Her Majesty the Queen v. Jennifer Pan et al.

COURT FILE NO.: 11-09099G

DATE: 20140721

ONTARIO

SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE

BETWEEN:

HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN

– and –

Jennifer Pan, David Mylvaganam, Eric Shawn Carty, Daniel Chi-Kwong Wong and Lenford Roy Crawford

Defendants

COUNSEL:

Rob Scott, Jennifer Halajian and Michelle Rumble for the Crown

Paul Cooper and Holly Chapman for Jennifer Pan

Peter Bawden for David Mylvaganam

Edward Sapiano for Eric Shawn Carty

Lawrence Cohen and Erin Dunsmore for Daniel Chi-Kwong Wong

Darren Sederoff and Brian Micner for Lenford Roy Crawford

HEARD: July 15, 2014

RULING ON MISTRIAL APPLICATIONS

BOSWELL J.

[1] In this trial, five accused jointly face one count of first degree murder and one count of attempted murder. The trial commenced in February 2014 with jury selection, which took approximately four weeks to complete. The evidentiary portion of the trial commenced March 19, 2014. The Crown’s case is days away from completion.

[2] Two of the five accused, Ms. Pan and Mr. Carty, seek a mistrial.

[3] The mistrial application arises as a result of a peculiar turn of events involving the jury.

The Jury Letter

[4] On Friday July 11, 2014 evidence was heard only until about noon, at which point the jury was excused for the weekend. They nevertheless remained in their jury room for another hour. Just after 1:00 p.m. they provided a note to the court, the precise content of which is set out in Appendix “A”. The gist of the letter is that the spouse of one of the jurors has been regularly attending the court proceedings and has provided the juror, by text messages, information about the case that was shared with some of the other jurors.

The Inquiry

[5] In light of the letter, an inquiry was conducted. It must be noted that Mr. Cooper urged the court to forego an inquiry and immediately declare a mistrial. His submission was that the conduct of the juror’s spouse and/or the juror may be criminal in nature. He argued that such criminal conduct fundamentally compromised the ability of the jury to do its job: to decide the case fairly and impartially and to follow the court’s instructions in discharging its duty. Moreover, he expressed the concern that any inquiry conducted by the court might impede a fulsome criminal investigation.

[6] I was not persuaded that a mistrial should be declared in the absence of an inquiry. In my view, there was insufficient information contained in the jury’s note on which to consider the request for a mistrial.

[7] Accordingly, after consultation with counsel, I settled on the following process:

(a) The jury was brought in and told, in general terms, about the process to be followed;

(b) The jurors were then excused and asked to return to the court, one by one, starting with the juror whose spouse sent the texts. As it happened, that was juror number four. Thereafter the jurors were questioned in sequential order, beginning with juror number one;

(c) Juror number four was asked about how long his spouse had been attending the trial. He was asked to provide particulars about the information his wife had imparted to him. I then asked him if any of the information he received affected his views of any of the accused, counsel or the trial process generally. Finally, he was asked whether he was still able to decide the case impartially and solely on the basis of the evidence presented in court and on my legal instructions at the end of the trial;

(d) All other jurors were asked to advise what information they had received through the texts that juror four’s wife had sent him. They too were asked if the information they heard affected their views in any way about any of the accused, counsel, or the trial process itself. Each was asked to confirm that he or she could still decide the case impartially, and solely on the evidence heard at trial and my legal instructions at the end of the trial; and,

(e) To avoid any discussion amongst jurors about the questions being asked of them, after each juror was questioned in open court he or she was excused to a second jury room, so that those jurors who had been questioned were segregated from those who had not yet been questioned.

The Information

[8] Juror number four described the information he had received from his wife. He said none of it related to proceedings that took place in the courtroom in the absence of the jury. He described the information in relatively minimal terms, saying it arose essentially from things going on in the hallway outside the courtroom. He recalled that his wife advised him one day that an upcoming witness had large breasts. On another occasion, that the court was going to be somewhat delayed because a witness was late getting to court. And on another, that there was a delay because counsel was late getting back to the courtroom.

[9] There were some minor variations in the descriptions provided by the balance of the jurors as to what information each had heard.

[10] Juror one heard that court was late starting one time because a lawyer was running behind. She also heard that court started late on another occasion because Mr. Carty did not get his sandwich.

