Ari Linds

The accused pleaded guilty to intimate partner violence offences but failed to appear for sentencing after travelling to China and not returning.

The Crown brought a motion to proceed with sentencing in absentia.

The court found it had jurisdiction to continue the proceedings under s. 669.2(1) of the Criminal Code because the original plea judge was unavailable.

The court also granted the motion to proceed in absentia under s. 475(1), finding that the accused had deliberately absconded, there was sufficient information to determine a fit sentence, and it was in the interests of justice to proceed given the seriousness of the offences and the delay.

Following a judge-alone criminal trial involving allegations of physical and sexual violence in the complainant's apartment, the court admitted the complainant's police statement and preliminary inquiry testimony after she failed to complete cross-examination because of a mental health crisis.

The court found the complainant's evidence sufficient, together with corroborative circumstantial evidence from responding officers and scene photographs, to prove that the accused assaulted the complainant, removed her underclothes in a sexual context without consent, and confined her in the apartment.

However, the court was left with a reasonable doubt about alleged vaginal and oral penetration, choking, and death threats, in part because of leading police questioning, evidentiary frailties, and alternative reasonable inferences.

The accused was acquitted of aggravated sexual assault, sexual assault via choking, and uttering a threat, but convicted of sexual assault, forcible confinement, and assault causing bodily harm as a lesser included offence.

In a judge-alone sexual assault trial, the complainant completed examination-in-chief but refused to complete cross-examination, later left the jurisdictional area, and subsequently attempted suicide after a mental health crisis associated with testifying.

The Crown sought admission of the complainant’s preliminary inquiry evidence, her videotaped police statement, her immediate post-incident statements to housing constables, and the accused’s later utterances captured on police body-worn camera.

Applying the Hart framework for incomplete cross-examination, the principled hearsay approach, and s. 715(1) of the Criminal Code, the court found the complainant was too ill to continue, that necessity and threshold reliability were established, and that admitting the prior evidence was a meaningful ameliorative measure preserving trial fairness.

The court also admitted the complainant’s spontaneous statements as res gestae and admitted the accused’s utterances as constituting the actus reus of the uttering threat charge.

The offender pleaded guilty to voyeurism, distribution of intimate images, and breach of probation after recording and sharing videos of the victim engaging in sexual activity.

The Crown and defence jointly submitted an 18-month conditional sentence but disputed whether a SOIRA order should issue.

The court imposed the conditional sentence, finding it met the principles of denunciation and deterrence.

The court declined to make a SOIRA order, concluding that the offender posed a low risk to re-offend and that the impact of a 20-year registration order would be grossly disproportionate to the public interest.

The court considered whether Dexter Peters was a party to a violent gunpoint robbery committed by his younger half-brother, J.M., in Toronto.

The Crown alleged Peters conspired with J.M. or aided and abetted the robbery, relying on circumstantial evidence including video surveillance, the presence of a GPS tracker on the victim’s car, and Peters’ conduct before, during, and after the offence.

The defence argued there were reasonable inferences consistent with innocence, including that Peters was unaware of J.M.’s plan and did not assist in the robbery.

The court found the evidence did not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Peters was a party to the offence, emphasizing the need for more than mere presence at the scene.

Peters was acquitted of all charges.

The court sentenced S.F. for mischief to computer data and failing to comply with a recognizance, both relating to his former partner R.J. The court found S.F. changed R.J.'s passwords to control her and maintained contact with her in breach of a court order.

The court imposed a conditional discharge with probation for the mischief to data offence and an absolute discharge for the breach, citing S.F.'s lack of criminal record, addiction recovery, and the limited harm caused.

The decision reviews sentencing ranges and factors for mischief to data, and the appropriateness of a discharge in domestic contexts.

The accused, S.F., was tried on multiple criminal charges including sexual assault, threatening bodily harm, assault, mischief to computer data, voyeurism, distributing an intimate image, and failing to comply with a recognizance.

The court found the complainant's evidence to have reliability issues.

S.F. was acquitted on the sexual assault counts, as the Crown failed to prove a lack of subjective consent or vitiated consent under the "position of power" provision (s. 273.1(2)(c) of the Criminal Code), which the court interpreted narrowly.

