Jonathan Bliss

This application, brought by His Majesty the King in Right of Ontario, sought an order extending various time limits under the Provincial Offences Act due to a disruption in postal services across Ontario.

The court found that identifying individual respondents was not possible and that it was not unjust to hear the application without notice.

The order extended specific time limits for proceedings and appeals under the Provincial Offences Act, as well as the due dates for fines, to account for the postal disruption, aiming to prevent prejudice to both respondents and municipalities.

L.M. pleaded guilty to child pornography offences.

The Crown sought reconsideration of a previous ruling that these offences did not constitute "serious personal injury offences" (SPIOs), which is a prerequisite for a dangerous offender designation.

The Crown's request for reconsideration was based on the Court of Appeal's decision in R. v. Snowden.

The court, after clarifying its previous reasoning and considering new evidence and the Snowden decision, reaffirmed its original finding that L.M.'s offences, while connected to harm, do not meet the threshold for SPIOs, thus precluding a dangerous offender designation.

The accused, L.M., pleaded guilty to child pornography offences.

The Crown sought to prove an unproven historical allegation of sexual assault involving M.L., the daughter of L.M.'s then-partner, as an aggravating fact for a potential long-term offender designation.

The court heard testimony from M.L. and her mother, N.L., and considered the challenges of assessing an adult's testimony about childhood events, including inconsistencies over time.

Applying principles from R. v. W.(R.) and R. v. A.M., the court found M.L. to be a credible and reliable witness, concluding that the sexual assault allegation was proven beyond a reasonable doubt, despite minor inconsistencies attributed to the passage of time and the victim's age at the time of the incident.

This is a sentencing decision for Jonathan Wong, who pleaded guilty to three counts of voyeurism under s. 162.1(a) of the Criminal Code.

His conduct involved surreptitiously recording 174 unidentified persons, 7 identified victims, and one victim during sexual activity, over a period of 20 years (2001-2021).

The collection of voyeuristic files was described as the largest in Canadian history.

The Crown sought 18 months imprisonment for the general voyeurism counts and a consecutive 3 months for the sexual activity recording.

The defence sought a conditional sentence or 12 months imprisonment.

The court emphasized denunciation and deterrence, finding that a conditional sentence would be inadequate given the gravity, duration, and volume of the offences, and the significant impact on victims.

The judge imposed a total sentence of 18 months imprisonment, with the 3-month sentence for the sexual activity recording to be served concurrently, followed by 18 months probation.

L.M. pleaded guilty to possessing, accessing, and distributing child pornography.

The Crown applied for an assessment to determine if L.M. should be declared a dangerous offender or a long-term offender.

The court dismissed the application for a dangerous offender assessment, finding no sufficient causal link between L.M.'s conduct and severe psychological damage to victims to classify the offences as "serious personal injury offences" (SPIO) under s.752 of the Criminal Code.

However, the court granted the application for an assessment to determine if L.M. might be a long-term offender under s.753.1, given his criminal history and risk of reoffending.

The Crown sought to admit four statements from a deceased witness (J.T.) at a preliminary hearing under s. 540(7) of the Criminal Code.

The court applied the "prima facie air of reliability" test to determine admissibility.

It found the portions of J.T.'s statements related to the kidnapping credible and trustworthy due to corroborating evidence, despite procedural deficiencies in statement-taking.

However, the portions related to drug possession and the identification of "Z" were deemed unreliable and were excised, as J.T.'s account was inconsistent and self-serving regarding her involvement with drugs.

The court affirmed its power to excise unreliable portions of a statement.

Craig Harris-Lowe applied for a stay of proceedings under s. 24(1) of the Charter, alleging a violation of his right to a trial within a reasonable time under s. 11(b).

The court analyzed the total delay from charge to anticipated trial conclusion, deducting periods attributable to defence conduct and exceptional circumstances (COVID-19 pandemic).

The court found significant defence-caused delays, including repeated failures to schedule resolution meetings and attend court.

Despite the total delay exceeding the presumptive ceiling, the net delay, after deductions, fell below it.

The application for a stay was denied as the defence failed to demonstrate meaningful, sustained efforts to expedite proceedings or that the case took markedly longer than it reasonably should have.

The accused was charged with possession of fentanyl contrary to s. 4(1) of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act.

She had submitted counterfeit fentanyl patches to a pharmacy on three occasions to obtain legitimate fentanyl patches to which she was not entitled, as part of her abuse of the medication.

The Crown sought a conditional sentence of four to six months; the defence sought a conditional discharge.

The court imposed a suspended sentence with 12 months probation, finding that while a discharge was not appropriate given the sophistication of the offending and the opioid crisis, a custodial sentence was unnecessary given the accused's significant rehabilitative efforts post-arrest.

The accused pleaded guilty to conspiracy to import fentanyl and its derivatives, possession of MDEA for the purpose of trafficking, and breach of probation.

The court found that the accused, aged 20 at the time of the offences, had imported fentanyl and other drugs from a Chinese mail order website and distributed them locally, contributing directly to five fentanyl overdoses in October 2016.