[11] Juror two could only recall hearing that court was late starting one day because a witness arrived late.

[12] Juror three heard that court was going to be delayed in starting one day because a witness was running late. He also heard, on another occasion, that Mr. Carty had not received the kind of sandwich he wanted.

[13] Juror five did not recall hearing anything.

[14] Juror six could only recall hearing about reasons why court was delayed in commencing. On one occasion it was because a witness was late. On another it was a lawyer running behind.

[15] Juror seven recalled hearing a physical description about a witness and also heard that court was delayed one day because a witness was running late.

[16] Jurors eight, nine and twelve could only recall hearing about a witness being late one day.

[17] Jurors ten and eleven recalled hearing information that the next witness one day was going to be Hana Omar.

Factual Findings

[18] The evidentiary record on the mistrial application is modest. It consists of the jury letter and the answers given by each juror to the questions posed by the court.

[19] The jurors were not sworn on the inquiry. They were not asked to take an oath or affirmation before answering the court’s questions for three principal reasons:

(a) Each juror, upon selection, swore an oath or solemnly affirmed as follows:

To well and truly try and true deliverance make between our Sovereign Lady the Queen and the accused at the bar, whom you shall have in charge and true verdict give according to the evidence.

(b) Once sworn in, jurors are effectively judges of this court until the completion of the trial. In light of their oath or affirmation and their role as judges of the facts, their integrity ought to be presumed;

(c) I was in any event satisfied that through questioning all twelve jurors individually, a fulsome account of the information improperly imparted to them would be provided.

[20] A central theme of Mr. Cooper’s submissions, which I will outline more fully below, involved a challenge to the integrity and credibility of the jurors. In his submission, none of the answers provided by the jurors could be considered trustworthy because:

(a) They were not given under oath;

(b) The jurors did not come forward immediately when they learned of the information improperly sent by juror four’s wife, thereby breaking their oaths to the court and undermining the trust invested in them;

(c) Their recollections of what information was imparted appeared limited, and as such is suspicious; and

(d) With juror four in particular, his answers were untrustworthy and, in Mr. Cooper’s submission, appeared to be “gilding the lily”. In particular, he said he only heard information from the hallway. Later jurors indicated, however, that there had been some information about Mr. Carty not getting a sandwich he wanted, which could only have come from the courtroom; and,

(e) The conduct of juror four was, moreover, criminal in nature.

[21] I am unable to agree with Mr. Cooper’s submissions about the credibility of the information provided by the jurors during the court’s brief inquiry. With all due respect to his position, I wish to make it clear that I completely distance myself from those submissions.

[22] The integrity and impartiality of the jurors ought to be presumed, absent cogent evidence to the contrary. That cogent evidence is entirely lacking in this instance.

[23] I have no reason to question the completeness or trustworthiness of the information provided to the court by the jurors. In my view, the jurors selected by counsel to try this action have proven to be conscientious and attentive at all times in what has been a long and difficult trial. They have been patient. They have sacrificed. They have been supportive. The trial is likely to take three months longer than at first indicated. They have not complained. This texting incident aside, their conduct has been exemplary.

[24] Although there were minor differences between their accounts of the information received through texts from the spouse of juror four, the jurors’ responses to the court’s questions were by and large consistent. Moreover, there is little reason to be suspicious in circumstances where the jury self-reported this incident. Mr. Cooper suggested that there was collusion amongst the jurors to frustrate the court’s inquiry. But if that were so, why would the jury have bothered to report their concerns in the first place?

[25] I am confident that, through the process of inquiry utilized in this instance, the court has a reasonable, if not thorough, appreciation of what information was imparted by juror four’s spouse and disseminated through the jury ranks.

[26] I trust the information provided by the jurors without hesitation and find as a fact that the information passed along by the spouse of juror four consisted of the following:

(a) A comment about the size of a witness’s breasts;

(b) An indication that the court was delayed on one occasion because of the late arrival of a witness;

(c) An indication that the court was delayed on another occasion because of the late arrival of one of the lawyers;

(d) An indication that the court was delayed on a further occasion because Mr. Carty did not receive a sandwich; and,

(e) An indication that an upcoming witness was going to be Hana Omar.

[27] I agree that the comment about Mr. Carty and his sandwich infers that he is in custody.

