Monica M.C. Heine

The accused, an inmate serving a life sentence for murder, was charged with counselling another inmate to commit the murders of four individuals connected to his civil litigation.

The Crown's case relied heavily on the testimony of a fellow inmate, 'Joe', an unsavoury witness with a mixed reputation for honesty.

The court found Joe's evidence unreliable and the alleged murder plot too implausible and contingent to meet the threshold for the offence of counselling.

The accused was acquitted.

The Crown brought an application for an enhanced publication ban under s. 486.31 of the Criminal Code and the court's inherent jurisdiction to protect the identity of an inmate witness, 'Joe'.

The accused, serving a life sentence for a previous contract killing, allegedly attempted to solicit Joe's assistance to hire a hitman to murder four individuals.

The defence sought to interview other inmates to investigate Joe's motivations, arguing it needed to disclose Joe's identity as a witness in this proceeding.

The court granted the application in part, holding that while the defence could investigate Joe's motivations using his real name, it was prohibited from disclosing to potential witnesses that Joe was a witness in this proceeding or identifying the accused as their client, due to the serious risk to Joe's safety.

The accused, J.W., pleaded guilty to sexual assault, threatening death, and unlawful confinement of K.G. The court was tasked with sentencing, considering the Crown's request for 8-10 years and the Defence's request for 7.5 years.

The decision weighed aggravating factors, including the violent nature of the offences, the victim's vulnerability as an Aboriginal female, and the significant impact on her life and career.

Mitigating factors included the offender's Aboriginal status, mental health issues, and cognitive deficits, stemming from intergenerational trauma.

The court sentenced the offender to nine years imprisonment, granting 1.5:1 credit for time in detention centres and 1:1 credit for time spent in a more comfortable hospital environment, resulting in a balance of four years to be served in a federal institution.

Ancillary orders were also imposed.

The offender was convicted of dangerous driving causing death and dangerous driving causing bodily harm after striking two cyclists on the shoulder of the road.

The court found the offender engaged in a prolonged pattern of dangerous driving, including speeding, tailgating, and driving while prohibited.

Emphasizing denunciation and deterrence, the court sentenced the offender to four years' imprisonment on each count to be served concurrently, along with a lifetime driving prohibition.

The accused was charged with dangerous driving causing bodily harm and death after his vehicle struck a group of cyclists standing on the shoulder of the road.

The court found that the accused engaged in a pattern of dangerous driving, including tailgating, excessive speed, and failing to pay attention to his surroundings.

The court rejected the accused's testimony that he was forced to make a split-second decision to avoid a collision, finding instead that his driving constituted a marked departure from the standard of care of a reasonable person.

The accused was found guilty on both counts.

Kirsten Pemberton pleaded guilty to infanticide and concealing the dead body of her child.

The court considered sentencing principles, including denunciation, deterrence, and rehabilitation, particularly in light of the diminished moral blameworthiness recognized for infanticide due to a disturbed mind.

The court also addressed credit for pre-trial custody and strict bail conditions.

A conditional sentence of one year for infanticide and six months concurrently for concealment was imposed, followed by two years of probation and a 20-year common law peace bond requiring notification of future pregnancies and medical care.

During a first-degree murder trial, the Crown sought to introduce an alternative theory of constructive first-degree murder based on criminal harassment under section 231(6) of the Criminal Code, arguing that the defendant's act of pointing a handgun at the victim with intent to scare constituted criminal harassment.

The defence challenged this, citing insufficient evidence and the late introduction of the theory after the evidentiary portion of the trial.

The court ruled against putting the alternative theory to the jury, finding that the facts did not meet the legal definition of criminal harassment, which requires a state of ongoing torment, and that the late introduction of the theory would prejudice the defendant's right to a fair trial.

The offender was convicted by a jury of second degree murder for shooting the victim in the head with a concealed handgun.

The court considered the devastating impact on the victim's family, the offender's lack of a significant criminal record, and the jury's recommendations for parole ineligibility.

The offender was sentenced to life imprisonment with no eligibility for parole for 16 years, along with non-communication, DNA, and lifetime weapons prohibition orders.

The accused was charged with first-degree murder after shooting his step-mother.

During the trial, the defence applied for a directed verdict of acquittal on the first-degree murder charge, arguing there was no evidence that the killing was planned and deliberate.

The court reviewed the circumstantial evidence, including the accused's prior statements, his access to the firearm, and his post-offence conduct.

Applying the test for a directed verdict, the court found there was some evidence upon which a properly instructed jury could infer planning and deliberation.

The application was dismissed.

The offender was convicted of possession of child pornography after police seized computers containing 9,888 images and 105 videos, including depictions of violence and infants.

The Crown sought 18 to 24 months' incarceration, while the defence requested a conditional sentence, citing the offender's mental health issues, including PTSD and depression, and his diagnosis of multiple sclerosis.

The court emphasized the principles of denunciation and deterrence, noting the serious nature and size of the collection.

The court rejected a conditional sentence and imposed 15 months' incarceration followed by three years' probation, along with DNA and sex offender registry orders.

The accused challenged the voluntariness of audio and video statements made to police following his arrest for murder.

The court considered the cumulative effect of persistent police questioning despite multiple assertions of the right to silence, elements of the "Reid Technique" used in interrogation, and the accused's emotional state.

