Bhavna Bhangu

This criminal trial concerned a charge of sexual assault against Ommema Ibeto.

The central issue was the credibility and reliability of the complainant's evidence, S.B., given significant inconsistencies and memory issues over time.

The court applied the W.D. analysis to the accused's testimony.

Ultimately, the court found the complainant's evidence to be unreliable and incredible, leading to a finding of not guilty.

Lawrence Caines was found not criminally responsible (NCRMD) for the first-degree murder of his brother due to a mental disorder (bipolar 1 disorder with mania and psychosis).

The Crown applied to designate Caines as a "high-risk accused" (HRA) under s. 672.64 of the Criminal Code, arguing there was a substantial likelihood of future violence or that the offence's brutal nature indicated such a risk.

The defence opposed, citing insufficient evidence of repetitive violent behaviour and lack of expert opinion on future dangerousness.

The court dismissed the HRA application, finding the Crown had not met the burden of proof on a balance of probabilities, noting the accused's current amenability to treatment and improved insight.

The matter was referred to the Ontario Review Board for disposition.

H.M. pleaded guilty to one count of sexual exploitation for having sexual relations with the complainant between 1995 and 1998, when she was 14-17 years old and he was in a position of trust.

The court considered significant aggravating factors, including the 18-year age difference, the prolonged nature of the abuse, the frequency and degrading nature of the sexual acts (including BDSM, anal intercourse, and video recording), and the severe, long-lasting impact on the victim.

Mitigating factors included no prior criminal record, low risk of reoffending, sincere remorse, and a guilty plea.

Applying principles from R. v. Friesen, the court emphasized deterrence and denunciation, rejecting the defence's argument against retroactive application of increased sentencing ranges for child sexual abuse.

The court balanced the severity of the offence with the offender's moral blameworthiness at the time, noting the then-lower maximum sentence and societal understanding.

H.M. was sentenced to 30 months in a federal institution.

The applicants, charged with human trafficking offences, applied under s. 462.34(1) of the Criminal Code to access approximately $133,000 in restrained funds held in their corporation's bank account to pay for living and legal expenses.

The court found the applicants had an interest in the funds and lacked sufficient other means to pay their legal fees, though they did not need the funds for living expenses.

However, because the corporation owed approximately $67,000 in unremitted HST, which is deemed to be held in trust for the Crown under the Excise Tax Act, the court only released the remaining $66,000 to the applicants' counsel to fund their defence.

The accused pled guilty to manslaughter after providing a substance he believed to be cocaine to the victim, who died from ingesting U-47700, a synthetic opioid.

The accused, along with another individual, also ingested the substance and survived.

The accused failed to call emergency services when the victim was found unresponsive, instead calling for a ride.

The court imposed an 18-month custodial sentence followed by three years' probation, with credit for pre-sentence custody and bail conditions.

The sentence balanced denunciation and deterrence against the accused's genuine remorse, lack of criminal record, and the fact that he believed he was supplying cocaine rather than a deadly synthetic opioid.

The Crown brought an application to remove counsel for the accused charged with two counts of second degree murder due to a conflict of interest.

The accused's counsel had previously represented a key Crown and defence witness in an unrelated impaired driving matter.

The court found that while a solicitor-client relationship existed, partial disqualification was a sufficient remedy to address the conflict of interest concerns while preserving the accused's right to counsel of choice.

The court ordered that counsel be prohibited from participating in the cross-examination of the witness and from being present when that witness testified.

Following a judge-alone criminal trial, the court convicted the accused on multiple sexual offences involving three child complainants and on firearm offences arising from firearms found in his rural residence while he was subject to a weapons prohibition order.

The court admitted two complainants' prior video-recorded statements under s. 715.1 of the Criminal Code, assessed the evidence through the lens of credibility, reliability, and the reasonable doubt standard, and accepted the complainants' evidence despite delayed disclosure and some peripheral inconsistencies.

DNA evidence from underwear and medical evidence from a sexual assault examination materially corroborated one complainant's account.

The court also found constructive possession of rifles in a locked cabinet and held that keeping a rifle in a kitchen accessible in a home with children, and discharging a firearm from inside the house, constituted a marked departure from the conduct of a reasonable person under s. 86(1).

Joanna Flynn, a registered nurse, was charged with manslaughter and criminal negligence causing death after discontinuing a patient's life support.

The Crown sought to examine hospital physicians and nurses regarding their awareness and understanding of hospital policies and practices concerning life support discontinuation, informed consent, and pronouncing death.

