Renee Gregor

The defendants, Frank Lee and Jason Cooney, brought a Charter application to exclude two kilograms of crystal methamphetamine found in their car, arguing violations of their s. 9 (unreasonable arrest) and s. 10(b) (right to counsel) Charter rights.

The court found that the police had reasonable and probable grounds for arrest, thus no s. 9 violation.

However, it found s. 10(b) violations for both defendants due to delays in advising and facilitating access to counsel.

Applying the s. 24(2) Grant test, the court determined that the seriousness of the police misconduct (carelessness, not systemic) and the impact on the accused's Charter interests (no evidence flowed from the breach) were outweighed by society's strong interest in adjudicating the case on its merits, given the reliable and significant evidence.

The application to exclude evidence was dismissed.

The offender pleaded guilty to trafficking in over one kilogram of cocaine.

Sentencing was delayed for eight months on compassionate grounds to allow the offender to care for his terminally ill mother.

The Crown sought a four-year sentence, while the defence sought three years based on the principle of restraint and the offender's lack of a recent criminal record.

The court weighed the significant quantity of drugs and commercial nature of the enterprise against the offender's guilty plea, remorse, and strong rehabilitation prospects.

The court imposed a sentence of four years imprisonment, finding it appropriate and below the usual range for such offences.

The accused was charged with firearm and drug offences after police found a loaded handgun and drugs in the center console of a vehicle he was driving.

The vehicle was registered to his mother.

The accused brought Charter applications alleging violations of his rights under ss. 8, 9, and 10(b).

The court found a violation of s. 10(b) due to a 2.5-hour delay in facilitating access to counsel but declined to exclude the evidence under s. 24(2).

At trial, the court acquitted the accused of all charges, finding the Crown failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused knew the contraband was in the vehicle, as it was not in plain view and the Crown did not call the vehicle's owner to testify.

The offender was convicted of manslaughter as a party to a fatal stabbing of a 15-year-old victim during an altercation in a park.

The Crown sought 10 years' imprisonment, while the offender sought 5 years (time served).

The court weighed aggravating factors, including the offender's possession of a knife while on a weapons prohibition, against mitigating factors such as his youth, lack of prior record, and harsh pre-sentence custody conditions during the COVID-19 pandemic.

The court imposed a sentence of 7.5 years' imprisonment, less 55.5 months of enhanced credit for pre-sentence custody, leaving 34.5 months to serve.

The accused, Tyrelle Lee and Steven MacIsaac, were charged with second-degree murder following a fatal stabbing at a park party.

A verbal altercation escalated into a physical melee, during which the deceased was chased to a hill and stabbed once in the chest by Lee.

MacIsaac was present, armed with a knife, and assisted in preventing the deceased from escaping.

The court found that while Lee caused the unlawful death, the Crown failed to prove the requisite intent for murder beyond a reasonable doubt.

Both accused were found guilty of manslaughter, with MacIsaac convicted as a party to the offence for aiding and abetting.

F.B. pleaded guilty to aggravated assault.

The Crown sought 6 months open custody, while the defence sought a non-custodial sentence of 18-24 months probation.

The court considered the Youth Criminal Justice Act (YCJA) sentencing principles, including proportionality and the "last resort" principle for custody.

Aggravating factors included the unprovoked, cowardly nature of the attack, the serious injuries, and the location (school parking lot).

Mitigating factors included the guilty plea, genuine remorse, community service, and efforts towards rehabilitation (work and school).

The court found a custodial sentence was proportionate and necessary, imposing 4 months custody (80 days open custody + 40 days supervision) followed by 18 months probation, along with a weapons prohibition and DNA order.

The accused, Jeremy Hall, charged with first-degree murder, brought an application (KGB application) to admit two police statements from a deceased witness, Tracey Friesz, for their substantive truth.

The defence argued for both procedural and substantive reliability of the statements.

The Crown conceded necessity but disputed reliability, highlighting Friesz's motive to protect her then-boyfriend, her history of dishonesty, and the lack of corroborative evidence.

The court denied the application, finding that procedural reliability was not established due to the absence of an oath and ineffective warnings, and substantive reliability was not met as the statements were not inherently trustworthy, given the declarant's motive to lie and lack of corroboration.

The court concluded that the probative value of the statements was substantially outweighed by their prejudicial effect.

