Erec Daniel Rolfe

The defendant, a Type-1 diabetic, was charged with two counts of dangerous driving causing bodily harm after a head-on collision.

The defense argued that the defendant lacked the capacity to appreciate the risk due to severe hypoglycemia (neuroglycopenia) and was in a state of automatism.

The court found that the defendant was in a state of neuroglycopenia when he began driving erratically and lacked the capacity to appreciate the risk, distinguishing the case from R. v. Elson where the driver was aware of dropping blood sugar.

The court concluded that the Crown failed to prove the requisite mens rea beyond a reasonable doubt, leading to the defendant's acquittal.

The automatism defense was not fully analyzed but the court was not satisfied it was proven on a balance of probabilities.

The appellant sought leave to appeal a six-month custodial sentence for possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking.

The sentence was imposed after a miscommunication within the Public Prosecution Service of Canada led to the prosecution seeking a nine-month sentence at trial, despite an internal intention to propose a joint submission for a conditional sentence.

The Court of Appeal granted leave to appeal, set aside the custodial sentence, and substituted a conditional sentence of 150 days, finding it appropriate given the appellant's personal circumstances, efforts to address addiction, employment, family responsibilities, and remorse.

This ruling addresses a Charter application under s. 10(b) and s. 24(2) by two accused seeking to exclude evidence (a firearm and drugs) due to alleged breaches of their right to counsel.

The Crown conceded a s. 10(b) breach occurred due to a communication breakdown between police forces, resulting in a delay of 1 hour 15 minutes for one applicant and 1 hour 45 minutes for the other to speak with counsel.

The court found the Toronto Police Service acted professionally, but the Durham Regional Police Service failed in their duty to facilitate access to counsel at the booking stage.

Applying the R. v. Grant factors, the court characterized the breach as serious but not systemic, found the impact on the applicants moderate, and society's interest in adjudication on the merits high given the serious nature of the charges (firearm and large quantity of drugs).

The application for exclusion of evidence was dismissed.

B.S., a 31-year-old inmate with chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (COPD), applied for a bail review under s. 520(1) of the Criminal Code.

He cited his medical condition and the COVID-19 pandemic as new evidence constituting a material change in circumstances since his initial detention order.

The Crown conceded jurisdiction but argued for continued detention on secondary grounds due to public safety risks, B.S.'s criminal record, and prior breaches of recognizance.

The court, acknowledging the reverse onus on B.S., found that while B.S. was not an ideal candidate for release, his proposed surety plan, combined with his motivation to avoid jail due to his vulnerability to COVID-19, sufficiently attenuated the risk of further offences or interference with the administration of justice.

The court emphasized that reducing prison populations where reasonable and safe is in the public health interest during the pandemic.

The detention order was set aside, and B.S. was released on a surety with house arrest conditions.

The appellant appealed a sentence of eight years and two months imposed for trafficking and possession for the purpose of trafficking in heroin, fentanyl, and methamphetamine.

The principal ground of appeal was that the trial judge erred in selecting the appropriate sentencing range for mid-level trafficking.

The Court of Appeal found the sentence was not demonstrably unfit, noting the case contained numerous aggravating factors including the appellant's calculated return to commercial trafficking within months of release from custody, the nature and variety of highly addictive substances trafficked, and significant community problems with opioid use.

The appeal was dismissed.

Two appellants appealed their convictions for conspiracy to traffic heroin and cocaine, and their sentences.

The appellants argued that the trial judge misapprehended the evidence, rendering the verdicts unreasonable.

The Court of Appeal upheld all convictions and sentences, finding that the trial judge properly applied the three-stage test from R. v. Carter for the co-conspirators exception to the hearsay rule.

The court found sufficient evidence that both appellants were members of the conspiracies, with McGean playing an instrumental role and Lucas acting as an enforcer.

The court also rejected arguments regarding the quantum of drugs and the scope of the conspiracy.

Victim surcharges were set aside for both appellants.

The Crown appealed a trial judge's declaration that section 719(3.1) of the Criminal Code, specifically the "bail misconduct exclusion," was unconstitutional.

The bail misconduct exclusion restricts pre-sentence custody credit to 1:1 (rather than the enhanced 1.5:1 credit) where an accused's bail was cancelled due to alleged misconduct while on release.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's finding that the provision violates section 7 of the Charter as overbroad.

The court found that the legislative purpose of the bail misconduct exclusion—to deter misconduct while on release—is not rationally connected to all of its impacts, particularly where individuals are punished for alleged (rather than proven) misconduct, or where detention results from inability to satisfy a reverse onus rather than actual misconduct.

The appellant appealed a ten-year driving prohibition imposed following her conviction for dangerous operation of a motor vehicle causing bodily harm.

She argued the prohibition was manifestly unfit and sought a five-year prohibition, contending the trial judge erred in emphasizing general deterrence and denunciation for a young, first-time offender.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that denunciation and deterrence were paramount given the seriousness of the offence, the appellant's prior poor driving record, and the devastating harm caused to the victims.

The court upheld the sentence as a whole, noting the trial judge exercised restraint by reducing the custodial sentence while lengthening the driving prohibition to protect the public.