The defence argued this evidence was not logically relevant to the standard of care, which requires expert testimony, and that its probative value was outweighed by its prejudicial effect.

The court dismissed the Crown's application, ruling that the understanding and experience of other hospital staff could not establish the standard of care for a "reasonable" or "reasonably prudent" person, which must be determined by expert evidence.

The Crown sought to admit expert evidence from Dr. Neil Lazar in a criminal trial for manslaughter and criminal negligence causing death against Joanna Flynn, a registered nurse.

The proposed evidence concerned medical ethics and accepted practices in ICUs regarding end-of-life decision-making, including determination of death, discontinuing life support, and obtaining informed consent from substitute decision-makers.

The defence opposed, arguing irrelevance, lack of qualification, and prejudicial effect.

The court applied the two-stage Mohan/White Burgess test for expert evidence admissibility.

It found Dr. Lazar qualified as an expert in medical ethics and ICU decision-making.

The court ruled that evidence regarding the 24-hour wait period before terminating life support and the process of obtaining informed consent from a substitute decision-maker was admissible, as it was relevant and necessary for the jury.

However, evidence related to the technical declaration of "brain death" and the specific GBGH Discontinuation of Life Support policy was deemed irrelevant or outside Dr. Lazar's expertise for interpretation and thus inadmissible.

The accused pleaded guilty to manslaughter, interfering with a dead body, and possession of child pornography.

The manslaughter and interference charges stemmed from a 1978 cold case where the accused shot an intruder in his home and, with his father's help, disposed of the body.

The accused confessed to the police in 2012.

The court weighed the aggravating factors, including the use of a firearm and the 34-year concealment, against mitigating factors such as the accused's confession and guilty plea.

The court imposed a global sentence of 8.5 years, reduced to 27 months after crediting pre-sentence custody.

The accused brought an application to exclude evidence under ss. 24(1) and 24(2) of the Charter, alleging breaches of ss. 7, 8, 9, and 10 following her arrest for impaired driving after a single-vehicle accident.

The accused argued her statements at the scene were statutorily compelled, her arrest lacked reasonable and probable grounds, and she was arbitrarily detained without being advised of her right to counsel.

The court dismissed the application, finding no evidence that the statements were compelled, that the police had reasonable and probable grounds to arrest based on the constellation of facts, and that the brief investigative detention prior to arrest did not engage s. 10 Charter rights.

A young person appealed convictions and sentence arising from participation in forcing the complainant into a washroom where a sexual assault occurred.

The appellant argued that the trial judge applied unequal credibility analysis, misapplied the R. v. W.(D.) reasonable doubt framework, and demonstrated a reasonable apprehension of bias.

The appeal court reviewed the trial record and found the trial judge properly assessed credibility, including rejecting the appellant’s evidence in light of corroboration from another participant and the complainant’s consistent account.

The court held the trial judge correctly applied the W.(D.) framework and did not reverse the onus or display bias.

Both conviction and sentence appeals were dismissed.

The accused, who is HIV-positive with an undetectable viral load, was charged with three counts of aggravated sexual assault for failing to disclose her status to three different complainants before engaging in sexual activity.

For the count involving oral sex, the court found no realistic possibility of transmission and acquitted the accused.

For the count involving unprotected vaginal intercourse, the court found a realistic possibility of transmission existed despite the undetectable viral load, vitiating consent, and found the accused guilty.

For the final count, the court acquitted the accused because the Crown failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that a condom was not used, given the complainant's credibility issues.

The accused was charged with assaulting the complainant on July 10, 2011.

The Crown's case relied on the testimony of the complainant, the investigating officer, and a neighbour.

The accused testified in his own defence, claiming self-defence.

The court rejected the accused's version of events and accepted the complainant's account.

The accused was found guilty of assault.

The court noted that the accused failed to attend court on two scheduled dates, resulting in a bench warrant being issued.

The accused was charged with assault causing bodily harm to the complainant on December 30, 2007.

The complainant alleged that after an evening of heavy drinking, the accused suddenly lost control, broke items in her home, and then delivered a violent kick to her face, breaking her nose.

The accused denied kicking the complainant and claimed she attacked him first, and he may have struck her nose while defending himself.

The case turned entirely on credibility.

The trial judge found the complainant's evidence reliable despite inconsistencies on peripheral matters, and rejected the accused's version based on his own admissions of wrongdoing to a witness, his failure to protest accusations, and the implausibility of his account when measured against the probabilities.

The accused was found guilty.