Carol Anne Shirtliff-Hinds

The applicant husband sought temporary sole custody and a s. 30 assessment, while the respondent wife sought summary judgment for permanent relocation to England with the children, or alternatively, an interim order to that effect, along with child and spousal support.

The court dismissed the husband's motions for temporary sole custody and a s. 30 assessment.

The wife's motion for summary judgment on permanent relocation was also dismissed, but she was granted interim sole custody and permission to return to England with the children, subject to conditions including a $10,000 security deposit and obtaining a mirror order in England.

The court also ordered a Voices of the Child report, with costs shared equally, and continued supervised access for the husband.

An expedited trial for custody, access, and mobility issues was set for January 2019.

The accused was charged with impaired driving and over 80 following a complaint of erratic driving.

The accused brought Charter applications seeking to exclude breath readings and stay proceedings, alleging violations of sections 7, 8, 9, and 10(b) of the Charter.

The court found that police lawfully entered the driveway under an implied licence, had reasonable grounds to make the approved screening device demand, and did not violate the accused's right to counsel of choice.

However, the court found a serious breach of section 10(b) when portions of the accused's privileged communications with duty counsel were inadvertently recorded by police audio equipment.

The breath readings were excluded pursuant to section 24(2) of the Charter.

The accused was charged with three counts of possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking, one count of possession of methamphetamine for the purpose of trafficking, careless storage of ammunition, possession of property obtained by crime, and two counts of failing to comply with a recognizance.

The accused challenged the validity of search warrants executed at his residence, a storage unit, and a vehicle, alleging violations of sections 8 and 9 of the Charter.

The court conducted a Garofoli review of the Information to Obtain and found that the warrants were properly issued based on sufficient grounds.

The court also found that even if there were Charter violations, the evidence would be admissible under section 24(2) of the Charter.

The appellant, the operator of a contracting company, appealed a Small Claims Court judgment holding him personally liable, jointly and severally with his company, for $25,000 in damages arising from an incomplete pool and landscaping project.

The respondents had provided a $25,000 cheque to the company, which they alleged was held in trust for future work, while the appellant claimed it was for past work.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, finding that the trial judge's reasons were inadequate because they failed to explain the basis for imposing personal liability on the appellant, such as piercing the corporate veil or finding a breach of trust.

A new trial was ordered on the narrow issues of whether the funds were impressed with a trust and whether the appellant misappropriated them.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Summary Conviction Appeal Court judge that set aside a stay of proceedings and ordered a new trial.

The Court of Appeal found no legal or factual basis for the stay of charges based on the police's failure to lay the information within the statutory time limit or serve the summons timely.

The court rejected the appellant's argument that the possibility of mitigating a driving suspension sentence constituted a credible Charter violation justifying a stay of serious criminal charges.

Leave to appeal was refused.

Yuk Yuen Lee and Jing Zhang Huang were convicted by a jury of production and trafficking of cannabis.

A Gardiner hearing determined that the Crown did not prove the number of plants for mandatory minimum sentencing, but confirmed a substantial grow operation.

The Crown sought four years for Lee and two years for Huang, arguing Lee was the mastermind.

The defence sought suspended sentences or fines.

The court rejected the 'mastermind' theory, finding both individuals were lower-level participants.

Lee was sentenced to 15 months incarceration and three years probation, with no credit for speculative parole eligibility time.

Huang was sentenced to seven months and one week incarceration (net five months after pre-trial credit) and three years probation.

Ancillary orders under s. 109 of the Criminal Code and DNA orders were imposed for both.

The court emphasized denunciation and deterrence, noting that commercial grow operations remain unlawful despite pending legislative changes to marijuana possession.

A Gardiner hearing was held to determine the number of marijuana plants for sentencing purposes after convictions for production and possession for trafficking.

The Crown sought to engage a mandatory minimum sentence based on a plant count exceeding 500.

The defence presented expert statistical evidence challenging the adequacy of the police's sampling methodology.

The court found that the Crown failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the number of marijuana plants exceeded 500 due to the arbitrary sampling process, thus precluding reliance on the mandatory minimum.

However, the court accepted that it was a substantial marijuana grow operation for general sentencing purposes.

The parties lived in a common law relationship for 13 years and purchased a home together.

Title was held as tenants in common with a 75% interest to the respondent and 25% to the applicant.

Following separation, the applicant sought an equal division of the house sale proceeds based on unjust enrichment and a joint family venture.

The respondent sought to enforce the 75/25 split or alternatively claimed deductions for a basement renovation, occupation rent, and the applicant's debt.

The court found that the parties were engaged in a joint family venture and that the applicant contributed significantly to the property.

The court ordered an equal division of the proceeds, dismissed the respondent's claims for deductions, and granted the applicant a restraining order due to a history of domestic abuse.

The applicant, charged with drug trafficking, brought a pre-trial motion (voir dire) to exclude three statements made to police (roadside, video, off-video) and evidence obtained via a search warrant, alleging violations of his Charter rights to counsel and unreasonable search and seizure, and lack of reasonable and probable grounds for arrest.

The Crown sought to admit the statements.

The court found the roadside statement inadmissible due to a Charter s. 10(b) violation.

However, the video and off-video statements were deemed voluntary and admissible, as the applicant had consulted duty counsel and did not diligently indicate inadequate advice or a change in circumstances to re-trigger the right to counsel of choice.

The court also found that reasonable and probable grounds for arrest existed and upheld the search warrant, despite a minor inaccuracy in the Information to Obtain, as sufficient information remained to authorize it.

The Crown appealed a stay of proceedings granted to the respondent for driving with excess alcohol.