The Parties’ Positions

[28] Mr. Carty requests a mistrial – at least in terms of the case against him - on the basis that his right to a fair trial has been irremediably impaired. Mr. Sapiano’s submissions were concisely set out as follows:

(a) The information imparted about “the sandwich” creates significant prejudice to him in two respects:

(i) It impugns his character generally by suggesting that he would impede the function of the court over a sandwich; and,

(ii) It clearly implies he is in custody;

(b) The wife of juror four has sat through voir dires that have addressed, at times, highly prejudicial issues, most notably propensity evidence involving Mr. Carty. At one point during a voir dire, Mr. Bawden described Mr. Carty as a “psychopath”. In light of what has happened, we can never have faith that additional, substantially prejudicial information has not been passed between spouses.

[29] Ms. Pan requests a mistrial of the entire joint trial. Mr. Cooper relied on the submissions he made before the jury inquiry, but amplified on them.

[30] Central to Mr. Cooper’s submissions is the principle so famously set out by Lord Chief Justice Hewart in R. v Sussex Justices, Ex parte McCarthy, [1924] 1 K.B. 256, [1923] All E.R. Rep. 233, that “it is not merely of some importance but is of fundamental importance that justice should not only be done, but should manifestly and undoubtedly be seen to be done.”

[31] In Mr. Cooper’s submission, it is no longer possible for justice to be seen to be done in this case because of the improper contact that the spouse of juror four has had with the jury. The appearance of impropriety is so strong that it entirely undermines the independence and impartiality that society is entitled to expect from a jury. Apart from the strong appearance of impropriety, Mr. Cooper addressed the following issues, all of which point in his view, to an inevitable mistrial:

(a) There is prejudice to Mr. Carty given the mention of the sandwich issue. It implies that Mr. Carty is in custody and, by extension, that all of the accused are in custody;

(b) A crime – obstruction of justice – has been committed by the spouse of juror four. The juror participated in the commission of the offence. A murder trial cannot be presided over by a party to a criminal act;

(c) The jury in this case will be required to carefully follow a significant number of limiting instructions to be provided by the court. There can be no confidence that the court’s instructions are likely to be followed;

(d) The court’s inquiry has failed to get at the truth of what happened, given the inability of jurors to remember what they heard through the improper contact; and,

(e) Right thinking members of the public would be shocked by what happened here. The only way to maintain public confidence is to declare a mistrial and start over.

[32] The Crown opposed the granting of any mistrial.

[33] Mr. Crawford and Mr. Wong took no position.

[34] Mr. Bawden supported the mistrial application of Mr. Carty, but for reasons unconnected to the issue presently before the court.[^1]

The Legal Framework

[35] This is an instance of a juror improperly receiving information about the trial from a source outside of the courtroom and sharing it with other members of the jury. Where something like this happens, concerns arise about whether the jury can remain impartial and whether the accused can still receive a fair trial. A fair trial conducted before an independent and impartial tribunal is, of course, a constitutional imperative: Charter of Rights and Freedoms, s. 11(d).

[36] Whether a trial proceeds by a judge alone, or before a jury, there is a presumption that the trier of fact is impartial: R. v. Burke, 2002 SCC 55, para. 65. Facts and circumstances, as they develop during a trial, can, at times, rebut the presumption of independence and impartiality.

[37] Where there are allegations, as there are here, of improper contact with the jury during the course of a trial, the court must conduct a sufficient inquiry to assess whether the contact has undermined the independence and/or impartiality of the jury giving rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias, or has otherwise impaired or compromised trial fairness: R. v. Snow, 2004 CanLII 34547 (ON CA), [2004] O.J. No. 4309 (C.A.). The goal of the inquiry is to deal with the “taint of suspicion of prejudice to the fair trial of the accused.” (Snow, para. 36).

[38] I have described the inquiry that was conducted in this instance and the factual findings that resulted from that inquiry. Counsel are not ad idem about what turns on those findings of fact.

[39] As the Court of Appeal described in R. v. Snow, as above at paras. 39-40, the case law has divided problems arising from inappropriate jury contact into two broad categories:

(a) Conduct that is so serious that it destroys the appearance of justice and fairness. The focus here is on the integrity of the administration of justice. In such circumstances, it is unnecessary to inquire into whether the accused suffered actual prejudice; and,

(b) Contact that is inappropriate, but not so egregious as to undermine the appearance of trial fairness, absent a demonstration of actual prejudice suffered by the accused.

