Phillip J. Brissette

The accused was charged with drug trafficking and weapons offences following a traffic stop initiated based on a tip from a confidential informant.

During the stop, the accused was arrested for possession of a prohibited weapon and subsequently subjected to a roadside strip search, which yielded cocaine.

The accused brought an application to exclude the evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter, alleging breaches of his ss. 8, 9, 10(a), and 10(b) rights.

The court found that while the initial detention and arrest were lawful, the roadside strip search violated s. 8, and the police breached ss. 10(a) and 10(b) by failing to promptly advise the accused of the reasons for his detention and delaying his access to counsel.

Applying the Grant framework, the court concluded that the admission of the evidence would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The evidence was excluded, and the accused was acquitted.

Alceste Pileggi was convicted of possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking.

The court considered aggravating factors, including the quantity of cocaine (1 kg with an estimated street value of $40,000-$65,000) and the financial motivation, and mitigating factors, such as no prior criminal record, strong family support, remorse, and judicial resource savings due to an agreed statement of facts after Charter issues were resolved.

The Crown sought a sentence of five to eight years, while the defence sought three to four years.

The court imposed a sentence of four years and four months, reduced by 13 months for stringent pre-trial bail conditions (25% credit for 26 months), resulting in a balance of three years and three months imprisonment.

Ancillary orders for a DNA sample and a ten-year weapons prohibition were also imposed.

The applicant, Ronald Byfield, sought to exclude cocaine evidence, arguing his Charter rights under sections 8 (unreasonable search) and 9 (arbitrary detention) were violated during his arrest and a subsequent roadside strip search.

The court found that the police had reasonable and probable grounds for arrest, thus no section 9 breach.

Regarding the search, the court determined it was a strip search as defined in R. v. Golden, but found it was justified by exigent circumstances (officer safety and evidence preservation) and conducted reasonably, without infringing section 8.

Alternatively, applying the R. v. Grant analysis, the court found that even if there were breaches, the evidence would not be excluded due to the good faith of the officers, minimal intrusiveness, reliability of the evidence, and society's interest in adjudication on the merits of a serious drug trafficking charge.

The application was dismissed, and the evidence was not excluded.

The applicant, Alceste Pileggi, sought to exclude evidence obtained during a search of his residence and subsequent detention and questioning, alleging breaches of his Charter rights under sections 8 (unreasonable search and seizure), 9 (arbitrary detention), 10(a) (right to be informed of reasons for arrest), and 10(b) (right to counsel).

The police executed a telewarrant for drug trafficking offences, using a forced entry.

The court found no infringement of Pileggi's Charter rights, determining that the telewarrant procedure was justified by impracticability, the forced entry was reasonable given concerns for evidence destruction and officer safety, his detention and handcuffing were not arbitrary, and he was promptly informed of the initial charge.

While there was a delay in accessing counsel, police efforts were reasonable and not deliberate, and Pileggi ultimately spoke with duty counsel.

The application to exclude evidence was dismissed.

The accused was charged with possession of fentanyl contrary to s. 4(1) of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act.

She had submitted counterfeit fentanyl patches to a pharmacy on three occasions to obtain legitimate fentanyl patches to which she was not entitled, as part of her abuse of the medication.

The Crown sought a conditional sentence of four to six months; the defence sought a conditional discharge.

The court imposed a suspended sentence with 12 months probation, finding that while a discharge was not appropriate given the sophistication of the offending and the opioid crisis, a custodial sentence was unnecessary given the accused's significant rehabilitative efforts post-arrest.

The accused was charged with impaired driving and over 80 following a complaint of erratic driving.

The accused brought Charter applications seeking to exclude breath readings and stay proceedings, alleging violations of sections 7, 8, 9, and 10(b) of the Charter.

The court found that police lawfully entered the driveway under an implied licence, had reasonable grounds to make the approved screening device demand, and did not violate the accused's right to counsel of choice.

However, the court found a serious breach of section 10(b) when portions of the accused's privileged communications with duty counsel were inadvertently recorded by police audio equipment.

The breath readings were excluded pursuant to section 24(2) of the Charter.