Ari Linds

The court considered whether Dexter Peters was a party to a violent gunpoint robbery committed by his younger half-brother, J.M., in Toronto.

The Crown alleged Peters conspired with J.M. or aided and abetted the robbery, relying on circumstantial evidence including video surveillance, the presence of a GPS tracker on the victim’s car, and Peters’ conduct before, during, and after the offence.

The defence argued there were reasonable inferences consistent with innocence, including that Peters was unaware of J.M.’s plan and did not assist in the robbery.

The court found the evidence did not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Peters was a party to the offence, emphasizing the need for more than mere presence at the scene.

Peters was acquitted of all charges.

The court sentenced S.F. for mischief to computer data and failing to comply with a recognizance, both relating to his former partner R.J. The court found S.F. changed R.J.'s passwords to control her and maintained contact with her in breach of a court order.

The court imposed a conditional discharge with probation for the mischief to data offence and an absolute discharge for the breach, citing S.F.'s lack of criminal record, addiction recovery, and the limited harm caused.

The decision reviews sentencing ranges and factors for mischief to data, and the appropriateness of a discharge in domestic contexts.

The accused, S.F., was tried on multiple criminal charges including sexual assault, threatening bodily harm, assault, mischief to computer data, voyeurism, distributing an intimate image, and failing to comply with a recognizance.

The court found the complainant's evidence to have reliability issues.

S.F. was acquitted on the sexual assault counts, as the Crown failed to prove a lack of subjective consent or vitiated consent under the "position of power" provision (s. 273.1(2)(c) of the Criminal Code), which the court interpreted narrowly.

Acquittals also occurred for threatening bodily harm, assault, most mischief counts, voyeurism (due to lack of surreptitiousness), and distributing an intimate image (due to hearsay).

S.F. was found guilty on one count of mischief to computer data and one count of failing to comply with a recognizance.

The accused, Kenny Raposo, pleaded guilty to 17 criminal offences, including 10 counts of break and enter, breaches of release conditions, possession of break-in tools, obstructing justice, mischief, and theft, committed over five months, primarily motivated by a crack cocaine addiction.

The offences targeted small businesses and community hubs, causing financial loss and property damage.

The Crown and Defence presented a joint submission for an 18-month conditional sentence (adjusted to 16 months due to additional pre-sentence custody), a 3-year probation order, restitution, and a DNA order.

The court accepted the joint submission, finding it consistent with sentencing principles and not contrary to the public interest, balancing the aggravating factors of a lengthy criminal record and crime spree with significant mitigating factors, including a guilty plea, remorse, substantial rehabilitative efforts in custody, and strong family support.

Brittney Hawboldt pleaded guilty to multiple offences including reckless discharge of a prohibited firearm, possession of a restricted firearm, dangerous operation of a motor vehicle, and various breaches of release orders.

The court considered aggravating factors such as the serious nature of the firearm and driving offences in a public place, and mitigating factors including her guilty plea, remorse, difficult childhood, and rehabilitative efforts.

The Crown sought a global sentence of six years.

The court imposed a global sentence of six years, granting significant credit for pre-sentence custody under harsh conditions and for time spent under stringent bail conditions, resulting in a balance of three years and one month remaining to be served.

Ancillary orders included a lifetime weapons prohibition, DNA order, and a 10-year driving prohibition, while declining restitution and victim fine surcharge.

The Toronto Police Service brought an application without notice for the further detention of seized items under s. 490(3) of the Criminal Code and for a sealing order under s. 487.3.

The court held that it had inherent jurisdiction to hear the application without notice, despite the statutory requirement for three days' notice, to prevent the absurdity of jeopardizing an ongoing, complex investigation.

The court also granted the sealing order, interpreting s. 487.3 broadly to apply to s. 490(3) applications to protect the integrity of the investigation.

The offender, Ryan Foster, pleaded guilty to three convenience store robberies involving weapons and gratuitous violence.

The Crown sought a 9-year global sentence and a 10-year Long-Term Supervision Order (LTSO).

The defence sought a 7-year global sentence (18 months further custody) and a 5-6 year LTSO.

The court imposed an 8-year global sentence, resulting in 18 months further custody, and a 7-year LTSO.

