Jennifer McKee

The appellant appealed a ten-year driving prohibition imposed following her conviction for dangerous operation of a motor vehicle causing bodily harm.

She argued the prohibition was manifestly unfit and sought a five-year prohibition, contending the trial judge erred in emphasizing general deterrence and denunciation for a young, first-time offender.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that denunciation and deterrence were paramount given the seriousness of the offence, the appellant's prior poor driving record, and the devastating harm caused to the victims.

The court upheld the sentence as a whole, noting the trial judge exercised restraint by reducing the custodial sentence while lengthening the driving prohibition to protect the public.

The appellant appealed his convictions for possession of child pornography entered by the trial judge on March 13, 2015.

The central issue was whether there was sufficient evidence for the trial judge to find that the appellant had knowledge of the child pornography on his computer.

The Court of Appeal upheld the convictions, finding that the evidence supported the trial judge's conclusion that the only rational explanation was that the appellant had knowledge of the contents of the computer, given his control and regular use of the computer, the vast quantities of child pornography found by police, and the absence of evidence that anyone else occupied the home.

The appellant appealed his conviction for firearm-related offences and his sentence.

The trial judge had convicted the appellant based on circumstantial evidence that he possessed and fired a firearm into the complainant's vehicle.

The appellant argued that the trial judge reversed the burden of proof by requiring him to identify an alternative suspect.

The Court of Appeal rejected this argument, finding that the trial judge's question regarding alternative suspects was merely rhetorical and that the trial judge properly applied the burden of proof.

The court found ample evidence supported the conviction and dismissed the appeal.

The appellant appealed his conviction for fraud entered by the Superior Court of Justice.

At trial, the appellant admitted to dishonest acts but contested whether he possessed the necessary mens rea for fraud.

The trial judge found that he did.

On appeal, the appellant raised two main arguments: first, that the trial judge erred in treating evidence about a remuneration scheme as hearsay when led to show the appellant's state of mind; and second, that the trial judge erred in relying on the Crown's suggestion that the appellant should have called other managers as witnesses.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both arguments and upheld the conviction.

The appellant appealed her conviction for possession of a firearm and ammunition.

The Crown's case relied on circumstantial evidence to prove that the appellant knew the firearm and ammunition were in a computer bag she possessed and transported from her apartment to her cousin's apartment.

The appellant argued the verdict was unreasonable, contending the trial judge failed to consider an alternative inference that the bag contained other contraband.

The Court of Appeal upheld the conviction, finding that the trial judge properly considered and rejected the speculative alternative inference and that ample evidence supported the inference that the appellant knew of the firearm's presence beyond a reasonable doubt.

The appellant was convicted of three counts of sexual assault against his former girlfriend's 15-year-old daughter.

The case turned entirely on credibility.

The complainant had recanted her allegations under oath in an affidavit after receiving independent legal advice, then withdrew the recantation at trial.

The summary conviction appeal court dismissed the appeal, finding that although the trial judge erred in curtailing cross-examination of the complainant in a key area, the curative proviso applied.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal on two grounds: (1) the summary conviction appeal court erred in applying the curative proviso on its own motion without Crown submission, and (2) the trial judge's reasons disclosed a reasonable apprehension of bias through intemperate, condescending, and sarcastic language expressing disdain for the appellant and defence witness while subjecting their evidence to greater scrutiny than the complainant's.

The appellant appealed a long-term offender (LTO) designation imposed following his conviction for aggravated assault, weapons dangerous, and breach of probation.

The appellant had stabbed a victim six times on a subway platform.

The trial judge sentenced him to four years and one day imprisonment with a concurrent sentence for breach of probation, and imposed an LTO designation with a seven-year supervision order.

The appellant raised three issues: insufficient reasons regarding the interpretation of "substantial risk that the offender will reoffend" misapplication of the statutory test, and failure to consider discretion not to make an LTO designation.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the evidence supported the LTO designation.

The Crown sought to appeal the respondent's acquittals for dangerous operation of a motor vehicle and flight from a peace officer.

After failing to serve the respondent personally, the Crown applied to the summary conviction appeal court for an order for substituted service.

The application judge dismissed the application, finding no jurisdiction to order substituted service under the Criminal Code for summary conviction appeals.

The Court of Appeal granted leave to appeal and allowed the appeal, holding that section 482(1) of the Criminal Code provides sufficient authority for rules governing substituted service in summary conviction appeals.