Jennifer Anne Halajian

The appellants appealed a Director's Order requiring them to develop a work plan to remove underground fuel tanks and delineate soil and groundwater contamination at a former retail fuel outlet they purchased at a municipal tax sale.

The appellants argued the Ministry should have pursued the former owner's estate or the adjoining property owner.

The Ontario Land Tribunal dismissed the appeal, finding the appellants were the current owners and managers of the site, and the uncontradicted expert evidence established that the order was necessary and advisable to protect the environment from petroleum hydrocarbon contaminants.

The appellants brought a motion for a stay of a Director's Order requiring them to remove underground fuel tanks and conduct environmental investigations at a gas bar property.

The Tribunal found that the appellants had already fully complied with the seven items in the Order prior to the hearing.

As the appellants had not suffered irreparable harm and the request was effectively moot, the Tribunal dismissed the motion for a stay.

A second case management conference was held concerning an appeal of a Director's order to remove underground fuel tanks and piping at a gas bar.

The Tribunal directed the appellant to confirm whether it intends to continue with its appeal, given recent developments.

If the appeal proceeds, the Tribunal set dates for a stay motion, the filing of a draft procedural order, and a one-day hearing on the merits.

The appellant appealed a Director's Order requiring the removal of underground fuel tanks and piping at a gas bar, and sought an interim stay of the Order pending a full stay motion.

The Ontario Land Tribunal denied the interim stay because the appellant failed to provide substantive submissions or evidence of irreparable harm, despite being given multiple opportunities.

The Tribunal scheduled the full stay motion for a later date.

F.B. pleaded guilty to aggravated assault.

The Crown sought 6 months open custody, while the defence sought a non-custodial sentence of 18-24 months probation.

The court considered the Youth Criminal Justice Act (YCJA) sentencing principles, including proportionality and the "last resort" principle for custody.

Aggravating factors included the unprovoked, cowardly nature of the attack, the serious injuries, and the location (school parking lot).

Mitigating factors included the guilty plea, genuine remorse, community service, and efforts towards rehabilitation (work and school).

The court found a custodial sentence was proportionate and necessary, imposing 4 months custody (80 days open custody + 40 days supervision) followed by 18 months probation, along with a weapons prohibition and DNA order.

The defendant was charged with nine counts of assault, threatening, and sexual assault against his wife spanning from 2003 to 2013.

The Crown's case relied primarily on the viva voce evidence of the complainant, who described a pattern of physical and sexual abuse during their marriage.

The defendant denied all allegations and testified that he would leave the house during arguments.

The court found the complainant's evidence largely uncorroborated, internally inconsistent, and lacking in credibility.

The defendant's evidence was forthright and not seriously shaken in cross-examination.

The court determined that the Crown failed to prove the allegations beyond a reasonable doubt and acquitted the defendant on all counts.

The offender was sentenced for sexual assault against a victim who was his adopted sister, having joined the family at age 13.

The offence occurred when the victim blacked out after drinking with the offender and woke to find him touching her.

The court considered the familial breach of trust as a significant aggravating factor and the offender's first offender status and guilty plea as mitigating factors.

A joint submission for sentencing was accepted.

The accused was convicted at trial of assault upon his 11-year-old son.

The assault occurred when the accused lost his temper after the child refused to leave a video game to attend a family barbecue, resulting in the accused dragging the child, throwing him against a wall, and holding him by the cheeks and neck.

The Crown sought a four-month jail sentence followed by 18 months of probation, while the defence sought a conditional discharge.

The court imposed a suspended sentence with 18 months of probation, finding that neither custodial nor discharge sentences were appropriate given the aggravating factors balanced against mitigating circumstances.

The accused was charged with assault of his minor son during a family dispute.

The Crown alleged that the accused, in anger, pulled his son to the doorway, threw him towards the door, choked him, and forced him onto a stool by the entrance.

The defence claimed the accused only pulled his son across the floor after reasonable persuasion failed, held his face briefly to get his attention, and that section 43 of the Criminal Code provided a defence for reasonable parental discipline.

The central issue was credibility.

The court found the accused's testimony unreliable and accepted the credible evidence of the three child witnesses.

The court determined that the accused's actions were plainly outside the scope of section 43 and constituted excessive force.

The accused was found guilty.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle with more than 80 mg of alcohol in 100 ml of blood.

A Charter application was brought alleging a breach of the accused's section 10(b) rights (right to counsel).

The accused clearly and unequivocally requested to speak to his lawyer of choice but needed to contact his wife to obtain the lawyer's name and phone number.

The police failed to facilitate this contact and did not adequately explain the role of duty counsel.

The court found a serious breach of the right to counsel and excluded the breath samples pursuant to section 24(2) of the Charter, resulting in the dismissal of the charge.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle with a blood/alcohol concentration greater than 80 mg in 100 ml of blood.

A Charter application was brought regarding alleged breaches of sections 9 and 10(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The court found that the accused had unequivocally requested to speak to duty counsel after being arrested, but the investigating officer failed to implement or facilitate this request.

The officer did not contact duty counsel despite having a realistic opportunity to do so during a 20-minute delay at the scene.

The court found serious breaches of the right to counsel and excluded the breath test results under section 24(2) of the Charter, resulting in the dismissal of the charge.

The Crown sought to admit a videotaped police statement of the complainant, Ashley Briscoe, for its truth under the principled approach to hearsay admissibility established in R. v. K.G.B. and R. v. Khelawon.