[40] The remedy sought here is a mistrial. The law is well settled that a mistrial should only be declared in the clearest of cases. The reasons supporting such a rule are obvious. A “clearest case” rule dictates that a mistrial should only be declared where an extinction level event has occurred: a turn of events so catastrophic to the process that it cannot be recovered from; it cannot be cured by any lesser, remedial measure. In the context of an allegation of interference with the jury, the proper question to be asked is whether it is likely that the information imparted to the jury could have affected the jury to the point that the entire trial was compromised and no other remedy will do, short of a new trial: see R. v. Pires; R. v. Lising, 2004 BCCA 33, [2004] B.C.J. No. 83 (B.C.C.A.), affirmed (2005), 2005 SCC 66, 201 C.C.C.(3d) 449, 259 D.L.R. (4^th) 441 (S.C.C.).

[41] Looked at through the lens of the Court of Appeal’s decision in R. v. Snow, in cases of jury interference a mistrial will be an appropriate, indeed inevitable remedy, where,:

(a) The appearance of justice and fairness has been destroyed by the improper interference with the jury; or,

(b) The improper interference, though not sufficient to undermine the appearance of justice and fairness, nevertheless is serious and causes actual prejudice to an accused person that cannot be remedied in any other manner.

[42] For the reasons that follow, I am not satisfied that a mistrial is called for in the circumstances of this case. Indeed, I am of the view that no remedial action is called for, apart from reminding the jury about the importance of not discussing the case with any outside source.

Analysis

[43] Improper contact with a jury member should always be condemned. Even though I do not consider the conduct of juror four’s spouse in this instance to have been egregious, it is troublesome nonetheless and it should not have happened.

[44] At the outset of this trial, I instructed the jurors not to discuss this case with anyone outside of their fellow jurors when all of them were together in their jury room. I have faith that all of the jurors have followed this instruction, including juror four. Indeed, he indicated that the reason his spouse has been attending the trial is because he has refused to provide her with any information about it.

[45] It would appear to me that in a few discrete moments of exuberance, the impugned spouse made some limited comments to her husband that she ought not to have made. She did not, however, advise him of any of the discussions that took place inside of the courtroom in the absence of the jury. Had she passed along the discussions that took place between counsel and the court on some of the more sensitive applications that have been brought in this case - for instance those relating to propensity evidence and severance – the problem would have been far more significant.

[46] Judges, lawyers and staff do their very best to insulate jurors from outside information about the case beginning with jury selection. Safeguards have been put in place in this case, as in virtually all others, to ensure jurors’ independence and impartiality. The jury panel, for instance, was vetted for issues that might affect jurors’ impartiality. In addition, in this case there was a twofold challenge for cause, intended to identify prospective jurors who were not impartial due to their prejudicial beliefs and/or their exposure to the case through the media. Once the jury was selected, they were provided with preliminary instructions that included a direction that they were not to discuss the case with anyone apart from their fellow jurors when they are all together. They were told that if anyone attempted to speak to them about the case they were to advise the person that they are not able to speak about it. Throughout the trial the jury has been excluded from the courtroom when applications have been heard about the admissibility of evidence, in order to ensure that jurors decide the case based solely on admissible evidence adduced during the trial process.

[47] One can never been entirely sure, of course, that jurors do not come into contact with information about the case from outside of the courtroom. This is particularly true in the internet age. In Canada we do not normally sequester jurors until deliberations begin. That means that during the trial, every evening and on weekends, jurors go back to their homes, their families, their jobs, their friends and their communities, on an unsupervised basis. This is a long case. It is a case that has received significant media coverage. It would be naïve to believe that non-sequestered jurors in these circumstances will be completely insulated from any information about this case not strictly introduced in the courtroom. We must rely on the jurors to maintain their oaths of impartiality and their promise to return a just and true verdict based on the evidence adduced during the trial.