The judge emphasized general and specific deterrence, while also considering the offender's mental health issues (PTSD, ASPD) and potential for rehabilitation, recommending he serve his remaining sentence at a correctional and treatment centre.

Following a jury trial, the accused was found guilty of robbery, extortion, sexual assault, and threatening death.

The accused had stolen the complainant's phone and used it to coerce her into performing sexual acts, before subsequently forcing vaginal intercourse upon her.

The defence argued that the rule against multiple convictions (the Kienapple principle) should apply to stay either the extortion or sexual assault conviction.

The court held that the Kienapple principle did not apply, finding that the extortion and the subsequent forced intercourse lacked a sufficient factual and legal nexus, as the intercourse was a departure from the coerced agreement and constituted a distinct delict.

Convictions were entered on both counts.

During a jury trial for sexual assault, the Crown requested a mid-trial instruction adapting the R. v. D.D. principles on delayed disclosure to address the complainant's incremental disclosure of vaginal penetration.

The defence opposed, arguing their challenge to credibility was based on specific cross-examination rather than a reflexive equation of delay with dishonesty.

The court declined to give the mid-trial instruction, finding it unnecessary and potentially prejudicial at this stage.

The court held that the jury already had a well-developed body of evidence and that the D.D. principles would be better communicated in the context of the final jury charge.

A.M. was charged with sexual assault, mischief, assault, and threatening.

The Crown proceeded by summary conviction.

The trial centered on the credibility of the complainant (K.J.) and the accused (A.M.).

The court found A.M.'s testimony to be credible and logical, corroborated in part by another witness (C.F.).

K.J.'s testimony, however, was found to have serious difficulties, including repeated claims of inability to recall details, significant inconsistencies between her testimony and prior statements, and embellishments.

The court concluded that the Crown failed to prove the offences beyond a reasonable doubt, and A.M. was found not guilty of all charges.

The accused, Jason Ronald Martin, faced multiple charges including impaired driving, drug possession, and probation breaches.

The defence brought Charter applications alleging breaches of ss. 8 (unreasonable search due to a routine strip search and inadequate record-keeping), 9 (arbitrary detention due to delay in bail hearing), and 10(a) and (b) (right to be informed of reasons for arrest and right to counsel).

The court found breaches of s. 8 and ss. 10(a) and (b), noting the police's routine strip search policy and their failure to promptly and clearly inform the accused of all charges.

The s. 9 application was dismissed as the delay in bringing the accused before a justice was deemed reasonable given the circumstances.

Applying the Grant test under s. 24(2) of the Charter, the court determined that the serious nature of the breaches and their significant impact on the accused's Charter-protected interests warranted the exclusion of all evidence.

Consequently, all charges against the accused were dismissed.

The accused, Andy Metatawabin, was charged with attempted murder, aggravated assault, possession of a weapon, and threatening death after stabbing another patient in a hospital.

The trial proceeded in two stages: identity and criminal responsibility.

The court found the accused was the assailant and guilty of aggravated assault and weapon possession, but not guilty of attempted murder or threatening due to reasonable doubt regarding intent and the alleged threat.

In the second stage, the court assessed whether the accused was Not Criminally Responsible by Reason of Mental Disorder (NCRMD) due to schizophrenia.

Weighing expert psychiatric evidence, the court accepted the defence psychiatrist's opinion that the accused was in a psychotic state at the time of the offence, rendering him incapable of knowing his actions were morally or legally wrong.

Consequently, the accused was found NCRMD on the aggravated assault and weapon possession charges and referred to the Ontario Review Board.

The accused, charged with attempted murder and other offences, brought an application for a stay of proceedings under s. 11(b) of the Charter, arguing unreasonable delay.

The total delay was 42 months and six days, exceeding the 30-month presumptive ceiling.

The court analyzed the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on the scheduling of the bifurcated trial.

The court found that the entire period from the originally scheduled trial date to the anticipated end of the rescheduled trial was attributable to the exceptional circumstance of the pandemic.

After deducting this period, the net delay was 23 months, which fell within the presumptive ceiling.

The application for a stay was dismissed.

The Ontario Court of Justice declared a mistrial in a criminal proceeding against the accused, who had been found guilty of aggravated assault.

