Roy Wellington

The defendant was convicted of sexual assault and invitation to sexual touching arising from the same transaction.

Before sentencing, the defendant brought a second Charter s. 11(b) application to stay proceedings based on delay.

The trial commenced October 1, 2024, but was adjourned after October 4, 2024, when the Crown prosecutor developed a medical issue.

The trial resumed January 30, 2025, and concluded February 6, 2025.

Submissions were heard April 11, 2025, and judgment was delivered May 2, 2025.

The defendant argued the total delay from charge to conclusion of submissions (27 months and 11 days) violated his right to trial within a reasonable time.

The court found net delay of 23 months, exceeding the Jordan ceiling of 18 months.

Although the Crown's illness was recognized as a discrete exceptional circumstance, the court found the system failed to adequately mitigate the delay by not offering continuation dates in a timely manner.

The court granted a stay of proceedings.

The court considered whether the Crown had proven beyond a reasonable doubt that Kimera Fullwood was in possession of a prohibited firearm found in a residence during a drug trafficking investigation.

The court reviewed the law on circumstantial evidence and possession, ultimately finding that the evidence was reasonably capable of supporting an alternative inference that another individual, Hasnan Sandhu, brought the firearm into the residence without Fullwood’s knowledge.

Fullwood was acquitted on the firearm charges.

The accused, Mr. Sills, brought a Charter application to exclude firearms evidence seized from his multi-unit dwelling.

The search warrant, targeting another individual (Mr. Fisher) in a different unit, was found to be facially overbroad as it authorized a search of the entire building despite police knowledge of its multi-unit nature and an undertaking to search only Mr. Fisher's areas.

The court found a serious Section 8 Charter breach (unreasonable search and seizure) and a minimal Section 10(b) breach (delay in right to counsel).

The search was not justified by exigent circumstances under CDSA s. 11(7).

The court excluded the evidence under Section 24(2) of the Charter, emphasizing the high expectation of privacy in one's home and the seriousness of police disregard for established rules, particularly concerning lower-income housing.

The accused, Jerome Lemon-Allison, was charged with robbery of a Scotiabank branch.

The Crown's case relied entirely on circumstantial evidence, including video identification, inculpatory statements made to undercover police officers, and evidence of acts and circumstances.

The court applied principles from R. v. Nikolovski for video identification and R. v. Villaroman for assessing circumstantial evidence.

The doctrine of recent possession was considered but not ultimately applied.

The court found a strong resemblance between the accused and individuals in Snapchat and surveillance videos, and accepted the reliability of the undercover officers' testimony regarding the accused's admissions about possessing cash and needing money laundering services.

The court concluded that the only reasonable inference was that the accused was a party to the robbery and found him guilty as charged.

The applicants, Rupert Folkard and Joseph Goldfinger, jointly charged with fraud over $5000, sought a Rowbotham Order for state-funded legal counsel after being refused Legal Aid.

The court applied the three-part test for a Rowbotham Order, finding that while the applicants were indigent despite exceeding Legal Aid thresholds, their right to a fair trial would not be materially compromised if unrepresented.

The charges were serious, but the facts were not overly complex, and both applicants, despite lacking legal training, were intelligent, educated, and accustomed to financial documents.

The court dismissed the application, concluding that they possessed the necessary skills to represent themselves and that logistical issues with disclosure could be resolved without state-funded counsel.

The applicant sought a stay of proceedings for child pornography charges, alleging a breach of his s. 11(b) Charter right to trial without unreasonable delay.

The court analyzed the 53-month delay under both the Morin and Jordan frameworks, attributing periods to neutral/inherent time, defence responsibility, Crown responsibility, and institutional delay, as well as an exceptional circumstance (police witness illness).

The court found no Charter breach, noting defence consent to trial dates and counsel's schedule contributing to delay, and applied the transitional exceptional circumstance category from Jordan.

The accused were convicted of production of marijuana and possession of marijuana for the purpose of trafficking following a trial.

The Crown operated two large-scale hydroponic marijuana grow operations in Toronto and Mississauga, containing approximately 4,961 and 6,758 plants respectively, with an estimated annual production value in the millions of dollars.

The court imposed a custodial sentence of 5 years on the first accused and 18 months on the second accused, finding that deterrence and denunciation were the predominant sentencing objectives.

The court declined to impose a restitution order but ordered forfeiture of cash seized from the first accused.

DNA orders and weapons prohibition orders were also imposed.

The Crown sought to qualify a York Regional Police detective as an expert witness to provide opinion evidence regarding marijuana production, distribution, trafficking, pricing, and related matters.

The defence objected on grounds of bias, arguing that the proposed expert had conducted surveillance prior to the search warrants and was from the same police unit as the principal investigators.

The trial judge applied the four-part Mohan test and the Abbey framework, finding that while the expert met the threshold requirements, certain portions of the report were inadmissible due to bias concerns and case-specific opinions that could usurp the trier of fact's role.