The court found that these factors, taken together, raised a reasonable doubt as to the voluntariness of the statements, rendering them inadmissible.

The court also stated that it would have exercised its residual discretion to exclude the evidence due to its prejudicial effect outweighing its probative value.

Kristopher Rothery was found guilty of criminal negligence and aggravated assault of his seven-week-old son, Jackson Rothery.

The offences occurred when Jackson was in the defendant's sole care, resulting in severe injuries including rib fractures, subdural hemorrhages, and brain injury.

The court considered sentencing principles under the Criminal Code, including denunciation and deterrence, and aggravating factors such as offences against children and abuse of trust.

Mitigating factors included the defendant's age, lack of criminal record, and mental health challenges.

The Crown sought 3-5 years imprisonment, while defence counsel suggested 2 years plus probation.

The court imposed a concurrent sentence of three years for aggravated assault and eighteen months for criminal negligence, along with ancillary orders.

The defendant, John White, charged with murder, brought three pre-trial applications: for a change of venue from Napanee, to challenge prospective jurors for cause based on pre-trial publicity, and to question prospective jurors on their occupation.

The court dismissed all three applications, finding no sufficient evidence of community prejudice or extensive, prejudicial pre-trial publicity to warrant a change of venue or challenge for cause.

The request to question jurors on occupation was deemed academic after the challenge for cause was dismissed, and not a standalone ground for challenge.

The defendant, Kristopher Rothery, was charged with aggravated assault, criminal negligence, and failing to provide the necessaries of life to his seven-week-old son, Jackson.

Jackson suffered severe injuries including subdural haemorrhages, rib fractures, and brain injury.

The court found that the injuries were inflicted by Rothery, who had shaken the child and subsequently failed to seek timely medical help.

Rothery's defence, claiming accidental injury during resuscitation and an honest but mistaken belief that the child was fine, was rejected.

The court found Rothery guilty of aggravated assault and criminal negligence, staying the charge of failing to provide necessaries of life under the Kienapple principle.

The accused, charged with possession of child pornography, brought a Garofoli application to quash a search warrant and a Charter motion to exclude evidence under s. 24(2).

The accused argued the Information to Obtain (ITO) contained errors and omissions, the warrant contained a "Branton error" (outdated form), the police failed to report to a justice as soon as practicable under s. 489.1(1) of the Criminal Code, and subscriber information was obtained without a warrant contrary to R. v. Spencer.

The court upheld the warrant on the Garofoli application after excising and amplifying the ITO.

On the Charter motion, the court found s. 8 breaches regarding the Branton error, the failure to report, and the Spencer issue.

However, applying the Grant framework, the court concluded that admitting the evidence would not bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The motion was dismissed.

The applicant, charged with possession of child pornography, sought leave to cross-examine the affiant of an Information to Obtain (ITO) a search warrant.

The motion raised three specific areas for cross-examination: delayed report to justice, a "Branton error" in the search warrant's language, and an incorrect date in the ITO regarding the initial complaint.

The court granted leave to cross-examine on the "Branton error" and the incorrect date, finding these issues could discredit the existence of reasonable and probable grounds for the warrant.

Leave was denied for the delayed report to justice, as it occurred after the warrant's issuance and did not bear on the pre-conditions for authorization.

The accused applied for bail while facing charges including first degree murder of a newborn child, concealing the body of a child, failing to obtain assistance in childbirth with intent to conceal birth, and failing to provide the necessaries of life.

The Crown opposed release relying primarily on the accused’s statement that she had suffocated the infant.

The court reviewed psychiatric evidence suggesting serious mental health concerns and the possible applicability of the infanticide provisions, as well as the absence of a determined cause of death and uncertainty whether the child was born alive.

Considering the tertiary ground under s. 515(10)(c) of the Criminal Code and the factors set out in R v St-Cloud, the court found the Crown’s case not strong and accepted a detailed release plan with family sureties and medical supervision.

Bail was granted subject to strict conditions including house arrest, psychiatric treatment, and supervision by sureties.

The accused applied for severance of counts in an indictment alleging historical sexual offences against two complainants: the accused’s sister and niece.

The defence argued the count involving the sister should be severed because the alleged conduct occurred when the accused was a youth and therefore engaged the Youth Criminal Justice Act.

The court rejected that argument but nevertheless considered severance under s. 591 of the Criminal Code.

Applying the factors set out in R. v. Last, the court found weak factual similarity between the allegations, a high risk of moral prejudice to the accused, and the likelihood of antagonistic defences.

The court concluded the interests of justice required separate trials.

The defendant, a school bus driver, was charged with careless driving following a fatal head-on collision that resulted in the death of an 18-year-old passenger.

The defendant's van drifted into the opposing lane and struck another vehicle.

The court found that the defendant's brief distraction, caused by the passenger moving seats and making noise behind him, constituted momentary inattention rather than a departure from the standard of care.

The defendant was acquitted.

The appellant sought habeas corpus relief arising from a parole-related matter.

The Court of Appeal held that habeas corpus is a discretionary remedy and found no reviewable error in the application judge's exercise of discretion.

The court further held that the Parole Board Appeal Tribunal could grant the remedy sought without considering the Charter.

The appeal was dismissed.