Bhavna Bhangu

This criminal trial concerned a charge of sexual assault against Ommema Ibeto.

The central issue was the credibility and reliability of the complainant's evidence, S.B., given significant inconsistencies and memory issues over time.

The court applied the W.D. analysis to the accused's testimony.

Ultimately, the court found the complainant's evidence to be unreliable and incredible, leading to a finding of not guilty.

Lawrence Caines was found not criminally responsible (NCRMD) for the first-degree murder of his brother due to a mental disorder (bipolar 1 disorder with mania and psychosis).

The Crown applied to designate Caines as a "high-risk accused" (HRA) under s. 672.64 of the Criminal Code, arguing there was a substantial likelihood of future violence or that the offence's brutal nature indicated such a risk.

The defence opposed, citing insufficient evidence of repetitive violent behaviour and lack of expert opinion on future dangerousness.

The court dismissed the HRA application, finding the Crown had not met the burden of proof on a balance of probabilities, noting the accused's current amenability to treatment and improved insight.

The matter was referred to the Ontario Review Board for disposition.

The applicants, charged with human trafficking offences, applied under s. 462.34(1) of the Criminal Code to access approximately $133,000 in restrained funds held in their corporation's bank account to pay for living and legal expenses.

The court found the applicants had an interest in the funds and lacked sufficient other means to pay their legal fees, though they did not need the funds for living expenses.

However, because the corporation owed approximately $67,000 in unremitted HST, which is deemed to be held in trust for the Crown under the Excise Tax Act, the court only released the remaining $66,000 to the applicants' counsel to fund their defence.

The accused pled guilty to manslaughter after providing a substance he believed to be cocaine to the victim, who died from ingesting U-47700, a synthetic opioid.

The accused, along with another individual, also ingested the substance and survived.

The accused failed to call emergency services when the victim was found unresponsive, instead calling for a ride.

The court imposed an 18-month custodial sentence followed by three years' probation, with credit for pre-sentence custody and bail conditions.

The sentence balanced denunciation and deterrence against the accused's genuine remorse, lack of criminal record, and the fact that he believed he was supplying cocaine rather than a deadly synthetic opioid.

The Crown brought an application to remove counsel for the accused charged with two counts of second degree murder due to a conflict of interest.

The accused's counsel had previously represented a key Crown and defence witness in an unrelated impaired driving matter.

The court found that while a solicitor-client relationship existed, partial disqualification was a sufficient remedy to address the conflict of interest concerns while preserving the accused's right to counsel of choice.

The court ordered that counsel be prohibited from participating in the cross-examination of the witness and from being present when that witness testified.

The Crown sought to admit expert evidence from Dr. Neil Lazar in a criminal trial for manslaughter and criminal negligence causing death against Joanna Flynn, a registered nurse.

The proposed evidence concerned medical ethics and accepted practices in ICUs regarding end-of-life decision-making, including determination of death, discontinuing life support, and obtaining informed consent from substitute decision-makers.

The defence opposed, arguing irrelevance, lack of qualification, and prejudicial effect.

The court applied the two-stage Mohan/White Burgess test for expert evidence admissibility.

It found Dr. Lazar qualified as an expert in medical ethics and ICU decision-making.

The court ruled that evidence regarding the 24-hour wait period before terminating life support and the process of obtaining informed consent from a substitute decision-maker was admissible, as it was relevant and necessary for the jury.

However, evidence related to the technical declaration of "brain death" and the specific GBGH Discontinuation of Life Support policy was deemed irrelevant or outside Dr. Lazar's expertise for interpretation and thus inadmissible.

Joanna Flynn, a registered nurse, was charged with manslaughter and criminal negligence causing death after discontinuing a patient's life support.

The Crown sought to examine hospital physicians and nurses regarding their awareness and understanding of hospital policies and practices concerning life support discontinuation, informed consent, and pronouncing death.

The defence argued this evidence was not logically relevant to the standard of care, which requires expert testimony, and that its probative value was outweighed by its prejudicial effect.

The court dismissed the Crown's application, ruling that the understanding and experience of other hospital staff could not establish the standard of care for a "reasonable" or "reasonably prudent" person, which must be determined by expert evidence.

The accused was charged with assaulting the complainant on July 10, 2011.

The Crown's case relied on the testimony of the complainant, the investigating officer, and a neighbour.

The accused testified in his own defence, claiming self-defence.

The court rejected the accused's version of events and accepted the complainant's account.

The accused was found guilty of assault.

The court noted that the accused failed to attend court on two scheduled dates, resulting in a bench warrant being issued.

The accused was charged with assault causing bodily harm to the complainant on December 30, 2007.

The complainant alleged that after an evening of heavy drinking, the accused suddenly lost control, broke items in her home, and then delivered a violent kick to her face, breaking her nose.

The accused denied kicking the complainant and claimed she attacked him first, and he may have struck her nose while defending himself.

The case turned entirely on credibility.

The trial judge found the complainant's evidence reliable despite inconsistencies on peripheral matters, and rejected the accused's version based on his own admissions of wrongdoing to a witness, his failure to protest accusations, and the implausibility of his account when measured against the probabilities.

The accused was found guilty.