Despite his difficult childhood marked by parental drug addiction and death, and his current rehabilitative efforts, the court imposed a sentence of 7 years and 6 months imprisonment, emphasizing the serious nature of fentanyl trafficking and the need for general deterrence and denunciation in the context of the opioid crisis.

The accused was charged with impaired driving and over 80 following a complaint of erratic driving.

The accused brought Charter applications seeking to exclude breath readings and stay proceedings, alleging violations of sections 7, 8, 9, and 10(b) of the Charter.

The court found that police lawfully entered the driveway under an implied licence, had reasonable grounds to make the approved screening device demand, and did not violate the accused's right to counsel of choice.

However, the court found a serious breach of section 10(b) when portions of the accused's privileged communications with duty counsel were inadvertently recorded by police audio equipment.

The breath readings were excluded pursuant to section 24(2) of the Charter.

The accused was charged with breaching a restraining order under section 127 of the Criminal Code by communicating indirectly with the protected person through a third party.

The accused sent text messages to an intermediary stating "you should tell Beverly that I pose no threat to her" in the context of arranging access to his children.

The court found that while the communication technically violated the order, the de minimis principle applied, as the conduct was so trivial and trifling as to raise no abiding concern to public or community interest.

The charge was dismissed.

Criminal trial involving charges of assault and uttering threats against two defendants arising from allegations of child abuse occurring between November 1 and December 23, 2016.

The prosecution relied primarily on testimony from two teenage witnesses, one of whom was a close friend of the family.

The court found credibility issues with the witnesses' evidence, particularly regarding exaggeration and inconsistencies.

The defendants were charged with failing to provide necessaries of life, assault, and uttering threats.

The fail to provide necessaries charges were dismissed on application for directed verdict.

The court found the defendants guilty of two assault charges but acquitted them of the remaining charges.

The accused was charged with care or control of a motor vehicle while impaired by a drug and breach of probation.

The accused was found sitting in his mother's vehicle in a farmer's field in the early morning hours.

Police observed dilated pupils, peculiar clothing, drug paraphernalia, and suspected drugs in the vehicle.

The Crown relied on circumstantial evidence including the accused's physical presentation, dilated pupils, and items found in the vehicle to establish impairment.

The defence argued that the evidence amounted only to possibilities without proof beyond a reasonable doubt.

The court found that while the accused's presentation was peculiar and possibly consistent with drug impairment, the absence of field sobriety testing, drug recognition expert evaluation, and chemical analysis of suspected substances, combined with limited evidence of actual incoordination, fell short of proof beyond a reasonable doubt.

A young person brought an application to stay charges pursuant to section 24(1) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms for breach of the section 11(b) right to be tried within a reasonable time.

The applicant faced charges arising from offences alleged to have occurred on October 25, 2015, including unlawfully being in a dwelling house, possession of a weapon, possession under $5,000, mischief to property, obstructing a peace officer, failing to comply with recognizance, and possession of MDMA.

The trial was originally scheduled to commence on November 9, 2016, but was delayed due to various procedural issues, including a defective information naming an incorrect accused, defence applications to quash the information and sever charges, and the recusal of the original trial judge.

The applicant argued that the total delay of approximately 18 to 20 months exceeded the presumptive ceiling established in R. v. Jordan and constituted an unreasonable delay.

The Crown argued that exceptional circumstances and defence delay should be deducted from the total delay, bringing it within acceptable limits for a transitional case.

A young person brought an application to stay charges pursuant to section 24(1) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms for breach of section 11(b) rights (right to be tried within a reasonable time).

The applicant faced charges on two informations arising from offences alleged to have occurred on October 25, 2015.

The application was heard following the recusal of the original trial judge.

The court considered the framework established in R. v. Jordan, 2016 SCC 27, and applied it contextually to a case involving a young person and proceedings that commenced before the Jordan decision was released.

The court found that the Crown established exceptional circumstances justifying the delay and that the defence failed to demonstrate a violation of section 11(b) rights.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle with over 80 mg of alcohol in 100 ml of blood.

Following a domestic incident call and traffic stop, police conducted a roadside approved screening device test which resulted in a fail.

The accused was arrested and provided two breath samples at the detachment with readings of 100 mg and 90 mg.

The defence challenged the admission of the certificate of analysis on multiple Charter and non-Charter grounds, including the timing of the roadside demand, the legality of the warrantless search and seizure, the proper operation of the intoxilyzer, and the availability of remedies under sections 24(1) and 24(2) of the Charter.

The court found no Charter violations and admitted the evidence, finding the accused guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.

A landscaping company was convicted of operating a pit without a licence under the Aggregate Resources Act after removing rocks and boulders from farmland to facilitate the construction of a fence.

The company appealed, arguing that the excavation was for the purpose of building a structure (a fence) and therefore fell within the statutory exemption.

The appellate court allowed the appeal and entered an acquittal, finding that the primary purpose of the excavation was to facilitate the building of a fence, which constitutes a structure within the meaning of the Act's exemption.