The trial judge found breaches of the respondent's Charter rights (s. 7, 9, 10(b), 11(d)) and that police errors prevented the respondent from accessing a beneficial sentencing program (Stream A), leading to a stay.

The appellate court found the trial judge erred in finding a s. 10(b) Charter breach, as the detention for a second Approved Screening Device (ASD) test was justified and did not trigger the immediate right to counsel.

The appellate court also found the trial judge's reasons for granting a stay were inadequate, lacking a proper s. 24(2) analysis and a balancing of societal and individual interests.

The appeal was allowed, and a new trial ordered.

The appellant appealed a decision dismissing his motion to set aside minutes of settlement in a family law proceeding.

He argued the motion judge erred in making credibility findings based on affidavit evidence, demonstrated bias, and that the absence of a recording of the motion argument denied him natural justice.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the motion judge was entitled to determine the matter on the affidavits, the judge's criticism of the appellant did not signal bias, and there is no legal requirement for motion arguments to be transcribed.

The applicant sought an order to release seized funds for legal fees and a declaration that s. 462.37(3) of the Criminal Code violates Charter rights if applied to such fees, creating a conflict of interest for counsel.

The Crown resisted, arguing lack of jurisdiction and prematurity for the constitutional issue.

The court found jurisdiction to release the funds, distinguishing previous case law, and determined the applicant had no other means to pay.

However, the court dismissed the declaratory relief, deeming the constitutional question premature as several contingencies must occur before s. 462.37(3) could apply, and emphasized that an offender truly unable to pay a fine in lieu of forfeiture would not face incarceration.

The tenant was successful on a motion for a stay pending appeal and sought costs on a substantial or partial indemnity basis.

The landlord argued for a lower amount.

The court found that substantial indemnity costs were not warranted, as there was no deliberate attempt to frustrate proceedings by fraud or deception.

However, the landlord's failure to comply with a previous order and the introduction of unnecessary complexity were considered.

Applying the factors in Rule 57.01 and the principles of fairness and reasonableness, the court fixed costs payable to the tenant at $7,500 all inclusive.

The accused were convicted of production of marijuana and possession of marijuana for the purpose of trafficking following a trial.

The Crown operated two large-scale hydroponic marijuana grow operations in Toronto and Mississauga, containing approximately 4,961 and 6,758 plants respectively, with an estimated annual production value in the millions of dollars.

The court imposed a custodial sentence of 5 years on the first accused and 18 months on the second accused, finding that deterrence and denunciation were the predominant sentencing objectives.

The court declined to impose a restitution order but ordered forfeiture of cash seized from the first accused.

DNA orders and weapons prohibition orders were also imposed.

The applicant sought certiorari to quash an order committing him to stand trial following a preliminary inquiry on charges of sexual assault and sexual touching of a person with a disability in a position of trust.

The applicant argued the preliminary inquiry justice erred by committing him for trial despite the absence of direct identification evidence linking him to the alleged perpetrator.

The court reviewed the circumstantial evidence, including the complainant’s description of a staff member named “Terry,” testimony from a staff supervisor who knew the accused, and evidence that the accused had been suspended following the complaint.

Applying the principles in Arcuri and Charemski, the court held that the evidence constituted some evidence of identification sufficient to permit a reasonable jury to infer identity.

The application to quash the committal was therefore dismissed.

The Crown sought to qualify a York Regional Police detective as an expert witness to provide opinion evidence regarding marijuana production, distribution, trafficking, pricing, and related matters.

The defence objected on grounds of bias, arguing that the proposed expert had conducted surveillance prior to the search warrants and was from the same police unit as the principal investigators.

The trial judge applied the four-part Mohan test and the Abbey framework, finding that while the expert met the threshold requirements, certain portions of the report were inadmissible due to bias concerns and case-specific opinions that could usurp the trier of fact's role.

The offender pleaded guilty to possession of a large quantity of marijuana for the purpose of trafficking.

Police surveillance and a subsequent search warrant led to the seizure of approximately 41 pounds of marijuana, cash, a debt list, and an imitation pistol from the offender’s residence.

The court considered the commercial nature of the operation and the significant quantity of drugs as aggravating factors, emphasizing denunciation and deterrence.

Mitigating factors included the offender’s youth, lack of criminal record, guilty plea, family responsibilities, stable employment, and evidence of rehabilitation following the birth of his child.

Balancing these factors, the court imposed a custodial sentence shorter than that sought by the Crown.

The accused was charged with trafficking cocaine contrary to s. 5(1) of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act and possession of proceeds of crime contrary to ss. 354(1)(a) and 355(b) of the Criminal Code.

The evidence consisted largely of surveillance observations and the recovery of police buy money from the accused following an undercover drug purchase arranged through intermediaries.

The defence argued that the case relied on circumstantial evidence and proposed alternative inferences inconsistent with guilt.

The court rejected those alternatives as speculative and held that circumstantial evidence must be assessed according to whether guilt is proven beyond a reasonable doubt, not by the strict Hodge’s rule formulation.

Finding that the only logical inference from the evidence was that the accused supplied the cocaine and received the buy money, the court entered convictions on both counts.

The appellant appealed his convictions for trafficking and possession of the proceeds of crime, arguing that the trial judge misapprehended the evidence and that the verdicts were unreasonable.

The Court of Appeal found that the circumstantial evidence, which included the appellant driving the car to the drug deal, questioning the undercover officer's identity, and being found in possession of the buy money shortly after the transaction, was sufficient to ground the convictions.

The court concluded there was no misapprehension of evidence and dismissed the appeal.