The complainant had recanted her allegations during cross-examination after initially adopting her police statement during examination-in-chief.

The court found that both the necessity and reliability criteria were satisfied.

Necessity was established by the complainant's recantation, and reliability was supported by the videotaped nature of the statement, the availability of the declarant for cross-examination, an adequate K.G.B. caution, and corroborative evidence of the alleged injuries.

The accused pleaded guilty to conspiracy to commit the murders of two victims in a planned home invasion arranged by a third party seeking the deaths of her parents.

The accused played a pivotal role by recruiting a shooter, arranging transportation, and driving armed participants to the residence while coordinating entry.

The conspiracy culminated in execution-style shootings that killed one victim and seriously injured the other.

The court emphasized denunciation and deterrence given the calculated nature of the plot and the accused’s extensive firearms record and prior murder conviction.

The accused was sentenced to 18 years’ imprisonment concurrent to an existing life sentence, with no credit for pre-sentence custody and with delayed parole eligibility requiring service of half the sentence.

During a murder trial involving multiple accused, the Crown brought a motion asking the court to reconsider a prior evidentiary ruling admitting a hearsay statement from a former girlfriend of an alleged alternate suspect.

The Crown argued new evidence from two witnesses and digital communications demonstrated a strong motive for the declarant to fabricate the statement.

The court held that the new evidence constituted a material change in circumstances permitting reconsideration of the earlier ruling.

However, applying the relaxed threshold reliability standard applicable to defence evidence, the judge concluded the statement retained some reliability and should remain admissible.

The Crown was permitted to call reply evidence from the new witnesses to challenge the credibility and reliability of the hearsay statement.

During a murder trial involving a home invasion, the accused advanced a third party suspect defence and sought to question the alleged third party about prior criminal charges that had not resulted in convictions.

The court considered whether such evidence was admissible as disposition evidence and whether it could be used to impeach the credibility of the defence’s own witness.

The court held that questioning a witness about prior charges without convictions was improper because it undermines the presumption of innocence and has little probative value.

However, the court found that the underlying facts of certain prior incidents involving firearms and violent activity could be admissible where relevant to the issue of identity and the third party suspect defence.

The court therefore permitted questioning about the underlying facts of most incidents, except a 1996 event involving a knife and pepper spray which lacked sufficient probative value.

In a multi‑accused murder trial, the Crown sought to introduce a PowerPoint presentation prepared by an Ontario Provincial Police analyst summarizing extensive cell phone records already entered in evidence.

Defence counsel objected, arguing the presentation was redundant, prejudicial, and effectively allowed the Crown to present its theory of the case twice.

The court held that the PowerPoint itself was not evidence but an illustrative aid reorganizing evidence already admitted.

Although useful and reliable, its probative value was outweighed by prejudice arising from duplication, significant trial time, and the unfair advantage of allowing the Crown to present its theory through a witness before closing submissions.

The court excluded the presentation from evidence but permitted the Crown to use it in closing argument and ordered the Crown to disclose the presentation to defence counsel in editable PowerPoint format.

During a joint trial for first-degree murder and attempted murder, the jury reported that a juror's spouse had been attending the proceedings and texting the juror information about the case, which was then shared with other jurors.

Two of the accused brought an application for a mistrial.

The court conducted an inquiry, questioning each juror individually, and determined that the information imparted was innocuous, primarily concerning scheduling delays and a witness's appearance.

The court dismissed the mistrial application, finding that the improper contact did not cause actual prejudice or irreparably taint the appearance of justice and fairness.

During a joint murder trial involving five accused, one accused (Mylvaganam) sought to introduce an alternate suspect defence, which included propensity evidence against a co-accused (Carty).

The trial judge prematurely ruled on the admissibility of this propensity evidence without a full evidentiary record or complete submissions.

Carty brought an application for severance, arguing the premature ruling gave rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias.

The court dismissed the application, finding that while the ruling was premature, a fully informed reasonable person would not apprehend bias, as the error could be remedied by conducting a proper and fulsome voir dire on the propensity evidence.

During a multi‑accused murder trial, one accused sought leave to introduce alternate suspect evidence implicating an uncharged third party.

The proposed evidence consisted primarily of hearsay statements allegedly made by that third party to former partners confessing involvement in the offence.

The court considered the admissibility of the statements under the principled exception to the hearsay rule, focusing on necessity and threshold reliability.

The judge concluded that the utterances possessed sufficient reliability and could be admitted, provided the declarant was first called and denied making them in accordance with the K.G.B. procedure.

The court further held that related propensity evidence affecting a co‑accused could be admitted with appropriate limiting instructions.

In a multi‑accused murder trial arising from a home invasion in which one victim was killed and another survived, a co‑accused sought to exclude a text message sent on the day of the offence stating “To after work ok will be game time.” The moving party argued the text was an ambiguous fragment whose meaning could only be determined through speculation and should therefore be excluded under the probative value versus prejudicial effect analysis.

The court distinguished authorities dealing with incomplete overheard utterances, finding the text was a stand‑alone statement capable of interpretation when viewed alongside earlier communications among the accused.

When considered in context with prior text exchanges suggesting planning activity, the message was capable of supporting an inference relevant to the identity and involvement of the accused.

The court held the text possessed probative value that outweighed any prejudicial effect and declined to exclude it.