The mistrial was initiated by the court prior to sentencing due to a finding of ineffective assistance of counsel.

Defence counsel had failed to call a qualified expert to support the accused's automatism defence, which was based on an epileptic seizure, due to a fundamental misunderstanding of the legal requirement for expert evidence in such defences.

The court found that this error rendered the trial fundamentally unfair and constituted a miscarriage of justice, as the defence could not have succeeded without the required expert testimony.

The accused, Vally Mawanga, was charged with one count of sexual assault.

The complainant, O.T., reported a memory blackout during which the alleged assault occurred, with only fragmented recollections.

The accused admitted to sexual intercourse but testified it was consensual, detailing a progression of interaction from meeting at Caribana to sexual activity at his apartment.

The court found the complainant's recollection unreliable due to inconsistencies and memory gaps, and accepted the accused's internally consistent and plausible account.

The Crown failed to prove lack of consent or lack of capacity to consent beyond a reasonable doubt, leading to an acquittal.

The accused was charged with refusing to provide a breath sample contrary to section 254(5) of the Criminal Code.

Following a traffic stop and failed approved screening device test, the accused was arrested and advised of his right to counsel.

He requested to speak with his lawyer, Daniel Kayfetz.

After waiting only 20 minutes without reaching the lawyer, police contacted duty counsel without consulting the accused.

The accused was placed in a privacy room where police believed he spoke with duty counsel, but the accused testified he did not speak to anyone.

When asked to provide a breath sample, the accused refused, stating he had not spoken to a lawyer.

The court found that police breached the accused's right to counsel under section 10(b) of the Charter by failing to provide a reasonable opportunity to consult with counsel of choice, and excluded the evidence of refusal under section 24(2).

The court also found that even without exclusion, the Crown had not proven an unequivocal refusal beyond a reasonable doubt.

The accused was acquitted.

The accused was charged with operation of a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 mg per 100 ml of blood.

The Crown's case relied on breath test results obtained at a RIDE (Reduce Impaired Driving Everywhere) checkpoint.

The accused challenged the admissibility of the breath evidence on Charter grounds, alleging violations of sections 8 and 10(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The central issue was whether the presence of a media cameraman recording the breath testing procedure and the subsequent broadcast of the footage violated the accused's constitutional rights.

The court found that both a section 10(b) breach (right to counsel in private) and a section 8 breach (unreasonable search and seizure) had occurred.

The breath evidence was excluded under section 24(2) of the Charter, and the accused was acquitted.

The accused was charged with driving while disqualified contrary to s. 259(4) of the Criminal Code and several highway traffic offences following a motor vehicle crash on the 407 at the 400 ramp.

The Crown proved the accused was prohibited from driving at the time of the crash.

The sole issue was identification—whether the Crown proved the accused drove the vehicle and fled the scene.

Two Crown witnesses provided descriptions of the driver, but neither participated in a photo lineup.

The court found the in-dock identification, based on general observations and not tested by a photo lineup, could not be given much weight.

The charge was dismissed as the Crown failed to prove the identity of the driver beyond a reasonable doubt.

The accused was charged with impaired driving and operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol level exceeding 80 mg%.

Following a traffic stop for speeding in a parking lot, the officer observed signs of impairment including erratic driving, slurred speech, and the odour of alcohol.

The accused refused to comply with police directions and demanded a supervisor.

After arrest, the officer failed to read the Approved Instrument demand at the scene, but the breath technician made a timely demand at the station.

The court found the officer had reasonable grounds for the arrest and demand, and that the Crown proved both offences beyond a reasonable doubt despite the accused's argument that the impairment was only slight.

The accused was charged with impaired driving and operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 mg/100 mL following a motor vehicle collision on September 8, 2012.

The Crown withdrew the Over 80 charge after brief evidence.

At trial, the Crown's case rested primarily on the observations of Sergeant Crane, who noted glossy eyes and a scent of alcohol, combined with Intoxilyzer readings.

The court found the evidence insufficient to prove impairment beyond a reasonable doubt, noting the absence of contemporaneous notes regarding key observations, the lack of observable signs of impairment at the scene, and the absence of expert evidence relating the BAC readings to the accused's driving ability.

The charge was dismissed.