[48] Despite the safeguards utilized in this case, certain information came to the attention of the jurors about the case other than from evidence introduced inside the courtroom. The jurors have discussed the situation at some length and have concluded that the information they heard is immaterial. The fact that they self-reported this information is significant. It signals that they are mindful of the instructions that I gave to them not to discuss the case with anyone and to bring to my attention any attempts on the part of any non-juror to discuss the case with them. They have demonstrated that they are alive to the need to remain independent and impartial and they have come to the conclusion that they are able to continue to do the job they swore or affirmed that they would do. I respect their approach and their views, but of course, it is the court that must be satisfied about the impact of the improper contact.

[49] In assessing the impact of the improper contact with the jury, I must have regard to the two categories of concerns identified in R. v. Snow, as above. These same sets of concerns were the subject of comment by Labrosse J.A. in R. v. Cameron, 1991 CanLII 7182 (ON CA), [1991] O.J. No. 415 (C.A.) where he observed, at para. 22:

…If…the offensive conduct is not such as to taint the administration of justice, then the concern is properly directed to whether actual prejudice was occasioned to the accused. Where the events in question are so serious as to affect the administration of justice…then the focus turns upon the justice system and the miscarriage of justice occurs whenever the confidence of the public in the system is shaken; that confidence is equally shaken by the appearance as by the fact of an unfair trial.

[50] I will start my analysis with the issue of actual prejudice, given that I view it as the easier of the two issues to contend with in this instance.

[51] In terms of Ms. Pan, I find that there has been no actual prejudice to her occasioned by the improper contact with the jury in issue.

[52] Mr. Carty has suffered some actual prejudice, but I consider it to be quite modest. It certainly is not of a character that supports a mistrial.

[53] Mr. Sapiano correctly identified the prejudice accruing to Mr. Carty. First, there is the concern that the sandwich comment reflects poorly on Mr. Carty’s attitude. Such an inference is somewhat speculative. At any rate, each juror was asked whether the information s/he had heard through juror four affected his or her views, in any way, of any of the accused, counsel or the trial process generally. Each confirmed that their views of the accused had not been affected in any way. Each confirmed that they remained able to consider this case impartially and render a verdict based solely on the evidence heard at trial and my instructions on the law to be provided at the end of the case. I am satisfied, on the basis of the jurors’ responses, that the sandwich comment has not had any material impact on the jurors’ views of Mr. Carty.

[54] The second aspect of prejudice caused to Mr. Carty also relates to the sandwich comment. A reasonable inference from the comment is that Mr. Carty is in custody. It is not an inevitable inference, but it is a certainly an available one. Even so, it does not result, in my view, in significant prejudice to Mr. Carty. I refer to the Court of Appeal’s decision in R. v. Roy, [2004] O.J. No 3940 which was a case where at least one juror had a brief opportunity to view the accused in shackles. Justice Simmons, for a unanimous court, held, at para. 80, that “it would be fanciful to suggest that the jury would disregard clear instructions concerning the presumption of innocence based on nothing more than a momentary opportunity of viewing an accused person in shackles”. In my view, any prejudice caused by the sandwich comment is certainly no more prejudicial than the circumstances in R. v. Roy. Any minimal prejudice can be cured by the court’s final instruction on the presumption of innocence. Mr. Sapiano did not ask for any midtrial instruction as a result of this issue.

[55] I turn now to the more difficult issue, which is whether the appearance of justice and fairness has been destroyed by the improper transmission of trial-related information from the spouse of juror four to him and to the jury at large.

[56] Mr. Cooper referred me to the R. v. Cameron decision, as above, which was an appeal of a conviction for second degree murder. He asserted that the circumstances in the instant case are more egregious than those in Cameron. The Court of Appeal ordered a new trial in Cameron. He urges me to effectively do the same by declaring a mistrial now.

[57] The salient facts of Cameron were set out by Labrosse J.A. at paras. 6-8 of the decision:

6 The trial judge had completed his charge to the jury at approximately 1:00 p.m. Two constables were duly sworn as court constables. The jury was sequestered and commenced its deliberations.

7 At approximately 6:30 p.m., unknown to the trial judge or to counsel, the jury had dinner in a private dining room of a local restaurant. Twenty-two persons were present at the dinner. In addition to the 12 jurors and the two sworn court constables, there were three additional unsworn court constables, the court registrar, the court reporter, a sheriff's deputy, a sheriff's officer in charge of prisoner control and a uniformed city police constable who was a "close" first cousin of the victim in the murder case. They all sat at a large table except the last two, who sat at a small table for two, approximately three feet away from the large table.

