Vincent Rishea

This decision addresses the application of section 10(b) of the Charter regarding the right to counsel in the context of an impaired driving charge.

The court considered whether the accused was properly informed of his right to contact any lawyer of his choice, and whether he was afforded a reasonable opportunity to speak to counsel at the roadside.

The judge found a violation of section 10(b) due to failure to properly inform the accused about the option to speak to counsel privately at the roadside.

However, the evidence from breathalyzer tests was admitted under section 24(2) of the Charter, as the breach was not serious enough to exclude the evidence.

The court also found the accused guilty of impaired driving based on the totality of the evidence, including the circumstances of the accident and observed signs of impairment.

L.M. pleaded guilty to child pornography offences.

The Crown sought reconsideration of a previous ruling that these offences did not constitute "serious personal injury offences" (SPIOs), which is a prerequisite for a dangerous offender designation.

The Crown's request for reconsideration was based on the Court of Appeal's decision in R. v. Snowden.

The court, after clarifying its previous reasoning and considering new evidence and the Snowden decision, reaffirmed its original finding that L.M.'s offences, while connected to harm, do not meet the threshold for SPIOs, thus precluding a dangerous offender designation.

The Crown applied for an assessment order under section 752.1 of the Criminal Code, seeking to determine if the respondent should be declared a dangerous or long-term offender following convictions for serious personal injury offences, including voyeurism and child pornography charges.

The respondent conceded most elements but disputed the likelihood of future reoffending.

The court found reasonable grounds for the assessment, citing the repetitive and protracted nature of the respondent's offending conduct across two distinct periods (1993 and 2022), which involved similar victims and abuse of trust.

The application for assessment was granted.

The accused, Thomas Donovan, applied to set aside his guilty plea to possession of fentanyl for the purpose of trafficking, entered on April 5, 2022.

The application was based on his assertion that the drugs were not his and that he took the headphone case containing them from an acquaintance, Zach Pringle, leading to a claim of factual inaccuracy in the plea.

Despite the plea being voluntary, informed, and unequivocal, the court found valid grounds to set it aside in the interests of justice.

The court considered the arguable credibility of the accused's new account, the hearsay evidence from Mr. Pringle, the accused's reluctance to implicate Mr. Pringle, his motivation to plead guilty due to poor detention conditions, and his Indigenous background as a relevant factor.

The court concluded that restoring the presumption of innocence was in the interests of justice, allowing the accused to make full answer and defence.

The accused, Neil Mains, was charged with five Criminal Code offences related to child pornography found on a computer in his apartment.

The trial involved a Charter application and voluntariness voir dire for a post-arrest statement.

The court dismissed the Charter application and found the statement voluntary.

The central issues were the accused's knowledge and control of the child pornography and whether he was wilfully blind to making it available via a peer-to-peer network.

The court found the accused guilty of two counts of possession and two counts of accessing child pornography, but not guilty of making child pornography available, finding reasonable doubt regarding his knowledge or willful blindness of the sharing aspect.

This decision addresses an application by the York Regional Police (YRP) for standing to make submissions in a disclosure classification hearing.

The defence sought police policy documents, and the core issue was whether these were first-party (Crown's automatic disclosure) or third-party (O'Connor regime) records.

The YRP, supported by the Crown, argued for standing, while the defence objected.

The court granted YRP standing, emphasizing that police forces have a direct interest in disclosure issues concerning their own records and that substance should prevail over form, especially when the Crown's position aligns with the police.

The defendant, Giuseppe Galati, facing a dangerous driving charge, brought an application for disclosure of the York Regional Police's (YRP) Suspect Apprehension Pursuit (SAP) policies and procedures.

The Crown and YRP opposed the request, arguing it was a speculative fishing expedition.

The court, applying the 'obviously relevant' test from R. v. Gubbins, found that the SAP policy was relevant to the credibility of the central Crown witness (PC Skelly) and the defence's ability to make full answer and defence.

The court ordered the YRP to disclose the SAP policy created pursuant to O. Reg. 266/10, but declined to order a broader disclosure of all pursuit-related policies as overly vague.

During a first-degree murder trial, the Crown sought to introduce an alternative theory of constructive first-degree murder based on criminal harassment under section 231(6) of the Criminal Code, arguing that the defendant's act of pointing a handgun at the victim with intent to scare constituted criminal harassment.

The defence challenged this, citing insufficient evidence and the late introduction of the theory after the evidentiary portion of the trial.

The court ruled against putting the alternative theory to the jury, finding that the facts did not meet the legal definition of criminal harassment, which requires a state of ongoing torment, and that the late introduction of the theory would prejudice the defendant's right to a fair trial.

The offender was convicted by a jury of second degree murder for shooting the victim in the head with a concealed handgun.

The court considered the devastating impact on the victim's family, the offender's lack of a significant criminal record, and the jury's recommendations for parole ineligibility.

The offender was sentenced to life imprisonment with no eligibility for parole for 16 years, along with non-communication, DNA, and lifetime weapons prohibition orders.

The accused was charged with first-degree murder after shooting his step-mother.

During the trial, the defence applied for a directed verdict of acquittal on the first-degree murder charge, arguing there was no evidence that the killing was planned and deliberate.

The court reviewed the circumstantial evidence, including the accused's prior statements, his access to the firearm, and his post-offence conduct.

Applying the test for a directed verdict, the court found there was some evidence upon which a properly instructed jury could infer planning and deliberation.

The application was dismissed.