Acquittals also occurred for threatening bodily harm, assault, most mischief counts, voyeurism (due to lack of surreptitiousness), and distributing an intimate image (due to hearsay).

S.F. was found guilty on one count of mischief to computer data and one count of failing to comply with a recognizance.

The accused, Kenny Raposo, pleaded guilty to 17 criminal offences, including 10 counts of break and enter, breaches of release conditions, possession of break-in tools, obstructing justice, mischief, and theft, committed over five months, primarily motivated by a crack cocaine addiction.

The offences targeted small businesses and community hubs, causing financial loss and property damage.

The Crown and Defence presented a joint submission for an 18-month conditional sentence (adjusted to 16 months due to additional pre-sentence custody), a 3-year probation order, restitution, and a DNA order.

The court accepted the joint submission, finding it consistent with sentencing principles and not contrary to the public interest, balancing the aggravating factors of a lengthy criminal record and crime spree with significant mitigating factors, including a guilty plea, remorse, substantial rehabilitative efforts in custody, and strong family support.

Brittney Hawboldt pleaded guilty to multiple offences including reckless discharge of a prohibited firearm, possession of a restricted firearm, dangerous operation of a motor vehicle, and various breaches of release orders.

The court considered aggravating factors such as the serious nature of the firearm and driving offences in a public place, and mitigating factors including her guilty plea, remorse, difficult childhood, and rehabilitative efforts.

The Crown sought a global sentence of six years.

The court imposed a global sentence of six years, granting significant credit for pre-sentence custody under harsh conditions and for time spent under stringent bail conditions, resulting in a balance of three years and one month remaining to be served.

Ancillary orders included a lifetime weapons prohibition, DNA order, and a 10-year driving prohibition, while declining restitution and victim fine surcharge.

The Toronto Police Service brought an application without notice for the further detention of seized items under s. 490(3) of the Criminal Code and for a sealing order under s. 487.3.

The court held that it had inherent jurisdiction to hear the application without notice, despite the statutory requirement for three days' notice, to prevent the absurdity of jeopardizing an ongoing, complex investigation.

The court also granted the sealing order, interpreting s. 487.3 broadly to apply to s. 490(3) applications to protect the integrity of the investigation.

The offender, Ryan Foster, pleaded guilty to three convenience store robberies involving weapons and gratuitous violence.

The Crown sought a 9-year global sentence and a 10-year Long-Term Supervision Order (LTSO).

The defence sought a 7-year global sentence (18 months further custody) and a 5-6 year LTSO.

The court imposed an 8-year global sentence, resulting in 18 months further custody, and a 7-year LTSO.

The judge emphasized general and specific deterrence, while also considering the offender's mental health issues (PTSD, ASPD) and potential for rehabilitation, recommending he serve his remaining sentence at a correctional and treatment centre.

Following a jury trial, the accused was found guilty of robbery, extortion, sexual assault, and threatening death.

The accused had stolen the complainant's phone and used it to coerce her into performing sexual acts, before subsequently forcing vaginal intercourse upon her.

The defence argued that the rule against multiple convictions (the Kienapple principle) should apply to stay either the extortion or sexual assault conviction.

The court held that the Kienapple principle did not apply, finding that the extortion and the subsequent forced intercourse lacked a sufficient factual and legal nexus, as the intercourse was a departure from the coerced agreement and constituted a distinct delict.

Convictions were entered on both counts.

During a jury trial for sexual assault, the Crown requested a mid-trial instruction adapting the R. v. D.D. principles on delayed disclosure to address the complainant's incremental disclosure of vaginal penetration.

The defence opposed, arguing their challenge to credibility was based on specific cross-examination rather than a reflexive equation of delay with dishonesty.

The court declined to give the mid-trial instruction, finding it unnecessary and potentially prejudicial at this stage.

The court held that the jury already had a well-developed body of evidence and that the D.D. principles would be better communicated in the context of the final jury charge.

A.M. was charged with sexual assault, mischief, assault, and threatening.

The Crown proceeded by summary conviction.

The trial centered on the credibility of the complainant (K.J.) and the accused (A.M.).

