Jennifer Anne Halajian

F.B. pleaded guilty to aggravated assault.

The Crown sought 6 months open custody, while the defence sought a non-custodial sentence of 18-24 months probation.

The court considered the Youth Criminal Justice Act (YCJA) sentencing principles, including proportionality and the "last resort" principle for custody.

Aggravating factors included the unprovoked, cowardly nature of the attack, the serious injuries, and the location (school parking lot).

Mitigating factors included the guilty plea, genuine remorse, community service, and efforts towards rehabilitation (work and school).

The court found a custodial sentence was proportionate and necessary, imposing 4 months custody (80 days open custody + 40 days supervision) followed by 18 months probation, along with a weapons prohibition and DNA order.

The defendant was charged with nine counts of assault, threatening, and sexual assault against his wife spanning from 2003 to 2013.

The Crown's case relied primarily on the viva voce evidence of the complainant, who described a pattern of physical and sexual abuse during their marriage.

The defendant denied all allegations and testified that he would leave the house during arguments.

The court found the complainant's evidence largely uncorroborated, internally inconsistent, and lacking in credibility.

The defendant's evidence was forthright and not seriously shaken in cross-examination.

The court determined that the Crown failed to prove the allegations beyond a reasonable doubt and acquitted the defendant on all counts.

The offender was sentenced for sexual assault against a victim who was his adopted sister, having joined the family at age 13.

The offence occurred when the victim blacked out after drinking with the offender and woke to find him touching her.

The court considered the familial breach of trust as a significant aggravating factor and the offender's first offender status and guilty plea as mitigating factors.

A joint submission for sentencing was accepted.

The accused was convicted at trial of assault upon his 11-year-old son.

The assault occurred when the accused lost his temper after the child refused to leave a video game to attend a family barbecue, resulting in the accused dragging the child, throwing him against a wall, and holding him by the cheeks and neck.

The Crown sought a four-month jail sentence followed by 18 months of probation, while the defence sought a conditional discharge.

The court imposed a suspended sentence with 18 months of probation, finding that neither custodial nor discharge sentences were appropriate given the aggravating factors balanced against mitigating circumstances.

The accused was charged with assault of his minor son during a family dispute.

The Crown alleged that the accused, in anger, pulled his son to the doorway, threw him towards the door, choked him, and forced him onto a stool by the entrance.

The defence claimed the accused only pulled his son across the floor after reasonable persuasion failed, held his face briefly to get his attention, and that section 43 of the Criminal Code provided a defence for reasonable parental discipline.

The central issue was credibility.

The court found the accused's testimony unreliable and accepted the credible evidence of the three child witnesses.

The court determined that the accused's actions were plainly outside the scope of section 43 and constituted excessive force.

The accused was found guilty.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle with more than 80 mg of alcohol in 100 ml of blood.

A Charter application was brought alleging a breach of the accused's section 10(b) rights (right to counsel).

The accused clearly and unequivocally requested to speak to his lawyer of choice but needed to contact his wife to obtain the lawyer's name and phone number.

The police failed to facilitate this contact and did not adequately explain the role of duty counsel.

The court found a serious breach of the right to counsel and excluded the breath samples pursuant to section 24(2) of the Charter, resulting in the dismissal of the charge.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle with a blood/alcohol concentration greater than 80 mg in 100 ml of blood.

A Charter application was brought regarding alleged breaches of sections 9 and 10(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The court found that the accused had unequivocally requested to speak to duty counsel after being arrested, but the investigating officer failed to implement or facilitate this request.

The officer did not contact duty counsel despite having a realistic opportunity to do so during a 20-minute delay at the scene.

The court found serious breaches of the right to counsel and excluded the breath test results under section 24(2) of the Charter, resulting in the dismissal of the charge.

The Crown sought to admit a videotaped police statement of the complainant, Ashley Briscoe, for its truth under the principled approach to hearsay admissibility established in R. v. K.G.B. and R. v. Khelawon.

The complainant had recanted her allegations during cross-examination after initially adopting her police statement during examination-in-chief.

The court found that both the necessity and reliability criteria were satisfied.

Necessity was established by the complainant's recantation, and reliability was supported by the videotaped nature of the statement, the availability of the declarant for cross-examination, an adequate K.G.B. caution, and corroborative evidence of the alleged injuries.