence objected on grounds of bias, arguing that the proposed expert had conducted surveillance prior to the search warrants and was from the same police unit as the principal investigators.

The trial judge applied the four-part Mohan test and the Abbey framework, finding that while the expert met the threshold requirements, certain portions of the report were inadmissible due to bias concerns and case-specific opinions that could usurp the trier of fact's role.

The plaintiffs, Nashaat and Taghreed Aly, claimed a partnership interest in a family grocery business, Nader Halal, operated by Adel Tohamy.

The court found a valid oral agreement from 2001 granting the Alys a 20% interest.

In a related family law application, Adel's former wife, Naiema, sought to set aside two separation agreements that released her claims to the family businesses and spousal support.

The court set aside both agreements under s. 56(4) of the Family Law Act due to Adel's deliberate failure to disclose significant assets, unconscionability, and duress.

The court also found the defendants engaged in spoliation of evidence by destroying financial records and ordered the appointment of a receiver over the businesses pending the damages phase of the trial.