8 The jury returned to the court house at approximately 8:00 p.m. and continued deliberations until 10:00 p.m., at which time they were taken to a hotel for the night. No additional court constables were sworn, but two unsworn court constables were enlisted to look after the jury. Once the jurors were in their rooms, their keys were taken away. An unsworn court constable, who had been at dinner, invited a juror who had expressed a desire to have a few drinks, to accompany him to the hotel bar. The court constable obtained a key and unlocked the juror's room. They proceeded to the bar where each had two drinks. The juror then was returned to his room.

[58] With respect to Mr. Cooper, I take a different view of the relative seriousness of the facts of Cameron. There, two court officers were sworn to keep the jury sequestered and to ensure that no one had contact with the jurors. Notwithstanding that oath, they permitted eight additional persons to have close contact with the jury, including a police officer whose cousin was the victim of the alleged offence under consideration by the jury. Those circumstances were appalling and clearly demanded that the matter be retried.

[59] Each case must be considered contextually, on its own facts. Here, none of the information imparted was of an acutely serious nature. I am satisfied that on the basis of the minimal information imparted and on the confirmation by each juror that s/he remains able to decide the case impartially, the jurors remain able to determine this case independently, impartially, justly and fairly. So, the sole question remaining is whether the appearance of justice and fairness has been undermined to such an extent that the only reasonable course of action is to declare a mistrial. I find that it has not.

[60] A reasonable person viewing this case would appreciate that it has been a long trial. Jurors are human beings. They interact with other human beings, including their friends and family. It is inevitable that someone’s spouse is going to ask him or her how their day went, across the dinner table. A reasonable person would not expect that the answer, each day for 6, 7 or 8 months is going to be “I’m not allowed to talk about it”. The answer might instead be, “boring”, “long”, “same old same old”, “interesting”, “fascinating”, “a lot of stops and starts”. There are many innocuous comments that jurors might, and no doubt do, say to the people in their lives that do not, in spirit at least, contravene my instruction not to discuss the case with anyone. No reasonable person would view the appearance of justice and fairness irreparably tainted by virtue of such innocuous comments.

[61] That said, in the absence of juror sequestration, we do have to rely on jurors to self-regulate. The faith that they are not discussing the case with friends, family or acquaintances, or being subject to improper interference or persuasion, rests on a relatively thin crust. That thin crust was shattered by the facts and circumstances in R. v. Cameron. Though dented, it remains intact in this instance.

[62] I am satisfied that the information imparted by the spouse of juror four is sufficiently innocuous that it has not irreparably tainted the appearance of justice and fairness in this case. It does send up a red flag. It does signal that the court and the jurors themselves must be more vigilant to prevent any further occurrences of a similar nature. But I do not believe that right-thinking members of the public would be shocked by this turn of events. I do not believe one could reasonably conclude that the appearance of justice and fairness has been shattered. In this case we are fortunate to have a very hard-working, conscientious, and committed jury; one committed to ensuring that the court’s instructions are followed; one committed to making fair, independent and impartial decisions. The conduct of juror four’s spouse – and of juror four himself – must be viewed in the larger context; in the context of a jury that has behaved in an exemplary fashion throughout the case. This isn’t about giving them a second chance. This is about recognizing that they – all twelve – remain committed to justice and fairness. I believe right-thinking, informed members of the public would be, in the circumstances, satisfied that the jury remains independent and impartial. I believe they would be shocked if a mistrial were granted in the circumstances, necessitating a re-start to the entire case.

[63] In the result, the applications for a mistrial are dismissed.

Boswell J.

Released: July 21, 2014

APPENDIX “A”

Content of Jury Letter dated July 11, 2014

We have been aware that a spouse of one of our jurors has been attending the proceedings on a regular basis.

It has recently come to our attention that a limited amount of text messages were received by the juror, some of which were shared with individuals amongst the jury.

We have discussed the issue in great detail and feel that the information shared is immaterial to the proceedings.

As part of our discussion, we felt an obligation to bring this to your attention.

[^1]: I am not going to expand on Mr. Bawden’s submissions because they were said somewhat tongue-in-cheek. They relate to a prior motion about propensity evidence Mr. Bawden sought to introduce against Mr. Carty and a corresponding application brought by Mr. Carty for severance.