The Crown applied to admit a recanted police statement from a material witness (Carol Ann Eaton) for substantive use in a first-degree murder trial against Jeremy Hall, under the "KGB application" framework.

The defence opposed, arguing lack of procedural and substantive reliability due to alleged coercion and the witness's recantation and claimed memory loss.

The court granted the Crown's application, finding that procedural reliability was established through the sworn, video-recorded statement and the opportunity for meaningful cross-examination of the witness at trial, despite her claims of coercion and memory lapse.

The court rejected the defence's arguments regarding police misconduct and the witness's credibility.

The appellant pleaded guilty to impaired driving causing bodily harm, refusing to provide a breath sample, and failing to stop at the scene of an accident.

Counsel presented a joint submission for 40 days' imprisonment.

The trial judge rejected the joint submission after hearing a victim impact statement and the Crown withdrew its support for the submission.

The trial judge refused to allow the appellant to withdraw his guilty plea and imposed a sentence of 12 months and one day.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the guilty plea was uninformed because the appellant did not know the Crown would withdraw its support for the joint submission, and that allowing the plea to stand would constitute a miscarriage of justice.

Appeal from conviction on five counts of sexual assault under s. 271 of the Criminal Code and one count of sexual exploitation under s. 153.

The appellant, a modeling agent, was convicted of sexual offences against three male models.

The jury was unable to reach a verdict on one count.

The appellant raised multiple grounds of appeal including failure to grant severance, failure to declare a mistrial, directed verdict applications, prior consistent statements, and Crown closing address issues.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds of appeal and upheld the convictions.

The accused, Courtney Salmon, brought a Charter application under s. 8 and s. 24(2) to exclude evidence obtained through various police searches of his residence, a rental vehicle, and electronic devices, alleging unreasonable search and seizure.

The court found the search incident to arrest of the vehicle and the subsequent seizure of an iPhone lawful.

The telewarrant for the residence and the seizure of other electronic devices under s. 489.1 of the Criminal Code were also deemed not to infringe Charter rights.

However, the execution of the devices warrant and assistance order for the iPhone outside their prescribed timeframes constituted an unreasonable search and a breach of Salmon's s. 8 rights.

Despite this breach, the court, applying the s. 24(2) analysis, determined that the evidence extracted from the iPhone should be admissible at trial, classifying the breach as minor and emphasizing society's interest in the proper adjudication of human trafficking cases.

The applicant, Brittany Taylor, sought a stay of proceedings for a charge of possessing fentanyl for the purpose of trafficking, alleging a denial of her right to a trial within a reasonable time under section 11(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The total delay from arrest to expected trial completion was 24 months, which is below the 30-month presumptive ceiling established in R. v. Jordan for Superior Court matters.

The court found no attributable defence delay.

However, it determined that the applicant's efforts to expedite the trial were not sustained and that the case did not markedly exceed its reasonable time requirements, considering its complexity and the institutional delays.

The application for a stay was dismissed.

A young person brought an application to stay charges pursuant to section 24(1) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms for breach of the section 11(b) right to be tried within a reasonable time.

The applicant faced charges arising from offences alleged to have occurred on October 25, 2015, including unlawfully being in a dwelling house, possession of a weapon, possession under $5,000, mischief to property, obstructing a peace officer, failing to comply with recognizance, and possession of MDMA.

The trial was originally scheduled to commence on November 9, 2016, but was delayed due to various procedural issues, including a defective information naming an incorrect accused, defence applications to quash the information and sever charges, and the recusal of the original trial judge.

The applicant argued that the total delay of approximately 18 to 20 months exceeded the presumptive ceiling established in R. v. Jordan and constituted an unreasonable delay.

The Crown argued that exceptional circumstances and defence delay should be deducted from the total delay, bringing it within acceptable limits for a transitional case.

A young person brought an application to stay charges pursuant to section 24(1) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms for breach of section 11(b) rights (right to be tried within a reasonable time).

The applicant faced charges on two informations arising from offences alleged to have occurred on October 25, 2015.

The application was heard following the recusal of the original trial judge.

The court considered the framework established in R. v. Jordan, 2016 SCC 27, and applied it contextually to a case involving a young person and proceedings that commenced before the Jordan decision was released.

The court found that the Crown established exceptional circumstances justifying the delay and that the defence failed to demonstrate a violation of section 11(b) rights.