The court found A.M.'s testimony to be credible and logical, corroborated in part by another witness (C.F.).

K.J.'s testimony, however, was found to have serious difficulties, including repeated claims of inability to recall details, significant inconsistencies between her testimony and prior statements, and embellishments.

The court concluded that the Crown failed to prove the offences beyond a reasonable doubt, and A.M. was found not guilty of all charges.

The accused brought an application under s. 11(b) of the Charter for a stay of proceedings, arguing his right to be tried within a reasonable time was violated.

The total delay from the laying of charges to the anticipated end of trial was 1,503 days.

After deducting 21 days of defence delay and 498 days of delay caused by the COVID-19 pandemic, the remaining delay was 984 days.

The court found the Crown failed to establish that delays during the preliminary hearing or the period prior to the first scheduled trial date were exceptional circumstances.

As the remaining delay exceeded the 30-month presumptive ceiling established in Jordan, the application was allowed and a stay of proceedings was granted.

The accused, Jason Ronald Martin, faced multiple charges including impaired driving, drug possession, and probation breaches.

The defence brought Charter applications alleging breaches of ss. 8 (unreasonable search due to a routine strip search and inadequate record-keeping), 9 (arbitrary detention due to delay in bail hearing), and 10(a) and (b) (right to be informed of reasons for arrest and right to counsel).

The court found breaches of s. 8 and ss. 10(a) and (b), noting the police's routine strip search policy and their failure to promptly and clearly inform the accused of all charges.

The s. 9 application was dismissed as the delay in bringing the accused before a justice was deemed reasonable given the circumstances.

Applying the Grant test under s. 24(2) of the Charter, the court determined that the serious nature of the breaches and their significant impact on the accused's Charter-protected interests warranted the exclusion of all evidence.

Consequently, all charges against the accused were dismissed.

The accused, Andy Metatawabin, was charged with attempted murder, aggravated assault, possession of a weapon, and threatening death after stabbing another patient in a hospital.

The trial proceeded in two stages: identity and criminal responsibility.

The court found the accused was the assailant and guilty of aggravated assault and weapon possession, but not guilty of attempted murder or threatening due to reasonable doubt regarding intent and the alleged threat.

In the second stage, the court assessed whether the accused was Not Criminally Responsible by Reason of Mental Disorder (NCRMD) due to schizophrenia.

Weighing expert psychiatric evidence, the court accepted the defence psychiatrist's opinion that the accused was in a psychotic state at the time of the offence, rendering him incapable of knowing his actions were morally or legally wrong.

Consequently, the accused was found NCRMD on the aggravated assault and weapon possession charges and referred to the Ontario Review Board.

The accused, charged with attempted murder and other offences, brought an application for a stay of proceedings under s. 11(b) of the Charter, arguing unreasonable delay.

The total delay was 42 months and six days, exceeding the 30-month presumptive ceiling.

The court analyzed the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on the scheduling of the bifurcated trial.

The court found that the entire period from the originally scheduled trial date to the anticipated end of the rescheduled trial was attributable to the exceptional circumstance of the pandemic.

After deducting this period, the net delay was 23 months, which fell within the presumptive ceiling.

The application for a stay was dismissed.

The accused, charged with sexual assault, brought a motion seeking disclosure of police occurrence reports and investigative notes relating to interactions between the complainant, the accused, and the police shortly after the alleged offence.

The Crown argued the materials were third-party records subject to the regime under section 278.1 of the Criminal Code.

The court held that the records were intertwined with the allegations, constituted the fruits of the investigation, and did not carry a reasonable expectation of privacy.

Consequently, the court ruled the materials were first-party disclosure governed by Stinchcombe and ordered their production.

The Crown brought an application to adduce out-of-court statements from a complainant who refused to testify in a trial for assault causing bodily harm and forcible confinement.

The statements included cries for help heard by responding officers and a video-recorded statement given to police.

The court admitted the cries for help as circumstantial evidence and under the spontaneous utterance exception to hearsay.

Applying the framework from Bradshaw, the court also admitted the video-recorded statement under the principled exception to hearsay, finding that corroborative evidence—including the complainant's visible injuries, the accused's DNA, and the locked room—established substantive threshold reliability.