Sarah Tarcza

The defendant, a 31-year-old Indigenous male, was convicted of two counts of sexual interference against his two step-sisters.

The court applied the principles from Friesen regarding the gravity of sexual offences against children, while also considering the Gladue factors related to the defendant's Indigenous background and intergenerational trauma.

The court sentenced the defendant to a global term of 7 years in custody (1.5 years for one victim, 5.5 years for the other), along with ancillary orders including a DNA order, weapons prohibition, SOIRA order, and a section 161 prohibition order.

The defendant, a Type-1 diabetic, was charged with two counts of dangerous driving causing bodily harm after a head-on collision.

The defense argued that the defendant lacked the capacity to appreciate the risk due to severe hypoglycemia (neuroglycopenia) and was in a state of automatism.

The court found that the defendant was in a state of neuroglycopenia when he began driving erratically and lacked the capacity to appreciate the risk, distinguishing the case from R. v. Elson where the driver was aware of dropping blood sugar.

The court concluded that the Crown failed to prove the requisite mens rea beyond a reasonable doubt, leading to the defendant's acquittal.

The automatism defense was not fully analyzed but the court was not satisfied it was proven on a balance of probabilities.

The youth accused was charged with second-degree murder following a fatal stabbing during a drug transaction.

The deceased and others had planned to rob the accused.

When the deceased approached the accused wearing a mask and drawing a large knife, the accused reacted by drawing his own knife and stabbing the deceased multiple times.

The court excluded the accused's subsequent statement to police, finding it lacked spontaneity.

However, applying the W.(D.) framework, the court accepted the accused's testimony that he believed he was about to be stabbed and acted to protect himself.

The Crown failed to disprove self-defence beyond a reasonable doubt, resulting in an acquittal.

The defendant, Tahir Ali, was charged with multiple drug trafficking offenses and manslaughter related to an opioid overdose death.

The court acquitted the defendant on charges of trafficking and possession for trafficking on April 9, 2017, and manslaughter, due to reasonable doubt regarding the source of drugs and causation of death.

The court also acquitted the defendant on a charge of trafficking on April 28, 2017, as the specific substance trafficked was not proven.

However, the defendant was convicted of possession of heroin and furanyl fentanyl for the purpose of trafficking on April 28, 2017, as the arrest was deemed lawful and the seized evidence admissible.

The appellant appealed convictions for failing to provide a breath sample and impaired driving.

The trial judge found a s. 10(b) Charter breach but declined to exclude evidence under s. 24(2), having speculated on the nature of legal advice the appellant would have received.

The Superior Court found this speculation to be a reversible legal error, contrary to Supreme Court precedent established in R. v. Bartle and R. v. Black.

The appeal was allowed, and the matter remitted for a new trial, as the s. 24(2) analysis required a fresh consideration of all evidence by a judge of first instance.

The defendant, Noah Poisson, was convicted of impaired driving causing death after his vehicle veered off the road, resulting in the death of his passenger, Parker Pautsch.

The defendant's blood alcohol concentration was between 129 to 171 mg of alcohol in 100 ml of blood at the time of the accident.

At the sentencing hearing, the Crown sought a 7-year jail sentence, while the defence argued for 2-3 years, citing the defendant's youth, remorse, and community support.

The court emphasized denunciation and general deterrence as paramount sentencing objectives for impaired driving offences, acknowledging the increasing range of sentences for such crimes.

While considering mitigating factors like the defendant's youth and genuine remorse, the court found that these could not outweigh the serious nature of the offence and the tragic loss of life.

A sentence of 5 years in custody was imposed, along with a DNA sample order and a 7-year driving prohibition.

The accused sought a stay of proceedings or, alternatively, an exclusion of evidence (blood samples and medical records) due to an alleged violation of his Section 7 Charter right to a fair trial.

The application was based on the conduct of two Crown witnesses who communicated with each other in breach of a court order excluding witnesses.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the accused's Section 7 rights were not violated.

The judge determined that while the communication was improper, it was not subversive or contemptuous, did not materially affect the witnesses' credibility or the reliability of their evidence, and did not warrant a stay of proceedings or exclusion of evidence, particularly as there was no Crown or police involvement in the alleged impropriety.

The applicant sought to exclude medical records, blood, and urine samples seized by police with a warrant in an impaired driving investigation.

The applicant argued the Information to Obtain (ITO) contained omissions and mischaracterizations, and that blood was drawn without permission in contravention of Charter rights.

The court found minor, unintentional errors in the ITO that did not affect warrant issuance, and that the blood was drawn for medical purposes, not at police behest, thus no Charter breach occurred.

Even if a breach existed, the evidence would be admitted under s. 24(2) of the Charter due to the low seriousness of state conduct, high privacy interest, and strong societal interest in adjudication on the merits of a serious offence.

The application was dismissed.

The accused was charged with impaired driving causing death, excess blood alcohol causing death, and dangerous driving causing death following a fatal motor vehicle collision.

The Crown successfully applied to amend the indictment to remove a reference to "drug" from the impaired driving charge, which the court granted, emphasizing substance over form and the absence of prejudice.

The court found the accused was the driver, established continuity of blood samples, and concluded that the accused was impaired by alcohol, which materially contributed to the accident and the victim's death.

The accused was convicted of impaired driving causing death, with the other two counts conditionally stayed under the *Kienapple* principle, as the wrongful conduct for all charges was deemed to overlap.

The Crown sought to admit expert evidence from Dr. Neil Lazar in a criminal trial for manslaughter and criminal negligence causing death against Joanna Flynn, a registered nurse.

The proposed evidence concerned medical ethics and accepted practices in ICUs regarding end-of-life decision-making, including determination of death, discontinuing life support, and obtaining informed consent from substitute decision-makers.

The defence opposed, arguing irrelevance, lack of qualification, and prejudicial effect.

The court applied the two-stage Mohan/White Burgess test for expert evidence admissibility.

It found Dr. Lazar qualified as an expert in medical ethics and ICU decision-making.

The court ruled that evidence regarding the 24-hour wait period before terminating life support and the process of obtaining informed consent from a substitute decision-maker was admissible, as it was relevant and necessary for the jury.

However, evidence related to the technical declaration of "brain death" and the specific GBGH Discontinuation of Life Support policy was deemed irrelevant or outside Dr. Lazar's expertise for interpretation and thus inadmissible.

Joanna Flynn, a registered nurse, was charged with manslaughter and criminal negligence causing death after discontinuing a patient's life support.

The Crown sought to examine hospital physicians and nurses regarding their awareness and understanding of hospital policies and practices concerning life support discontinuation, informed consent, and pronouncing death.

The defence argued this evidence was not logically relevant to the standard of care, which requires expert testimony, and that its probative value was outweighed by its prejudicial effect.

The court dismissed the Crown's application, ruling that the understanding and experience of other hospital staff could not establish the standard of care for a "reasonable" or "reasonably prudent" person, which must be determined by expert evidence.

The accused was charged with possession of cocaine contrary to the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act, assault of a peace officer, and disarming a peace officer.

The charges arose from an incident at a housing complex where police officers observed the accused in a vehicle with a plastic bag.

The accused was arrested following a physical altercation with officers.

The trial court acquitted the accused of the drug possession charge, finding insufficient evidence that the cocaine found at the scene was ever in the accused's possession.

However, the court convicted the accused of assault and disarming a peace officer, finding that the officers were lawfully executing their duties and that the accused's resistance and attempt to take the officer's taser were established beyond reasonable doubt.